Bush v. Carter County Detention Center et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Dfts. Carter County Detention Center and Carter County, Kentucky's motion for summary judgment DE# 25 is GRANTED; (2) Dfts. Belinda Madden and Southern Health Partners, Inc.'s motion for summary judgm ent DE# 27 is GRANTED; (3) Plf. Katrina Bush's Complaint DE#1-2 is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (4) This is a FINAL and APPEALABLE Order; and (5) This matter is STRICKEN from the active docket of the Court. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 8/29/11.(KSS)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT ASHLAND
CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-16-DLB-EBA
KATRINA BUSH
vs.
PLAINTIFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CARTER COUNTY DETENTION CENTER, ET AL.
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DEFENDANTS
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In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Plaintiff Katrina Bush alleges that Defendants Carter
County,1 Southern Health Partners, Inc., and Belinda Madden violated her Eighth
Amendment rights when they acted “with deliberate indifference to her need for medical
care.” (Doc. # 1-2 ¶ 10). This matter is now before the Court on Defendants’ motions for
summary judgment. (Docs. # 25, 27). After the time for filing a response expired, the
Court offered Plaintiff an additional week to oppose Defendants’ motions, and warned that
if she failed to do so, the Court would adjudicate Defendants’ motions without the benefit
of a response from Plaintiff. (Doc. # 28). This extension has also expired without any
response from Plaintiff. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions are now ripe for review.
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Though Plaintiff sued both Carter County and Carter County Detention Center, municipal
departments such as jails are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Marbry v. Corr. Med.
Servs. 238 F.3d 422, 2000 WL 1720959, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2000) (Table). Accordingly, the Court
construes the claims against Carter County Detention Center as against Carter County itself. Rideout v.
Daviess Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:09-CV-P74-M, 2009 WL 3614310, at *2 (W.D.Ky. Oct. 29, 2009) (“The Court
will therefore construe the claim against Daviess County Detention Center as brought against Daviess
County.”).
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I.
BACKGROUND
Southern Health Partners (SHP) provided healthcare services to Carter County
Detention Center (CCDC)—where the events giving rise to this suit took place—pursuant
to a contractual arrangement. (Doc. # 27-3 at 3). Per the agreement, SHP provided fulltime licensed practical nurses(such as Defendant Belinda Madden) to be present at CCDC
seven (7) days a week and on call twenty-four (24) hours a day to treat inmates. (Doc. #
27-3 at 4-6). SHP also arranged for a physician and physician’s assistant to be available
for emergencies. (Doc. # 27-3 at 6-7). Madden testified that if there ever was an
emergency situation where an inmate’s life was in danger, the treating nurse had the
authority to send the inmate to the hospital. (Doc. # 25-2 at 13-14).
Plaintiff Katrina Bush was arrested on June 24, 2008 in Carter County for
possession of a controlled substance and promoting contraband. (Doc. # 25-3 at 2). Bush
was released on bond, but her bond was revoked after she failed sixteen (16) drug tests;
she was booked at CCDC on January 5, 2009. (Doc. # 25-3 at 3-5). Bush conceded that
she was “high” when she was booked at CCDC because she had taken Percocet 30s
before being incarcerated. (Doc. # 25-3 at 8-9). Bush warned the nurse who conducted
her medical screening that she would be having withdrawals while incarcerated. (Doc. #
25-3 at 10-11).
On January 6, 2009—the day after being booked at CCDC—Plaintiff Bush informed
Defendant Madden that she expected to begin withdrawals soon. (Doc. # 27-4 at 11-13).
Defendant Madden, in turn, ordered that Plaintiff receive medication to treat the withdrawal
symptoms. (Doc. # 27-4 at 12).
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As expected, Bush began withdrawing from pain pills on January 7, 2009. (Doc. #
27-4 at 10-11). Bush explained that she had body cramps, sweating, vomiting, and
diarrhea—symptoms similar to those she had experienced “[p]robably three or four” times
in the past during prior withdrawals from pain pills. (Doc. # 27-4 at 8-9, 11-12). The next
day, January 8, 2009, Bush was moved to a medical observation cell so SHP personnel
could monitor her condition every fifteen minutes. (Doc. # 27-4 at 19; 27-3 at 10). On
January 9, 2009 when Defendant Madden was leaving to go home, Plaintiff informed her
that she was feeling better. (Doc. # 27-3 at 9).
On January 10, 2009, Bush’s conditions worsened. (Doc. # 27-4 at 19-20). Plaintiff
testified that over the next few days her vomiting became more frequent, her stomach
began to swell, and her pain grew worse. (Doc. # 25-3 at 13-14).
The following day, January 11, 2009, Plaintiff Bush’s parents and grandfather visited
her for fifteen (15) minutes. Bush’s grandfather was unable to recall the visit. (Doc. # 25-4
at 2). Bush’s mother said Bush was “gray” and “looked so bad” but that she displayed no
other symptoms. (Doc. # 25-5 at 2-3). Bush’s mother testified that a deputy at CCDC
explained that Bush was withdrawing from pain pills. (Doc. # 25-5 at 3). Bush’s mother
also stated that Bush “didn’t mention anything” about wanting to go to the hospital. (Doc.
# 25-5 at 4). Bush’s father said that although she looked sick, he could not recall any
specific symptoms. (Doc. # 25-6 at 3). Moreover, both Bush’s father and grandfather
testified that if they had believed something was seriously wrong with Bush they would
have taken some action; both acknowledged, however, that they did not contact anyone
at CCDC or request that Bush be taken to the hospital. (Docs. # 25-4 at 4-5; 25-6 at 4-5).
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Bush’s condition worsened in the early morning of January 13, 2009. Bush testified
that she took a shower, struggled to walk back to her cell, fell asleep, and began
hallucinating for the first time. (Doc. # 25-3 at 11-12). Bush testified that, on a scale of one
to ten, her pain had increased from a four on the day she was moved to the observation
cell, to “definitely a 10” by the early hours of January 13. (Doc. # 25-3 at 13).
Defendant Madden testified that she received a call at home in the early morning
of January 13 from the CCDC deputy on duty who reported that Bush was pale, clammy,
having abdominal pain, and that the appearance of Bush’s vomit had changed. (Doc. #
25-2 at 11, 16). As a result of Bush’s changed symptoms, Madden instructed the deputy
that Bush needed to go to the hospital. (Doc. # 25-2 at 12-13). Madden said that before
she received this call on January 13, she continued to believe that Bush was merely “going
through a simple withdrawal.” (Doc. # 25-2 at 10).
Bush was transported to Our Lady of Bellefonte Hospital in Ashland, Kentucky on
January 13, 2009, where the recorded “admitting impression” was “[i]ntractable nausea and
vomiting secondary to narcotic withdrawal.” (Doc. # 25-7 at 2). By January 15, however,
Bush had developed a “high grade fever” and her white blood cell count had increased.
(Doc. # 25-8 at 1). Accordingly, she underwent exploratory surgery to determine the cause
of her symptoms. (Doc. # 25-8 at 1). Surgery revealed that Bush had a ruptured appendix,
which was removed. (Doc. # 25-8 at 1). Aside from the remaining scar, Bush testified that
she has fully recovered. (Doc. # 25-3 at 19-20).
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II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Standard
Rule 56(a) entitles a moving party to summary judgment if that party “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c)(1) further instructs that “[a] party asserting that a fact
cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by” citing to the record or
“showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.”
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
The “moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issues
of material fact.” Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 483 (6th Cir. 2008). The
moving party may meet this burden by demonstrating the absence of evidence concerning
an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim on which it will bear the burden of proof at
trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has satisfied
its burden, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586,
it must produce specific facts showing that a genuine issue remains. Plant v. Morton Int’l,
Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 2000). If, after reviewing the record in its entirety, a
rational fact finder could not find for the nonmoving party, summary judgment should be
granted. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 1998).
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Moreover, the trial court is not required to “search the entire record to establish that
it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.” Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d
1472, 1479-80 (6th Cir. 1989). Rather, “the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to
direct the court’s attention to those specific portions of the record upon which it seeks to
rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir.
2001).
B.
Application
Though Plaintiff Bush brings this action pursuant to the Eighth Amendment,
because she was a “a pre-trial detainee, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the proper starting point.” Phillips v. Roane Cnty., Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 539
(6th Cir. 2008). Notwithstanding the technical distinction, the two are “similar claim[s]” that
require Plaintiff Bush to show CCDC officials acted with deliberate indifference to her
serious medical needs. Border v. Trumbull Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 414 F.App’x 831, 835,
2011 WL 917253, at *5 (6th Cir. March 17, 2011). “[D]eliberate indifference violates an
inmate’s rights ‘when the indifference is manifested by . . . prison guards in intentionally
denying or delaying access to medical care’ for a serious medical need.” Phillips, 534 F.3d
at 539 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976)). To establish deliberate
indifference, Plaintiff must prove objective and subjective components. Plaintiff cannot
satisfy either prong.
1.
Objective Component
“The objective component requires a plaintiff to show the existence of a ‘sufficiently
serious’ medical need.” Phillips, 534 F.3d at 539 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.
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825, 834 (1994)). This component is met when a plaintiff’s injury is “so obvious that even
a layperson would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id. (quoting
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 899-900 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations
omitted)). It is also sufficient to show that the plaintiff “actually experienced the need for
medical treatment, and that need was not addressed within a reasonable time frame.” Id.
at 539-40 (quoting Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 899-900).
Plaintiff has failed to identify facts that would have alerted a layperson to her need
for medical attention beyond that provided by Defendant Madden. When Plaintiff began
feeling sick, she was moved to a holding cell for close observation. While there, she
exhibited symptoms consistent with those she had experienced during prior withdrawals
from pain pills. Defendant Madden and CCDC anticipated that Plaintiff would display such
symptoms because Plaintiff expressly warned them that she expected to suffer withdrawal
symptoms. Moreover, even after visiting, neither Plaintiff’s father nor her grandfather
informed CCDC staff that Plaintiff needed immediate medical care, even though both
testified that they would have taken action if Plaintiff needed to be hospitalized.
Additionally, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendants failed to provide
medical treatment within a reasonable time frame after Plaintiff demonstrated a need for
it. Instead, Defendant Madden testified that Bush’s symptoms were similar to those of
other individuals during withdrawal and that in her experience “most withdrawals last 14
days” and some even take “almost 30 days to get back to normal.” (Doc. # 27-3 at 15-16).
Defendant Madden also stated that Plaintiff never indicated that she needed to go to the
hospital, and also that the symptoms were similar to those she experienced during her prior
withdrawals. (Doc. # 27-3 at 14-15). Moreover, as soon as Plaintiff exhibited symptoms
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inconsistent with withdrawal, during the early morning of January 13, Defendant Madden
took immediate and appropriate action by directing CCDC staff to take Plaintiff to the
hospital.
2.
Subjective Component
To establish the subjective component, Plaintiff must prove that a CCDC official
“subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did
in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Comstock v. McCrary,
273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). The Supreme Court
has left no question that this is truly a subjective test: “[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a
significant risk that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for
commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”
Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838). This subjective element “is meant to prevent the
constitutionalization of medical malpractice claims,” so a plaintiff “must show more than
negligence or the misdiagnosis of an ailment.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106).
Accordingly, “[w]hen a prison doctor provides treatment, albeit carelessly or inefficaciously,
to a prisoner, he has not displayed a deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s needs, but
merely a degree of incompetence which does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.” Id.
Importantly, however, Plaintiff need not show that the prison official acted “for the
very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Id. (quoting Farmer,
511 U.S. 835).
Rather, Plaintiff need only show that the prison official recklessly
disregarded the risk of harm. Id. Because prison officials “do not readily admit this
subjective component . . . ‘it is permissible for reviewing courts to infer from circumstantial
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evidence that a prison official had the requisite knowledge.’” Phillips, 534 F.3d at 540
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836).
Plaintiff Bush readily acknowledges that she received medical treatment throughout
her time at CCDC. Bush testified that she was seen once or twice a day by Defendant
Madden who checked on her and tested her vital signs, which were good. (Doc. # 25-3 at
15, 28-29). Defendant Madden also gave Plaintiff medicine to treat her withdrawal
symptoms. (Doc. # 25-3 at 17-18). Additionally, Defendant Madden brought Plaintiff food
from outside CCDC which she believed would help Plaintiff feel better and would be easier
to keep down. (Doc. # 25-3 at 29). Indeed, Plaintiff even confirmed that Defendant
Madden and CCDC staff believed that she was merely suffering withdrawal symptoms.
(Doc. # 25-3 at 11, 16, 17, 30).
Far from arguing—not to mention raising a genuine factual dispute—that
Defendants subjectively perceived facts from which to infer a substantial risk to Plaintiff
and then disregarded that risk, Plaintiff has acknowledged that none of the staff at CCDC
intentionally prevented her from going to the hospital and, further, that if CCDC staff
believed she needed to go the hospital they would have taken her. (Doc. # 25-3 at 27-28).
Indeed, Plaintiff testified that CCDC staff always responded when she indicated that was
sick or needed assistance. (Doc. # 25-3 at 28).
Perhaps even more persuasive is that the hospital’s initial examination on January
13, 2009 also failed to properly diagnose Plaintiff’s condition. Instead, the hospital’s
“admitting impression” was “intractable nausea and vomiting secondary to narcotic
withdrawal”—precisely Defendant Madden’s belief. (Doc. # 25-7 at 2). It was not until two
days later when Plaintiff began suffering from a high-grade fever and her white blood count
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elevated that the hospital took additional action. And even then, the hospital needed to
conduct exploratory surgery to properly diagnose Plaintiff.
These facts prove that
Defendants did not subjectively perceive and ignore a risk to Plaintiff’s health. This
evidence also establishes that—though it is not the standard—there was no way that
Defendants could or should have known that Plaintiff was suffering from anything more
than withdrawal symptoms, particularly before Plaintiff began suffering from a high-grade
fever.
Because Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to either
of the two prongs of the “deliberate indifference” standard—least of all both
prongs—Defendants’ motions for summary judgment will be granted. This determination
renders Defendants’ additional arguments for dismissal moot.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons IT IS ORDERED that,
1.
Defendants Carter County Detention Center and Carter County, Kentucky’s
motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 25) is GRANTED;
2.
Defendants Belinda Madden and Southern Health Partners, Inc.’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. # 27) is GRANTED;
3.
Plaintiff Katrina Bush’s Complaint (Doc. # 1-2) is DISMISSED with
prejudice;
4.
This is a FINAL and APPEALABLE Order; and
5.
This matter is STRICKEN from the active docket of the Court.
A separate Judgment shall be entered concurrently herewith.
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This 29th day of August, 2011.
G:\DATA\ORDERS\Ashland Civil\2010\10-16-MSJ Order.wpd
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