Eastman et al v. Coffeyville Resources Refining & Marketing, LLC

Filing 71

NUNC PRO TUNC MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. This corrected order has an unnecessary word omitted on page 7. Signed by District Judge Monti L. Belot on 8/5/2013. (aa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

BENJAMIN M. EASTMAN and
MARCITA K. EASTMAN,
as Trustees of the
Eastman Family 1999 Revocable
Trust,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COFFEYVILLE RESOURCES REFINING
& MARKETING, LLC,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION
No. 10-1216-MLB

NUNC PRO TUNC MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages.
57).

(Doc.

The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision.

(Docs. 58, 62, 65).

Defendant’s motion is denied for the reasons

herein.
I.

Facts
The relevant and material facts of this case are not in dispute.

The Coffeyville Resources refinery, located adjacent to the Verdigris
River in Coffeyville, Kansas, processes crude oil and its constituents
on a continuous basis.

Plaintiffs are trustees of property located

near Coffeyville, Kansas, in close proximity to the Verdigris River,
approximately

two

or

more

miles

downstream

of

the

Coffeyville

Resources refinery.
On July 1, 2007, an unprecedented 100 year flood of the Verdigris
River necessitated an emergency shutdown of the Coffeyville Resources
refinery. During the emergency shutdown, approximately 80,000 gallons

(over 1900 barrels) of crude oil, 5,000 gallons of diesel oil, and
4,000 gallons of crude oil fractions were accidentally released into
the flood waters. The crude oil release was terminated within an hour
or two of its inception.
Defendant mobilized clean-up crews, while monitored by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), to clean up oil on public and
private property.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on June 30, 2010,

alleging that oil carried by the flood waters impacted their pecan
grove and that defendant has not cleaned up the oil.

Plaintiffs

allege that oil remains on their property and continues to impact
their annual pecan harvests.
Plaintiffs bring a statutory claim pursuant to K.S.A. 65–6203.
In addition to actual damages, plaintiffs seek punitive damages.

In

the proposed pretrial order, plaintiffs assert that defendant should
have known that predicted severe flooding would cause serious damage
to

downstream

neighbors

and

defendant’s

employees

wantonly

and

recklessly1 failed to close a valve on one of the oil storage tanks
which

allowed

crude

oil,

diesel

and

other

pollutants

to

flow

downstream, damaging plaintiff’s property.
Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ punitive
damages claim on the basis that the statute does not allow punitive
damages.2
1

K.S.A. 60-3701(c) does not authorize an award of punitive
damages based on reckless conduct.
Wanton conduct is defined in
PIK4th Civil 103.03.
2

In Vowell, et. al v. Coffeyville Resources Refining and
Marketing, LLC, 2011 WL 148239 (D. Kan.), Judge Melgren noted that
defendant had not raised this discrete issue and declined to address
it.
(Id., fn 52).
Judge Melgren denied summary judgment on
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II.

Summary Judgment Standard
The rules applicable to the resolution of this case, now at the

summary judgment stage, are well-known and are only briefly outlined
here.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) directs the entry of

summary judgment in favor of a party who "show[s] that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

An issue is “genuine” if sufficient evidence exists so that a rational
trier of fact could resolve the issue either way and an issue is
“material” if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper
disposition of the claim.

Adamson v. Multi Community Diversified

Svcs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008).

When confronted

with a fully briefed motion for summary judgment, the court must
ultimately determine "whether there is the need for a trial–whether,
in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party."
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).
judgment.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

If so, the court cannot grant summary

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).

III. Analysis
The statute at issue in this case states as follows:
It shall be the duty of any person responsible for an
accidental release or discharge of materials detrimental to
the quality of the waters or soil of the state to: (1)
Compensate the owner of the property where the release or
discharge occurred for actual damages incurred as the
result of the release or discharge, or as the result of
corrective action taken or access to take corrective
plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim, which doubtlessly explains why
defendant has not filed a similar motion in this case.
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action, if the release or discharge occurred without any
contribution to the contamination and without any causal
connection to the release or discharge by any action of the
owner or owner-permitted occupant of the property; and (2)
comply with all existing rules and regulations and
requirements of the secretary of health and environment
designed to ensure the prompt correction of any such
release or discharge for the protection of the public
health and environment.
K.S.A. 65–6203(a)(emphasis supplied).
In Eastman v. Coffeyville Resources Refining & Marketing LLC, 295
Kan. 470, 476-477 (Kan. 2012)3, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
“clear and unambiguous language of K.S.A. 65–6203(a)(1) provides that
any person responsible for the accidental release or discharge of
materials detrimental to the quality of the waters or soil of the
state has a ‘duty’ to ‘[c]ompensate the owner of the property where
the release or discharge occurred for actual damages incurred as the
result of the release or discharge, or as the result of corrective
action taken or access to take corrective action.’”
however,

the

court

was

not

confronted

with

the

In Eastman,
issue

of

the

availability of punitive damages.
In Kansas, punitive damages are awarded to punish the
wrongdoer for his malicious, vindictive, or willful and
wanton invasion of another's rights, with the ultimate
purpose being to restrain and deter others from the
commission of similar wrongs. A jury may consider an award
of punitive damages if any reasonable view of the evidence
would support such an award. To constitute wantonness, the
acts complained of must show not simply lack of due care,
but that the actor must be deemed to have realized the
imminence of injury to others from his acts and to have
3

The Kansas Supreme Court decision in Eastman was the result of
this court’s certification of the following two questions: “(1)
whether K.S.A. 65–6203 creates absolute liability, and (2) which
statute of limitations, if any, applies to K.S.A. 65–6203?” 295 Kan.
at 472.
The answers to these questions had and continue to have
implications in this case. They are not, however, relevant to the
issue that is presently before the court.
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refrained from taking steps to prevent the injury because
indifferent to whether it occurred or not.
Folks v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 243 Kan. 57, Syl. ¶ 6 (1988),
overruled on other grounds by York v. InTrust Bank, 265 Kan. 271, 962
P.2d 405 (1998).
Defendant contends that this general rule regarding punitive
damages is not applicable in actions brought pursuant to a statute
which does not explicitly provide for punitive damages, citing Smith
v. Printup, 254 Kan. 315 (1993).

In Smith, the Kansas Supreme Court

was faced with the question of whether punitive damages were available
in a wrongful death action.

In deciding the issue, the court looked

at the statute in question which provided as follows:
Damages may be recovered for, but are not limited to:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
and
(6)

Mental anguish, suffering or bereavement;
loss of society, companionship, comfort or protection;
loss of marital care, attention, advice or counsel;
loss of filial care or attention;
loss of parental care, training, guidance or education;
reasonable funeral expenses for the deceased.

K.S.A. 60-1904(a).

In addition, the court noted that K.S.A. 60-1903

requires the jury to itemize its verdict in wrongful death actions to
reflect the amount awarded for “nonpecuniary damages, expenses for the
care of the deceased caused by the injury, and other pecuniary
damages.”

Smith, 254 Kan. at 334.

for punitive damages.”

The statute “makes no provision

Id.

After reviewing authority from Kansas and other jurisdictions,
the court determined that punitive damages were not allowed in a
wrongful death action because the “statute does not authorize punitive
damages and specifically identifies the type of damages that are

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recoverable.” Id. at 334-35 (emphasis supplied). Defendant contends
that this court should interpret Smith as holding that punitive
damages are not available in a statutory action which does not
explicitly authorize punitive damages.
to be that far reaching.

The court does not find Smith

The Smith court restrained its discussion

to the wrongful death statute at issue and conducted an in depth
analysis of authority in Kansas and other states in reaching its
decision.

In other decisions by the Kansas Supreme Court on this

issue, the court has looked to the statute and the facts in the case
to determine whether punitive damages were warranted.
In Geiger v. Wallace, 233 Kan. 656, (1983), the Kansas Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether punitive damages were
allowed under the Kansas Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, K.S.A.
58–2540 et seq.

That statute provides for damages sustained by a

tenant and is silent as to punitive damages.

The court held that

punitive damages were available when a landlord acted “willfully and
wantonly in violation of the tenant’s rights.”

Geiger, 233 Kan. at

661.
The Kansas Supreme Court issued a similar decision in Equitable
Life Leasing Corp. v. Abbick, 243 Kan. 513 (1988).

In Abbick, the

statute at issue was the Kansas Consumer Protection Act which allows
a consumer aggrieved by a violation of the act to recover actual
damages or a prescribed civil penalty, whichever is greater.

K.S.A.

50–634(b). In holding that punitive damages were available, the court
reasoned that there is “nothing in the KCPA [which] limits any other
remedies provided by law.”

Abbick, 243 Kan. at 517.

The court cited

Geiger in support of its conclusion that punitive damages were
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available even though K.S.A. 50-634(b) was silent on the issue.

But

the court also observed that “K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 50-646 specifically
provides that nothing in the KCPA limits any other remedies provided
by law.”

Id.

No similar language appears in K.S.A. 65-6203(a) which

is a “stand alone” statute.
In Golconda Screw, Inc. v. West Bottoms Ltd., 20 Kan. App.2d 1002
(1995), a case decided after Smith, the Kansas Court of Appeals held
that

punitive

damages

were

available

in

a

statutory

fraudulent conveyance even though the statute was silent.

claim

of

The court

stated that punitive damages are available in Kansas to “punish the
wrongdoer

for

his

malicious,

vindictive,

invasion of another’s rights.”

Id. at 1007.

or

willful

and

wanton

Therefore, as long as

the facts supported a claim for punitive damages, the plaintiff could
recover punitive damages.
The statute at issue in this case, K.S.A. 65–6203(a), states that
“actual damages” are available to “compensate” the owner. The statute
is silent as to punitive damages and neither limits nor expands the
relief available under the statute.

The court finds that the

statutory language at issue here is similar to the statutes in Geiger,
Abbick and Golconda Screw, which allowed for actual damages but were
silent as to punitive damages.

The statutory language in Smith,

however, is not similar to this case or those statutes in Geiger,
Abbick and Golconda Screw because the wrongful death statute provides
specific classifications of damages and requires a special finding by
the jury as to each damage type.
Contrary to defendant’s position, the court does not find that
Smith categorically denies punitive damages in all statutory actions
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which do not expressly provide for punitive damages.

The court finds

that the reasoning in Geiger, Abbick and Golconda Screw is applicable
in this case.
Accordingly, the court finds that punitive damages are available
in an action pursuant to section 65-6203(a). The clear and convincing
evidence presented at trial must support a finding, however, that
defendant’s actions were wanton. Moreover, the evidence must satisfy
K.S.A. 60-3701(d)(1).

If such evidence is presented, the jury will

decide whether to award punitive damages and, if so, the amount of
such damages.

Jones v. United Parcel Serv., 674 F.3d 1187, 1202-07

(10th Cir. 2012).4
IV.

Conclusion
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim of

punitive damages is denied.

(Doc. 57).

Plaintiffs’ motion for oral

argument is denied. (Doc. 63). The final pretrial conference in this
case will be held on September 3 at 1:45 p.m.
A motion for reconsideration of this order is not encouraged.
Any such motion shall not exceed 3 double-spaced pages and shall
strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in Comeau
v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (1992).

The response to any motion

for reconsideration shall not exceed 3 double-spaced pages.

4

No reply

There is a practical side to allowing the jury to decide the
issue of punitive damages. The jury will have to return a separate
verdict and, if so instructed, answer special questions regarding the
evidence supporting a finding of wanton conduct. In the event of
appellate review, an award of punitive damages can be modified or set
aside without disturbing a finding of liability for actual damages.
But if defendant’s motion is sustained and punitive damages are not
presented to the jury, a later finding of error would require a second
trial, which is in no one’s interest.
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shall be filed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

5th

day of August 2013, at Wichita, Kansas.

s/ Monti Belot
Monti L. Belot
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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