Gamble v. Helton et al
Filing
31
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER, 1) granting 27 MOTION to Dismiss by Holly Goodpaster, Keith Helton, Rebecca Lewis, Joseph P. Meko 2) Gamble's claims under federal law are DISMISSED WITH PREJ; his state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ; 3) court will enter an appropriate judgment 4) matter is STRICKEN FROM DOCKET. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 7/26/12.(SMT)cc: COR, Gamble via USMail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION AT ASHLAND
BENNIE L. GAMBLE, JR.,
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Plaintiff,
V.
KEITH HELTON, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 10-19-HRW
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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Defendants Keith Helton, Rebecca Lewis, Joseph Meko, and Holly Goodpaster
have filed a Motion to Dismiss [D.E. No. 27] and plaintiff Bennie L. Gamble, Jr. has
filed his response. [D.E. No. 29] This matter is therefore ready for decision.
Gamble filed this action on February 24,2010. In his complaint, he alleged
that while confined at the Little Sandy Correctional Complex ("LSCC"), several
prison officials and an unknown employee ofthe Sandy Hook, Kentucky, Post Office,
mishandled a package that a friend had mailed to him, costing him lost wages and
profits from an unidentified business venture and causing him to be convicted of a
prison disciplinary offense.
Gamble alleged that the defendants had violated his
constitutional rights and were liable to him under various state law tort theories, and
sought monetary damages.
On April 15, 2010, the Court dismissed Gamble's complaint on initial
screening. [D.E. No.7, 8] Following remand from the Sixth Circuit, on March 26,
2012, the Court ordered the defendants to be served with process. [D.E. No. 19,20]
On May 29, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that any
claims against them in their official capacities were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, and that Gamble had not alleged that he was asserting claims against
them in their individual capacities. [D.E. No. 27] Under the Local Rule 7.1(c),
Gamble had 21 days in which to respond to that motion. Silence followed.
When Gamble failed to respond, on June 25, 2012, the Court sua sponte
extended his time to do so, but ordered him to file a substantive response to the
motion by July 11, 2012. The Order expressly warned him that the Court would
dismiss his complaint ifhe did not. [D.E. No. 28] Instead, on July 6, 2012, Gamble
filed - not a substantive explanation ofwhy the defendants were not entitled to relief
but an unadorned copy of the one-page mandate issued by the Sixth Circuit on
November 17, 2011, as well as proposed summons forms. [D.E. No. 29] This is
clearly not a substantive response to the motion to dismiss, but does suggest his desire
that his claims should not be dismissed. The Court will not manufacture arguments
on behalf of a plaintiff who is unwilling to make them himself, Nali v. Ekman, 355
F. App'x 909,912 (6th Cir. 2009) (Sutton, J., dissenting); Superior Kitchen Designs,
Inc. v. Va/spar Indus. (US.A.), Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 140, 148 (D. Mass. 2003), but it
will evaluate the legal sufficiency of the defendants' arguments on their own terms.
To properly allege a constitutional claim against defendants in their individual
capacities, a plaintiffmust clearly notify them ofthe potential that they might be held
individually liable for the payment ofdamages. Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587,594
(6th Cir. 2003); Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 967-69 (6th Cir. 2002).
Gamble's complaint is mute on the capacity in which he sues the defendants, leaving
them to guess whether he intends to hold them personally liable for damages on his
constitutional and state law claims. But silence alone does not end the inquiry: when
the complaint does not speak to the question of capacity, a court must look to the
plaintiffs conduct during the course of the proceedings to determine whether his
actions gave the defendants fair notice ofhis intention to hold them personally liable.
Moorev. CityojHarriman, 272F.3d 769,772, n.l (6th Cir. 2001) (en bane). Acourt
may consider the nature of the plaintiffs claims, his demands for legal or equitable
relief, the nature of any defenses raised in response to the complaint (particularly the
defense of qualified immunity), and any subsequent pleadings filed, to determine
whether the defendants were put on notice that the plaintiff intended to hold them
personally accountable. Id.
In Moore, the caption on the complaint listed the police officers' names, but
not their titles; referred to them throughout as "individual defendants"; alleged that
they acted "for themselves and for the City"; and sought compensatory and punitive
damages against "each ofthe defendants." Finally, in response to the officers' motion
to dismiss, Moore "clarified any remaining ambiguity" by stating that the officers
were "being sued in their individual capacities." Id. at 773. Under those facts, the
Sixth Circuit found that Moore had given sufficient notice to the defendants that he
intended to sue them in their individual capacities.
In this case, each time Gamble referred to a defendant in the complaint, he
linked their name to their respective position at the prison. [D.E. No.2, pp. 2-5]
Gamble did request monetary damages in his complaint, a factor that might place a
defendant on notice that he was being sued in his individual capacity. But that factor,
standing alone, is usually not sufficient to provide the required notice. Rodgers, 344
F.3d at 594; Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 967-69. This is particularly so in this case, where
Gamble specifically demanded that "the state" - not the individually named
defendants - pay him damages for the alleged constitutional violations and reimburse
him for his lost wages and profits. [D.E. 2 at 4] This statement strongly suggests
only an official-capacity suit. Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 594; Shepherd, 313 F.3d at 969.
Gamble has never suggested otherwise, either through an amended complaint or in
any other document filed with the Court.
Gamble has done nothing in these proceedings to put the defendants on notice
ofhis intent to impose personal liability on them, either expressly or by implication,
and the defendants are therefore correct that the claims against them are asserted
solely in their official capacities. Moore, 272 F.3d at 772; Lovelace, 985 F.2d at 850.
Because a state official sued in his or her official capacity is merely a proxy for the
state, such claims are barred by both the Eleventh Amendment, Will v. Mich. Dep't
ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), and the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 itself.
Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). As for Gamble's pendent
claims under Kentucky law, the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over them
where it has already dismissed his federal claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Taylor v. First of Am.
Bank-Wayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th Cir. 1992). Gamble's state law claims will
be dismissed without prejudice to his right to re-assert them in a state court.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.
Defendants' motion to dismiss [D.E. No. 27] is GRANTED.
2.
Gamble's claims under federal law are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE; his state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3.
The Court will enter an appropriate judgment.
4.
This matter is STRICKEN from the Court's active docket.
This 26 th day of July, 2012.
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