Society of Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace, IFPTE Local 2001 et al v. Spirit Aerosystems, Inc. et al

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 22 Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim for Declaratory Judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kenneth G. Gale on 6/8/15. (df)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL
ENGINEERING EMPLOYEES IN
AEROSPACE, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
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SPIRIT AEROSYSTEMS, INC., et al.,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )

Case No.: 14-1407-EFM-KGG

MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Leave to File Counterclaim for
Declaratory Judgment (Doc. 22). Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the
Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion.
This action was brought by Plaintiff in December 2014, with Plaintiff
SPEEA seeking to
(1) compel arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement on behalf of, or (2) to enforce the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement between, SPEEA and
Spirit or (3) for reformation of that Agreement, and by
[individual Plaintiffs] in the alternative to (1) enforce
their rights under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §1001 et seq., (‘ERISA’)
or, (2) for reformation of a Plan document.
(Doc. 1, at 1-2.) Defendants filed their Answer on January 22, 2015, generally
denying Plaintiffs’ allegations and raising certain affirmative defenses. (Doc. 9.)

No Scheduling Order has been entered in this case as a result of Plaintiff’s motion
for partial judgment on the pleadings and motion to stay discovery. (Doc. 17, text
entry, 3/26/15; Doc. 18.)
Defendants now move the Court for an Order allowing them to file a
counterclaim for declaratory judgment on
the threshold question of whether the Spirit Health Plan’s
requirement that otherwise-eligible employees who are
laid off within 30 months before turning age 62 must
enroll in the Access Only retiree medical plan at the time
of layoff, to be eligible to enroll in company subsidized
retiree medical coverage upon turning 62, violates the
collective bargaining agreement, which provides that
benefits shall be provided as defined in the Plans.
(Doc. 23, at 1.) In response, Plaintiffs argues that the requested amendment should
be denied because of undue delay, that they would be prejudiced by the
amendment, and that any such counterclaim is futile. (See Doc. 25.)
The Declaratory Judgment Act “confers jurisdiction on federal courts to
hear declaratory judgment actions,” but “does not impose a duty upon district
courts to make a declaration of rights.” Board of County Comm’rs v. Continental
Western Ins. Co., 174 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1120 (D. Kan. 2001) (citing 28 U.S.C.
2201(a)). “Instead, the decision whether to exercise jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act over actions in which they otherwise have jurisdiction is
within the sound discretion of the district courts.” Id., (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls
2

Co., 515 U.S. 277, 282, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Runyon, 53 F.3d 1167, 1168 (10th Cir.1995)).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “a party may amend its
pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave.” In the
absence of any apparent or declared reason, such as undue delay, undue prejudice
to the opposing party, bad faith or dilatory motive, failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, or futility of amendment, leave to amend should
be freely given, as required by the federal rule. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962); Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d
1357, 1365 (10th Cir.1993).
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the proposed amendment has not
been brought with undue delay nor would allowing it cause undue prejudice to
Plaintiffs. As stated by Defendants, they “moved for leave to assert a counterclaim
less than two months after they filed their Answer, less than one month after
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, before discovery
started, and, most significantly, before the deadline for amending the pleadings had
passed or even been established.” (Doc. 26, at 1.) While Defendants could have
included their counterclaim in their original Answer, this does not prohibit them
from moving to amend.
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The Court’s analysis thus turns to the issue of futility.
‘A proposed amendment would be futile if the amended
[pleading] would be subject to dismissal.’ The Court
applies the standard governing motions to dismiss under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) to determine whether the proposed
amendment is futile. That is, the [pleading] ‘must
present ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’’ When deciding whether the [party
moving for amendment] has stated a plausible claim, the
Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the
[pleading] and views them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. ‘Conclusory statements, threadbare recitals
of elements, and legal conclusions, however, are not
entitled to a presumption of truth.’
Szczygiel v. Kansas, 2015 WL 630570, at *2 (D. Kan. Feb. 12, 2015) (citations
omitted). Given these parameters, and in the context of the present Motion for
Leave, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established that the proposed
amendment is futile.1 The Motion for Leave (Doc. 22) is, therefore, GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated at Wichita, Kansas, on this 8th day of June, 2015.
S/ KENNETH G. GALE

KENNETH G. GALE
United States Magistrate Judge

1

This ruling does not impact any determination of potential dispositive motions
by the District Court.
4