Great Plains Ventures, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company

Filing 69

ORDER denying 63 defendant's motion to stay. Signed by Magistrate Judge James P. O'Hara on 02/12/2015. (mb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
GREAT PLAINS VENTURES, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 14-1136-JAR

LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.

ORDER
This case is before the undersigned U.S. Magistrate Judge, James P. O’Hara, on
defendant Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company’s motion to stay pending its Rule
72(a) objection to the court’s discovery order (ECF doc. 63). For the reasons discussed
below, defendant’s motion is denied.
On December 29, 2014, plaintiff Great Plains Ventures, Inc. filed a motion to
compel arguing that defendant’s responses to its first set of production requests were
evasive or incomplete. In response, defendant reasserted its relevancy and confidentiality
objections to support its withholding and redaction of certain documents. On January 29,
2015, the court overruled defendant’s objections and ordered defendant to produce unredacted copies of all responsive documents by February 9, 2015.1 Defendant then filed
the instant motion to stay in anticipation of filing its objection to the discovery order. On
1

See ECF doc. 62.

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February 12, 2015, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), defendant filed a motion to review
the January 29, 2015 order compelling production. Defendant argues that the court’s
discovery order is “erroneous and contrary to law for several reasons, including the
following: (a) information … related to other insureds, insured under other insurance
contracts, issued by a different insurance company has no arguable relevancy to the
pending action; and (b) reserve information is inadmissible at trial, and not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”2
In its motion, defendant asserts that “any production of the subject materials prior
to [] a ruling [by the district judge] would be unduly and irreversibly prejudicial to
defendant.”3 Therefore, defendant asks that the court enter a stay of its order until the
presiding U.S. District Judge, Julie A. Robinson, has considered and ruled upon its
objection. Defendant cited no other authority or case law in support of its request.
Plaintiff responds that the stay should be denied because this is not an emergency
situation requiring a stay and a delay in document production will delay the trial
schedule.4 Plaintiff argues that compliance with the discovery order will not unduly or
irreversibly prejudice defendant because: (1) the order does not require production of
privileged documents; (2) after production, defendant can continue to advance its
relevance-based objections to the admission of these documents as evidence; and (3) any
2

ECF doc. 67.

3

ECF doc. 63 at 2.

4

See ECF doc. 65.

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concerns about confidentiality are adequately addressed by the protective order already
entered in this case. However, if a stay is entered, plaintiff insists that the further delay in
the production of documents will jeopardize the deadlines set in the scheduling order.
Plaintiff asserts that it will also delay the depositions of defendant’s representatives
whom plaintiff seeks to depose regarding the content of the documents defendant has
been ordered to produce.
In its reply, defendant argues that it is “only reasonable and proper that the
production be stayed until the District Judge has considered the objections.”5 Defendant
asserts that a stay of this discovery will have no impact on other discovery or the
scheduling of depositions. And, even if discovery is delayed, defendant asserts that this
isn’t a reason to deny its right to have the order reviewed by the district judge. Defendant
argues that the information sought is likely not admissible and once plaintiff sees it, it
can’t be unseen. Therefore, defendant insists that even if the district judge overturns the
discovery order, it will “fail to rectify the prejudice to defendant resulting from plaintiff’s
counsel having already seen the information.” Once again, defendant cites no authority
in support of its request for a stay.6

5

ECF doc. 68 at 1.

6

Defendant did cite to Boardwalk Apartments, L.C. v. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., No. 11-2714, 2014 WL 2690150, *3 (D. Kan. June 13, 2014), but only for the
proposition that the “reserve information is not admissible at trial” (ECF doc. 68 at 2).
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Although the parties have not cited, and the court was unable to locate, any
standard specific to consideration of a motion to stay an order of a magistrate judge
pending resolution of an appeal by objections filed with the district court, some courts
have held that a stay of a magistrate judge’s discovery order should be granted sparingly.7
Allowing such stays as a matter of course would encourage the filing of frivolous
objections and grind the magistrate judge system to a halt.8 As the court noted in our
sister district:
Discovery matters have been delegated to the magistrate judges in order to
promote judicial efficiency and speedy resolution of pretrial disputes…. Illconsidered “strategic” objections to a magistrate judge’s orders threaten to
undermine these goals and do a disservice to the parties, who presumably
are themselves interested in a speedy resolution of their disputes.9
However, a stay of a magistrate judge’s discovery order may be appropriate where there
is a serious issue about the propriety of the ruling and where a failure to render a stay
could result in serious, irreversible injury to the party seeking the stay.10

7

See HEI Resources East OMG Joint Venture v. Evans, No. 09-00028, 2009 WL
250364, *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 3, 2009); Granato v. City and County of Denver, No. 11-304,
2011 WL 1335854, *2 (D. Colo. Apr. 7, 2011); Copic Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
No. 09-00041, 2010 WL 935646, *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 11, 2010); Zander v. Craig Hosp.,
09-2121, 2010 WL 1571213, *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 20, 2010).
8

Granato, 2011 WL 133585854, at *2 (citing Litton Indus., Inc. v. Lehman Bros.
Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 75, 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
9

Id. (quoting Nat’l Excess Ins. v. Civerolo, Hansen & Wolf, P.A., 139 F.R.D. 401, 404
(D.N.M. 1991).
10

Id. See Adams v. Gateway, Inc., No. 02-106, 2004 WL 733990, *2 (D. Utah Jan. 5,
2004) (stating that there is no existing authority concerning the standard for a stay
pending resolution of an objection to a magistrate judge’s order by adopting a four part
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Here, defendant has not shown that a stay is necessary to protect its interests.
Although defendant claims that it will be unduly and irreversibly prejudiced if a stay is
not entered, defendant fails to state any specifics as to how it will be prejudiced.
Defendant only makes conclusory assertions. As recognized in Granato, a stay may be
appropriate where enforcing the existing discovery order would require the disclosure of
arguably privileged information, trade secrets to a competitor, or the like. 11

But,

relevancy is the only objection at issue here. Defendant has not only failed to show any
irreparable harm, but it has not even shown it is unduly burdensome for it to comply with
the order and submit un-redacted forms of the responsive documents. Therefore, the
court sees no reason to grant defendant’s unsupported request and risk unnecessarily
delaying the proceedings.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Defendant’s motion to stay (ECF doc. 63) is denied.
2. All responsive documents that defendant has been ordered to produce shall be
served by February 20, 2015.

test involving “(1) the likelihood of success on appeal; (2) the threat of irreparable harm
if the stay is not granted; (3) the absence of harm to opposing parties if the stay is
granted; and (4) any risk of harm to the public interest”).
11

Id.

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Dated February 12, 2015 at Kansas City, Kansas.

s/ James P. O’Hara
James P. O’Hara
U. S. Magistrate Judge

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