Mauk v. SSA

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER, denying Plaintiff's 9 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings by Larry E. Mauk ; and granting Defendant's 11 MOTION for Summary Judgment by Commissioner of SSA ; a judgment in favor of dft will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 3/16/16.(SMT)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
at ASHLAND
Civil Action No. 14-176-HRW
LARRY E. MAUK
0/B/0 RANDY A. MAUK,

v.

PLAINTIFF,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CAROLYN COLVIN,
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

DEFENDANT.

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendaot denying Randy Mauk's application for disability insurance benefits
and supplemental security income benefits. The Comi having reviewed the record in this case
and the dispositive motions filed by the parties, and being otherwise sufficiently advised, for the
reasons set forth herein, finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by
substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Randy A. Mauk, filed an application for Title II Disability Income Benefits
and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") disability benefits on June 20,2011,
alleging an onset date of December 19,2010 (Tr. 197-212).

He alleged disability due to

"seizures, depression and migraines" (Tr. 232). The application was denied
initially on August 23,2011 (Tr. 60-78), and upon reconsideration on October 17,2011 (Tr.
106-111 ). Thereafter, Mauk filed a Request for Hearing. (Tr. 131-132). An administrative
hearing was held in Huntington, West Virginia, with Administrative Law Judge Robeti Bowling

presiding (Tr. 48-57). Mauk appeared with his attorney; the hearing was continued for purposes
of allowing additional development of the record (Tr. 56-57). A second administrative hearing
was convened by ALJ Charlie Paul Andrus ("ALJ") presiding (Tr. 31-48). Mauk again appeared
with his attorney and offered sworn testimony. Vocational Expe1t ("VE") Gina Baldwin also
appeared and testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following fivestep sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Mauk was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairment(s) must
be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No.4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.

The ALJ issued a decision finding that Randy Mauk was not disabled (Tr. 8-24). He was
36 years old at the time he alleges he became disabled. He has a high school education as has
worked in various capacities for several tree-trimming companies.
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Mauk had not engaged in

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substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability (Tr. 13).
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that he suffers from seizures, cognitive disorder,
anxiety and depression which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations (Tr.
13 -15).
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Mauk's impairments did not meet or medically equal any of
the listed impairments (Tr. 15). In doing so, the ALJ specifically considered Listings 11.00,
11.03, 12.02, 12.04and 12.06 (Tr. 15-17).
The ALJ fmiher found that Mauk could not return to his past relevant work (Tr. 21) but
determined that he had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform simple work with no
exposure to the public and no exposure to heights or dangerous machinery and only routine
changes in the work setting (Tr. 17).
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national and
regional economies, as identified by the VE (Tr. 41-47).
Accordingly, the ALJ found Mauk not to be disabled at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process.
Notably, Mauk died in June 2014 due to hypetiension and atherosclerosis cardiovascular
disease (Tr. 512) impairments that were not alleged in his application (Tr. 232) or demonstrated
to be severe impairments in the medical record that was before the ALJ (Tr. 11-24). Where a
claimant dies before any payment of benefits under Title II is due, payment of the amount due is
made to a qualified surviving spouse or, if none, to any qualified surviving children or parents
(Mauk's father, Larry Mauk, is bringing this suit on his behalf(see Tr. 302)). See 42 U.S.C. §
404(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.503(b). Because payment of benefits under Title XVI can only be paid to
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a surviving spouse and he was divorced (Tr. 35), see 42 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(l)(A); 20 C.P.R.§
416.542(b), his death extinguished his SSI claim.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiffs request for review and adopted the ALI's decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner.
Plaintiff Larry Mauk thereafter filed this civil action seeking a reversal of the
Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary Judgment [Docket Nos.
9, I 0 and 11] and this matter is ripe for decision.

II. ANALYSIS
A.

Standard of Review

The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ' s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to supp01t a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a
whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6'h Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner's decision is supp01ted by
substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretmy ofHealth and Human
Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6'h Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The court may
not tty the case de novo nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."
Bradley v. Secretmy ofHealth and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6'h Cir. 1988).
Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have suppotted an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270,273 (6th
Cir.1997).

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B.

Plaintifrs Contentions on Appeal

Plaintiff contends that the ALI's finding of no disability is erroneous because: (1) the
ALI erred in failing to include limitations in his controlling hypothetical question and his RFC to
account for all of the severe impairments that he found to exist and (2) the ALJ failed to follow
the requirements of SSR 96-7p and 20 C.F.R. §§404.1529(c)(3) and 416.929(c)(3) in
determining Randy Mauk's credibility
C.

Analysis of Contentions on Appeal

Plaintiffs first claim of error is that the ALI erred in failing to include limitations in his
controlling hypothetical question and his RFC to account for all of the severe impairments that he
found to exist. Although Plaintiff casts his assignment of error as a step-five challenge to the
ALI's reliance on vocational expert testimony in response to a posed hypothetical question, it is,
as Defendant notes, actually a challenge to the ALI's residual functional capacity assessment.
The responsibility for determining a claimant's residual functional capacity is reserved to
the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1545.
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALI's finding that, despite his history of seizures and
depression, he had the residual functional capacity to perform simple work with no public contact
or exposure to heights or dangerous machinery and only routine changes in the work setting (Tr.
17).
With regard to Mauk's seizures, the ALI pointed out that the treatment notes of record
showed that his seizure disorder was well controlled with medication (Tr. 19, see Tr. 338 ("Last
seizure over 15 yrs [sic]"), 417 (last seizure two years prior), 477 (last "bad" seizure
approximately five years prior), 487 (last seizure in 2007 and could count total number of
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seizures "on one hand")). Dr. Lewis's notes indicated that Plaintiff was doing well (Tr. 19, see
Tr. 342 ("[d]oing well"), 349 ("[d]oing generally well")). The ALJ also noted that Mauk reported
that he continued to drive, indicating that his seizures were controlled (Tr. 19, see Tr. 35).
With regard to depression and anxiety, the ALJ noted that treatment records showed that
Mauk's prescribed anti-depressant (Celexa) provided moderate relief and rapidly improved his
depression (Tr. 18, see Tr. 467 ("[depression] has been rapidly improving"), 470 ("[depression]
has been gradually improving")). Moreover, the ALJ pointed out that mental status examinations
were largely normal (Tr. 19, see Tr. 490). Accordingly, the ALJ reasonably found that Mauk's
complaints of disabling physical and mental limitations were not supported by the treatment
notes of record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4).
As for the various medical opinions in the record, it is clear from the hearing decision that
the ALJ considered them in fashioning the RFC. In weighing the opinions, the ALJ discounted
the opinions of Tony Goudy, Ph.D. and Sheila Emerson, M.A., both of whom evaluated Randy
Mauk at the behest of his attorney.
Doctor Goudy's report indicated that Mauk complained of severe memmy and
concentration problems on Dilantin, as well as depression (Tr. 476-78). Goudy diagnosed
cognitive disorder and adjustment disorder with depressed mood (Tr. 480). He opined that Mauk
had marked limitations in performing in activities of daily living, moderate limitations in social
functioning, and marked impairments in concentration, persistence, or pace (Tr. 480). Goudy also
opined that Mauk had moderate limitations in using judgment; marked limitations in functioning,
maintaining attention and concentrating, understanding, remembering, carrying out simple and
detailed job instructions, and completing a normal work-day and work-week; and extreme

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limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out complex job instructions (but
otherwise had slight limitations) (Tr. 483-84).
In her report, Ms. Emerson noted a full scale IQ score of 63 and diagnosed anxiety and
mental retardation (Tr. 493). Ms. Emerson opined that Mauk had a limited ability to sustain
concentration, persistence, and pace and a vety limited ability to follow multi-step instructions,
adding that it would be challenging for him to maintain employment (Tr. 493). In a check-box
style form, Ms. Emerson opined that he had moderate, marked, or extreme limitations in most
areas of functioning (Tr. 495-96).
These opinions of extreme limitation in functioning are at odds with the other medical
evidence in the record.

For example, Megan L. Green, Psy.D., performed a psychological

evaluation of Mauk in connection with his disability application (Tr. 431-34). She noted that he
did not have a histoty of learning problems and was not experiencing depressive symptoms at the
time of the evaluation (while he was on anti-depressant medication), but had experienced them in
the past (Tr. 432-33). Dr. Green did not diagnose any mental disorders and noted that Mauk was
not psychologically limited in his ability to function in an occupational capacity (Tr. 434).
In addition, state agency psychologist Mmy K. Thompson, Ph.D., reviewed Mauk's
medical records and did not find evidence of any severe mental impairments (Tr. 67). Two
months later, another state agency psychologist Sharon Ames-Dennard, Ph.D., reviewed Mauk's
medical records and agreed that he did not have any severe mental impairments (Tr. 86-87).
Similarly, state agency physician Carlos Hernandez, M.D., reviewed Plaintiffs medical
records and found no evidence of any severe physical impairments (Tr. 85-86).

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Moreover, the ALJ noted that the opinions of Doctor Goudy and Ms. Emerson were
inconsistent with Mauk's own reports regarding his functioning, including that he could
complete household chores, shop, drive, and pay bills (Tr. 20, see Tr. 238-45, 266-72).
The Court finds that The ALJ' s decision to discount these opinions and the reasons the
ALJ gave in doing so are reasonable and supported by the record. See Norris v. Comm 'r ofSoc.

Sec., 461 F. App'x 433,440 (6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) ("So long as the ALI's decision
adequately explains and justifies its determination as a whole, it satisfies the necessary
requirements to survive [judicial] review.").
To the extent Plaintiff suggests that the ALJ substituted his lay opinion for any one
doctor's opinion, he is incorrect. The ALJ did what he was charged with doing, to-wit, weighing
the various opinions of record and assessing a residual functional capacity that was in line with
the record as a whole.
As for the hypothetical posed to the VE, the questions posed complied with this circuit's
long-standing rule that the hypothetical question is proper where it accurately describes a
claimant's functional limitations. Varley v. Secretary ofHealth and Human Services, 820 F.2d
777, 779. (6 1h Cir. 1987). This rule is necessarily tempered by the requirement that the ALJ
incorporate only those limitations which he or she finds to be credible. Casey v. Secretmy of

Health and Human Services, 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6'h Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff's second claim of error is that the ALJ improperly evaluated Randy Mauk' s
credibility.

It is well established that as the "ALJ has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of a
witness, (her) conclusions with respect to credibility should not be discarded lightly and should

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be accorded deference." Hardaway v. Secretmy ofHealth and Human Services, 823 F.2d 922,
928 (6' 11 Cir. 1987).
The ALJ also found that Mauk's inconsistent statements detracted from the credibility of
his claims (Tr. 18). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(4) (stating an ALJ must consider inconsistencies
in the evidence). The ALJ pointed out that while he unequivocally testified that he had not done
any work for pay since December 2010 (Tr. 37), a May 2011 urgent care treatment note showed
that Mauk presented for treatment of a right hand injury sustained while doing "construction
work" (Tr. 322-24). The ALJ also noted that, despite Mauk's claims that he quit working in
December 2010 because he "started feeling more tired," he said in the same sentence that he left
work at that time for "a job paying more" but it fell through and he could not get his other job
back (Tr. 36). Additionally, as set f01th above, he reported a differing seizure hist01y to different
providers, reporting to some that he had not had a seizure for 15 years and others that his last
seizure was two years prior (compare Tr. 338,417,477, 487).
Given the inconsistencies in the record, the ALJ permissibly discounted Mauk's
credibility.

III. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALJ' s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summaty
Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summaty Judgment be

SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This

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