Tackett v. SSA

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER; pla motion for s/j be OVERRULED; dfts motion for s/j be SUSTAINED; a judgment in favor of dft will be entered herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 2/8/16.(SMT)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
at ASHLAND
Civil Action No.14-171-HRW
REBECCA ANN TACKETT,
v.

PLAINTIFF,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CAROLYN COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiffs application for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income benefits. The Court having reviewed the record in this case and
the dispositive motions filed by the parties, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the
reasons set forth herein, finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by
substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed her current application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income benefits on July 19, 2011, alleging disability beginning on May 7, 20 10, due to
"back injuty, neck injury, kidney problems resulting in the removal of one kidney, frequent
dizziness, migraines, fibromyalgia, depression, shaking, constant pain in left leg [and] weakness
and some loss of use in upper extremities (Tr. 266). This application was denied initially and on
reconsideration. Thereafter, upon request by Plaintiff, an administrative hearing was conducted
by Administrative Law Judge Andrew Chwalibog (hereinafter "ALJ"), wherein Plaintiff,
accompanied by counsel, testified. At the hearing, Gina Baldwin, a vocational expe1i

accompanied by counsel, testified. At the hearing, Gina Baldwin, a vocational expe1t
(hereinafter "VE"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following fivestep sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairment(s) must
be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No.4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.

The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled (Tr. 10-27). Plaintiff
was 48 years old at the time of the hearing decision. She has a 12'h grade education (Tr. 267).
Her past relevant work experience consists of work as a bmtender, dining room manager and
bartender's helper (Tr. 57-58, 267).
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability (Tr.12).
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from chronic pain syndrome

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secondmy to degenerative disc disease of the cervical or lumbar spines, mood disorder and
anxiety disorder, which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations (Tr. 1215).
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or medically equal any
of the listed impairments (Tr. 15-18).
The ALJ fmiher found that Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work (Tr. 25)
but determined that her has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light exertion
work with additional postural, environmental, and mental limitations (Tr. 18).
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national and
regional economies, as identified by the VE (Tr. 26).
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both pmiies have filed Motions for Summmy
Judgment [Docket Nos. 10 and] and this matter is ripe for decision.

II. ANALYSIS
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a
whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6 1h Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner's decision is suppmied by

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substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human

Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6'h Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The court may
not try the case de novo nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."

Bradley v. Secretmy ofHealth and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6'h Cir. 1988).
Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270,273 (6th
Cir.1997).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing her RFC. Specifically, she
contends that the ALJ did not properly consider the opinion of her treating psychiatrist, Scott
Lance, M.D. and that the RFC should have included manipulative limitations involving her upper
extremities.
A claimant's residual functional capacity is assessed by the ALJ between steps three and four
and is "the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] impairments." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),
404.1545(a)(l) & (5). An ALJ is required to "assess a claimant's residual functional capacity based
on all of the relevant medical and other evidence." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(3), 416.945(a)(3).
Thus, no medical source opinion is alone conclusive on this issue. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at
*2, 4-5. The ALJ weighs an acceptable medical source opinion against the other evidence of record,
among other factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527©, 416.927( c).
With regard to Plaintiffs mental functioning, the ALJ considered the opinions of treating
psychiatrist, Dr. Lance, and state agency consultants, Leigh Rosenberg, Psy.D. and H. Thompson
Prout, Ph.D.

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Dr. Lance completed a Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related Activities
(Mental) and, based on Plaintiff's repotts of"feeling anxious and overwhelmed easily," opined that
she had a good ability to follow work rules; relate to co-workers; use judgment; interact with
supervisors; function independently; understand, remember, and carry out both detailed and simple
job instructions; and maintain personal appearance. Dr. Lance also opined that Plaintiff would have a
fair ability to deal with the public; deal with work stress; maintain attention/concentration;
understand, remember, and carry out complex job instructions; behave in an emotionally stable
manner; relate predictably in social situations; and demonstrate reliability. Nevertheless, Dr. Lance
determined that Plaintiff would likely be absent from work more than four days per month because
of psychologically mentally based impairments or treatments (Tr. 734-735).
Ms. Rosenberg, Psy.D., opined that Plaintiff was subject to affective and somatoform
disorders but with no more than mild limitations in her activities of daily living, maintaining social
functioning, and in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace (Tr. 75-76, 88-89).
Doctor Prout reviewed the record and opined that Plaintiff was subject to mild limitation in
her activities of daily living, but moderate limitations in maintaining social functioning, and in
maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. As relevant to the case before the Cotnt, Dr. Prout
also opined that Plaintiff was not significantly limited in her ability to understand, remember and
carry out very short and simple instructions; sustain an ordinary routine without special supervision;
work in coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted; make simple workrelated decisions; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from
psychologically based symptoms; and to perform at a consistent pace. Dr. Prout flllther opined that,
mentally, Plaintiff would be able to understand and remember routine, simple tasks; sustain attention
and effort on tasks that require minimal judgment for extended periods of two hour segments; relate
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adequately in object-focused settings; and adapt to expected, routine task demands (Tr. I 04-105,
I 08-11 0).

The ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment takes into account Plaintiffs alleged
mental impairments in finding that from a mental standpoint, she can understand and remember
simple, routine tasks; sustain attention and effort on tasks that require minimal judgment for
extended periods of two-hour segments; relate adequately in object-focused settings; and adapt to
expected routine task demands. (Tr. 18). The ALJ specifically stated that Dr. Lance's "essentially
disabling assessment" was not an accurate representation of Plaintiffs true level of functioning, with
the evidence as a whole suggesting that "she exhibits good response to treatment with proper
adherence to all recommended/prescribed treatment measures ... " (Tr. 17). Moreover, Dr. Lance
provides no objective support for his overly restrictive opinion but, instead, as noted by Dr. Lance, is
based on Plaintiffs subjective complaints of feeling anxious and easily overwhelmed (Tr. 734-735).
It is clear that the ALJ considered the relevant evidence of record and the Court finds that he
reasonably found that Plaintiff had no more than a mild limitation in her activities of daily living,
with no more than moderate limitations in social functioning and in concentration, persistence or
pace (Tt·. 15-17).
With regard to physical functioning, Plaintiff urges that manipulative limitations
regarding her upper extremities were erroneously omitted. The ALJ's physical residual functional
capacity assessment of light exertion work with additional postural and environmental limitations
included no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme cold,
vibration, or work-related hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery. In
considering the extent of Plaintiffs physical limitations, the ALJ considered all of the relevant
evidence and clearly set forth his reasoning for weighing one opinion of another. The Court finds no

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error in this regard.
To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the evidence is open to another interpretation that
favors her claim, the Court declines to reweigh the evidence in this fashion. If the Commissioner's
decision denying benefits is supported by substantial evidence, as it is here, the Coutt must affirm
that decision. Longworth v. Commissioner ofSocial Security, 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6'h Cir. 2005).
Even if substantial evidence exists to support Plaintiff's claim, the Coutt should still affirm the
Commissioner's decision because it is suppotted by substantial evidence. Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d
762,772 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Smith v. Chafer, 99 F.3d 780,782 (6th Cir. 1996) (even if the
Court would have decided the matter differently than the ALI, if substantial evidence sup potts the
ALI's decision, it must be affirmed.)

III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALI's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be

SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This 8'h day of February, 2016.

Signed By:
Henrv R. Will! nit. Jr.

United StnteB Cletrlct Juci!Je

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