Smith v. Via Christi
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 30 Motion to Set Aside. Plaintiff is ordered to execute the formal settlement agreement within 10 days of this order. Signed by District Judge John W. Broomes on 08/24/2018. Mailed to pro se party Gretta E. Smith at 938 N. Belmont, Wichita, KS 67208 by regular mail. (aa)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
GRETA SMITH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 17-1270-JWB
VIA CHRISTI AND ASSOCIATES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff moves the court to set aside its June 15, 2018 order which found a handwritten
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), signed by both parties following a court-ordered
mediation, constituted a binding and enforceable settlement agreement. (Doc. 30.) The motion is
fully briefed and ripe for decision.1 (Doc. 33.) Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED for the reasons stated
herein.
I.
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit against her former employer alleging racial
discrimination and retaliatory discharge in October 2017. (Doc. 1.) Following a four-hour court
ordered mediation, the parties reached an agreement. The essential terms of the agreement were
memorialized in the MOU prepared by the mediator and signed by all parties to the agreement.
(Doc. 28, Exh. B.)
One week later, Defendant sent Plaintiff the formalized settlement agreement. Five days
after the formalized agreement was sent, and twelve days after the mediation, plaintiff informed
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Plaintiff did not file a reply brief and the time for doing so has now passed.
the mediator that she refused to sign the agreement, instead demanding more money for settlement
of her claims. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to enforce the settlement to which Plaintiff
failed to respond. The court granted Defendant’s motion to enforce the settlement after finding
that: (1) a meeting of the minds had occurred during the mediation; (2) the parties reduced the full
terms of their agreement to a signed handwritten MOU; and (3) the MOU did not state that it was
conditioned upon the execution of a final settlement agreement. (Doc. 29.)
II.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff does not contest that she reached an agreement following mediation which she
voluntarily bargained for and signed; rather, her argument is that she was not aware the agreement
was binding and that she believed she had seven days to consider whether to adhere to the terms
of the MOU. (Doc. 30.) Plaintiff also asserts that her failure to respond to Defendant’s motion to
enforce the settlement agreement was due to illness.
Plaintiff does not specify the rule of procedure that she believe requires the court to modify
or supplement its June 15, 2018 order. Nevertheless, the court will consider the pro se motion
liberally.
A. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
District of Kansas Rule 7.3(a), which governs motions for reconsideration, states that
“[p]arties seeking reconsideration of dispositive orders or judgments must file a motion pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60. The court will not grant reconsideration of such
an order or judgment under this rule.” D. Kan. R. 7.3(a).
Here, the order challenged by Plaintiff was dispositive in that it would ultimately result in
the dismissal of her action. Thus, the court must decide whether Rule 59 (e) or Rule 60 provides
Plaintiff a mechanism for relief.
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B. RULE 59(e) MOTION
“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry
of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Motions pursuant to Rule 59 are appropriate in the event
of “(1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, [or]
(3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice,” and may be granted “where the
court has misapprehended the facts, a party's position, or the controlling law.” Servants of the
Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir.2000).
Here, because Plaintiff’s motion was filed within 28 days of the court's judgment, and the
motion seeks to alter the substantive ruling of the court, the court could construe Plaintiff’s motion
as a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e). However, Plaintiff has not
shown a change in controlling law, introduced any new evidence, or identified any clear error in
the court’s decision.
The only argument Plaintiff has alleged is that she believed she had time to consider and
reject the offer and was “unaware” she was signing a binding agreement. But, Plaintiff points to
no evidence that this confusion was due to any misrepresentation by the mediator or Defendant.
Plaintiff seems to believe that the agreement reached during settlement was not binding until
Defendant sent the formalized contract for her to sign.
However, under Kansas contract law, the mere “fact that the parties contemplate the
subsequent execution of a formal instrument as evidence of their agreement does not necessarily
imply they have not already bound themselves to a definite and enforceable contract.” Phillips &
Easton Supply Co., Inc. v. Eleanor Int'l, 212 Kan. 730, 735 (1973). “A settlement agreement is
enforceable if there has been a meeting of the minds on all essential terms and the parties intend
to be bound by it.” Terracon Consultants, Inc. v. Drash, 2013 WL 6080429, at *6 (D. Kan. 2013).
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The court has already considered the enforceability of the settlement agreement and is
unconvinced that the decision requires revisiting. Although Plaintiff’s motion identifies some
health issues that occurred after the execution of the MOU, Plaintiff fails to present any basis for
the court to set aside its decision on the basis of manifest injustice. Thus, Plaintiff’s motion fails
under Rule 59(e).
C. RULE 60 MOTION
Rule 60(b) states that the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer
equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
The six provisions of Rule 60(b) “are mutually exclusive.” See Pioneer Inv. Services Co.
v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Psp., 507 U.S. 380, 393, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1488 (1993). Thus, any
claims that fit within one of the specific grounds enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1)-(b)(5) may not be
raised under subdivision (6). Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863, 108
S. Ct. 2194, 2204 (1988); In re Gledhill, 76 F.3d 1070, 1080 (10th Cir. 1996).
After reviewing Plaintiff’s motion, the court finds that Plaintiff could be asserting mistake
or excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). The other provisions of Rule 60 are inapplicable.
The guidelines governing the court's consideration of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion are well
established. “Rule 60(b)(1) relief is not available for a party who simply misunderstands the legal
consequences of his deliberate acts.” Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 577 (10th Cir.
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1996). “Rule 60(b)(1) provides for relief from default judgments under the mistake provision only
under one of the following prongs: (1) a party has made an excusable litigation mistake or an
attorney in the litigation has acted without authority from a party; or (2) the court has made a
substantive mistake of law or fact in the final judgment or order.” In re Wallace, 298 B.R. 435,
440 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003), aff'd, 99 F. App'x 870 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Yapp v. Excel Corp.,
186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir.1999)). Here, plaintiff cites her medical condition as the reason for
her failure to respond. However, this long-term condition has not prevented her from meeting any
previous filing deadlines. Moreover, nothing in Plaintiff’s current motion shows grounds for
altering the court’s prior decision. Nor does the court find Plaintiff’s argument that she was
unaware the MOU was a binding agreement rises to the level of mistake contemplated by Rule
60(b)(1).
A settlement agreement is a contract and issues involving their formation, construction and
enforceability are resolved by applying state contract law. Terracon Consultants, Inc. v. Drash,
No. 12-2345-EFM, 2013 WL 6080429, *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 19, 2013). In analyzing similar issues,
the Kansas Supreme Court follows the rule that, “parties assume the risk of mistake as to matters
intended to be resolved by the compromise, a compromise and settlement is not defective merely
because the parties were ignorant or mistaken as to the full extent of their rights…. A person who
enters into a compromise, consciously ignorant of a fact but meaning to waive all inquiry into it,
is not mistaken, in the legal sense; in such a situation it is the intention of the parties to accept the
consequences of uncertainty.” In re Estate of Thompson, 226 Kan. 437, 441, 601 P.2d 1105 (1979)
(quoting Fieser v. Stinnett, 212 Kan. 26, 32-33, 509 P.2d 1156 (1973)).
Plaintiff fails to allege a mistake in her understanding of the settlement agreement’s
enforceability which would require the June 2018 order be set aside. Plaintiff’s motion concedes
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she signed an agreement, “but not a contract.” (Doc. 30.) However, the formal agreement was but
a formality of the already binding MOU agreement, which contained no indication either party
requested or negotiated for time to consider the terms further.
With respect to excusable neglect, although Plaintiff’s excuse for failing to respond may
be meritorious, Plaintiff has not asserted any legal basis to find the MOU unenforceable.
Moreover, the court’s previous order did not order the enforcement of the MOU solely as an
uncontested motion. Rather, the court additionally reviewed the motion on the merits and found
the MOU enforceable.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion to set aside the order under Rule 60(b)(1) is denied.
III.
CONCLUSION
The settlement agreement signed by Plaintiff represented a binding agreement and no
mechanism available to Plaintiff persuades the court to set aside its prior order. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s motion to set aside is DENIED (Doc. 30.) Plaintiff is ordered to execute the formal
settlement agreement within 10 days of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of August, 2018.
__s/ John W. Broomes____________
JOHN W. BROOMES
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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