Snider v. Yates

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 5 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kenneth G. Gale on 9/30/2013. Mailed to pro se party Vaughn Snider by regular mail. (df)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

VAUGHN L. SNIDER,

vs.
TAFT YATES,

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Plaintiff,
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Defendant. )
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Case No. 13-1330-RDR-KGG

ORDER ON MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
In conjunction with his federal court Complaint alleging discrimination and
a violation of his civil rights, Plaintiff Vaughn Snider filed a Motion to Proceed
Without Prepayment of Fees (IFP Application, Doc. 3, sealed), which the Court
previously granted (see Doc. 4). Plaintiff now files a Motion for Appointment of
Counsel. (Doc. 5.) Having reviewed Plaintiff’s motion, as well as his Complaint
(Doc. 1), the Court DENIES this motion.
DISCUSSION
The Tenth Circuit has identified four factors to be considered when a court is
deciding whether to appoint counsel for an individual: (1) plaintiff’s ability to
afford counsel, (2) plaintiff’s diligence in searching for counsel, (3) the merits of
plaintiff’s case, and (4) plaintiff’s capacity to prepare and present the case without

the aid of counsel. McCarthy v. Weinberg, 753 F.2d 836, 838-39 (10th Cir. 1985)
(listing factors applicable to applications under the IFP statute); Castner v.
Colorado Springs Cablevision, 979 F.2d 1417, 1421 (10th Cir. 1992) (listing
factors applicable to applications under Title VII). Thoughtful and prudent use of
the appointment power is necessary so that willing counsel may be located without
the need to make coercive appointments. The indiscriminate appointment of
volunteer counsel to undeserving claims will waste a precious resource and may
discourage attorneys from donating their time. Castner, 979 F.2d at 1421.
Having granted Plaintiff IFP status (Doc. 4), the Court finds that he has a
limited ability to afford counsel, satisfying the first Castner factor. Plaintiff also
satisfies the second Castner factor through his diligent search for counsel. (See
Doc. 5.) The Court sees no glaring concerns on the face of Plaintiff’s federal court
Complaint, satisfying the third factor. (Doc. 1.) The Court’s analysis thus turns to
the fourth Castner factor – Plaintiff’s capacity to represent himself. 979 F.2d at
1420-21.
In considering this factor, the Court must look to the complexity of the legal
issues and Plaintiff’s ability to gather and present crucial facts. Id., at 1422. The
Court notes that the factual and legal issues in this discrimination case are not
unusually complex. Cf. Kayhill v. Unified Govern. of Wyandotte, 197 F.R.D. 454,
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458 (D.Kan. 2000) (finding that the “factual and legal issues” in a case involving a
former employee’s allegations of race, religion, sex, national origin, and disability
discrimination were “not complex”).
The Court sees no basis to distinguish Plaintiff from the many other
untrained individuals who represent themselves pro se on various types of claims
in Courts throughout the United States on any given day. To the contrary, Plaintiff
has shown his ability to represent himself by drafting his federal court Complaint
and navigating the U.S. Department of Justice disability rights administrative
complaint procedure. (See generally, Doc. 1.) Although Plaintiff is not trained as
an attorney, and while an attorney might present his case more effectively, this fact
alone does not warrant appointment of counsel.
The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff appears to be an articulate individual
with the ability to gather and present facts crucial to his case. As such, his Motion
to Appoint Counsel is DENIED.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment
of Counsel (Doc. 5) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Wichita, Kansas, on this 30th day of September, 2013.
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S/ KENNETH G. GALE

KENNETH G. GALE
United States Magistrate Judge

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