Benningfield v. Attorney General of the United States of America et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER; 1) Clerk shall on the CM/ECF cover sheet TERMINATE the Attorney General for the United States of America and Federal Bureau of Prisons and shall DESIGNATE Jodie L. Snyder-Norris as the sole respondent 2) petition for w rit of habeas corpus is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to his right to file civil rights action 3) Court will enter appropriate judgment 4) habeas proceeding is DISMISSED AND STRICKEN from court's docket. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 3/29/16.(SMT)cc: COR, Benningfield via USMail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION AT ASHLAND
STERLING R. BENNINGFIELD,
Petitioner,
v.
JODIE SNYDER-NORRIS, Warden, 1
Respondent.
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Civi!ActionNo.15-CV-115-HRW
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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Petitioner Sterling R. Benningfield is an imnate confined by the BOP in the Federal
Correctional Institution ("FCI")-Ashland, located in Ashland, Kentucky. Proceeding without an
attorney, Benningfield has filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2241, challenging his BOP security classification. [D. E. No. 1] 2 Benningfield asks this Court
to order the BOP to transfer him to a lower security federal prison. Benningfield has paid the
$5.00 filing fee. [Id.]
1
Benningfield has named the Attorney General of the United States of America and the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP")
as the Respondents to this action, but the only proper respondent to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the
individual having immediate custody of the person detained, typically the warden of the facility where the petitioner
is confined. 28 U.S.C. §2243; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004). As Jodie L. Snyder-Norris is the
Warden ofFCI-Ashland and the person who has immediate custody of Benningfield, the Clerk of the Court will be
instructed to terminate the United States and the BOP as the respondents on the CM/ECF cover sheet, and to
designate Jodie L. Snyder-Norris, the Warden ofFCI-Ashland, as the sole respondent to this proceeding.
2
Benningfield filed his § 2241 petition on August 3, 2015, in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. See Sterling R. Benningfield v. Attorney General of the United States of America, et al., No. 15-1254
(ROM) (D.D.C. 20 15). On October 27, 2915, the District of Columbia transferred Benningfield's § 2241 petition to
this Court, citing "immediate-custodian rule" applicable to § 2241 habeas corpus petitions, and the fact that
Benningfield's custodian was located in this judicial district. [D. E. No. 2] The transfer of the proceeding to this
Court was not effectuated until December 14,2015. [D. E. No.5]
I
The Court conducts an initial review of habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2243;
Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App'x 544, 545 (6th Cir. 2011). The Court
must deny the petition "if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United
States District Courts (applicable to§ 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule 1(b)). The Court evaluates
Benningfield's petition under a more lenient standard because he is not represented by an
attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th
Cir. 2003).
At this stage, the Court accepts Benningfield's factual allegations as true, and
liberally construes his legal claims in his favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555-56 (2007). Having reviewed the petition, the Court must deny relief because Benningfield
may not assert his claims in a habeas corpus proceeding under § 2241.
CLAIMS ASSERTED IN THE§ 2241 I'ETITION
On October 14, 2014, the district court in San Antonio, Texas, sentenced Benningfield to
serve a 41-month prison term stemming from his conviction for Attempting to Evade or Defeat
Tax, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. United States v. Sterling R. Benningfield, alkla Sterling
Randall Benningfield, No. 05-CR-101-FB (W.D. Tex. 2005) [D. E. No. 40, therein]
In his § 2241 petition, Benningfield alleges that the BOP has assigned him an incorrect
security classification which to has resulted in his confinement in a high security prison, instead
of a lower security prison camp where other federal prisoners similarly situated to him have been
placed.
Benningfield alleges that is being confined in a facility which houses " ... violent
inmates and with worse living conditions than a facility where, according to their [BOP] policy, I
should be." [D. E. No. I, p. 3]
2
Benningfield alleges that his current BOP security classification violates the provisions of
BOP Program Statement 5100.08, Inmate Security Designation and Custody Classification; that
he has no detainers lodged against him that justify his higher security classification and
confinement at FCI-Ashland; 3 that his higher security classification has rendered him ineligible
for participation in the Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP); 4 that between June 2015 and
July 2015, his outgoing U.S. mail was unlawfhlly held at FCI-Ashland; and that his placement in
FCI-Ashland violates his right to equal protection of the law, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Benningfield seeks an order directing the BOP to transfer
him to a lower security facility, such as the FCI-Ashland satellite camp, "commensurate with
their policy thus allowing me my constitutional right." [!d., p. 5]
DISCUSSION
Claims challenging the manner in which a prisoner's sentence is being executed, such as
the computation of sentence credits or parole eligibility, are issues which fall under the purview
of§ 2241. United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 1999)
Benningfield assetis his
challenge to his BOP custody classification in a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28
US.C. § 2241, but it is well established that challenges to a prisoner's classification or place of
3
Benningfield submitted documentation showing that he began the BOP's administrative remedy process. On May
13, 2015, FCI-Ashland Warden Jodie L. Snyder-Norris denied Benningfield's Request for an Administrative
Remedy (BP-9), stating that although no formal detainer had been lodged against Benningfield, several pending
charges were listed in his PSI (Pre-Sentence Investigation Report) with unknown dispositions, and that
documentation fi'om the jurisdictions involved was needed " ... to verify the intent of the charging agency. The
responsibility of obtaining such documentation falls on the inmate." [D. E. No. I, p. 9] Warden Snyder-Norris also
rejected Benningfield's claim that he was unsafe at FCI-Ashland, noting that his file contained no reports that he had
received threats from either inmates or the prison staff. [!d.] On June 8, 2015, the BOP's Mid-Atlantic Regional
Office affirmed the Warden's denial of Benningfield's remedy request, explaining that at that time, Benningfield did
not have a "Custody Classification Form," but that he would be receiving one six months following his Initial
Review after his first Program Review. [Id., p. II]
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The RDAP is a program through which qualified federal inmates receive various incentives for participating in
drug abuse treatment programs. 28 C.F.R. § 550.57. The BOP has discretion to allow an inmate a sentence
reduction of up to one year if the inmate was convicted of a nonviolent offense and has successfully completed a
substance abuse treatment program. 18 U.S. C.§ 3621(e)(2)(B).
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confinement, such as the challenges Benningfield advances in this proceeding, are "conditions of
confinement" claims which may only be asserted in a civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
See Hunter v. Mulvaney, No. 2:13-CV-84, 2013 WL 4499036, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2013)
(finding that prisoner's complaints about his security threat designation and its negative
consequences, including a higher security classification and reduced privileges, were claims
challenging the conditions of his confinement, not habeas claims seeking a speedier release from
custody); Bateman v. USP-Big Sandy, No. 7:10-00146-KKC, 2011 WL 2183553, at *1 (E.D.
Ky. June 6, 2011) (petitioner could not seek relief from the conditions of BOP confinement in a
§ 2241 petition and was instead required to file a civil rights action under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 );
Simmons v. Curtin, No. 10-CV-4751, 2010 WL 5279914, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2010)
("Simmons's challenges to his security classification and resulting transfer to a different facility,
however, are not attacks upon the execution of his sentence, and therefore, are not cognizable
under§ 2241."); McCray v. Rios, No. 08-206-ART, 2009 WL 103602, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 14,
2009) (same).
Habeas corpus relief is not available to prisoners who are complaining only of the
conditions of their confinement or mistreatment during their legal incarceration. See Martin v.
Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004); Sullivan v. United States, 90 F. App'x 862, 863 (6th
Cir. 2004); Lutz v. Hemingway, 476 F. Supp. 2d 715, 718 (E.D. Mich. 2007). Complaints
concerning conditions of confinement "do not relate to the legality of the petitioner's
confinement, nor do they relate to the legal sufficiency of the criminal court proceedings which
resulted in the incarceration of the petitioner." Lutz, 476 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (quoting Jl.Iaddux v.
Rose, 483 F. Supp. 661, 672 (E.D. Tenn. 1980)). Here, Benningfield not only challenges his
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BOP security classification, but also alleges that the FCI-Ashland staff has improperly held his
outgoing mail, a claim which clearly qualifies as yet another challenge to the conditions of his
confinement.
If Benningfield intends to challenge his current custody classification at FCI-
Ashland and pursue his mail-tampering claims, he must file a civil rights action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, pursuant to the doctrine announced in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971 ). The filing fee for such an action is $400.00, although Benningfield may seek in
forma pauperis status and ask to pay that fee in installments. 5 The dismissal of this action is
without prejudice to Benningfield filing a Bivens civil rights action asserting his condition of
confinement claims.
Benningfield is advised that even if he files a Bivens civil rights action, his challenge to
his security classification could likely be found to suffer from several substantive defects. First,
to the extent that Benningfield alleges that the BOP ignored its own program statement and other
internal policies with respect to his security classification, it is unlikely that he states grounds
entitling him to relief. The requirements of procedural due process are defined by the United
States Constitution, not by an agency's internal regulations or guidelines. Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472, 485 (1995).
Thus, an agency's alleged failure to adhere to its own policies or
guidelines does not state a due process claim. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 541, (1985); Smith v. City of Salem, Ohio, 378 F.3d 566, 578 (6th Cir. 2004); Slater v.
Holland, No. 0:11-CV-86-HRW, 2012 WL 1655985, at *5 (E.D. Ky. May 10, 2012). Prison
regulations are "primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a
prison. [They are] not designed to confer rights on inmates .... " Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-82; see
also Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 846 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that noncompliance with timing
5
If Benningfield is granted pauper status, the $50.00 administrative fee will be waived.
5
provisions of28 C.P.R.§ 541.15(a) and (b) did not violate inmate's due process rights because
those prison regulations do not "shield inmates from an 'atypical or significant hardship ... in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life'" and thus do not give rise to independent liberty
interest protected by due process) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484)).
Second, the RDAP statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3621, requires the BOP to provide a residential
drug abuse treatment program, but it defines neither the contours of that program nor the
requirements for prisoner eligibility, and leaves to the BOP's discretion the decision of whether
to grant early release. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 241 (2001). Thus, even where a
prisoner successfully completes the RDAP, the BOP retains the discretion to deny early release.
See McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1182 (9th Cir. 1999); Orr v. Hawk, 156 F.3d 651, 65354 (6th Cir. 1998).
Third, in her denial of Benningfield's Request for an Administrative Remedy, Warden
Snyder-Norris noted that while Benningfield was being investigated for tax evasion, he fled to
Mexico and remained there as a fugitive for nine years to avoid prosecution; that when he
retumed to the United States, he resided with his sister until he was arrested; and that at
sentencing, he received a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.
[!d.]
considerations could adversely affect a federal prisoner's security classification.
These
Warden
Snyder-Norris also rejected Benningfield's claim that he was unsafe at FCI-Ashland because his
file contained no reports that he had received threats from either inmates or the prison staff.
[!d.].
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
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I.
The Clerk of the Court shall, on the CM/ECF cover sheet, TERMINATE the
United States of America and the Federal Bureau of Prisons as the Respondents to this action,
and shall DESIGNATE Jodie L. Snyder-Norris, Warden of the FCI-Ashland in Ashland,
Kentucky, as the sole Respondent to this proceeding.
2.
Petitioner Sterling R. Benningfield's 28 U.S. C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas
corpus [D. E. No. I] is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to his right to file a civil rights
action under 28 US.C. § 1331, asserting his condition of confinement claims.
3.
The Court will enter an appropriate judgment.
4.
This habeas proceeding is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's
docket.
This March 29,2016.
Signed By:
Henry R. Wl!holr, Jr.
United States Dletrlot Judge
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