Morrison v. Geico General Insurance Company
Filing
33
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER denying 21 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Eric F. Melgren on 10/17/2018. (cm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
PAUL MORRISON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 17-CV-1272-EFM
GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
In June 2016, Plaintiff Paul Morrison sustained injuries after his vehicle allegedly hit a tire
or tire tread, lost control, and flipped. He provided his auto insurer, Defendant GEICO General
Insurance Company, with a settlement demand and Defendant denied coverage under the
applicable insurance policy. This suit followed. Plaintiff seeks damages allegedly available
pursuant to his uninsured motorist coverage.
The matter is currently before the Court on
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 21). For the reasons stated below, the Court
denies Defendant’s Motion.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background1
At approximately 10:35 p.m. on June 5, 2016, while traveling alone in Illinois, Plaintiff
was injured in a one-vehicle accident. Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that he struck a large tire that
fell off an unidentified vehicle or its load. Plaintiff testified that he only saw the alleged object for
a split second, and that he was not sure what he had hit, but that he believed he had hit a tire tread.
Plaintiff does not know where the alleged tire tread came from, how it got in the road, or how long
it had been in the road.
Plaintiff informed the investigating police officer, Officer Korando, that he struck
“something in the roadway” which caused his vehicle to leave the roadway, strike a ditch, and roll
onto its roof. Officer Korando testified that he would have specifically stated in his report what
kind of object Plaintiff struck if he had been provided that information. While at the scene of the
accident, Officer Korando did not see any tire, tire tread, or debris in the roadway or along the side
of the road. During accident investigations, Officer Korando routinely inquires into the existence
of any witnesses and lists witnesses, if any, in his report. Officer Korando’s report listed no
witnesses to Plaintiff’s accident.
According to Plaintiff, a couple—the Woolfords—traveling in the same direction as
Plaintiff saw the accident and stopped to assist. While at the scene of the accident, Mr. Woolford
allegedly searched the immediate area, but found no tire, tire parts, or debris of any kind.
1
The facts in this section, unless otherwise noted, are uncontroverted for purposes of summary judgment.
-2-
Plaintiff’s attempts to contact the Woolfords have been unsuccessful, and no testimony or
admissible statements have been procured from the Woolfords.
Plaintiff has not identified evidence that the alleged tire tread fell from a vehicle
transporting an unsecured load of debris, or that if it had, the owner or operator of such vehicle
was aware of the loss. Nor has Plaintiff identified any evidence that the driver of the vehicle that
lost the tire tread would have known that it had been lost. Plaintiff’s expert on this issue agrees
that when a semi-trailer, or similar trailer, loses a tread on a double set of wheels, the driver may
not be aware that the tread had been lost.
At the time of Plaintiff’s accident, Plaintiff possessed a GEICO automobile liability policy
(“Policy”). Section IV of the Policy provides uninsured motorist coverage and states that “we will
pay damages for bodily injury caused by accident which the insured is legally entitled to recover
from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle or hit-and-run motor vehicle arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that auto.”2 Section IV defines a hit-and-run motor
vehicle and an uninsured motor vehicle as follows:
1. “Hit-and-run motor vehicle” is a motor vehicle whose operator or owner
cannot be identified and which causes an accident resulting in bodily injury
without hitting
(a) you or any relative;
(b) a vehicle which you or any relative are occupying; or
(c) your insured auto,
2
The Policy indicates which terms are defined in the Policy by bolding and italicizing those terms or phrases.
Thus, terms and phrases not bolded and italicized are not given definitions in the Policy. Unless otherwise noted, all
quotes to the Policy include the original typographical emphases.
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Provided the insured or someone on his behalf:
(a) reports the accident within 24 hours to a police, peace or judicial officer or
to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles;
(b) files with us within 30 days a statement setting forth the facts of the
accident and claiming that he has a cause of action for damages against an
unidentified person; and
(c) makes available for inspection, at our request, the auto occupied by the
insured at the time of the accident.
In an accident involving a hit-and-run motor vehicle where there has not been
any physical contact with the hit-and-run motor vehicle, the facts of the
accident must be proven by reliable evidence from disinterested witnesses who
are not making claim under this or similar coverage.
....
7. “Uninsured motor vehicle” is a motor vehicle which had no bodily injury
liability bond or insurance policy applicable with liability limits complying
with the financial responsibility law of the state in which the insured auto is
principally garaged at the time of an accident. This term also includes an auto
whose insurer is or becomes insolvent or denies coverage and an underinsured
motor vehicle as defined.
The term “uninsured motor vehicle” does not include:
(a) an insured auto;
(b) an auto owned or operated by a self-insurer within the meaning of any
motor vehicle financial responsibility law, motor carrier law or any
similar law;
(c) an auto owned by the United States of America, any other national
government, a state, or a political sub-division of any such government
or its agencies;
(d) a land motor vehicle or trailer operated on rails or crawler-treads or
located [illegible] or premises; or
(e) a farm-type tractor or equipment designed for use principally off public
roads except while used on public roads.
-4-
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that his injuries resulted from the negligence of an
uninsured motorist, that he is entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under his Policy with
Defendant, and that Defendant has refused to provide coverage. Neither parties’ briefing of the
Motion addressed the language of the Policy, and on October 9, 2018, the Court held a hearing to
allow the parties an opportunity to address the language of the Policy.3
II.
Legal Standard
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.4 A fact is
“material” when it is essential to the claim, and issues of fact are “genuine” if the proffered
evidence permits a reasonable jury to decide the issue in either party’s favor.5 The movant bears
the initial burden of proof and must show the lack of evidence on an essential element of the claim.6
If the movant carries his initial burden, the nonmoving party may not simply rest on its pleading,
but must instead “set forth specific facts” that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial
from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.7 These facts must be clearly
identified through affidavits, deposition transcripts, or incorporated exhibits—conclusory
3
Instead, the parties’ briefs focused primarily on the requirements of K.S.A. § 40-284—the Kansas uninsured
motorist statute.
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
5
Haynes v. Level 3 Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006).
6
Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 851 (10th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
7
Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).
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allegations alone cannot survive a motion for summary judgment.8 The Court views all evidence
and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.9
III.
Analysis10
Defendant’s brief alleges that the Policy “incorporated the language of K.S.A. 40284(e)(3)”—the Kansas uninsured motorist statute—and argues that based on K.S.A. § 40284(e)(3), the Policy does not provide coverage for Plaintiff’s claim. At oral argument, Defendant
also argued that the Policy language precludes coverage for Plaintiff’s claim because the definition
of a hit-and-run motor vehicle is “a motor vehicle which causes an accident” and here a tire—not
a motor vehicle—caused the accident; thus, no coverage exists. Although the Policy at issue in
this case does not incorporate the language of K.S.A. § 40-284, as alleged, the Court will first set
forth the relevant law regarding K.S.A. § 40-284 because that statute delineates the minimum
uninsured motorist coverage required under Kansas law.
A.
The Kansas uninsured motorist statute
In 1968, the Kansas legislature enacted K.S.A. § 40-284, the Kansas uninsured motorist
statute, which made uninsured motorist coverage “mandatory” for automobile liability insurance
policies issued in Kansas.11 As described by the Kansas Supreme Court, “the uninsured motorist
statute is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to provide a broad protection to the
insured against all damages resulting from bodily injuries sustained by the insured, caused by an
8
Mitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d 1190, 1197 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
9
LifeWise Master Funding v. Telebank, 374 F.3d 917, 927 (10th Cir. 2004).
10
Both parties’ arguments assume that Kansas law applies to the interpretation of the Policy. Nothing before
the Court indicates that another state’s law would apply, and the Policy suggests that Kansas law governs its
interpretation. Accordingly, the Court construes the Policy under Kansas law.
11
Cannon v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., 274 Kan. 166, 50 P.3d 48, 51 (2002).
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automobile accident, and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the insured motor
vehicle, where those damages are caused by the acts of an uninsured motorist.”12 An insurance
provision which denies protection otherwise required by the statute “is an attempt to limit or dilute
the unqualified uninsured motorist coverage mandated by K.S.A. 40-284 and is therefore void and
unenforceable.”13
The Kansas legislature amended the uninsured motorist statute in 1981, “primarily in
response to Simpson,” in order “to permit, among other exclusions, . . . the phantom hit-and-run
vehicle” limitation authorized in current subsection (e)(3).14 In Simpson, the plaintiff was forced
to drive her vehicle into a ditch in order to avoid colliding with another vehicle; the other vehicle
fled from the scene of the accident and the owner of the fleeing vehicle was never identified.15
The policy at issue “excluded coverage when there was no physical contact between the insured
and the uninsured phantom vehicle,” and the Kansas Supreme Court found “that the ‘physical
contact’ requirement in the ‘hit and run’ provisions of the [policy] was in derogation of the
uninsured motorist statute and was, therefore, void as against public policy.”16
12
Simpson v. Farmers Ins. Co. Inc., 225 Kan. 508, 592 P.2d 445, 448 (1979).
13
Id. at 450 (holding “ ‘physical contact’ requirement in the ‘hit and run’ provisions of the automobile
liability policy . . . in derogation of the Kansas Uninsured Motorist Statute, and [] therefore, void as against public
policy”). In Simpson, the policy in question denied “protection to an insured for damages and injuries caused by a
‘hit and run’ vehicle unless there [was] actual physical contact between the vehicles.” Id. at 448-49. See also Cannon,
50 P.3d at 51 (“Any attempts not authorized by statute to condition, limit, or dilute the broad, unqualified mandated
uninsured motorist coverage are void and unenforceable.”).
14
Cannon, 50 P.3d at 51 (emphasis added).
15
Simpson, 592 P.2d at 446.
16
Cannon, 50 P.3d at 51.
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The statute now includes six subparts, (a)-(f).17 Applicable here are subsections (a) and
(e)—those addressing mandatory coverage and permissive limitations. These subsections provide:
(a) No automobile liability insurance policy covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or
issued for delivery in this state . . . unless the policy contains or has endorsed
thereon, a provision with coverage limits equal to the limits of liability
coverage for bodily injury or death in such automobile liability insurance policy
sold to the named insured for payment of part or all sums which the insured or
the insured’s legal representative shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the uninsured owner or operator of a motor vehicle because of bodily
injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom, sustained by
the insured, caused by accident and arising out of ownership, maintenance or
use of such motor vehicle, or providing for such payment irrespective of legal
liability of the insured or any other person or organization.
....
(e) Any insurer may provide for the exclusion or limitation of coverage:
(1) When the insured is occupying or struck by an uninsured automobile or
trailer owned or provided for the insured’s regular use;
(2) when the uninsured automobile is owned by a self-insurer or any
governmental entity;
(3) when there is no evidence of physical contact with the uninsured motor
vehicle and when there is no reliable competent evidence to prove the facts
of the accident from a disinterested witness not making claim under the
policy;
(4) to the extent that workers’ compensation benefits apply;
(5) when suit is filed against the uninsured motorist without notice to the
insurance carrier; and
17
Subsection (a) sets forth the requirement that insurers provide uninsured motorist coverage. Subsection
(b) clarifies that “[a]ny uninsured motorist coverage shall include an underinsured motorist provision,” and includes
requirements for such provisions. Subsection (c) provides the insured with “the right to reject, in writing, the uninsured
motorist coverage required by subsections (a) and (b) which is in excess of the limits for bodily injury or death set
forth in K.S.A. 40-3107,” and provides additional detail relating to a rejection of coverage. Subsection (d) discusses
coverage limits.17 Subsection (e) permits insurers to “provide for the exclusion or limitation of coverage” in six
specifically enumerated circumstances. And subsection (f) addresses subrogation rights and settlement.
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(6) to the extent that personal injury protection benefits apply.
While subsection (a) requires insurers to provide uninsured motorist coverage unless
waived in writing, subsection (e) merely permits insurers to limit such coverage under the
circumstances identified therein.18 In other words, even if the Kansas uninsured motorist statute
allows coverage to be excluded, those limitations do not apply unless the terms of the Policy also
clearly and unambiguously include the authorized limitations. Thus, the specific language utilized
in the Policy must be analyzed.19
B.
The Policy
The Kansas Supreme Court has summarized Kansas law regarding the interpretation of an
insurance Policy as follows:
Because the insurer prepares its own contracts, it has a duty to make the
meaning clear. If the insurer intends to restrict or limit coverage under the
policy, it must use clear and unambiguous language; otherwise, the policy will
be liberally construed in favor of the insured. If an insurance policy’s language
is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken in its plain, ordinary, and popular
sense. In such case, there is no need for judicial interpretation or the application
of rules of liberal construction. The court shall not make another contract for
the parties and must enforce the contract as made.
18
See, e.g., Cannon, 50 P.3d at 51 (noting that the statute includes “permissible exclusions” to the “mandatory
uninsured motorist coverage,” and that the legislature “amended the law to permit, among other exclusions, the one
we consider in this case regarding the phantom hit-and-run vehicle”) (emphases added).
19
Although the Court finds the Policy language dispositive for purposes of this motion, Defendant’s
arguments regarding other states’ uninsured motorist statutes do not persuade the Court as to the meaning of Kansas’
uninsured motorist statute. The three states cited by Defendant as allegedly having uninsured motorist statutes
“virtually identical” to Kansas—Louisiana, South Carolina, and West Virginia—have adopted materially
distinguishable statutory frameworks that render cases interpreting those states’ laws of minimal guidance. While
Defendant does not specifically identify the statutes it alleges mirror Kansas, a review of those states’ codes reveals
that, unlike Kansas, each state mandates a “physical contact” requirement in defining insureds’ rights. See La. Stat.
Ann. § 22:1295(d)(i); S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-170 (formerly S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-850 (1976), recodified to § 3877-170 in 1987); W. Va. Code Ann. § 33-6-31(e)(3) (West). That these states’ legislatures mandated a “physical
contact” limitation suggests differing public policy value-judgments underlie these statutes. Indeed, when Kansas
adopted the limitations found in subsection (e), other states had adopted statutes mandating a physical contact
restriction, yet the Kansas legislature chose to make the restrictions permissive. See, e.g., S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-850
(1976).
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However, where the terms of an insurance policy are ambiguous or uncertain,
conflicting, or susceptible of more than one construction, the construction most
favorable to the insured must prevail.
To be ambiguous, a contract must contain provisions or language of doubtful
or conflicting meaning, as gleaned from a natural and reasonable interpretation
of its language. Ambiguity in a written contract does not appear until the
application of pertinent rules of interpretation to the face of the instrument
leaves it genuinely uncertain which one of two or more meanings is the proper
meaning.
Whether a written instrument is ambiguous is a question of law to be decided
by the courts. Courts should not strain to create an ambiguity where, in
common sense, there is not one. The test in determining whether an insurance
contract is ambiguous is not what the insurer intends the language to mean, but
what a reasonably prudent insured would understand the language to mean.20
When analyzing insurance policies, “exceptions, limitations, and exclusions to insurance
policies require narrow construction on the theory that the insurer, having affirmatively expressed
coverage through broad promises, assumes the duty to define any limitations on that coverage in
clear and explicit terms.”21 With regard to coverage provisions, the Kansas Supreme Court has
favorably cited Appleman on Insurance for the proposition that “[m]ost American courts apply a
rule of construction that coverage terms are construed broadly and exclusions and limitations of
coverage are construed narrowly.”22 As the party seeking summary judgment on an insurance
policy, Defendant “bears the burden to prove that a loss or claim is excluded under the policy.”23
Defendant cannot meet this burden.
20
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkins, 285 Kan. 1054, 179 P.3d 1104, 1109-10 (2008) (quotation marks and
bracketed material omitted).
21
Crist v. Hunan Palace, Inc., 277 Kan. 706, 89 P.3d 573, 577 (2004) (quoting Marquis v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 265 Kan. 317, 961 P.2d 1213, 1220 (1998)).
22
Miller v. Westport Ins. Corp., 288 Kan. 27, 200 P.3d 419, 426 (2009) (citing 2 Holmes’ Appleman on
Insurance, § 6.1, p. 173 (2d ed. 1996)); Lee Builders, Inc. v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 281 Kan. 844, 137 P.3d 486,
858 (2006) (same).
23
Miller, 200 P.3d at 426.
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Here, the Policy states that Defendant “will pay damages for bodily injury caused by
accident which the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured motor vehicle or hit-and-run motor vehicle arising out of the ownership, maintenance
or use of that auto.” Defendant’s Policy-based arguments hinge entirely upon the meaning of a
hit-and-run motor vehicle under the Policy.24 The Policy’s definition of a hit-and-run motor
vehicle, however, contains unclear, doubtful, and ambiguous language. Indeed, the definition
appears to elude logical construction without either ignoring certain language in the Policy or
adding additional language to the Policy.25 The Court may do neither.
The Policy defines a hit-and-run motor vehicle as one that causes an accident without
hitting the insured, a vehicle the insured is occupying, or the insured’s auto. Oddly, the Policy
also requires evidence from disinterested witnesses in accidents involving hit-and-run motor
vehicles “where there has not been any physical contact with the hit-and-run motor vehicle.”
Viewing the hit-and-run provision in its entirety, as this Court must,26 the Policy appears to
contemplate situations where there is some kind of physical contact with the hit-and-run motor
24
Plaintiff encourages the Court to find coverage proper because it is legally entitled to recover from the
owner or operator of an “uninsured motor vehicle.” Defendant suggests that an uninsured motor vehicle does not
include unknown or phantom drivers, but the Policy does not dictate this result. Distinctions between uninsured motor
vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles are Policy-created distinctions—the Kansas uninsured motorist statute does
not distinguish between these types of uninsured motorists. Given the inherent ambiguity in the definition of a hitand-run motor vehicle, and the fact that the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle does not exclude motor vehicles
whose owner or operators are unknown—despite the fact that it specifically sets forth what an “uninsured motor
vehicle” does not include—the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s argument is reasonable.
25
While Defendant did not admit that the Policy is illogical, it admitted during oral argument that the
definition of a hit-and-run motor vehicle “is not as logical as it might be.” The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s description
of the Policy language relating to a hit-and-run motor vehicle as “so convoluted that it’s almost impossible to
understand.”
26
See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 275 Kan. 698, 71 P.3d 1097, 1120 (2003)
(“All pertinent provisions of an insurance policy must be considered together, rather than in isolation, and given
effect.”) (citation omitted).
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vehicle, but no hitting. Defendant could not describe a situation where there would be “any
physical contact with the hit-and-run motor vehicle” without there also having been a “hitting.”
Rather, it suggests that physical contact and hitting are the same thing and argues that the definition
of a hit-and-run motor vehicle includes, by inference, a motor vehicle that causes an accident by
hitting the insured. This attempt to reconcile these provisions, however, directly conflicts with the
definition provided by the Policy—that a hit-and-run motor vehicle is one that causes an accident
without hitting the insured. The only logical interpretation of the Policy as written is that the
phrase “any physical contact” encompasses more contact than when a motor vehicle hits the
insured. The Policy does not define what constitutes “any physical contact,” but it is reasonable
to conclude that it includes physical contact such as alleged by Plaintiff.27
The Kansas uninsured motorist statute sets forth the minimum uninsured motorist coverage
insurers must provide. Defendant has not argued that coverage would not be proper under K.S.A.
§ 40-284(a)—nor does it appear that argument would succeed. Rather, Defendant argues that the
Policy language adopts the limitations permitted by Kansas law, including the limitation identified
in § 40-284(e)(3). A review of the Policy, however, indicates that the limitations Defendant argues
27
A subsequent provision of the Policy uses the phrase “direct physical contact,” leading the Court to
conclude that a reasonable interpretation of the term “any physical contact” may include both direct and indirect
physical contact. Other Courts have concluded that physical contact with a motor vehicle need not be “direct” and
have found that coverage may exist where a vehicle has struck an item in the roadway, even though no one witnessed
the item detach or fall from another vehicle. See, e.g., Duffiney v. Home Owners Ins. Co., 2010 WL 3768119 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2010) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant where insured hit an industrial
valve in the road). Thus, when construing the ambiguous Policy language in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that the phrase “any physical contact” includes indirect physical contact with a motor
vehicle, such as contact with a tire or tire tread left in the roadway, and that the Policy covers such indirect contact.
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apply here are unclear, ambiguous, and do not put the insured on notice of what coverage otherwise
required by Kansas law has been excluded by the terms of the Policy.28
Defendant, as the preparer of its contracts, has the duty to make the meaning of its policies
clear, including any limitations or restrictions on coverage. Defendant has failed to make clear the
meaning of a hit-and-run motor vehicle and it cannot deny coverage based on the illogical and
convoluted definition contained in the Policy. The Policy can be reasonably construed to find
coverage under the circumstances alleged in this case and Defendant has failed to meet its burden
to prove that Plaintiff’s claim is excluded under the terms of the Policy.
C.
Causation
Defendant also sets forth arguments regarding the requisite causal connection Plaintiff
must satisfy to obtain coverage under the Policy. To the extent these arguments relate to the
requirements to constitute a hit-and-run motor vehicle under the Policy, the Court has already
concluded that the definition lacks the requisite clarity for Defendant to rely on it as a limitation
or restriction on coverage.29 To the extent Defendant asks this Court to determine that Plaintiff
cannot satisfy its burden to show that it is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of
an uninsured motor vehicle, the Court declines to do so. Typically, questions of causation involve
28
It is unnecessary for the Court to analyze whether K.S.A. § 40-284(e)(3) authorizes Defendant to exclude
coverage under the circumstances because Defendant’s Policy fails to clearly and unambiguously adopt that limitation.
29
Further, nothing in the Policy language requires the type of immediate causation advocated for by
Defendant and the cases Defendant relies upon in support of its position are not persuasive as they involved different
states’ laws, different statutory frameworks, and different policy language.
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questions of fact for the jury, and the undisputed facts do not present only one permissible
inference such that this Court may enter summary judgment in Defendant’s favor.30
IV.
Conclusion
The language Defendant argues precludes coverage under the Policy at issue here does not
clearly and unambiguously preclude coverage, and genuine issues of material fact remain as to
whether coverage is proper under the Policy. Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
21) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 17th day of October, 2018.
ERIC F. MELGREN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
30
See, e.g., Hale v. Brown, 287 Kan. 320, 197 P.3d 438, 441 (2008) (noting that “proximate cause is
ordinarily a question of fact that is reserved for the trier of fact” and only becomes a question of law if “all the evidence
on which a party relies is undisputed and susceptible of only one inference”).
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