Payne v. Unknown Defendant
Filing
10
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Petition is denied; (2) Action will be dismissed and stricken; (3) Judgment enter contemporaneously with this Order in favor of Respondents. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr. on 11/29/2011.(CMR)cc: COR Modified on 11/29/2011 to show a copy was sent to William Payne by U. S. Mail. (CMR).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION AT ASHLAND
WILLIAM PAYNE,
Petitioner,
Civil Action No. 0:11-00035-HRW
v.
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
GENERAL, et al.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND
ORDER
Respondents.
***** ***** ***** *****
Petitioner William Payne ("Payne"), an individual confined in the satellite
camp at the Federal Correctional Institution in Ashland, Kentucky ("FCI-Ashland"),
has submitted a habeas corpus petition, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and has
paid the filing fee. Payne challenges the amount of jail time credit the Bureau of
Prisons ("BOP") has given him on his federal sentence [R. 2], claiming that he is
entitled to additional credit on his federal sentence for the period oftime while he was
released on bail under "home confinement" from October 16, 2006, through May 12,
2008.
The Court reviews the § 2241 petition to determine whether "it plainly appears
from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254
Cases; (applicable to § 2241 petitions under Rule l(b)). See, e.g., Patton v. Fenton,
491 F.Supp. 156, 158-59 (M.D. Pa.1979); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court may
summarily dismiss a petition if it appears from the face thereof that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2243; Blevins v. Lamanna, 23 F. App'x 216,
218 (6th Cir. 2001); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970).
CLAIMS
As grounds for his § 2241 petition, Payne asserts that the BOP improperly
denied him credit on his federal sentence from October 16, 2006, through May 12,
2008, after he had been released on bail under certain conditions prior to self
reporting to his designated institution following his sentencing hearing on April 18,
2008. Payne claims that due to the restrictions imposed by the court, he was similarly
situated to a post-sentencing detainee and that the BOP's failure to credit his sentence
for this period of time spent under "home detention" prior to sentencing violates the
"equal protection" component of the Fifth Amendment due process clause of the
United States Constitution.
Upon review of this matter, the Court concludes that Payne is not entitled to
any additional jail time credit and will dismiss his § 2241 petition. The rationale for
this decision is set out below.
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DISCUSSION/ANALYSIS
In Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995), the habeas petitioner sought a writ of
habeas corpus, claiming that he was entitled to credit toward his sentence for time he
had spent in a community treatment center while released on bail. The trial court
denied his petition, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicting decisions among the
Courts of Appeals on this matter and reversed and remanded, concluding that time
spent by a prisoner at a community treatment center while "released" on bail,
pursuant to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not "official detention."
The Reno Court began its analysis of the issue before it, as follows:
Title 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) provides that a defendant generally
must "be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for
any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence
commences." Before the commencement of respondent's federal
sentence, a Federal Magistrate Judge "released" him on bail pursuant to
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and ordered him confined to a community
treatment center. The question presented is whether respondent was in
"official detention," and thus entitled to a sentence credit under §
3585(b), during the time he spent at the treatment center.
515 U.S. at 52.
The Reno reviewed the complete statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3585, not just 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585(b) in isolation, stating that:
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Title 18 U.S.C. § 3585 determines when a federal sentence of
imprisonment commences and whether credit against that sentence must
be granted for time spent in "official detention" before the sentence
began. It states:
"Calculation of a term of imprisonment
"(a) COMMENCEMENT OF SENTENCE.-A sentence to a term
of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in
custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence
service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the
sentence is to be served.
"(b) CREDIT FOR PRIOR CUSTODY.-A defendant shall be
given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time
he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence
commences
"(1) as a result ofthe offense for which the sentence was imposed;
or
"(2) as a result of any other charge for which the defendant was
arrested after the commission ofthe offense for which the sentence was
imposed;
"that has not been credited against another sentence." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3585 (emphasis added).
In United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337, 112 S.Ct. 1351,
1355-1356, 117 L.Ed.2d 593 (1992), we specifically noted Congress'
use of the term" 'official detention' " in § 3585(b), but we had no
occasion to rule on the meaning of that term. We must do so today.
(Footnote omitted).
515 U.S. at 55.
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In arriving at the meaning of the term "official detention," the Reno Court
continued its analysis, as follows:
Section 3585(b) provides credit for time "spent in official
detention prior to the date the sentence commences," 18 U.S.C. §
3585(b) (emphasis added), thus making clear that credit is awarded only
for presentence restraints on liberty. Because the Bail Reform Act of
1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141 et seq., is the body oflawthat authorizes federal
courts to place presentence restraints on a defendant's liberty, see §
3142(a) (authorizing courts to impose restraints on the defendant
"pending trial"); § 3143(a) (authorizing courts to impose restraints while
the defendant "is waiting imposition or execution of sentence"), the
"official detention" language of § 3585(b) must be construed in
conjunction with that Act. This is especially so because the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 was enacted in the same statute as the Sentencing Reform
Act of 1984, of which § 3585 is a part. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United
States, 498 U.S. 395,407-408, 111 S.Ct. 840,848-849, 112 L.Ed.2d 919
(1991) ("It is not uncommon to refer to other, related legislative
enactments when interpreting specialized statutory terms," since
Congress is presumed to have "legislated with reference to" those
terms).
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a federal court with two
choices when dealing with a criminal defendant who has been "charged
with an offense" and is awaiting trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a), or who "has
been found guilty of an offense and ... is awaiting imposition or
execution of sentence," 18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(1) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
The court may either (1) "release" the defendant on bailor (2) order him
"detained" without bail. A court may "release" a defendant subject to a
variety of restrictive conditions, including residence in a community
treatment center. See §§ 3142(c)(1)(B)(i), (x), and (xiv). If, however,
the court "finds that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of any other person and the community," § 3142(e), the court
"shall order the detention of the person," ibid., by issuing a "detention
order" "direct[ing] that the person be committed to the custody of the
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Attorney General for confinement in a corrections facility," § 3142(i)(2).
Thus, under the language of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant
suffers "detention" only when committed to the custody ofthe Attorney
General; a defendant admitted to bail on restrictive conditions, as
respondent was, is "released." See Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884,
889-890, and nn. 11-12 (CAll 1995); Moreland v. United States, 968
F.2d 655,659-660 (CA8), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028, 113 S.Ct. 675,
121 L.Ed.2d 598 (1992); 968 F.2d, at 661-663 Loken, J., concurring);
United States v. Becak, 954 F.2d 386,388 (CA6), cert. denied, 504 U.S.
945, 112 S.Ct. 2286, 119 L.Ed.2d 211 (1992).
Section 3585(a) and related sentencing provisions confirm this
interpretation. Section 3585(a) provides that a federal sentence
"commences" when the defendant is received for transportation to or
arrives at "the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be
served." Title 18 U.S.C. § 3621, in tum, provides that the sentenced
defendant "shall be committed to the custody ofthe Bureau ofPrisons,"
§ 3621(a), which "may designate any available penal or correctional
facility ..., whether maintained by the Federal Government or otherwise
..., that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable," § 3621 (b)
(emphasis added). The phrase "official detention facility" in § 3585(a)
therefore must refer to a correctional facility designated by the Bureau
for the service of federal sentences, where the Bureau retains the
discretion to "direct the transfer of a prisoner from one penal or
correctional facility to another." § 3621(b).
515 U.S. at 56-58.
The Reno Court also considered the context and history of § 3585(b), as well
as the BOP's interpretation of that statute:
The Bureau, as the agency charged with administering the credit
statute, see Wilson, supra, at 334-335, 112 S.Ct., at 1354-1355, likewise
has interpreted § 3585(b)'s "official detention" language to require credit
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for time spent by a defend'tnt under a § 3142(e) "detention order," but
not for time spent under a§ 3142(c) "release order," no matter how
restrictive the conditions. As we have explained, see supra, at
2024-2026, the Bureau's interpretation is the most natural and
reasonable reading of § 3585(b)'s "official detention" language. It is
true that the Bureau's interpretation appears only in a "Program
Statemen[t]"-an internal agency guideline-rather than in "published
regulations subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedur[e] Act,
including public notice and comment." 21 F.3d, at 562. But BOP's
internal agency guideline, which is akin to an "interpretive rule" that
"do[es] not require notice and comment," Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial
Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 99, 115 S.Ct. 1232, 1239, 131 L.Ed.2d 106
(1995), is still entitled to some deference, cf Martin v. Occupational
Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 157, 111 S.Ct. 1171,
1179, 113 L.Ed.2d 117 (1991), since it is a "permissible construction of
the statute," Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843,104 S.Ct. 2778,2782,81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).
515 U.S. at 59-61.
In the final analysis, in Reno v. Koray, supra, the Supreme Court held that
Koray's time spent at a community treatment center while "released" on bail pursuant
to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 was not "official detention" within the meaning of 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b); thus, Koray was not entitled to a credit against his sentence for this
period of time.
The holding in Reno v. Koray is equally applicable and controlling in the
present case. Payne was released on bail. Therefore, Payne was not in "official
detention" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), regardless of the restrictions
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imposed by the release order, and is not entitled to any credit on his sentence for the
period for which he seeks credit.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Payne's habeas petition filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 is without merit.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1. The petition filed by William Payne for a for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [R. 2] is DENIED;
2. This action will be DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the active docket;
and,
3. Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Order in favor of
the Respondents.
This the 29th day of November, 2011.
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