Anderson v. Social Security Administration, Commissioner of

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER - It is ordered that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner's final decision. Signed by District Judge John W. Lungstrum on 07/16/2021. (ses)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
WILLIAM A.,1

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
2
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
)
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
)
)
Defendant.
)
______________________________________)

CIVIL ACTION
No. 20-1165-JWL

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff seeks review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) pursuant to sections 216(i) and 223 of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i) and 423 (hereinafter the Act). Finding no error
in the Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) evaluation of the evidence and medical
opinions or in his residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment, the court ORDERS that

The court makes all its “Memorandum and Order[s]” available online. Therefore, in the
interest of protecting the privacy interests of Social Security disability claimants, it has
determined to caption such opinions using only the initial of the Plaintiff’s last name.
1

2

On July 9, 2021, Kilolo Kijakazi was appointed as Acting Commissioner of Social
Security. In accordance with Rule 25(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr.
Kijakazi is substituted for Commissioner Andrew M. Saul as the defendant. In
accordance with the last sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), no further action is necessary.

judgment shall be entered pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s final decision.
I.

Background
Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB on October 16, 2017. (R. 12,

226). After exhausting administrative remedies before the Social Security
Administration (SSA), Plaintiff filed this case seeking judicial review of the
Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff claims “[t]he ALJ’s
RFC for light work, specifically standing and walking for six hours in the workday, is not
supported by substantial evidence.” (Pl. Br. 9) (underline omitted).
The court’s review is guided by the Act. Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052
(10th Cir. 2009). Section 405(g) of the Act provides that in judicial review “[t]he
findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court must determine whether the ALJ’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether he applied the
correct legal standard. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007); accord,
White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 905 (10th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence” refers to
the weight, not the amount, of the evidence. It requires more than a scintilla, but less
than a preponderance; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); see
also, Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052; Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988).
Consequently, to overturn an agency’s finding of fact the court “must find that the

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evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it.” I.N.S. v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, n.1 (1992) (emphases in original).
The court may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute [its] judgment for that
of the agency.” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991)); accord,
Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1172 (10th Cir. 2005); see also, Bowling v. Shalala,
36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994) (The court “may not reweigh the evidence in the record,
nor try the issues de novo, nor substitute [the Court’s] judgment for the
[Commissioner’s], even if the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s]
decision.”) (quoting Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 1988)). Nonetheless,
the determination whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision is
not simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by
other evidence or if it constitutes mere conclusion. Gossett, 862 F.2d at 804-05; Ray v.
Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).
The Commissioner uses the familiar five-step sequential process to evaluate a
claim for disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th
Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988)). “If a
determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled,
evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary.” Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting
Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In the first three steps, the Commissioner determines whether
claimant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset, whether he
has a severe impairment(s), and whether the severity of his impairment(s) meets or equals
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the severity of any impairment in the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt.
P, App. 1). Williams, 844 F.2d at 750-51. After evaluating step three, the Commissioner
assesses claimant’s RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). This assessment is used at both step
four and step five of the sequential evaluation process. Id.
The Commissioner next evaluates steps four and five of the process—determining
at step four whether, considering the RFC assessed, claimant can perform his past
relevant work; and at step five whether, when also considering the vocational factors of
age, education, and work experience, he is able to perform other work in the economy.
Wilson, 602 F.3d at 1139 (quoting Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084). In steps one through four the
burden is on Plaintiff to prove a disability that prevents performance of past relevant
work. Blea v. Barnhart, 466 F.3d 903, 907 (10th Cir. 2006); accord, Dikeman v. Halter,
245 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); Williams, 844 F.2d at 751 n.2. At step five, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there are jobs in the economy which are
within the RFC previously assessed. Id.; Haddock v. Apfel, 196 F.3d 1084, 1088 (10th
Cir. 1999). The court addresses the error alleged in Plaintiff’s Social Security Brief, but
first addresses the issue of whether it should consider certain evidence presented for the
first time to the Appeals Council, and if so, what evidence it should consider.
II.

Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council
Plaintiff argues that he submitted records to the Appeals Council which render the

ALJ’s “assessment of the State [sic] agency consultants’ opinions and the light RFC
unsupported.” (Pl. Br. 11). He acknowledges that the Council found some of the
evidence not chronologically relevant but argues “this evidence was new and material as
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it pertained to the same reported symptoms and impairments as prior to the unfavorable
decision [and] provided additional support for Dr. Cranston’s opinion and [Plaintiff]’s
allegations of limitations.” (Pl. Br. 12). Plaintiff also argues, “the Appeals Council erred
in finding the evidence did not change the outcome of this case because the additional
evidence left the ALJ’s decision unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. at 13. In
response, the Commissioner argues that “the Appeals Council did not err in its finding
that this evidence was either not time relevant or would not provide a basis for changing
the ALJ’s decision that Plaintiff could perform the limited demands of light work through
May 2019.” (Comm’r Br. 9). In reply, Plaintiff argues, “because the Appeals Council
failed to provide any further analysis of this additional evidence, it is unclear why this
evidence would not have altered the ALJ’s decision and remand is appropriate for the
ALJ to make that determination.” (Reply 3) (citing Padilla v. Colvin, 525 F. App’x. 710,
712 (10th Cir. 2013)).
As the parties agree, Plaintiff submitted additional evidence to the Appeals
Council and the Council determined that some of the evidence was not related to the
period at issue (before the ALJ issued his decision on May 23, 2019) and that some of the
evidence “does not show a reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the
decision.” (R. 2). Moreover, the Council segregated the evidence into two groups,
noting the “medical records from Freeman Health System, dated March 27, 2019 through
May 20, 2019 (13 pages)” and the “medical records from Ascension Via Christi Hospital
Pittsburg, Inc., dated April 19, 2019 (1 page)” was the evidence which “does not show a
reasonable probability that it would change the outcome of the decision.” (R. 2)
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(evidence entered in the record at R. 129-42). It also noted “medical records from
Ascension Via Christi Hospital Pittsburg, Inc., dated May 31, 2019 through October 3,
2019 (10 pages); medical records from Freeman Health System, dated May 31, 2019
through November 4, 2019 (53 pages); medical records from Orthopaedic Specialists of
Four States, dated July 5, 2019 (3 pages); [and] medical records from Freeman Midwest
Internal Medicine, dated June 5, 2019 through November 4, 2019 (29 pages)” was the
evidence which “does not relate to the period at issue. Therefore, it does not affect the
decision about whether you were disabled beginning on or before May 23, 2019.” (R. 2)
(evidence entered in the record at R. 8-95, 101-05). The parties’ arguments tend to
conflate the two groups of evidence, but the Appeals Council addressed them separately
as two groups and the court will do the same.
The Social Security regulations in effect when the ALJ made the decision in this
case explain:
(a) The Appeals Council will review a case … if—
***
(5) … the Appeals Council receives additional evidence that is new,
material, and relates to the period on or before the date of the hearing
decision, and there is a reasonable probability that the additional
evidence would change the outcome of the decision.
20 C.F.R. § 404.970 (2019).
The Tenth Circuit has interpreted the regulations, and decided that when the
Appeals Council accepts new, material, and chronologically relevant evidence, that
evidence becomes a part of the administrative record which must be considered by a

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court when reviewing the final decision. O’Dell v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 855, 858-59 (10th
Cir. 1994). “Whether [evidence] qualifies as new, material and chronologically relevant
is a question of law subject to [the court’s] de novo review. Chambers v. Barnhart, 389
F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 2004). If the evidence does not qualify, the court will not
consider it in its judicial review. Id. “Finally, if the evidence qualifies but the Appeals
Council did not consider it, the case should be remanded for further proceedings.” Id.
Shortly after deciding Chambers, the Tenth Circuit explained that when the Appeals
Council does not specify whether the evidence submitted to it qualifies as new, material,
and chronologically relevant evidence, but makes the evidence at issue a part of the
administrative record, the court will interpret that action “as an implicit determination”
that the evidence is “qualifying new evidence,” and will consider it in its substantial
evidence review of the Commissioner’s decision. Martinez v. Barnhart, 444 F.3d 1201,
1207 (10th Cir. 2006).3
The Council stated it did not exhibit the evidence which it found would not change
the outcome of the decision. (R. 2). What this means is that, although the evidence is
contained within the miscellaneous documents in the early portion of the record (the
Appeals Council decision, evidence presented to the Appeals Council but not made a part
of the record, correspondence with the Appeals Council, the Hearing Decision, and the
Transcript of the Oral Hearing), the evidence was not made a part of the formal

Plaintiff cites to Martinez in his brief as 164 F. App’x. 725, 732. (Pl. Br. 12). The court
notes the Tenth Circuit ordered Martinez to be published on April 25, 2006. The opinion
cited in Plaintiff’s Brief is the same opinion, as published by order of the Tenth Circuit,
and cited by the court above.
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administrative record. This understanding is confirmed by the fact Plaintiff submitted
evidence to the Appeals Council to which the Council assigned exhibit numbers and
made a part of the administrative record, and which does not appear among the
miscellaneous documents early in the record. (R. 6) (“Order of Appeals Council, noting
“additional evidence” received “which it is making part of the record,” consisting of
Exhibit 15B, and Exhibit 22E).
With regard to this evidence, the real question for the court is whether there is a
reasonable probability it would change the outcome of the decision (whether it is
material). The medical record from Ascension Via Christi Hospital Pittsburg, Inc., dated
April 19, 2019 is the report of an ultrasound of Plaintiff’s thyroid. (R. 142). The report
indicates Plaintiff has hypothyroidism and states the impression, “Thyroid heterogeneity
with subcentimeter left lobe nodule. No dominant thyroid mass is detected.” Id. The
ALJ recognized Plaintiff was diagnosed with hypothyroidism and noted that “laboratory
testing shows that his condition is well compensated with use of Levothyroxine.” (R.
113). He noted that his record review revealed no functional limitations resulting from
hypothyroidism, id., and laboratory testing revealed normal thyroid function. (R. 117).
The record evidence supports the ALJ’s findings and the report of the thyroid ultrasound
gives no new information and has no reasonable probability of changing his decision.
The same result obtains when considering the medical records from Freeman
Health System, dated March 27, 2019 through May 20, 2019. (R. 129-41). In his
decision, the ALJ considered and discussed the evidence related to Plaintiff’s neuropathy
(R. 119), Lyme disease/Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever (RMSF) (R. 112, 115, 118, 119),
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cardiovascular condition including a stress test (R. 112, 117-19), spine condition (R. 11221, passim), and vocal cord dysfunction. (R. 113). Plaintiff points to no evidence in
these records demonstrating disabling functional limitations resulting from these or any
other impairments which were not specifically considered and discussed by the ALJ. As
the Appeals Council found, Plaintiff has shown no reasonable probability these medical
records would change the outcome of the ALJ’s decision.
The Appeals Council found the medical records dated after May 23, 2019 do not
relate to the period at issue and consequently do not affect the question of disability
before May 23, 2019. (R. 8-95, 101-05). Plaintiff argues, “this evidence was new and
material” because it relates “to the same reported symptoms and impairments” as the
earlier record evidence and because it “provided additional support for Dr. Cranston’s
opinion and [for Plaintiff]’s allegations of limitations.” (Pl. Brief 12). The evidence is
clearly new in the sense it was not in existence at the time the ALJ considered the record
and issued his decision. To the extent it relates to the same reported symptoms and
impairments, however, it is merely cumulative and not material to the issues already
decided by the ALJ. And, Plaintiff does not address the Appeals Council’s finding that it
is not chronologically relevant or cite to evidence in these new medical records which
demonstrate disabling functional limitations before May 23, 2019. Moreover, in a cover
letter with the records from Freeman Health System (R. 8-58), Plaintiff argues his
“condition has greatly deteriorated since the ALJ’s decision and he has been diagnosed
with” a rare and debilitating disorder. (R. 9). The ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled
within the meaning of the Act from September 17, 2016 through May 23, 2019, the date
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of his decision. (R. 123-24). If his condition has deteriorated since that time and he is
now disabled, he should do as the Appeals Council suggested and apply again. Hopefully
he has done so. The court finds the Appeals Council correctly determined the additional
evidence submitted is not new, material, and chronologically relevant to the ALJ’s
decision. Consequently, the court will not consider that evidence in its judicial review of
the ALJ’s decision.
III. The ALJ’s RFC Assessment for Light Work
Plaintiff quotes the definition of substantial evidence from Wall, 561 F.3d at 1052,
“[s]ubstantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance.” (Pl. Br. 10). He then argues, “A reasonable mind would not accept the
ALJ’s conclusion that [Plaintiff] retains the ability to stand and walk for six hours in an
eight-hour workday. Id. Plaintiff argues the ALJ erroneously relied on the state agency
medical consultants’ opinions because those opinions are not based on substantial
evidence. Id. He argues this is so because the consultants’ opinions are inconsistent with
the opinions of Dr. Wilberding, who examined Plaintiff and Dr. Cranston who treated
him. Id. He argues the “consultants’ opinions are also inconsistent with the longitudinal
record.” Id. at 11. He argues “other evidence of record supports additional limitations,”
id. at 13, and the opinions of Dr. Wilberding and Dr. Cranston support “a greater
limitation in standing and walking.” Id. at 14. He acknowledges the ALJ considered the
supportability and consistency of Dr. Wilberding’s and Dr. Cranston’s opinions, id. at 1415 but argues “that substantial evidence of record does not support the ALJ’s decision to
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find [Dr Wilberding’s] opinion unpersuasive and ultimately conclude that [Plaintiff]
could perform full-time competitive employment at the light exertional level.” Id.
Similarly, he argues, “Despite finding Dr. Cranston’s opinion based on a treating
relationship, which included treatment for ongoing symptoms of Rocky Mountain
Spotted Fever, the ALJ found the opinion unpersuasive. The ALJ’s conclusion, however,
is not supported by substantial evidence.” (Pl. Br. 16). He argues the record evidence
supports Dr. Wilberding’s and Dr. Cranston’s opinions. Id. at 16-17. He argues the ALJ
erroneously relied on Plaintiff’s activities because Plaintiff stated “that if he overdid it, he
would be sore for days,” he had assistance with household chores, took extra time to
perform them, and “had to modify the way he hunted and fished, and he could not do the
activities often.” Id. at 18. He explains how, in his view, the ALJ should have weighed
the supportability and consistency factors when evaluating the medical opinions, and
concludes, “the record as a whole supports and is consistent with Dr. Cranston’s
opinion.” Id. at 19-20.
The Commissioner argues the ALJ properly applied the new regulations for
evaluating medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings and adequately
explained that he found Dr. Wilberding’s opinion less persuasive than the medical
opinions of the state agency medical consultants and did not find Dr. Cranston’s opinion
persuasive. (Comm’r Br. 6-8). He argues that Plaintiff points to nothing in the records
that demonstrates he is unable to stand and walk a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.
Id. at 9. In his Reply Brief, Plaintiff argues that the medical opinions previously
discussed show greater limitations than assessed by the ALJ. (Reply 2). He argues his
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fatigue “in combination with his other admittedly severe impairments” demonstrate he is
unable to walk and stand a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. Id.
As noted above, in order to demonstrate that the ALJ’s finding of fact is
erroneous, Plaintiff must point to record evidence that compels a contrary conclusion.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481, n.1. The mere fact that the evidence might also support a
contrary finding will not establish error in the ALJ’s determination. “The possibility of
drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an
administrative agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence. We may
not displace the agency’s choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the
court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de
novo.” Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084 (citations, quotations, and bracket omitted); see also,
Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm=n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
The court’s review begins with the decision of the ALJ, not what the plaintiff—or
even the court—believes should have been the better, or best, decision. If the ALJ
applied the correct legal standard and the record contains “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the ALJ’s] conclusion,’ Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, the court must affirm that decision.
Plaintiff’s argument proceeds in two stages: First the ALJ should have found the
opinions of Dr. Wilberding, who examined Plaintiff, and Dr. Cranston, who treated
Plaintiff, more persuasive than the opinions of the state agency medical consultants, Dr.

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Spence and Dr. Panek,4 who merely reviewed the incomplete record before all of Dr.
Cranston’s medical records were submitted and before Dr. Cranston provided her medical
opinion. Second, the record evidence is in conflict with the finding Plaintiff can stand
and walk 6 hours total in an 8-hour workday but supports Dr. Wilberding’s and Dr.
Cranston’s opinions he has much greater limitations.
As Plaintiff acknowledges, the Commissioner propounded new regulations
regarding the evaluation of medical opinions for claims filed, such as was the present
claim, on or after March 27, 2017. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2019). An ALJ is to evaluate
medical opinions using five factors; supportability, consistency, relationship of source to
claimant, specialization, and other factors tending to support or contradict a medical
opinion or prior administrative medical finding. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)(c)(1-5)
(2019). The most important factors are supportability and consistency, id., and the ALJ
will articulate how persuasive he finds all medical opinions. Id. § 404.1520c(b).
In adopting the new regulations and dropping the treating physician rule, the
Commissioner provided two explanations germane to the issues here:
To account for the changes in the way healthcare is currently delivered, we
are adopting rules that focus more on the content of medical opinions and
less on weighing treating relationships against each other. This approach is
more consistent with current healthcare practice.

The “opinions” of Dr. Spence and Dr. Panek are properly referred to as “prior
administrative medical findings.” However, in cases such as this, medical opinions and
prior administrative medical findings are considered and articulated in the same manner.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (2019). The court refers to them here as medical opinions.
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Revisions to Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5,84401, 5,854, 2017 WL 168819 (SSA Jan. 18, 2017) (emphasis added). And,
By moving away from assigning a specific weight to medical opinions, we
are clarifying both how we use the terms “weigh” and “weight” in final
404.1520c(a), 404.1527, 416.920c(a), and 416.927 and also clarifying that
adjudicators should focus on how persuasive they find medical opinions
and prior administrative medical findings in final 404.1520c and 416.920c.
Our intent in these rules is to make it clear that it is never appropriate under
our rules to “credit-as-true” any medical opinion.
Id. at 5,858.
The ALJ applied the new regulations to evaluate the medical opinions in this case
and the court must determine whether substantial evidence supports his persuasiveness
findings. The ALJ found the functional limitations opined by the state agency medical
consultants
more consistent with the evidence than the opinion of Dr. Wilberding.
Although Dr. Wilberding found that bilateral straight leg raising was
positive, that is the only evidence of any lower extremity involvement. The
claimant’s gait has consistently been normal. There is no evidence of
decreased strength and, despite his complaints of numbness and tingling in
his feet, there is no evidence of loss of sensation.
(R. 121). Therefore, he found the medical consultants’ opinions more persuasive than
that of Dr. Wilberding. The evidence supports the ALJ’s findings and Plaintiff does not
point to evidence which compels finding greater limitations. He points to Plaintiff’s
testimony, to the positive straight leg raising found by Dr. Wilberding, to Dr. Cranston’s
opinion, and to Plaintiff’s neuropathy. However, all of that evidence was considered and
explained by the ALJ. The court will discuss his consideration of Dr. Cranston’s opinion
shortly, but as quoted above the ALJ noted Dr. Wilberding’s examination was the only

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one revealing positive straight leg raising bilaterally, Plaintiff’s gait has been consistently
normal, and although he has neuropathy, the evidence does not reveal a loss of sensation.
Plaintiff has not shown that this is not the type of evidence a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion—it is.
Regarding Dr. Cranston’s opinion, the ALJ recognized she was Plaintiff’s treating
physician, but he found her opinion not persuasive because “it appeared to be based
largely on the claimant’s subjective complaints.” (R. 121). There is support for this
finding in Dr. Cranston’s opinion. (R. 640). The form which she completed with her
opinion asked for “the principal clinical/laboratory findings and symptoms/allegations
supporting” her opined limitations for “Lift/Carry, Stand/Walk, Sit, Push/Pull, Climb,
Balance, Stoop, Kneel, Crouch, Crawl.” Id. (underline in original). Dr. Cranston
answered the query, stating, “Chronic pain of Back & Neck Which limits [Plaintiff’s]
ability to perform tasks including lifting/carrying, standing, walking, etc.” Id. In other
words, Dr. Cranston opined that the principal support for the walking and standing
limitations she opined was Plaintiff’s reported pain. While this is an appropriate basis for
the physician’s opinion, she provided no additional basis or clinical or laboratory
findings. The ALJ went on the explain why he did not accept the opinion based
principally on Plaintiff’s subjective complaints:
As discussed above, a single instance of positive straight leg raise testing
and reduced range of motion of the lumbar spine at consultative physical
examination is the only evidence of any lower extremity involvement. The
claimant’s gait has consistently been normal, and there is no evidence of
decreased strength or sensory deficit. Moreover, the claimant has reported
daily activities, which require activity far in excess of those detailed in this
opinion such as hunting with a crossbow, training dogs for duck hunting,
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fishing, mowing, and yardwork in addition to his household chores and
daily activities.
(R. 121). This is also the type of evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.
Plaintiff argues that although Plaintiff performed the activities noted, he testified
that the activities were accommodated and not as he performed them before he allegedly
became disabled. While it is true that Plaintiff suggested limitations in the activities he
performed, the fact he was able to perform several of the activities at all suggests he is
not so limited as Dr. Cranston opined, and is a basis to find her opinion not persuasive.
The ALJ explained his bases for finding the medical consultants’ opinions
persuasive and the other opinions less persuasive, and those bases are supported by the
record evidence. Plaintiff has shown no error in the ALJ’s decision.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that judgment shall be entered pursuant to the
fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner’s final decision.
Dated July 16, 2021, at Kansas City, Kansas.

s:/ John W. Lungstrum
John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge

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