Sanders v. Snyder-Norris
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that: 1. Kenneth Sanders' petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 USC 2241 DE 1 is DENIED. 2. This action is STRICKEN from the Court's docket. 3. The Court will enter an appropriate judgment contemporaneously with this Order. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 10/1/15.(KSS)cc: COR, Sanders (via US mail)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
ASHLAND
KENNETH DALE SANDERS,
Petitioner,
v.
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)
)
)
Civil Action No. 15-51-HRW
)
JODIE SNYDER-NORRIS, Warden,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
*** *** *** ***
This matter is before the Court upon the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by federal inmate Kenneth Dale Sanders. [D. E.
No. 1]
The Comi reviews habeas corpus petitions to determine "if it plainly
appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled
to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States
District Courts (applicable to § 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2243; Alexander v. Northern Bureau ofPrisons, 419 F. App'x 544, 545 (6th Cir.
2011 ).
On October 24, 2003, in Winchester, Tennessee, Sanders pled guilty to
conspiracy to manufacture 50 or more grams of methamphetamine in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 846 and to possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in exchange for the dismissal of other drug
and firearms counts. In light of two prior felony drug convictions in 1997 and
1998, the presentence investigation report indicated that Sanders qualified as an
armed career criminal under U.S.S.G. 4Bl.l.
Accordingly, the trial court
sentenced Sanders to 262 months imprisonment on the conspiracy charge to be
followed by a 60-month consecutive term on the firearms charge. United States v.
Sanders, No. 4:02-CR-54-CLC-1 (B.D. Tenn. 2002).
On direct appeal, the Sixth Circuit remanded for resentencing in light of
Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), but following remand the trial court
imposed the same sentence. On his second appeal, Sanders acknowledged his
prior convictions but argued that his sentence was excessive when the career
offender enhancement was applied. The Sixth Circuit rejected that argument and
affirmed Sanders' sentence on December 7, 2006.
Since that date, Sanders has filed a number of motions in the trial court,
including several under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, challenging the application of the career
offender enhancement to his sentence. In his April 11, 2008, motion under § 2255,
Sanders contended that his 1997 conviction for possession of marijuana did not
qualifY as a valid predicate offense, an argument the trial court rejected on
September 21, 20 11.
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In an October 14, 2010, motion, Sanders asserted that he was "actually
innocent" of being a career offender, in part on the theory that the career offender
enhancement violated the Constitution's prohibition against punishing a citizen a
second time for conduct for which he had already been punished. The trial court
denied the latter motion on July 13, 2011, on both procedural and substantive
grounds, noting that Sanders' double jeopardy argument had been flatly rejected by
the Supreme Court. Sanders, No. 4:02-CR-54-CLC-1 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) at D. E.
No. 76, 80 (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967) ("[Recidivist]
statutes . . . have been sustained in this Court on several occasions against
contentions that they violate constitutional strictures dealing with double jeopardy,
ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process, equal protection,
and privileges and immunities.")).
Undeterred, Sanders repackaged this same argument in a series of motions
and petitions filed in the trial court and with the Sixth Circuit on December 11,
2012; January 23, 2013; September 9, 2013; June 6, 2014; and September 8, 2015.
Sanders, No. 4:02-CR-54-CLC-1 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) at D. E. Nos. 90, 92, 98, 102,
110. None were successful. In denying one motion, on December 23, 2013, the
Sixth Circuit noted that:
Double-jeopardy protections generally are not applicable to
sentencing enhancements because such enhancements are not an
"additional punishment for the previous offense; rather, they act to
increase a sentence 'because of the manner in which [the defendant]
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committed the crime of conviction."' Monge v. California, 524 U.S.
721, 728 (1998) (quoting United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 154
(1997) (per curiam)); see also United States v. Wheeler, 330 F.3d 407,
413 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that "double jeopardy principles
generally have no application in the sentencing context").
In re: Sanders, No. 13-6065 (6th Cir. 2013).
Sanders filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 in this Court on July 20, 2015, asserting the same arguments previously
considered and rejected by the trial court and the Sixth Circuit -that use of prior
state drug convictions for which he had already been convicted and punished by
state authorities to enhance his federal sentence violates the Double Jeopardy
and/or Due Process clauses of the Constitution. [D. E. No. 1 at 4, 6-10]
If the Court were to reach the merits of this claim, it would plainly be
frivolous. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397-400 (1995); United States v.
Lawrence, 735 F. 3d 385, 427 (6th Cir. 2013) ("use of prior convictions to enhance
a sentence for a subsequent offense does not constitute double jeopardy.") (citing
Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 230 (1994)); see also United States v. Ramirez,
2015 WL 3423162, at *1 (lOth Cir. May 29, 2015) ("To the extent Ramirez might
instead suggest that the use of her prior convictions to increase her sentence runs
afoul of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the United States Supreme Court has
'consistently rejected double jeopardy challenges to recidivism statutes."') (citing
United States v. Andrews, 447 F. 3d 806, 810 (lOth Cir. 2006)).
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But more fundamentally, Sanders may not assert this claim in a habeas
corpus petition under § 2241. If a federal prisoner wishes to challenge the legality
of his federal conviction or sentence, he must file a motion for post-conviction
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the court that convicted and sentenced him.
Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1123 (6th Cir. 2003). The prisoner may not
use a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for this purpose, as it
does not constitute an additional or alternative remedy to the one available under
§ 2255. Hernandez v. Lamanna, 16 F. App'x 317,320 (6th Cir. 2001). Instead, a
petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is limited to challenges to actions taken by
prison officials that affect the manner in which the prisoner's sentence is being
carried out, such as computing sentence credits or determining parole eligibility.
Terrell v. United States, 564 F.3d 442, 447 (6th Cir. 2009).
A narrow exception exists for certain statutory construction claims
predicated upon an intervening Supreme Court decision which narrows the scope
of conduct proscribed the statute of conviction, Hayes v. Holland, 473 F. App'x
501, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2012), but Sanders makes no such claim here. And even this
exception reaches only claims which challenge an underlying conviction, not
objections to the sentence imposed. Brown v. Hogsten, 503 F. App'x 342, 343 (6th
Cir. 2012) (noting that "claims of sentencing error may not serve as the basis for an
actual innocence claim."). Because Sanders' claim does not fall within the savings
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clause of§ 2255(e), the Court must deny his petition under § 2241 for lack of
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.
Kenneth Sanders' petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 [D. E. No. 1] is DENIED.
2.
This action is STRICKEN from the Court's docket.
3.
The Court will enter an appropriate judgment contemporaneously with
this Order.
This 1st day of October, 2015.
Al~.~* Signed By:
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