Mann v. Snyder-Norris

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER; 1) petitioner Jack Mann's petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED 2) action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from Court's docket 3) Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with MO&O. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 7/28/17.(SMT)cc: COR, Mann via USMail

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
ASHLAND
JACK MANN,
Petitioner,
V.

JODIE L. SNYDER-NORRIS,
Respondent.

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Civil No. 16-88-HRW

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

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Petitioner Jack Mann is an inmate confined by the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP")
at the Federal Correctional Institution-Ashland, located in Ashland, Kentucky
("FCI-Ashland"). Proceeding without an attorney, Mann has filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [D.E. No. l], as well as briefs in
support of his § 2241 petition. [D. E. Nos. 1-2, 7] In his petition, Mann challenges
his exclusion from the BOP' s Residential Drug Abuse ("RDAP") Program. 1
I.

Procedural Background
In September 2010, pursuant to a Plea Agreement with the United States

Attorney for the Northern District of Indiana, Mann pled guilty in the United States
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The RDAP is a program through which qualified federal inmates receive various incentives for
participating in drug abuse treatment programs. 28 C.F.R. § 550.57. The BOP has discretion to
allow an inmate a sentence reduction of up to one year if the inmate was convicted of a nonviolent
offense and has successfully completed a substance abuse treatment program. 18 U.S.C. §
3621 (e)(2)(B).

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to Solicitation to Commit Murder
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 2

United States v. Jack Mann,

No. 1:10-CR-35-2-SMM (N.D. Ill. 2010). [Record Nos. 10, 43, 44, 86, 91, 146
therein] Mann was sentenced by the Honorable William J. Hibbler, United States
District Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, to one hundred and five ( 105)
months of imprisonment. [Id. at Record No. 86-2] In the Judgment, Judge Hibbler
states: "The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States
Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of: ONE HUNDRED-FIVE (105)
MONTHS.

Defendant shall participate in the Residential Drug and Alcohol

Program and mental health evaluation and treatment." [Id. (emphasis added)] With
respect to the recommendations made to the Bureau of Prisons, Judge Hibbler
recommends that Defendant be placed at the Oxford, Wisconsin or Milan, Michigan
facility. [Id.]
In his petition, Mann argues that, because the language in the Judgment
stating that "Defendant shall participate in the Residential Drug and Alcohol
Program and mental health evaluation and treatment," is part of the sentencing
language itself and not in the "Recommendations" section of the Judgment, the

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The victims in Mann's solicitation case were an Assistant United States Attorney in the Northern
District of Illinois and a Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent assigned to Mann's codefendant's drug case that was pending in the Northern District of Illinois. Thus, Mann's plea
agreement was handled by the Office of the United States Attorney for the Northern District of
Indiana.
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Judgment imposes a requirement that Mann participate in the RDAP program. [D.E.
No. 1 at p. 3] Although Mann concedes that the BOP has control over participation
in treatment programs, including the RDAP, he argues that, in his case, his
participation in the RDAP is required by his Judgment.

[D.E. No. 1 at p. 5]

Accordingly, Mann argues that the BOP's failure to comply with this requirement
of his Judgment is arbitrary and capricious in violation of the AP A, as well as his
constitutional rights. [Id.; D.E. No. 1-2 at p. 1-3] Mann also argues that, as a result
of his exclusion from the RDAP, he is being treated differently to other federal
inmates who are "similarly situated" and that this unequal treatment is the result of
purposeful or intentional discrimination. [D.E. No. 1 at p. 5; D.E. No. 1-2 at p. 3]
Finally, Mann argues that, because the BOP has allegedly "dragged their feet to
assure that Mann is not given the ability to participate or receive the time credit" for
the RDAP program, he should now be given full credit for the participation in the
RDAP program, even though he has not actually participated. [D.E. No. 1 at p. 3]

II.

Analysis
The Court conducts an initial review of habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2243; Alexander v. Northern Bureau of Prisons, 419 F. App'x 544, 545 (6th Cir.
2011 ). The Court evaluates Mann's petition under a more lenient standard because
he is not represented by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court accepts the petitioner's factual allegations
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as true and construes all legal claims in his favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). After reviewing Mann's petition, the Court concludes
that it must be denied because, for several reasons, "it plainly appears from the
petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4
of the Rules Governing§ 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (applicable
to§ 2241 petitions pursuant to Rule l(b)).
First, although Mann argues that the BOP's placement decision is "arbitrary
and capricious" in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §
706(2)(A)-(C), the BOP's determinations regarding halfway house placement are
expressly insulated from judicial review under the APA. 28 U.S.C. § 3625 ("The
provisions of sections 554 and 555 and 701 through 706 of title 5, United States
Code, do not apply to the making of any determination, decision, or order under this
subchapter."). Cf. Woodard v. Quintana, No. 5:15-307-KKC, 2015 WL 7185478,
at *5-6 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 13, 2015). Indeed, as Mann even recognizes in his petition,
"[ w]hen a court sentences a federal offender, the BOP has plenary control, subject
to statutory constraints, over 'the place of the prisoner's imprisonment,' and the
treatment programs (if any) in which he may participate." Tapia v. United States,
564 U.S. 319, 331 (2011)( citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 362l(b ), (e), (f); 3624([); 28 C.F.R.
pt. 544 (2010)). As explained by the United States Supreme Court, "A sentencing
court can recommend that the BOP place an offender in a particular facility or
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program. But decisionmaking authority rests with the BOP." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(a)).

Thus, the language of Judge Hibbler's Order stating that "Defendant shall
participate in the Residential Drug and Alcohol Program and mental health
evaluation and treatment" must be construed as a recommendation, albeit a very
strong one, to the BOP that Mann be placed in the RDAP.

However, this

recommendation does not require the BOP to place Mann in the RDAP.
Moreover, to the extent that Mann challenges the BOP's determination with
respect to his participation in an RDAP on constitutional grounds, any such
challenge fails as a matter of law, as Mann does not have a constitutional right to
participate in an RDAP. Cf. Standifer v. Ledezma, 653 F.3d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir.
2011) (no constitutional right to participate in RDAP).
Finally, the BOP's online Inmate Locator Database indicates that Mann has
already been released from prison and transferred to a halfway house in the Chicago,
Illinois area, and that he will be released from that facility on January 6, 2018. See
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited on July 18, 2017). Mann has also filed
a change of address in the record in this case indicating that he now resides in
Chicago, Illinois. [D.E. Nos. 8, 9] Mann's release from incarceration to a halfway
house renders his claim seeking an earlier placement in an RDAP moot. Miller v.
Whitehead, 527 F. 3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 2008); Zomber v. Stine, No. 7: 07-402-DCR,
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2008 WL 1735169, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 11, 2008) ("The Sixth Circuit has ruled that
a prisoner's placement in a RRC during the pendency of a habeas corpus petition
seeking earlier placement renders the petition moot, and also falls outside the
exception to mootness for cases 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.'") (citing

Brockv. United States Dept. ofJustice, 2007 WL 4163854, at *2 n.3 (6th Cir. 2007)).
For each of the foregoing reasons, Mann's petition must be denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.

Petitioner Jack Mann's petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2241 [D.E. No. 1] is DENIED.
2.

This action is DISMISSED and STRICKEN from the Court's docket.

3.

Judgment shall be entered contemporaneously with this Memorandum

Opinion and Order.
This 28th day of July, 2017.

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