Rollins v. Cargill, Inc. et al

Filing 87

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 49 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 8/26/2013. (alm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

RONALD ROLLINS,
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 11-1147-EFM

CARGILL, INC., and CARGILL MEAT
SOLUTIONS CORP.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Ronald Rollins brought suit against his employer for wrongful termination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act1 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”).2 Defendants Cargill, Inc., and Cargill Meat Solutions Corp. ask the Court to grant
summary judgment for failure to prove a claim under Title VII or a causal connection between
Rollins’s age and termination. Because Rollins is not a member of a class protected under Title
VII and because no reasonable jury could find from the evidence that Rollins was terminated due
to his age, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

1

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

2

29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

I.

Factual Background3

Plaintiff Ronald Rollins was employed by Defendant Cargill Meat Solutions Corporation
(“CMSC”) from August 10, 1994, until his termination on January 18, 2010. At the time he was
hired, Rollins signed a Confidential Information and Invention Agreement, in which Rollins
agreed that, upon his termination, Rollins would return all confidential information and materials
arising from his employment.
On October 2, 2007, Rollins received a written warning for a “Behavior/Conduct
Infraction” from his manager, Jim Jandrain (age 63). Rollins contends that he received this
warning for performing required safety-check duties. On October 16, 2007, Jandrain verbally
counseled Rollins about his behavior towards a co-worker. Jandrain provided negative remarks
during Rollins’s 2007 annual performance review; Rollins contends that this critique centered on
Rollins’s attitude.

On July 3, 2008, Rollins received a Final Written Warning for

“Behavior/Conduct Infraction.” On July 9, 2008, Rollins was verbally counseled for cutting a
piece of meat in the lunch room without a safety glove.
On December 11, 2008, Rollins’s supervisor, Jessica Jensen, observed Rollins leaving a
training session regarding dry ice without signing the training sheet. Rollins contends that he
refused to sign the sheet because the training session was supposed to last four hours, but that
time was cut in half and the instructor allegedly provided the class with answers for the test over
the material that was not covered. The following day, Rollins was suspended with pay pending
an investigation of his failure to sign the training sheet. On January 15, 2009, Rollins signed a
3

In accordance with summary judgment procedures, the Court has set forth the uncontroverted facts,
related in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Rollins. Furthermore, it appears that Rollins’s responses to
Cargill’s factual statements are numbered incorrectly. See Resp. to Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 76, at 5
(showing two consecutive paragraphs labeled with a “1”). The Court has attempted to align the response with the
appropriate factual assertion.

-2-

“Last Chance Agreement,” that informed Rollins that any future behavioral issues could result in
his termination.
On January 5, 2010, Jensen assigned Rollins to a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”)
that required Rollins to elevate his performance to an acceptable level by improving his attitude
and behavior towards his team members and accepting work assignments. On January 7, 2010,
Rollins failed to leave the building when a fire alarm sounded. Rollins contends that he was not
the only employee to stay inside, that he knew there was no fire, and that it was cold outside and
he was soaking wet. CMSC’s policy requires employees to evacuate the building upon the
sounding of a fire alarm, but Rollins alleges that even management-level staff reentered the
building while the alarm was sounding. CMSC investigated the fire alarm incident and Rollins
was terminated on January 18, 2010.
Rollins filed suit on May 27, 2011, alleging that he was unlawfully fired on the basis of
his age and in retaliation for his insistence on following food safety regulations. During the
course of discovery, CMSC learned that Plaintiff took company documents labeled
“confidential” during the course of his employment for his own personal reasons. CMSC asserts
that Rollins should have been terminated for removing those documents. CMSC now requests
summary judgment on Rollins’s claims, alleging that Rollins failed to make a prima facie case of
age discrimination and that Rollins has no cause of action for retaliatory discharge under Title
VII. Rollins does not contest summary judgment on his ADEA claims or CMSC’s request to
remove Cargill, Inc., from the suit because CMSC is Rollins’s sole employer and not Cargill,
Inc.

-3-

II.
A.

Legal Standard

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4
A fact is “material” when it is essential to the claim, and issues of fact are “genuine” if the
proffered evidence permits a reasonable jury to decide the issue in either party’s favor.5 The
movant bears the initial burden of proof, and must show the lack of evidence on an essential
element of the claim.6 The nonmovant must then bring forth specific facts showing a genuine
issue for trial.7 These facts must be clearly identified through affidavits, deposition transcripts,
or incorporated exhibits—conclusory allegations alone cannot survive a motion for summary
judgment.8 The Court views all evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the party opposing summary judgment.9
B.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from treating a particular person

less favorably than others on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.10 On
summary judgment, the parties’ burdens of proof are subject to the tripartite McDonnell Douglas
4

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

5

Haynes v. Level 3 Communications, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006).

6

Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
7

Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005).

8

Mitchell v. City of Moore, Okla., 218 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Adler v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998)).
9

LifeWise Master Funding, 374 F.3d at 927.

10

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).

-4-

framework.11 First, the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of
racial discrimination.12

To make a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must prove the

following: (1) that he engaged in protected opposition to unlawful discrimination, (2) that the
plaintiff suffered materially adverse employment consequences, and (3) that a causal connection
existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action.13
If the plaintiff meets the initial burden of proof, the burden then shifts to the defendant to
provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.14 If the defendant presents such a
reason, the burden returns to the plaintiff who must show that the defendant’s stated reason is a
pretext for discriminatory intent.15 To show pretext, the plaintiff “must produce evidence of such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them
unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondiscriminatory reasons.”16
III.

Analysis

CMSC requests summary judgment on Rollins’s claims that he was wrongfully
terminated on the basis of his age and as an act of retaliation for taking protected action. Rollins
does not contest CMSC’s motion for summary judgment as to the ADEA claim. Rollins does,

11

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–05 (1972).

12

Adamson v. Multi Community Diversified Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008).

13

Twigg v. Hawker Beechcraft Corp., 659 F.3d 987, 998 (10th Cir. 2011).

14

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–03.

15

See Elmore, 58 F.3d at 530.

16

Fye v. Okla. Corp. Com’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted).

-5-

however, contend that Rollins’s “termination for failing to obey a fire drill rule was trumped up
as an excuse to retaliate against him for continuing to insist that the food safety regulations be
followed both as outlined by the USDA and the HACPP plan regulations.”17
Although never explicitly stated in his pleadings, the case law Rollins cites makes clear
that he is bringing his retaliation claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Rollins claims he
made a prima facie case of retaliation, but does not specifically identify the protected activity
that he engaged in. Furthermore, “a vague reference to discrimination and harassment without
any indication that this misconduct was motivated by race (or another category protected by Title
VII) does not constitute protected activity and will not support a retaliation claim.”18 Rollins
claims that his termination was retaliation for his insistence that CMCS abide by certain
regulations.

Assuming arguendo that the fire alarm incident was a pretextual reason for

terminating Rollins’s employment, and CMCS was in fact motivated to terminate Rollins
because they were frustrated with him, frustration is not a category protected by Title VII.19
Rollins presents no evidence that he was terminated due to his race, religion, sex, or national
origin. Rollins has therefore failed to state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, and summary
judgment is appropriate on all claims.

17

Resp. to Mot. for Summary Judgment, Doc. 76, at 19.

18

Anderson v. Academy Sch. Dist. 20, 122 Fed. App’x 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2004).

19

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (protecting employees from adverse employment actions motivated by
race, religion, sex, and national origin).

-6-

IT IS ACCORDINGLY ORDERED this 26th day of August, 2013, that Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 49) is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-7-