Chaddock v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: Defendant's judgment denying plaintiff's claims for benefits shall be affirmed pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 USC 409(g). Signed by District Judge Richard D. Rogers on 1/29/2014. (meh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
TRACY CHADDOCK,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner,
Social Security Administration
Defendant.

Case No. 13-1074-RDR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On October 26, 2009, plaintiff filed an application for
supplemental security income (SSI) benefits, alleging disability
beginning on August 16, 2005.

The alleged disability date was

later

2009.

amended

hearing

was

administrative

to

October

conducted
law

26,

upon

judge

On

August

plaintiff’s

(ALJ)

considered

24,

2011,

application.
the

evidence

a

The
and

decided on December 9, 2011 that plaintiff was not qualified to
receive

benefits

under the law.

because

she

was

not

“disabled”

as

required

The Appeals Council denied review and the ALJ’s

decision was then adopted by defendant.

This case is now before

the court upon plaintiff’s motion to review the decision to deny
plaintiff’s application for benefits.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
To qualify for SSI benefits, a claimant must establish that

he is “disabled” under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §

1381a.

This

means

proving

that

the

claimant

is

unable

“to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which . . .
has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not

less

than

12

months.”

42

U.S.C.

§

1382c(a)(3)(A).

A

claimant becomes eligible for SSI benefits in the first month
where he is both disabled and has an application on file.

20

C.F.R. §§ 416.202-03, 416.330, 416.335.
The court must affirm the ALJ’s decision if it is supported
by substantial evidence and if the ALJ applied the proper legal
standards.
2004).

Rebeck v. Barnhart, 317 F.Supp.2d 1263, 1270 (D.Kan.

“Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla;”

it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Id., quoting Richardson

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

The court must examine

the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly
detracts from the weight of the defendant’s decision, and on
that

basis

decide

defendant’s decision.
Cir.

1994)(quoting

if

substantial

evidence

supports

the

Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984 (10th
Casias

v.

Secretary

of

Health

Services, 933 F.2d 799, 800-01 (10th Cir. 1991)).

&

Human

The court may

not reverse the defendant’s choice between two reasonable but
conflicting views, even if the court would have made a different
choice if the matter were referred to the court de novo.
2

Lax v.

Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007)(quoting Zoltanski
v. F.A.A., 372 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2004)).
II.

THE ALJ’S DECISION (Tr. 11-25).
The

process

ALJ
set

eligibility

followed
forth

for

the

at

SSI

20

five-step

C.F.R.

benefits.

§

sequential

416.920

The

ALJ

for

found

evaluation
determining
first

that

plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
the alleged onset date of disability, October 26, 2009.
Second,
severe

the

medical

ALJ

found

that

impairments:

plaintiff

has

bradycardia;

the

following

atherosclerosis;

coronary artery disease; bipolar disorder NOS; bipolar disorder
with

psychotic

features;

major

depressive

disorder/major

depression; generalized anxiety disorder/anxiety disorder; and
panic

disorder

without

agoraphobia.

The

ALJ

found

that

plaintiff had a mild restriction in her activities of daily
living and observed that she was able to take care of herself,
do typical household tasks, drive, and manage her finances.
determined

that

she

had

moderate

difficulties

in

He

social

functioning, although she could shop in stores and did attend
church.

The ALJ further concluded that plaintiff had moderate

difficulties in concentration, persistence or pace, although he
acknowledged that plaintiff had been noted by some sources to
have good concentration, attention, insight and memory.

3

Third,

he

determined

that

plaintiff

did

not

have

an

impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments in the
social security regulations.
Fourth,

the

ALJ

found

that

plaintiff

had

the

residual

functional capacity (RFC) to perform a range of medium work as
defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(c), but is limited to simple,
routine,

repetitive

tasks,

not

performed

in

a

fast-paced

production environment or as an integral part of a team, and
involving only simple work-related decisions.

The ALJ further

found that plaintiff was limited to superficial interaction with
supervisors and co-workers and must avoid all interactions with
the general public.

With this RFC in mind, the ALJ found that

plaintiff could not perform her past relevant work as a personal
care attendant.
Finally,
considering

at

the

plaintiff’s

fifth

step,

age,

the

education,

ALJ
work

concluded,

after

experience,

and

RFC, that there were jobs which existed in significant numbers
in the national economy that plaintiff could perform.
this

finding,

testified

that

the

ALJ

relied

plaintiff

upon

would

be

a

vocational
able

to

In making
expert

perform

who
the

requirements of a kitchen helper, industrial cleaner and dining
room attendant.

4

III. THE ALJ PROPERLY
PLAINTIFF’S RFC.

CONSIDERED

THE

EVIDENCE

RELATING

TO

Plaintiff makes two main arguments to overturn the decision
to deny SSI benefits.
failed

to

properly

plaintiff’s RFC.

First, plaintiff contends that the ALJ

consider

relevant

evidence

in

determining

Specifically, plaintiff argues that the ALJ

did not consider plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome and failed
to consider plaintiff’s GAF scores in light of the longitudinal
evidence.

Plaintiff

references

SSR

96-8p

in

making

this

argument.
A. Carpal tunnel syndrome
As plaintiff’s counsel acknowledges in her brief, the ALJ
considered

evidence

in

the

record

regarding

carpal

tunnel

syndrome and determined that that it was a non-severe impairment
to the extent that it was established.

(Tr. 14).

He noted that

the plaintiff was assessed with carpal tunnel syndrome by a
nurse practitioner, Michael Forbes, on March 21, 2011 and that
this

was

not

an

acceptable

medical

whether plaintiff had an impairment.1

source

for

establishing

The ALJ gave weight to a

consultative physical examination by Dr. Saad M. Al-Shathir on
January 4, 2010.
significant

(Tr. 18).

problem

with

This examination did not report a
carpal

1

tunnel

syndrome;

it

also

Forbes’ report of his examination stated that plaintiff complained that her
feet and hands went numb at night and that she needed to sit up and wiggle
her feet and hands until the feeling came back. Positive bilateral Phalen’s
and Tinel’s signs were reported. And bilateral wrist splints and pain
medication were prescribed. (Tr. 436).

5

concluded that plaintiff could manipulate objects in her hands.
(Tr. 323-328).

The ALJ also give significant weight to the

physical residual functional capacity assessment of Dr. Rees (on
June 7, 2010) as affirmed by Dr. Wainner.
not list any manipulative limitations.

These opinions did

(Tr. 377, 417).

Nor did

plaintiff mention carpal tunnel as a significant issue during
her

testimony

before

the

ALJ.

She

stated

that,

during

the

daytime, numbness affected her “slightly” and that she had to be
careful gripping her coffee cup or an ink pen.

(Tr. 74).

SSR-96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at *1, provides in part that:
The
RFC
assessment
considers
only
functional
limitations and restrictions that result from an
individual’s medically determinable impairment or
combination of impairments, including the impact of
any related symptoms. . . . RFC is not the least an
individual can do despite his or her limitations or
restrictions, but the most.
It further provides at *5 that:
In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must consider
limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an
individual’s impairments, even those that are not
‘severe.’ While a ‘not severe’ impairment(s) standing
along may not significantly limit an individual’s
ability to do basic work activities, it may - - when
considered with limitations or restrictions due to
other impairments - - be critical to the outcome of a
claim.
The court rejects plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred
by

not

syndrome.

considering

evidence

of

plaintiff’s

The ALJ did consider the evidence.

carpal

tunnel

But, in light of

the slight proof of any functional limitation from carpal tunnel
6

syndrome, as well as the medical evidence and reports of daily
activities indicating the absence of a substantial limitation,
the ALJ’s RFC findings are supported by substantial evidence.
B.
The

GAF scores
ALJ

commented

as

follows

regarding

plaintiff’s

GAF

(Global Assessment of Functioning) scores:
GAF scores have consistently been low in the 45-49
range, suggesting the presence of very limiting mental
symptoms. However, GAF scores include not only Axis I
and II diagnoses, but Axis IV factors such as social
and occupational functioning. [Plaintiff’s] treatment
notes
consistently
report
Axis
IV
problems
in
conjunction with her GAF scores.
Because of the
inclusion of these non-disability factors, these GAF
scores are given some weight.
(Tr. 21). Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not provide an
adequate legal basis for this conclusion.
A GAF score is an estimate of a person’s functional level
which considers psychosocial stressors as well as other mental
health issues.

As explained recently in Osburn v. Colvin, 2013

WL 6389138 *5 (E.D.Cal. 12/06/2013):
A Global Assessment of Functioning score is the
clinician's judgment of the individual's overall level
of functioning. It is rated with respect only to
psychological, social, and occupational functioning,
without regard to impairments in functioning due to
physical or environmental limitations. See Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, at 32 (Am.
Psychiatric Ass'n 4th ed. 2000) (“DSM–IV”). “A GAF
score
is
a
rough
estimate
of
an
individual's
psychological, social, and occupational functioning
used to reflect the individual's need for treatment.”
Brewes v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157,
1160 n. 2 (9th Cir.2012) (quoting Vargas v. Lambert,
7

159 F.3d 1161, 1164 n. 2 (9th Cir.1998)). GAF Scores
range from 1–100. DSM–IV at 32. In arriving at a GAF
Score, the clinician considers psychological, social,
and
occupational
functioning
on
a
hypothetical
continuum of mental health illness. DSM–IV at 34. A
GAF score of 41–50 indicates “[s]erious symptoms
(e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals,
frequent shoplifting) OR any serious impairment in
social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., no
friends, unable to keep a job).” DSM–IV at 34. A GAF
score of 51–60 indicates “[m]oderate symptoms (e.g.,
flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional
panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social,
occupational,
or
school
functioning
(e.g.,
few
friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).” Id.
The court in Osburn further noted that in 2013 the American
Psychiatric

Association

dropped

multiaxial diagnostic system.

the

GAF

scale

from

its

Id. at *6.

In plaintiff’s case, Axis IV factors which affected one of
plaintiff’s GAF scores included:

problems related to primary

support; financial difficulties; problems in living situation;
and

access

to

health

care

services.

(Tr.

339).

Another

assessment listed “problems with social environment, educational
problems,

unemployment,

financial

difficulties

and

access

to

health care services” as Axis IV factors affecting plaintiff’s
GAF score.

(Tr. 336).

Another listed economic problems, health

care access problems and housing problems as some of the Axis IV
psychosocial and environmental problems.

(Tr. 534).

We find that the ALJ reasonably held that “non-disability
factors” negatively affected plaintiff’s GAF score.

And we find

that the ALJ’s reasoning has been upheld in other cases.
8

See

Creed v. Astrue, 2010 WL 2520087 *4 (D.Kan. 6/15/2010)(affirming
ALJ consideration of Axis IV factors as one reason to discount
GAF

score);

Boucher

v.

Astrue,

2009

WL

737156

*2

(D.Kan.

3/20/2009)(same); Effertz v. Astrue, 2008 WL 4787522 *4 (D.Kan.
10/31/2008)(considering GAF scores as “a piece” of the record
that standing alone and in light of Axis IV factors does not
necessarily

determine

disability);

Olds

v.

Astrue,

2008

WL

339757 *4 (D.Kan. 2/5/2008)(same); see also, Petree v. Astrue,
260 Fed.Appx. 33, 42 (10th Cir. 12/28/2007)(a low GAF score is a
piece of evidence to be considered with the rest of the record);
Lee v. Barnhart, 117 Fed.Appx. 674, 678 (10th Cir. 12/8/2004)(a
low

GAF

score

impairment).

does

not

necessarily

evidence

a

serious

work

Therefore, we hold that the ALJ did not commit a

legal error in his review and consideration of plaintiff’s GAF
scores as part of his overall disability analysis.
IV. THE ALJ PROPERLY ANALYZED PLAINTIFF’S CREDIBILITY.
Plaintiff’s second major argument to reverse the decision
to deny SSI benefits is that the ALJ failed to properly analyze
plaintiff’s credibility.
the

ALJ

failed

to

Specifically, plaintiff argues that

consider

that

plaintiff

has

consistently

reported insomnia, exhaustion, and a desire to avoid people.
Plaintiff
consider
reviewing

further
the

argues

that

effectiveness

this

the

of

contention,

failed

plaintiff’s
we

9

ALJ

note

to

adequately

treatment.
that

In

credibility

determinations are the province of the ALJ and we will not upset
such

determinations

evidence.

if

they

are

supported

by

substantial

Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995).

An ALJ is not required to do a “formalistic factor-by-factor
recitation of the evidence” as part of a credibility analysis,
but he should discuss the specific evidence he relies on in
evaluating the issue.
(10th

1167

Cir.

Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue, 695 F.3d 1156,

2012).

perfection, is our guide.”

“[C]ommon

sense,

not

technical

Id.

The ALJ began his assessment of plaintiff’s credibility by
discussing her function report, which indicated that plaintiff
has no problems with personal care, performs typical household
chores,

can

manage

bills

and

bank

accounts,

drives

a

car,

follows simple written and verbal instructions, and shops once a
month.

The ALJ reviewed plaintiff’s testimony that she does not

leave the house often, but does go grocery shopping, attends
church on occasion, and that she tries to get along with people,
but not be around them too long.

He considered plaintiff’s

testimony that most weeks she has four bad days during which she
stays in bed, does not leave the house, and wants to be left
alone.
the

The ALJ discounted this testimony as inconsistent with

degree

records.

of

limitation

He

found

that

described
plaintiff

in

plaintiff’s
has

been

medical

prescribed

appropriate medications for her physical and mental impairments
10

and that these medications have been effective in controlling
her symptoms.

He further determined that the record reflected

some inconsistencies in plaintiff’s reports.
Upon review of the record, the court finds that the ALJ
followed the proper legal standards and that his conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ stated the same

factors from SSR 96-7p for evaluating credibility that plaintiff
repeats

in

her

brief

grounds

to

hold

to

that

reverse

the

ALJ

his

did

decision.

not

We

actually

find

apply

no

these

standards.
As

plaintiff

complaints

to

argues,

caregivers

she

over

has

the

made

years.

some
She

consistent

also

has

had

issues with the effectiveness, side effects, and availability of
medication.

This does not mean that all of plaintiff’s alleged

functional limitations are as severe as plaintiff alleges or
that

the

ALJ

must

accept

them

as

reported

by

plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s psychiatric state was recorded as “normal” several
times in 2011.

(Tr. 513, 521, 523, and 526).

In July 2010 and

January

plaintiff

having

2011,

was

assessed

as

a

“mild

impairment” from mood swings, uncontrolled anger, and anxiety.
(Tr. 385-387, 460-461).
2010

concluded

environment,
during

a

that

could

normal

A consultative examination in February

plaintiff

could

adapt

concentrate

and

persist

work

day,

and
11

could

to
on

interact

a

simple
simple

in

a

work
tasks

limited

contact situation with the public and supervisors or co-workers.
(Tr.

336).

conclusions

These
that

reports,

and

medication

has

others,
shown

support

the

ALJ’s

effectiveness

in

controlling plaintiff’s symptoms and that plaintiff’s functional
capacity is not as limited as plaintiff’s testimony would imply.
Therefore, we reject plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ failed
to properly analyze plaintiff’s credibility.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, defendant’s judgment denying

plaintiff’s claims for benefits shall be affirmed pursuant to
the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 29th day of January, 2014, at Topeka, Kansas.

s/ Richard D. Rogers
Richard D. Rogers
United States District Judge

12