Keel v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of
Filing
15
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER: The judgment of the Commissioner is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum and order. Signed by U.S. District Senior Judge Sam A. Crow on 3/10/15. (msb)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
MICHAEL KEEL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 13-1458-SAC
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action reviewing the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security denying the plaintiff disability
insurance benefits.
The matter has been fully briefed by the
parties.
I.
General legal standards
The court's standard of review is set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g), which provides that "the findings of the Commissioner
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive."
The court should review the Commissioner's
decision to determine only whether the decision was supported by
substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the
correct legal standards.
(10th Cir. 1994).
Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984
Substantial evidence requires more than a
scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is satisfied by
1
such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the
conclusion.
The determination of whether substantial evidence
supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a
quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is
overwhelmed by other evidence or if it really constitutes mere
conclusion.
Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).
Although the court is not to reweigh the evidence, the findings
of the Commissioner will not be mechanically accepted.
Nor will
the findings be affirmed by isolating facts and labeling them
substantial evidence, as the court must scrutinize the entire
record in determining whether the Commissioner's conclusions are
rational.
1992).
Graham v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (D. Kan.
The court should examine the record as a whole,
including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight
of the Commissioner's decision and, on that basis, determine if
the substantiality of the evidence test has been met.
Glenn, 21
F.3d at 984.
The Social Security Act provides that an individual shall
be determined to be under a disability only if the claimant can
establish that they have a physical or mental impairment
expected to result in death or last for a continuous period of
twelve months which prevents the claimant from engaging in
substantial gainful activity (SGA).
The claimant's physical or
mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that
2
they are not only unable to perform their previous work but
cannot, considering their age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy.
42 U.S.C. § 423(d).
The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential
evaluation process to determine disability.
If at any step a
finding of disability or non-disability can be made, the
Commissioner will not review the claim further.
At step one,
the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant can show
that he or she is not working at a “substantial gainful
activity.”
At step two, the agency will find non-disability
unless the claimant shows that he or she has a “severe
impairment,” which is defined as any “impairment or combination
of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”
At
step three, the agency determines whether the impairment which
enabled the claimant to survive step two is on the list of
impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled.
If
the claimant’s impairment does not meet or equal a listed
impairment, the inquiry proceeds to step four, at which the
agency assesses whether the claimant can do his or her previous
work; unless the claimant shows that he or she cannot perform
their previous work, they are determined not to be disabled.
the claimant survives step four, the fifth and final step
3
If
requires the agency to consider vocational factors (the
claimant’s age, education, and past work experience) and to
determine whether the claimant is capable of performing other
jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy.
Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S. Ct. 376, 379-380 (2003).
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four of
Nielson v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th
the analysis.
Cir. 1993).
At step five, the burden shifts to the
Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work
that exists in the national economy.
Nielson, 992 F.2d at 1120;
Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993).
The
Commissioner meets this burden if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1487.
Before going from step three to step four, the agency will
assess the claimant’s residual functional capacity (RFC).
This
RFC assessment is used to evaluate the claim at both step four
and step five.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 404.1520(e,f,g);
416.920(a)(4), 416.920(e,f,g).
II.
History of case
On August 22, 2011, administrative law judge (ALJ)
Christina Young Mein issued the 1st ALJ decision, finding
plaintiff not disabled (R. at 98-108).
On October 25, 2012, the
Appeals Council issued a decision remanding the case back to the
ALJ (R. at 114-116).
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On August 27, 2013, ALJ Timothy G. Stueve issued the 2nd ALJ
decision (R. at 11-27).
Plaintiff alleges that he had been
disabled since May 12, 2009 (R. at 12).
Plaintiff meets the
insured status requirements for social security disability
benefits through December 31, 2013 (R. at 14).
At step one, the
ALJ found that plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful
activity after the alleged onset date (R. at 14).
At step two,
the ALJ found that plaintiff had severe impairments of chronic
pain syndrome; degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; an
affective disorder variously described in the record as both a
bipolar disorder and major depression; and generalized anxiety
disorder (R. at 14).
At step three, the ALJ determined that
plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment
(R. at 15-16).
After determining plaintiff’s RFC (R. at 16),
the ALJ determined at step four that plaintiff is unable to
perform past relevant work (R. at 25).
At step five, the ALJ
found that plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy (R. at 26).
Therefore, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled (R.
at 26-27).
III.
Are the ALJ’s RFC findings supported by substantial
evidence?
According to SSR 96-8p, the RFC assessment “must include a
narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports each
5
conclusion, citing specific medical facts...and nonmedical
evidence.”
The ALJ must explain how any material
inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the case
record were considered and resolved.
The RFC assessment must
always consider and address medical source opinions.
If the RFC
assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the
ALJ must explain why the opinion was not adopted.
1996 WL 374184 at *7.
SSR 96-8p,
SSR rulings are binding on an ALJ.
20
C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530
n.9, 110 S. Ct. 885, 891 n.9, 107 L. Ed.2d 967 (1990); Nielson
v. Sullivan, 992 F.2d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 1993).
When the ALJ fails to provide a narrative discussion
describing how the evidence supports each conclusion, citing to
specific medical facts and nonmedical evidence, the court will
conclude that his RFC conclusions are not supported by
substantial evidence.
See Southard v. Barnhart, 72 Fed. Appx.
781, 784-785 (10th Cir. July 28, 2003).
The ALJ’s decision must
be sufficiently articulated so that it is capable of meaningful
review; the ALJ is charged with carefully considering all of the
relevant evidence and linking his findings to specific evidence.
Spicer v. Barnhart, 64 Fed. Appx. 173, 177-178 (10th Cir. May 5,
2003).
It is insufficient for the ALJ to only generally discuss
the evidence, but fail to relate that evidence to his
conclusions.
Cruse v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 49
6
F.3d 614, 618 (10th Cir. 1995).
When the ALJ has failed to
comply with SSR 96-8p because he has not linked his RFC
determination with specific evidence in the record, the court
cannot adequately assess whether relevant evidence supports the
ALJ’s RFC determination.
Such bare conclusions are beyond
meaningful judicial review.
Brown v. Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration, 245 F. Supp.2d 1175, 1187 (D. Kan.
2003).
At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had severe
impairments of affective disorder and a generalized anxiety
disorder (R. at 14).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to
provide limitations related to his RFC finding of generalized
anxiety disorder, and that the RFC failed to incorporate all of
plaintiff’s mental limitations.
In reviewing plaintiff’s mental limitations, the ALJ found
that plaintiff had a moderate limitation in the category of
concentration, persistence and pace (R. at 15-16, 24).
Specifically, the ALJ stated that plaintiff has some difficulty
in sustaining focus, attention and concentration sufficiently
long enough to permit the timely and appropriate completion of
tasks commonly found in work settings (R. at 15-16).
The ALJ
stated that he accommodated the moderate difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence and pace by limiting
plaintiff in his RFC findings to simple, routine and repetitive
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tasks, involving only simple, work related decisions with few,
if any, work place changes (R. at 24, 16).
This limitation was
included in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert
(VE) (R. at 60).
The question raised is whether the RFC assessment is
insufficient because it lacks limitations consistent with all of
plaintiff’s severe mental impairments (Doc. 11 at 13).
The ALJ
himself found that plaintiff has moderate difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence and pace.
However, this
limitation was not included in the RFC findings, nor in the
hypothetical question to the VE.
Instead, the ALJ asserted that
this moderate limitation was accommodated by limiting plaintiff
in his RFC findings to simple, routine and repetitive tasks,
involving only simple, work-related decisions with few, if any,
work place changes.
Defendant argues that this restriction in
the RFC was designed to accommodate the credible restrictions
from plaintiff’s mental impairments, and that the ALJ reasonably
determined that further restrictions were not warranted by the
record (Doc. 14 at 6).
In the case of Jaramillo v. Colvin, 576 Fed. Appx. 870 (10th
Cir. Aug. 27, 2014), the ALJ expressly gave great weight to a
medical opinion (Dr. Mellon) that plaintiff had three moderate
mental limitations, including a moderate limitation in the
ability to attend and concentrate.
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Id. at 872, 873, 876.
On
the basis of the opinions of Dr. Mellon and Dr. Wynne, the ALJ,
in his RFC findings, limited plaintiff to simple, routine,
repetitive, unskilled tasks.
Id. at 873.
The court held that
the limitation to simple, routine, repetitive, and unskilled
tasks does not clearly relate the moderate impairments found by
Dr. Mellon, and given great weight by the ALJ.
Those moderate
impairments must be accounted for in an RFC finding and,
consequently, in a dispositive hypothetical to the VE.
As a
result of this failure, the ALJ’s reliance on the jobs the VE
identified in response to the hypothetical was not supported by
substantial evidence.
Id. at 876.
Even simple work can be ruled out by a vocational expert on
the basis of a serious impairment in concentration and
attention.
Moderate impairments may also decrease a claimant’s
ability to perform simple work.
Bowers v. Astrue, 271 Fed.
Appx. 731, 733 (10th Cir. March 26, 2008); see Brosnahan v.
Barnhart, 336 F.3d 671, 675 (8th Cir. 2003); Newton v. Chater, 92
F.3d 688, 695 (8th Cir. 1996)(two medical opinions indicated that
that claimant had moderate limitations in his ability to
maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; the
vocational expert testified that a moderate deficiency in
concentration and persistence would cause problems on an ongoing
daily basis regardless of what the job required from a physical
or skill standpoint; the court rejected the Commissioner’s
9
contention that deficiencies in attention and concentration,
along with other mental limitations, did not have to be included
in the hypothetical question because the question limited the
claimant’s capabilities to simple jobs).
In Wiederholt v. Barnhart, 121 Fed. Appx. 833, 839 (10th
Cir. Feb. 8, 2005), the ALJ posed a hypothetical question that
limited plaintiff to simple, unskilled work, and omitted from
the hypothetical the ALJ’s earlier and more specific findings
that she had various mild and moderate restrictions.
The court
held that the relatively broad, unspecified nature of the
description “simple” and “unskilled” did not adequately
incorporate additional, more specific findings regarding a
claimant’s mental impairments (including moderate difficulty in
maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace), and therefore
the hypothetical question was flawed.
Because of the flawed
hypothetical, the court found that the VE’s opinion that the
claimant could perform other work was therefore not substantial
evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.
The case law is clear that when the ALJ finds a moderate
difficulty in maintaining, concentration, persistence and pace,
or gives great weight to a medical opinion with that limitation,
a limitation in the RFC to simple, routine, repetitive and
unskilled tasks fails to clearly relate or incorporate the
moderate impairment.
The court therefore finds that the
10
restriction to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks in the RFC
findings fails to sufficiently relate, incorporate or
accommodate the mental limitation found by the ALJ that
plaintiff had a moderate difficulty in maintaining
concentration, persistence and pace.
This case shall therefore
be remanded in order for the ALJ to include this moderate
limitation in the RFC findings and in the hypothetical question
to the VE.
Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred in the relative
weight given to the various medical opinions.
The opinions of
physicians, psychologists, or psychiatrists who have seen a
claimant over a period of time for purposes of treatment are
given more weight than the views of consulting physicians or
those who only review the medical records and never examine the
claimant.
The opinion of an examining physician is generally
entitled to less weight than that of a treating physician, and
the opinion of an agency physician who has never seen the
claimant is entitled to the least weight of all.
Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1084 (10th Cir. 2004).
Robinson v.
When a treating
source opinion is inconsistent with the other medical evidence,
the ALJ’s task is to examine the other medical source’s reports
to see if they outweigh the treating source’s reports, not the
other way around.
Treating source opinions are given particular
weight because of their unique perspective to the medical
11
evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical
findings alone or from reports of individual examinations, such
as consultative examinations.
If an ALJ intends to rely on a
nontreating physician or examiner’s opinion, he must explain the
weight he is giving to it.
1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208,
The ALJ must provide a legally sufficient
explanation for rejecting the opinion of treating medical
sources in favor of non-examining or consulting medical sources.
Robinson, 366 F.3d at 1084.
A treating physician’s opinion about the nature and
severity of the claimant’s impairments should be given
controlling weight by the Commissioner if well supported by
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and if it is not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.
Castellano v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 26 F.3d
1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2),
416.927(d)(2).
When a treating physician opinion is not given
controlling weight, the ALJ must nonetheless specify what lesser
weight he assigned the treating physician opinion.
Barnhart, 366 F.3d 1078, 1083 (10th Cir. 2004).
Robinson v.
A treating
source opinion not entitled to controlling weight is still
entitled to deference and must be weighed using all of the
following factors:
12
(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency
of examination;
(2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship,
including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or
testing performed;
(3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is supported by
relevant evidence;
(4) consistency between the opinion and the record as a whole;
(5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area
upon which an opinion is rendered; and
(6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to
support or contradict the opinion.
Watkins v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300-1301 (10th Cir. 2003).
After considering the above factors, the ALJ must give good
reasons in his/her decision for the weight he/she ultimately
assigns the opinion.
If the ALJ rejects the opinion completely,
he/she must then give specific, legitimate reasons for doing so.
Watkins, 350 F.3d at 1301.
The record contains opinions from Dr. Atwood (R. at 913,
925, treating physician), Dr. Schicker (R. at 961-970, examining
physician), Dr. Reeves (R. at 814-817, examining physician), Dr.
Siemsen (R. at 842-849, 912, non-examining physician), Dr.
Tanjim ( R. at 1007-1011, treating psychiatrist), Dr. Koeneman
(R. at 808-810, examining psychologist), Dr. Adams and Dr. Stern
(R. at 828-840, 911, non-examining psychologists).
The ALJ
discussed each of the opinions in detail, and set forth the
relative weight he accorded to those opinions (R. at 21-25).
The court will not reweigh the evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the Commissioner.
13
Hackett v. Barnhart, 395
F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005); White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d
903, 905, 908, 909 (10th Cir. 2002).
Although the court will
not reweigh the evidence, the conclusions reached by the ALJ
must be reasonable and consistent with the evidence.
See Glenn
v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 988 (10th Cir. 1994)(the court must
affirm if, considering the evidence as a whole, there is
sufficient evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion).
the sufficiency of the evidence.
The court can only review
Although the evidence may
support a contrary finding, the court cannot displace the
agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even
though the court may have justifiably made a different choice
had the matter been before it de novo.
Oldham v. Astrue, 509
F.3d 1254, 1257-1258 (10th Cir. 2007).
The ALJ gave significant weight to the opinions of Dr.
Siemsen, a non-examining physician.1
The ALJ, however, did not
adopt Dr. Siemsen’s opinion that plaintiff could not climb
ladders, ropes or scaffolds, and provided specific reasons, with
citations to the medical record, for discounting that particular
opinion (R. at 21).
The ALJ found that plaintiff could
occasionally climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds (R. at 16).
This
finding is consistent with the only other specific physical RFC
1
Dr. Siemsen affirmed the opinion of a single decision maker (SDM) (R. at 842-849, 912). Although the decision
of an SDM is entitled to no weight as a medical opinion, a medical consultant may adopt the SDM opinion as his
own. An ALJ does not err by relying on an opinion affirmed by an acceptable medial source after reviewing the
evidence in the file. Hernandez v. Colvin, Case No. 13-2596-SAC (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2015; Doc. 17 at 15-16).
14
opinion, that of Dr. Schicker (R. at 968).
The court finds that
the ALJ gave specific, legitimate reasons for discounting this
opinion by Dr. Siemsen.
The ALJ also included some additional
postural and environmental limitations not contained in the
report of Dr. Siemsen, which was to plaintiff’s benefit (R. at
21).
The ALJ also gave specific, legitimate reasons for
discounting the opinions of Dr. Atwood and Dr. Reeves (R. at 2122).
Both physicians only gave opinions on the ultimate issue
of disability, and did not set forth any specific physical and
or mental limitations.
In fact, Dr. Atwood stated that he was
unable to complete the medical source statement, and could only
offer a guess as to Mr. Keel’s physical limitations; he did
indicate that nearly anything he would do physically would
exacerbate his pain condition, and that any occupation would
create stress which would cause substantial decompensation
mentally (R. at 935).
Treating source opinions on issues that
are reserved to the Commissioner, including whether a claimant
is disabled, should be carefully considered and must never be
ignored, but they are never entitled to controlling weight or
special significance.
SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183 at *2-3.
See
Franklin v. Astrue, 450 Fed. Appx. 782, 785 (10th Cir. Dec. 16,
2011)(court held that other than conclusory statement of total
disability, the doctor did not express any opinion concerning
15
claimant’s physical or mental capabilities; ALJ discounted
opinion because it was unsupported by medical records and
invaded the ultimate issue of disability which is reserved to
Commissioner; the court concluded that the ALJ decision to give
medical opinion little weight was supported by substantial
evidence).
The ALJ also stated that he gave no weight to the opinions
of Dr. Schicker, setting forth a number of reasons for
discounting his opinions (R. at 22).
However, Dr. Schicker’s
lifting/carrying limitations are consistent with or even less
restrictive than the ALJ’s RFC findings, and Dr. Schicker’s
postural limitations are either the same as, or even less
limited than those contained in the RFC findings (compare R. at
16 with R. at 965-970).
The ALJ found that plaintiff had a
number of more restrictive environmental limitations than those
found by Dr. Schicker.
On the other hand, Dr. Schicker included some manipulative
limitations in handling, fingering, feeling and pushing/pulling
with the hands, but offered no explanation for those limitations
(R. at 967).
The ALJ gave little weight to the manipulative
limitations, noting that they were contrary to a number of his
medical findings (preserved dexterity, negative tinel’s and
phalen’s testing, and bilateral grip strength greater than or
equal to 50 pounds, and ability to lift up to 50 pounds)(R. at
16
22).
The ALJ found that plaintiff could sit for up to 6 hours
and stand/walk for 2 hour in an 8 hour workday (R. at 16).
Dr.
Schicker found that plaintiff could sit for up to 5 hours, stand
for 3 hours, and walk for 2 hours in an 8 hour workday (R. at
966).
Thus, Dr. Schicker found plaintiff slightly more limited
in sitting, but less limited in standing/walking.
On this
point, the ALJ adopted the limitations of Dr. Siemsen.
Although
the evidence may support a contrary finding, the court finds no
clear error in the relative weight accorded to the opinions of
Dr. Schicker.
The ALJ discussed the opinions of Dr. Tanjim, and set forth
detailed, specific and legitimate reasons for discounting his
more restrictive mental limitations (R. at 22-24).
However, the
ALJ also discounted the opinions of Dr. Koeneman, Dr. Adams and
Dr. Stern that plaintiff’s mental impairments did not result in
significant work limitations and were not severe (R. at 22-25).
As noted above, the ALJ found that plaintiff had some mental
limitations, including a moderate difficulty in maintaining,
concentration, persistence and pace (R. at 24).
The ALJ discussed the medical records in great detail, and
set forth a number of specific findings which led the ALJ to
conclude that plaintiff was not disabled and did not have some
of the more severe limitations set forth by some of the medical
sources (R. at 18-25).
The court finds no clear error by the
17
ALJ in his analysis.
In summary, the court finds that the ALJ
provided specific and legitimate reasons for the weight assigned
to the opinions of the various medical sources; the court will
not reweigh the evidence.
IV.
Are the ALJ’s credibility findings supported by substantial
evidence?
Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of
the finder of fact, and a court will not upset such
determinations when supported by substantial evidence.
However,
findings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively
linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the
guise of findings.
Cir. 1995).
Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th
Furthermore, the ALJ cannot ignore evidence
favorable to the plaintiff.
Owen v. Chater, 913 F. Supp. 1413,
1420 (D. Kan. 1995).
When analyzing evidence of pain, the court does not require
a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence.
So
long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in
evaluating the claimant’s credibility, the ALJ will be deemed to
have satisfied the requirements set forth in Kepler.
White v.
Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2002); Qualls v. Apfel,
206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000).
Furthermore, the ALJ need
not discuss every relevant factor in evaluating pain testimony.
Bates v. Barnhart, 222 F. Supp.2d 1252, 1260 (D. Kan. 2002).
18
An
ALJ must therefore explain and support with substantial evidence
which part(s) of claimant’s testimony he did not believe and
why.
McGoffin v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th Cir.
2002).
It is error for the ALJ to use standard boilerplate
language which fails to set forth the specific evidence the ALJ
considered in determining that a claimant’s complaints were not
credible.
2004).
Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 679 (10th Cir.
On the other hand, an ALJ’s credibility determination
which does not rest on mere boilerplate language, but which is
linked to specific findings of fact fairly derived from the
record, will be affirmed by the court.
White, 287 F.3d at 909-
910.
The ALJ reviewed the medical evidence in detail, including
a number of specific findings which led the ALJ to discount some
of plaintiff’s allegations (R. at 18-20).
The ALJ considered
plaintiff’s work history, which the ALJ also found did not
support plaintiff’s allegations (R. at 20-21).
The ALJ also
discussed in some detail inconsistencies in his activities of
daily living (R. at 20, 24).
The ALJ extensively discussed the
medical opinion evidence, and as noted above, provided specific
and legitimate reasons for the relative weight accorded to those
opinions.
The court will not reweigh the evidence.
The court
finds no clear error in the ALJ’s credibility analysis, and the
court will not reweigh the evidence.
19
The court finds that the
balance of the ALJ’s credibility analysis is supported by
substantial evidence.
Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1274
(10th Cir. 2004)( “While we have some concerns regarding the ALJ’s
reliance on plaintiff’s alleged failure to follow a weight loss
program and her performance of certain minimal household chores,
we conclude that the balance of the ALJ’s credibility analysis
is supported by substantial evidence in the record”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the judgment of the
Commissioner is reversed and remanded pursuant to sentence four
of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with
this memorandum and order.
Dated this 10th day of March 2015, Topeka, Kansas.
s/Sam A. Crow
Sam A. Crow, U.S. District Senior Judge
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