Brin et al v. ACI Motor Freight, Inc. et al

Filing 47

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying as moot 6 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot 7 Motion to Dismiss; denying as moot 10 Motion to Dismiss. Parties may file a motion concerning the Court's personal jurisdiction over defendants on or before 10/6/2014. See Order for details. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 9/15/2014. (cm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

AUTUMN M. BRIN, Individually and on
behalf of her son, Devon Hoffman, a minor
Plaintiffs,

vs.

Case No. 14-CV-1125-EFM-KGG

ACI MOTOR FREIGHT, INC.,
ROBERT L. CLAIBOURN, III,
GIBSON & ASSOCIATES, INC.,
KROGER CO., and
JOSHUA ROWLEY,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Autumn Brin and her son, Devon Hoffman, seek monetary damages against
Defendants ACI Motor Freight, Inc.; Robert L. Claibourn, III; Gibson & Associates, Inc.
(“Gibson”); Kroger Co.; and Joshua Rowley for injuries allegedly resulting from a traffic
accident. Defendants Kroger Co., GAI, and Rowley ask this Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).
Alternatively, Defendants GAI and Rowley also request dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). As explained more fully below,
Defendants’ motions are denied as moot.

I.

Legal Standard

Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to justiciable cases and
controversies.1 A justiciable case or controversy is one that presents the court with a question
“in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial process” and does not “intrude into areas committed to the other branches of
government.”2 To enforce this restriction on federal-court jurisdiction, the Supreme Court relies
on both Article III and certain prudential requirements announced in case law.3
Mootness is one aspect of the court’s inquiry into justiciability. The mootness doctrine
requires that the court be able to “grant effectual relief” to redress an ongoing injury affecting a
party.4 The issue for the court’s consideration must be “extant at all stages of review, not merely
at the time the complaint is filed.”5 “[A] federal court has no authority to give advisory opinions
upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law which
cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it. For that reason, if an event occurs while a
case is pending . . . that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever .
. . the [issue] must be dismissed.”6

1

U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2 (defining the power of the federal courts to include nine enumerated categories of
“cases” and “controversies”).
2

Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).

3

Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 2.2 (5th ed. 2007); see also Flast, 392 U.S. at 96 (“[I]t is quite
clear that the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability is that the federal courts will not
give advisory opinions.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
4

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

5

Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67

6

Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quotation marks and citation

(1997).
omitted).

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II.

Analysis

Plaintiffs originally filed this negligence action in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Colorado, asserting diversity as the basis for the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332. Brin and her son are Colorado residents. Except for Stiefvater, all Defendants
reside in states other than Colorado.

The Complaint alleges that Stiefvater is a Colorado

resident. Pointing to the lack of complete diversity among the parties, Kroger Co., Gibson, and
Rowley each moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Additionally, Gibson and Rowley each requested dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Gibson (a Texas corporation) and Rowley (a Kansas resident) contend that
Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not allege sufficient contacts between themselves and Colorado to
subject them to the judgments of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado.
Plaintiffs responded to Defendants’ motions but not to Rowley’s lack of personal
jurisdiction claim.

To establish complete diversity among the parties, Plaintiffs agreed to

dismiss Stiefvater.7 Plaintiffs defended, however, the District of Colorado’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over Gibson based on Gibson’s registration with the Colorado Secretary of State and
the Colorado Department of Transportation to conduct business in Colorado. Gibson rejected
Plaintiffs’ allegations of mere registration to conduct business in a state as sufficient to establish
continuous and systematic contacts with Colorado. Subsequent to an evidentiary hearing on the
matter of personal jurisdiction over Gibson, Plaintiffs filed a motion to transfer venue to the

7

To invoke diversity jurisdiction, “a party must show that complete diversity of citizenship exists between
the adverse parties and that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.” Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 987
(10th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). In this case, the parties do not dispute that the
amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold. The dispute here centers on whether complete diversity
of citizenship exists. The court lacks diversity jurisdiction when any of the plaintiffs has the same residency as even
a single defendant. Id. Stiefvater was the only defendant named by Plaintiffs who, like Plaintiffs, resided in
Colorado. With Stiefvater’s dismissal, no defendant has the same residency as Plaintiffs, establishing complete
diversity.

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District of Kansas. Without ruling on Defendants’ motions, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against Stiefvater and granted Plaintiffs’ motion
to transfer venue to the District of Kansas. With the only non-diverse party now dismissed and
the case removed from the District of Colorado, the Court now finds Defendants’ jurisdiction
claims moot.
The Parties are granted an extension of time to file, as necessary, new motions regarding
this Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendants based upon the status of this case as it now
exists. Such motions must be filed within 21 days from the date of this Order.
Accordingly,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Kroger Co.’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
6) is hereby DENIED AS MOOT,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Gibson & Associates, Inc.’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. 7) is hereby DENIED AS MOOT,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Joshua Rowley’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 10) is hereby DENIED AS MOOT,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Parties may file a motion concerning this Court’s
personal jurisdiction over Defendants within 21 days of September 15, 2014.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 15th day of September 2014.

ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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