Allen v. Saint Francis Ministries et al

Filing 21

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. Kansas Department for Children and Families' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8 ) is granted. The court dismisses plaintiff's claims against Kansas Department for Children and Families without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. Saint Francis Ministries' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13 ) is granted. The court dismisses plaintiff's claims against Saint Francis Ministries without prejudice. Signed by District Judge Daniel D. Crabtree on 6/4/2024. (mam)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

LAURYN ELIZABETH ALLEN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 23-1166-DDC-GEB

v.
SAINT FRANCIS MINISTRIES, et al.,
Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff Lauryn Allen sued defendants Kansas Department of Children and
Families (KDCF) and Saint Francis Ministries (St. Francis) under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 for
alienation of her three children. The court construes plaintiff’s claim as a § 1983 claim against
defendants for violating her Fourteenth Amendment rights. Both defendants have filed Motions
to Dismiss (Doc. 8; Doc. 13). KDCF argues that it’s immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment. St. Francis argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(1) and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Doc. 13. The court grants defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss for reasons explained below.
I.

Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff Lauryn Allen has three children in custody of defendant KDCF. Doc. 9 at 3.

KDCF contracts with defendant St. Francis to help reintegrate children in state custody with their
families. Id. In September 2022, Lisa Moser—plaintiff’s former case manager—halted two of
plaintiff’s visitations with her children to conduct research on plaintiff’s case. Doc. 1 at 4
(Compl. ¶ 1). Two weeks later, Ms. Moser told plaintiff that the visitations with her children

were suspended because plaintiff’s children had elevated heart rates. Id. In November 2022,
Ms. Moser told plaintiff that she had a substantiated case in the State of Oklahoma for physical
and emotional abuse. Id. (Compl. ¶ 2). Plaintiff denied the charge accusing her of physical
abuse. Id. She contacted the Oklahoma “DHS” and spoke with an employee there. Id. The
employee confirmed that plaintiff had a case pending against her and that it was unsubstantiated.
Id. In February 2022, plaintiff’s former attorney, Desiree Brown, “attempted to bring up the
alleged substantive case and was shut down by the court Liaison[.]” Id.
From September 7, 2022, to May 17, 2023, plaintiff didn’t see her children. Id. (Compl.
¶ 1). During that time, two of her children had surgery without plaintiff’s consent or knowledge.
Id. (Compl. ¶ 3). Plaintiff currently sees her children once each week during a 15-minute Zoom
call. Id. (Compl. ¶ 4).
On August 15, 2023, plaintiff sued KDCF and St. Francis under 28 U.S.C. § 1343
accusing them of alienating her children. Id. at 3. Plaintiff seeks $5 million in damages for
violating her “rights that are protected under The Constitution of the United States,” “emotional
damage caused by the alienation of [her] children,” reduced “hire-ability,” and “defamation of
[her] character by committing perjury in District Court.” Id. at 5.
KDCF filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) asserting that plaintiff had failed to state a
claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). St. Francis filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13). It too
alleges plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and that the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). The motions are fully briefed and thus
ripe for review.
II.

Legal Standard
Defendants seek dismissal under two provisions of Rule 12—Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and

12(b)(6).
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The court begins by reciting the standard both defendants have invoked—Rule 12(b)(6).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss an action for failing “to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the pleading “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must assume that the
factual allegations in the complaint are true, but it is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation[.]’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). And,
while this pleading standard doesn’t require “‘detailed factual allegations,’” it demands more
than a “pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action’” which, the Supreme Court has explained, simply “‘will not do.’” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Defendant St. Francis also invokes Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a
defendant may move the court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, as such, must have a statutory
basis to exercise jurisdiction.” Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952, 955 (10th Cir. 2002). Federal
district courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions arising under the constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States or where there is diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–32.
“A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of

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the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power
& Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears
the burden to prove it exists. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994); see also Siloam Springs Hotel, L.L.C. v. Century Sur. Co., 906 F.3d 926, 931 (10th Cir.
2018).
Because plaintiff appears pro se, the court construes her pleadings liberally and holds
them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” See Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But the court can’t assume the role of her
advocate. Id. Finally, plaintiff’s pro se status does not excuse her from “the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Id.
III.

Analysis

The court applies these legal standards to defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, starting with
KDCF’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) for failure to state a claim, including a sovereign immunity
defense, then turning to St. Francis’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) for failure to state a claim and
for lack of jurisdiction. But first, the court resolves an issue common to both motions.
A.

Construing Plaintiff’s Claim as a § 1983 Claim

Defendants assert that the Complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because it
asserts no cause of action. According to defendants, plaintiff invokes 28 U.S.C. § 1343—a
statute that merely confers subject matter jurisdiction over some claims—without alleging that
defendants violated any Constitutional or federal law. See Smith v. G & W Foods, No. 20-CV2517, 2021 WL 1546222, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr. 20, 2021) (“Section 1343 grants federal district
courts jurisdiction to hear civil rights cases, but this statute does not specifically provide a cause
of action.”). Plaintiff checked the § 1343 box on her Complaint showing that she intended to
invoke subject matter jurisdiction under that statute. Doc. 1 at 3. But the “Statement of the
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Claim” section of the Complaint never explicitly alleges that defendants have violated her
Constitutional rights. See id. at 3–4.
Plaintiff plainly references Constitutional rights in the damages section of plaintiff’s
Complaint and on an untitled page quoting various cases. Id. at 5, 8. The Complaint also
discloses that plaintiff seeks damages “for the violation of [her] rights that are protected under
The Constitution of the United States,” and for “emotional damages caused by the alienation of
[her] children[.]” Doc. 1 at 5. Plaintiff’s Complaint also cites a variety of cases about parents’
constitutional rights. Id. at 8 (first citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1982)
(holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent’s liberty interest in care and custody
of the parent’s child); then citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (recognizing a
parent’s liberty interest in “the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her
children”); and then citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing a
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in a parent’s right to “bring up children”)). Given these
allegations and citations—though invoked within the Complaint in a disorderly fashion—the
court thus construes plaintiff’s Complaint as one asserting a § 1983 claim for violating her
Fourteenth Amendment rights.1
B.

Claim Against Kansas Department of Children and Families

KDCF argues that the Complaint fails to state a claim because it alleges no facts
connecting plaintiff’s alleged injury to KDCF’s actions. KDCF also asserts that the Eleventh

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The court’s decision to construe the Complaint as bringing § 1983 claims for violating the
Fourteenth Amendment doesn’t prejudice defendants. Plaintiff’s later filings confirm that she asserts
§ 1983 Fourteenth Amendment claims. See Doc. 9 at 2 (“The case pertains to 14th amendment
interference with parent/child relationship lacking due process, . . . pursuant to . . . 42 U.S.C 1983.”);
Doc. 15 at 1–2 (citing § 1983 and noting that “[i]nterference with the Parent-child relationship is a
fourteenth amendment violation and lacks substantive due process”). And defendants responded to that
§ 1983 argument in their Reply briefs. See Doc. 16; Doc. 17-1.

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Amendment immunizes KDCF—an arm of the state—from plaintiff’s § 1983 suit. Because state
sovereign immunity is a threshold jurisdictional issue, the court addresses it first.
The Eleventh Amendment grants immunity that “accord[s] states the respect owed them
as joint sovereigns[,]” and this immunity “applies to any action brought against a state in federal
court, including suits initiated by a state’s own citizens.” Steadfast Ins. Co. v. Agric. Ins. Co.,
507 F.3d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Eleventh Amendment immunity bars
“unconsented suits in federal court against a state and arms of the state.” Wagoner Cnty. Rural
Water Dist. No. 2 v. Grand River Dam Auth., 577 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). The Amendment’s “immunity extends to arms of the state and to state officials who
are sued for damages in their official capacity.” Turner v. Nat’l Council of State Bds. of Nursing,
Inc., 561 F. App’x 661, 665 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205
(10th Cir. 2013)). KDCF is an arm of the State of Kansas, so it’s immune from suit in federal
court. McCollum v. Kansas, No. 14-cv-1049, 2014 WL 3341139, at *6 (D. Kan. July 8, 2014)
(“DCF is the agency through which the state acts in all matters that relate to children who are
found to be in need of care.”), aff’d, 599 F. App’x 841 (10th Cir. 2015). And plaintiff’s
Complaint here seeks damages. Doc. 1 at 5. Because KDCF enjoys Eleventh Amendment
immunity, the court lacks jurisdiction over the claim asserted against KDCF. Because the court
lacks jurisdiction over the claim attacked by KDCF’s Rule 12(b)(6) arguments, the court must
decline to address KDCF’s arguments on the merits of those claims.
The court thus grants KDCF’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) and because the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over defendant Kansas Department of Children and Families. Next,
the court addresses St. Francis’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13).

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C.

Claim Against Saint Francis Ministries

Defendant St. Francis Ministries asks the court to dismiss plaintiff’s claims because they
fail to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Also, St. Francis moves to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Because subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold
issue, the court begins its analysis with the Rule 12(b)(1) arguments.
St. Francis argues that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff’s claim
is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Doc. 14 at 7–15. “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court
losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the [federal] district court proceedings
commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). This doctrine also encompasses claims alleging
“injuries caused by state-court judgments[.]” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. Rooker-Feldman
applies “where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to
a lower federal court.” Lance, 546 U.S. at 466. To permit otherwise would contravene 28
U.S.C. § 1257, which confers jurisdiction to hear appeals from final state court judgments on the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court alone. Id. at 463. In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
precludes lower federal courts “from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court
judgments.” Id.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “two categories of claims, those (1) actually decided
by a state court; or (2) inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment.” Pittsburg Cnty.
Rural Water Dist. No. 7 v. City of McAlester, 358 F.3d 694, 707 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). “A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a statecourt judgment if that judgment caused, actually and proximately, the injury for which the

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federal-court plaintiff seeks redress.” Bear v. Patton, 451 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 2006)
(citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).
Here, St. Francis engages the second Rooker-Feldman category. St. Francis argues that
plaintiff’s “purported civil rights claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the decisions in the
underlying State court custody proceedings pertaining to Plaintiff’s three minor children[.]”
Doc. 14 at 13. Also, it contends that “all three of Plaintiff’s minor children . . . are currently
under DCF/State custody in ongoing [Child in Need of Care] proceedings pending in the District
Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas.” Id. St. Francis asks the court to take judicial notice of
these ongoing State child custody proceedings pending in the Sedgwick County, Kansas court:
22JC242, 22JC243, and 22JC244. The court properly can take judicial notice of these
proceedings. See St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172
(10th Cir. 1979) (“[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings
in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a
direct relation to matters at issue.”).2
The Complaint explicitly references these state court proceedings. Plaintiff claims that
Desiree Smith, her former attorney, “attempted to bring up the alleged substantiated [Oklahoma]
case” in “the District Court” and “was shut down by the court Liaison[.]” Doc. 1 at 4. She
alleges that Ms. Smith “informed the Courts that [the placement of plaintiff’s children] appears

2

“In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a federal court may take judicial notice of another court's
publicly filed records if they have a direct relation to matters at issue.” Bruce v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
57 F.4th 738, 742 n.3 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1265 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006)
(taking judicial notice of state court records and affirming district court’s decision to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 79, (2023); see
also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (allowing a court to “take judicial notice at any stage of the proceeding” of “a fact
that is not subject to reasonable dispute”). “However, the documents may only be considered to show
their contents, not to prove the truth of matters asserted therein.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).

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to have a ve[s]ted interest in keeping the children away from their mother with zero results.” Id.
And plaintiff seeks damages for “the defamation of [her] character by committing perjury in
District Court.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff doubles the attack against the state court proceedings in her
Response (Doc. 15). She claims that “Judge Patrick Walters”—a Judge of the Sedgwick County,
Kansas court—issued a “ruling to continue permanency in December of 2022” and “a St. Francis
Ministries case manager . . . willfully submitted a fabricated document that is impacting the case
in a negative way.” Doc. 15 at 2.
Plaintiff’s claims repeatedly allude to ongoing state child custody proceedings pending in
Sedgwick County state court. Plaintiff’s injury—alienation from her children—is “inextricably
linked” with the state court cases because the judgments in those cases determine plaintiff’s
custody over her children. Our court lacks jurisdiction to insert itself in the middle of these state
court proceedings. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 280 (“Congress had empowered only [the
Supreme] Court alone to exercise appellate authority to reverse or modify a state-court
judgment.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Because plaintiff’s § 1983 claims
challenge the final state court judgment or alleged injuries derived from that judgment, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits the court from hearing these claims. The court thus grants
St. Francis’s Motion to Dismiss.
In sum, the court grants St. Francis’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13) under Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
IV.

Conclusion

The court construes plaintiff’s claim as a § 1983 claim against defendants for violating
her Fourteenth Amendment rights. It grants KDCF’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) because KDCF
enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit. And the court grants St. Francis’s Motion to

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Dismiss (Doc. 13) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) because the court lacks jurisdiction to upset the
pending state court proceedings “inextricably intertwined” with plaintiff’s claims here.
Finally, St. Francis asks the court to dismiss plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. A district
court has discretion to decide whether to dismiss an action with or without prejudice. Brown v.
Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121, 1123–24 (10th Cir. 2005). Here, the court exercises its discretion and
dismisses plaintiff’s Complaint without prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice unfairly could
prejudice the pro se plaintiff should she later reassert her claims in a proper forum. See
Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990) (reminding district courts to extend
“to pro se plaintiffs an opportunity to remedy defects potentially attributable to their ignorance of
federal law and motion . . . in a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) context”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also 6 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure
§ 1483 (3d ed. 2023) (“[I]f it is at all possible that the party against whom a dismissal is directed
can correct the defect in the pleading or state a claim for relief, the court should dismiss with
leave to amend.”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Kansas Department for Children and
Families’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is granted. The court dismisses plaintiff’s claims against
Kansas Department for Children and Families without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT Saint Francis Ministries’ Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 13) is granted. The court dismisses plaintiff’s claims against Saint Francis Ministries
without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated this 4th day of June, 2024, at Kansas City, Kansas.
s/ Daniel D. Crabtree
Daniel D. Crabtree
United States District Judge

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