Snider v. Yates

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Dismiss. The court shall grant defendant's motion as it relates to plaintiff's improper use of hancuffs and false imprisonment. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 20 days of filing this order. SEE ORDER FOR DETAILS. Signed by District Judge Richard D. Rogers on 11/21/2013.Mailed to pro se party Vaughn L. Snider by regular mail (meh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
VAUGHN L. SNIDER,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
_

Plaintiff,
v.
TAFT YATES,
Defendant.

Case No. 13-1330-RDR

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff,

pro

se,

has

been

granted

complaint in this case in forma pauperis.
No. 1) consists of:

leave

to

file

the

The complaint (Doc.

a civil complaint form supplied by the

court which plaintiff has completed; an attached Department of
Justice form for making a complaint under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; and a copy of
a

letter

addressed

to

Olavee

Raub

in

Ellis,

Kansas

which

provides some factual detail regarding the matters concerned in
the other documents.
The complaint names Taft Yates, the Ellis Police Department
Chief, as defendant.
imprisonment;
supplies;

2)

and

4)

It lists plaintiff’s claims as:

use

of

handcuffs;

disability

3)

disallowing

1) false

discrimination

under

medical
the

ADA.

Plaintiff has not provided any significant factual detail in
either

the

complaint

form

supplied

by

the

court

or

the

Department

of

Justice

form.

But,

the

letter

to

Ms.

Raub

supplies information which the court shall treat as part of the
complaint’s factual allegations.
The letter to Ms. Raub indicates that on November 9, 2012
plaintiff was overheard making a remark which was apparently
reported

as

department.

a

suicide

Plaintiff

threat
was

to

the

thereafter

Ellis,

Kansas

“confronted

police

by

three

police officers” while he was drinking coffee at a Love’s Travel
Plaza.
anyone
Yates

Plaintiff denied that he was a threat to himself or
else,
to

the

“complied.”
defendant

but

defendant

High

Plains

Yates

forced

insisted

that

he

Mental

Health

Center.

accompany
Plaintiff

After his interview at the mental health center,
handcuffed

Larned State Hospital.
being

Yates

to

go

plaintiff

and

transported

him

to

Plaintiff alleges that he objected to
to

the

hospital

and

that

it

was

“unprofessional and unnecessary” that he be handcuffed, as he
had already been searched twice for a weapon.

In addition,

plaintiff alleges that he has been partially paralyzed for 37
years and presented no danger to himself or Yates.

Plaintiff

claims that he asked that Yates allow plaintiff to go home or
accompany plaintiff to plaintiff’s home, so that plaintiff could
collect medical supplies necessary for plaintiff to void his
bladder without assistance.

This request was refused.

2

This case is before the court upon defendant’s motion to
dismiss.
action

Defendant contends that the court should dismiss this
because:

the

complaint

fails

to

conform

to

basic

pleading standards; qualified immunity protects defendant from
liability; and defendant cannot be found liable under the ADA.
I.

RULE 12(b)(6) STANDARDS.
FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of actions for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

“To

survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state

a

claim

to

relief

that

is

plausible

on

its

face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted).
The court must not “weigh potential evidence that the parties
might present at trial, but . . . assess whether the plaintiff’s
complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which
relief may be granted.”
646

F.3d

717,

724

Cohon v. New Mexico Dept. of Health,

(10th

Cir.

2011)

(interior

quotations

omitted).
The

Supreme

Court

has

stated

that

plausibility

requires

that the allegations of a complaint should “raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” supporting the
elements of the claims, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007), and “allo[w] the court to draw the reasonable
inference

that

the

defendant

is
3

liable

for

the

misconduct

alleged,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“Where a complaint pleads

facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability,
it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of

entitlement

to

relief.”

Id.

(internal

quotations

and

citations omitted).
The

Tenth

Circuit

has

elaborated

upon

the

plausibility

standard as follows:
we have concluded the Twombly/Iqbal standard is a
middle ground between heightened fact pleading, which
is expressly rejected, and allowing complaints that
are no more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action, which
the Court stated will not do.
Khalik

v.

United

Air

Lines,

671

F.3d

1188,

1191

(10th

Cir.

2012)(interior quotations and citation omitted).
Exhibits attached to a complaint are treated as part of the
pleadings for purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss.

Tal v.

Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264 n. 24 (10th Cir. 2006) cert. denied,
549 U.S. 2109 (2007).

Normally, however, attached documents are

“’considered only to show their contents, not to prove of the
matters asserted therein.’”

Id. (quoting Oxford Asset Mgmt.,

Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002)).
plaintiff

is

proceeding

pleadings

“liberally

and

pro

se,

holds

the

[them]

court
to

a

construes
less

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).

4

As
his

stringent
Riddle v.

So, for the

purposes of this opinion, the court shall treat the contents of
the

letter

to

Ms.

Raub

as

part

of

the

allegations

of

the

complaint.
II.

ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSAL.

A.
The complaint (with the letter to Ms. Raub) contains
adequate factual detail and notice of claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, the ADA, and state law.
Defendant contends that the complaint contains no specific
factual allegations and therefore should be dismissed.

This

argument, however, appears to ignore the allegations made in
plaintiff’s letter to Ms. Raub.

Given the liberal construction

the court must apply to pro se pleadings, we believe plaintiff
has provided defendant with adequate notice of what plaintiff is
alleging.
Although the court is not obliged to construct a legal
theory on behalf of a pro se plaintiff (Whitney v. New Mexico,
113

F.3d

1170,

1173-74

(10th

Cir.

1997)),

the

court

should

consider legal theories that are apparent on the face of the
complaint.
1994).

Barrett v. Tallon, 30 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir.

It seems apparent on the face of plaintiff’s complaint

that plaintiff is attempting to bring an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (although the statute is not expressly alleged) and the

5

ADA.1

Plaintiff may also be considered to have alleged a state

law action for false imprisonment.
B.
Plaintiff’s
claim under § 1983.

“use

of

handcuffs”

allegations

state

a

Defendant asserts that there is no viable claim stated for
“use of handcuff.”
plaintiff’s
cause.

claim

The court will not prejudge the merits of
that

he

was

handcuffed

without

sufficient

For the purposes of this order, it is sufficient to

observe that particularized suspicion that a person is dangerous
(to others or himself) is necessary to justify handcuffs and
that standard police procedure may not control the analysis of
whether there is a constitutional violation.
Higdon,

575

F.3d

1135,

1149-50

(10th

Cir.

See Manzanares v.
2009).

Plaintiff

claims that he was not a danger to himself or anyone else.
further alleges that he was compliant with the police.

He

Given

these allegations, the court believes plaintiff has stated a
plausible claim that he was unreasonably seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment as enforced via § 1983.
C. Plaintiff states a claim under § 1983 and state law for
false imprisonment.
Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to go to Larned State
Hospital

and

that

he

complied

1

when

defendant

insisted

that

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish two elements: (1)
that he suffered a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and
laws of the United States; and (2) that the act or omission causing the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

6

plaintiff go to the High Plains Mental Health Center.

The Tenth

Circuit has recognized that “the seizure of a person for an
emergency

mental

health

evaluation

is

a

restriction

on

the

fundamental right of personal liberty and so is governed by the
reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”

Meyer v.

Board of County Commissioners, 482 F.3d 1232, 1239 (10th Cir.
2007).

“[P]robable cause is required to support an emergency

detention for a psychiatric evaluation.”

Id.

Again, given the

allegations in the attachments to the complaint that plaintiff
was not a threat to himself or others, the court finds that
plaintiff has stated a plausible claim for a violation of the
Fourth Amendment as enforced via § 1983 as well as a claim for
false imprisonment.
F.Supp.

986,

989

See Wright v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 814
(D.Kan.

1993)(state

law

claim

for

false

imprisonment requires that an individual be restrained of his
liberty without any sufficient legal cause).
D.
Plaintiff does not state a claim for relief under §
1983 for being disallowed medical supplies or for a violation of
the ADA.
The court is unable to discern a plausible claim under §
1983 arising from the denial of medical supplies while plaintiff
was allegedly under defendant Yates’ control.

Plaintiff does

not identify any legal authority persuasive to the court and the
court is not aware of any apparent source for such a claim.

7

The complaint and its attachments also fail to state an ADA
claim.

The ADA forbids employment discrimination on the basis

of disability in Title I (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117); it forbids
discrimination in public services, programs and activities in
Title

II

(42

U.S.C.

§§

12131-12134);

and

it

prohibits

discrimination in public accommodations in Title III (42 U.S.C.
§§

12181-12189).

(2004).

Tennessee

v.

Lane,

541

U.S.

509,

516-17

Title I obviously is not pertinent here; plaintiff is

not making an employment claim.
Plaintiff

also

cannot

state

a

damages

claim

defendant in his personal capacity under Title II.

against
Section

12132 provides:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no
qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason
of
such
disability,
be
excluded
from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity,
or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.
Courts have construed this provision as limiting claims to those
against a public entity.

Anderson v. Usher, 2013 WL 1187399

(D.C.Cir. 3/4/2013); Williams v. McLemore, 247 Fed.Appx. 1, 8
(6th Cir. 6/19/2007);
1/19/2011);
(D.D.C.

Sindram

2007).

A

Rix v. McClure, 2011 WL 166731 *6 (D.Kan.
v.

Merriwether,

claim

against

506

F.Supp.2d

defendant

in

his

7,

11-12

personal

capacity for damages is not a claim against a public entity.

8

Therefore, plaintiff does not state a claim under Title II of
the ADA.
Finally,

plaintiff

Title III of the ADA.
in

public

does

not

state

a

viable

claim

under

Title III provides for nondiscrimination

accommodations

and

in

commercial

facilities.

Defendant Yates is not alleged to be a person who owns, leases
or operates a place of public accommodation so as to support a
claim of discrimination under Title III of the ADA.
12182(a).

42 U.S.C. §

In addition, Title III does not provide a private

right of action for damages.

Goodwin v. C.N.J., Inc., 436 F.3d

44, 50 (1st Cir. 2006); Powell v. Nat’l Bd. Of Med. Exam’rs, 364
F.3d

79,

86

(2nd

Cir.

requested by plaintiff.

2004).

Damages

is

the

only

relief

For these reasons, plaintiff does not

state a claim under Title III.
E.
The court cannot determine at this stage
defendant enjoys qualified immunity against liability.

whether

The Tenth Circuit has instructed that “[i]n resolving a
motion to dismiss on qualified immunity, a court must consider
whether

the

facts

that

a

plaintiff

has

alleged

make

out

a

violation of a constitutional right, and whether the right at
issue was clearly established at the time of defendant’s alleged
misconduct.”

Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir.

2011).

9

As
alleged

mentioned
a

above,

plausible

the

court

violation

of

believes
the

plaintiff

constitutional

has
right

against unreasonable seizure, both by use of excessive force and
by restraining plaintiff’s freedom of movement without probable
cause.
Here

the

allegations

indicate

that

plaintiff

was

not

suspected of committing a crime or of being a threat to others’
safety.

Nor was he actively resisting arrest or attempting to

flee, according to the complaint.

At most, there is a slight

suggestion that plaintiff may have been considered a threat to
himself, although plaintiff denies this.

A consideration of

these factors suggests that plaintiff has stated a plausible
claim for excessive force.

See Morris v. Noe, 672 F.3d 1185,

1195 (10th Cir. 2012)(reviewing factors to consider in resolving
excessive force questions).
As

for

whether

the

rights

in

question

were

clearly

establish, recently the Tenth Circuit stated:
The question of whether a right is clearly established
must be answered in light of the specific context of
the case, not as a broad general proposition.
Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly
established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth
Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts must have found
the law to be as the plaintiff maintains. But, because
the existence of excessive force is a fact-specific
inquiry, there will almost never be a previously
published
opinion
involving
exactly
the
same
circumstances.
Accordingly, our court has adopted a
sliding scale: The more obviously egregious the
10

conduct
in
light
of
prevailing
constitutional
principles, the less specificity is required from
prior case law to clearly establish the violation.
Long

v.

Fulmer,

2013

WL

6038340

(10th

*3

11/15/2013)(interior quotations and citations omitted).

Cir.
While a

case directly on point is not required, “existing precedent must
have

place

the

debate.”

statutory

Ashcroft

or

v.

constitutional

al-Kidd,

131

question

S.Ct.

beyond

2074,

2083

that

“any

(2011)(emphasis added).
In

Manzanares,

the

Tenth

Circuit

stated

reasonable officer would understand that it is unconstitutional
to

handcuff

basis

to

suspect

reasonable
Romero,

someone
a

absent

probable

threat

to

suspicion.”

616

F.3d

575

1108,

cause

officer

F.3d

1122-23

at
(10th

or

an

safety

1150.
Cir.

In

articulable

combined

with

Lundstrom

2010),

the

v.

Tenth

Circuit further stated:

“’the use of handcuffs is greater than

a

and

de

minimus

demonstrate

intrusion

that

the

facts

thus

requires

available

to

the

government

the

officer

to

would

warrant a man of caution in the belief that the action taken was
appropriate.’”

Quoting U.S. v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th

Cir. 2009); see also, El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452,
460 (8th Cir. 2011)(“it is well established that if suspects are
cooperative and officers have no objective concerns for safety,
the officers may not use intrusive tactics such as handcuffing
absent any extraordinary circumstances”).
11

At this point in the

proceedings,

the

court

cannot

determine

that

there

was

an

objective concern for safety which overcomes plaintiff’s clearly
established

right

against

being

handcuffed.

Therefore,

the

court cannot conclude that defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity from liability under § 1983 for the improper use of
handcuffs.
The

Tenth

Circuit

has

also

stated:

“it

[is]

clearly

established that community caretaking detentions must be based
on specific articulable facts warranting an intrusion into an
individual’s

liberty.”

Lundstrom,

616

F.3d

at

1125.

Once

again, it is not clear upon the record before the court that
defendant’s actions in detaining plaintiff for the purpose of
obtaining a mental health evaluation or treatment were warranted
by sufficient cause.
qualified

immunity

Therefore, the court denies defendant’s

argument

without

prejudice

to

its

renewal

later in these proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 9) shall be granted
in part and denied in part.
motion

to

dismiss

The court shall grant defendant’s

plaintiff’s

claims

for

disallowing

supplies and plaintiff’s claims under the ADA.

medical

The court shall

deny defendant’s motion to dismiss as it relates to plaintiff’s
claims for improper use of handcuffs and false imprisonment.
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within
12

20 days of this order.

Plaintiff may use the amended complaint

to attempt to properly reassert claims under the ADA or for the
denial

of

medical

supplies.

Plaintiff

might

also

consider

filing an amended complaint simply to elaborate or clarify his
factual

contentions.

Plaintiff

may

either

use

the

civil

complaint form of the court, paying particular attention to the
instructions provided under section III – “Statement of Claim”,
or plaintiff may file an amended complaint without using the
court

form,

in

which

case

he

should

pay

close

attention

to

FED.R.CIV.P. 10 and not ignore other pertinent federal rules of
civil

procedure.

complaint,

this

If
case

plaintiff

shall

does

proceed

not

upon

the

file

an

amended

handcuffing

and

false imprisonment claims discussed in this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 21st

day of November, 2013, at Topeka, Kansas.

_____

__s/ Richard D. Rogers____
Richard D. Rogers
United States District Judge

13