Kitchen v. SSA

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER : Pla's 12 MOTION for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is DENIED and that Deft's 14 MOTION for Summary Judgment be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. A separate judge in conformity herewith shall this date be entered. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 9/20/18.(JLS)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION at ASHLAND

ANGELA KITCHEN,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL., Acting
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.

Civil Case No.
0:18-cv-03-JMH
MEMORANDUM OPINION
& ORDER

***
Plaintiff Angela Kitchen brings this matter under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) seeking judicial review of an administrative decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security.

The Court, having reviewed

the record, will AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision as it is
supported by substantial evidence.
I.
In

determining

disability,

an

(“ALJ”) uses a five-step analysis.

Administrative

the

claimant

is

still

Judge

See Jones v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
whether

Law

performing

Step One considers
substantial

gainful

activity; Step Two, whether any of the claimant’s impairments are
“severe”; Step Three, whether the impairments meet or equal a
listing in the Listing of Impairments; Step Four, whether the
claimant can still perform his past relevant work; and Step Five,
1 

whether significant numbers of other jobs exist in the national
economy which the claimant can perform.

As to the last step, the

burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner. Id.;
see also Preslar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107,
1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited
to an inquiry into whether or not the findings of the Commissioner
are supported by substantial evidence, and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 401 (1971). “The substantial
evidence standard is met if a reasonable mind might accept the
relevant evidence as adequate to support a conclusion.” Longworth
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal
citations omitted). A reviewing court may not try the case de novo,
resolve

conflicts

in

the

evidence,

or

decide

questions

of

credibility. See Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 709, 713
(6th Cir. 2012). Even if the court would have resolved the factual
issues differently, the Commissioner’s decision must stand if
supported by substantial evidence. See Tyra of Health & Human
Servs.,

896

F.2d

administrative

1024,

decision

1028
is

(6th

not

Cir.

subject

1990).
to

Similarly,

reversal

even

an
if

substantial evidence would have supported the opposite conclusion.
Ulman, 693 F.3d at 714.

2 

Plaintiff

filed

an

application

for

Disability

Insurance

Benefits (DIB), alleging disability beginning June 1, 2010.

(TR

177-178). The claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
(TR 86, 87).

After a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

denied Plaintiff’s claim on October 5, 2016.

(TR 22-38).

The

ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when
the Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s ruling.
This appeal followed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

(TR 5-7).
Consistent

with the Court’s Standing Scheduling Order, the parties have
submitted cross motions for summary judgment, which are ripe for
review.

[DE 12, 14].

Plaintiff

has

restricted

her

arguments

to

the

issues

specifically discussed below. Plaintiff’s Brief (Pl.’s Br.) at 511.

Therefore, the Court will limit its recitation of the medical

evidence to that pertaining to the issues in the case and will
discuss the evidence before the ALJ only with respect to those
issues specifically argued by Plaintiff or to provide context.
II.
Marc Workman, M.D., has occasionally treated Plaintiff since
2013-2014 (with appointments occurring 3-4 months apart) (Tr. 392394, 636). Dr. Workman’s conservative treatment of Plaintiff has
primarily

consisted

of

prescribed

medications

for

back

pain,

diabetes mellitus, anxiety/depression, and chronic obstructive
3 

pulmonary disease (COPD) (Tr. 394, 604). An October 2014 MRI of
Plaintiff’s lumbar spine provided by Alan Cochrane, M.D., at the
request of Dr. Workman showed previous posterior fusion changes at
L4, L5, and S1, with appropriately positioned hardware, no postoperative complications, and no disc herniation (Tr.  435). In
relation to Plaintiff’s diabetes mellitus, January 2013 records
indicate that she reported that her blood sugar levels were doing
well (Tr. 394). However, by August 2014, Dr. Workman noted that
Plaintiff was not compliant in taking her diabetes medication (Tr.
428).

In

January

2015,

Dr.

Workman

noted

that

Plaintiff’s

degenerative disc disease was fairly stable (Tr. 622). In late
June 2015, Plaintiff advised Dr. Workman that she was staying “very
active” and “doing a lot of work in the hay fields.” (Tr. 612).
Nonetheless, in a July 2016 Mental Impairment Questionnaire,
Dr. Workman opined that Plaintiff had marked restriction in her
activities of daily living; marked difficulties in maintaining
social functioning and in maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace; and had experienced three episodes of decompensation
within a 12-month period, each of a least two weeks duration (Tr.
636-639). In a contemporaneous medical source statement as to
Plaintiff’s physical ability to perform work-related activities,
he

opined

that

Plaintiff

could

lift

and

carry

10

pounds

occasionally, less than 10 pounds frequently; sit for 30 minutes
at one time and a total of four hours in an 8-hour workday; stand
4 

and walk for 15 minutes at one time and for a total of 2 hours in
an 8-hour workday; would need the opportunity to shift at will
from sitting or standing and walking; but could occasionally
perform specific postural and manipulative activities.

He further

opined that Plaintiff would need to take an unscheduled break every
hour for 10 minutes at a time before returning to work; and needed
to avoid moderate exposure to operating a motor vehicle; as well
as all exposure to specific environmental conditions; and that she
would

miss

more

than

4

days

per

month

due

to

her

alleged

impairments or associated treatments (Tr. 632-634).
William

E.

Waltrip,

M.D.,

performed

a

consultative

examination of Plaintiff in September 2014 (Tr. 378-387). Dr.
Waltrip’s examination revealed Plaintiff exhibited no memory loss;
with good expansion of the ribcage with equal aeration bilaterally;
easily heard breath sounds; her lungs clear to auscultation and
percussion; no loss of muscle mass or tone of extremities; normal
range of motion testing, no scoliosis, and no muscle tenderness or
spasm. Plaintiff also exhibited no deformity, heat, tenderness, or
redness of the joints; an ability to make a fist; good grip
strength;

ability

to

perform

fine

manipulations

without

limitation; normal gait; no loss of motor strength; no loss of
sensation to fine touch; ability to walk heel-to-toe and tandem;
ability to perform a knee squat; ability to walk on the tips of
her

toes

and

her

heels;

and

normal
5 

deep

tendon

reflexes.

Plaintiff’s pulmonary function study showed very mild restrictive
disease,

but

no

significant

obstructive

disease.

Dr.

Waltrip

diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic back pain with radiculopathy of
the left lower extremity, noninsulin-dependent diabetes mellitus,
sleep apnea, and COPD; and opined that Plaintiff was very minimally
limited in her ability to walk, stand, or sit. Dr. Waltrip noted
that Plaintiff did not require use of a cane or an assistive device
for ambulation. Dr. Waltrip opined that Plaintiff should be able
to lift objects of 20-25 pounds without limitation, with good grip
and the ability to perform fine and gross manipulation (Tr. 378387).

The record reflects that Plaintiff underwent carpal tunnel

release surgery on her right hand in September 2015 (Tr. 459-461).
In early September 2014, consultative psychologist, Megan
Green, Psy.D., also examined Plaintiff (Tr. 388-391).

Dr. Green

noted that Plaintiff reported that she had a lot of social anxiety
and that she did not like to go anywhere alone because she did not
know what to expect.
crying

spells,

She reported daily depression, occasional

impatience,

irritability,

worthlessness, and trouble concentrating.

feelings

of

However, Plaintiff

reported that she was able to maintain personal hygiene, prepare
meals, work on things around the house, take care of the animals,
and do household shopping with her daughter.

Dr. Green noted that

Plaintiff exhibited full orientation; unremarkable psychomotor
activity; a cooperative and friendly attitude; normal thought;
6 

normal speech; no observed perceptual abnormalities; a depressed
and

anxious

mood;

appropriate

affect;

adequate

insight

and

judgment; intact attention; mildly impaired concentration; and
normal memory.

Dr. Green provided diagnoses of an unspecified

anxiety and depressive disorders and opined that Plaintiff would
likely be capable of understanding, remembering, and carrying out
instructions and sustaining persistence and pace; as well as
adapting to change in work environments that required completion
of simple, repetitive tasks (Tr. 388-391).
In November 2014, state agency physician Douglas Back, M.D.,
opined

that

Plaintiff

had

abilities

consistent

with

medium

exertion work (occasional lifting and carrying of 50 pounds and 25
pounds frequently); stand or walk about six hours in an eight-hour
workday; and sit about six hours in an eight-hour workday.

Dr.

Back opined that Plaintiff could climb ramps and stairs, but she
should never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds.

Dr. Back opined

that Plaintiff could frequently balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and
crawl;

with

restrictions

no
of

manipulative
avoiding

even

limitations
moderate

and

exposure

environmental
to

pulmonary

irritants and workplace hazards (Tr. 97-100).
At her August 22, 2016 administrative hearing, Plaintiff
testified that she was 51 years old and had a high school education
with additional data processing training (Tr. 45). She said that
she then described her past work activities including her last
7 

position that she left in June 2010 (Tr. 45-47).

She testified

that the primary reason she was unable to work was that she worried
excessively (Tr. 48).

Plaintiff testified that she did not like

to leave the house much but that she did some shopping (Tr. 52).
She said that she passed the time by playing with her little dog,
card games on her phone, bible studies, and watching TV (Tr. 53).
She testified that she was able to care for her own personal needs
and sometimes does housework (Tr. 54).

Plaintiff testified that

she had sleep apnea (but did not have a CPAP machine) and severe
bladder problems (Tr. 54).

She said that she had remote back

surgery in 2005 but was still able to lift 20 pounds (Tr. 55-56).
She testified that she had problems with her hands due to carpal
tunnel (Tr. 56). Plaintiff testified that she could stand for 20
minutes at a time and walk for 10 minutes (but that it varied from
day to day (Tr. 56).

She said that she did not have problems

sitting but that when she gets up her hips are stiff and “it takes
a little bit to get moving” (Tr. 57).

She also said that she

experienced muscle cramps in her arms and legs (Tr. 59). Plaintiff
testified that she had been subject to “a lot of surgeries” and
had excessive scar tissue (Tr. 60).
bowel

problems

and

urinary

tract

She also said that she had
infections

(Tr.

61).

She

testified that Dr. Workman had prescribed medication for anxiety
and

depression

that

caused

sleepiness

8 

(Tr.

63).

Plaintiff

testified that she had lost 20 pounds in the last 6-8 months (Tr.
65).
A vocational expert (VE), Gina K. Baldwin, testified at the
August 22, 2016 hearing.
relevant

work

(Tr.

67),

After determining Plaintiff’s past
the

ALJ

asked

the

VE

to

assume

a

hypothetical individual of Plaintiff’s age, education and work
experience,

with

limitations

the

same

as

determined by the ALJ to be those of Plaintiff.

those

ultimately

The VE testified

that such an individual could not perform her past relevant work
but could perform the representative unskilled light and sedentary
exertion

occupations

of

nut

and

bolt

assembler,

small

parts

assembler, and non-governmental mail clerk (light exertion); as
well as table worker, final assembler, and weigher (sedentary
exertion) (Tr. 67-68).
III.
In her October 5, 2016 decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
had severe impairments consisting of obesity, arthritis, carpal
tunnel

syndrome,

degenerative

disc

disease,

COPD,

diabetes

mellitus, sleep apnea, depression, and an anxiety disorder (Tr.
23; Finding No. 3), but that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet
or equal the severity of a listed impairment (Tr. 24-26; Finding
No. 4).

The ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual

functional capacity (RFC) to perform light exertion work with
additional

postural,

manipulative,
9 

environmental

and

mental

limitations (Tr. 26-32; Finding No. 5), and that her complaints of
disabling

limitations

were

not

entirely

medical and other evidence (Tr. 30).

consistent

with

the

Finally, the ALJ found that

although Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work,
there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy
that

Plaintiff

could

perform,

including

the

representative

unskilled, light exertion positions of nut and bolt assembler,
small parts assembler, and non-governmental mail clerk; as well as
the

unskilled

sedentary

occupations

of

table

worker,

assembler, and weigher (Tr. 32-34; Finding Nos. 6, 10).

final

Thus, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined in
the Social Security Act from his alleged disability onset date
through the date of his decision (Tr. 34; Finding No. 11).
When reviewing the ALJ’s ruling, this Court may not “’try the
case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions
of credibility.’”

Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec, 693 F.3d 709, 713

(6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th
Cir. 2007)).

This Court determines only whether the ALJ’s ruling

is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to
proper legal standards.

Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,

25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).

“Substantial evidence” is

defined as “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
10 

Id.

We are to

affirm the decision, provided it is supported by substantial
evidence, even if we might have decided the case differently.

See

Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999).
IV.
Plaintiff

only

unsubstantiated

presents

challenges

disability claim.

to

two

the

related

ALJ’s

and

narrow

consideration

of

her

She argues that the ALJ did not properly

consider medical source opinions and, in doing so, erred in
assessing the severity of her alleged mental impairments and her
RFC. Pl.’s Br. at 5-11. Plaintiff has thus waived any arguments as
to any other issue not raised or argued with specificity in her
brief.

See Hollon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 447 F.3d 477, 491 (6th

Cir. 2006) (“[W]e limit our consideration to the particular points
that Hollon appears to raise in her brief on appeal.”); United
States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[I]ssues
adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort
at

developed

argumentation,

are

deemed

waived.”

(internal

quotation omitted)); Stiltner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 244 F. App’x
685, 686 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (arguments not included in
the claimant’s brief are waived).
Plaintiff’s

arguments

about

the

ALJ’s

reasonable

consideration of the medical opinions of record and her Step Three
and RFC findings do not withstand scrutiny.

11 

The ALJ specifically

indicated that she carefully considered the total record including
all relevant objective medical evidence, medical source and state
agency medical consultant’s opinions, and Plaintiff’s subjective
complaints in the making of her justifiable Step Three and RFC
findings, and in determining that Plaintiff retained the capacity
to

perform

the

identified

representative

unskilled

light

and

sedentary exertion occupations (Tr. 23, 26; Finding No. 5).
In the case before the Court, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
erred in not assigning “greater weight” to the opinion of treating
physician,

Dr.

Workman,

which

the

ALJ

reasonably

discounted

(according the opinion “little weight”), with numerous references
to both objective medical records and medical source opinions from
treating and examining physicians as well as reviewing state agency
medical consultants (Tr. 26-32; Finding No. 5).

The overall total

objective medical record (including records from Dr. Workman or
other providers) and opinions from Drs. Waltrip, Green, and Back,
demonstrate

that

Plaintiff’s

alleged

impairments

were

not

as

limiting as the extreme limitations as opined by Dr. Workman. See
Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462, 472 (6th Cir.
2006) (discussed in Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742,
748–49 (6th Cir. 2006)) (“The ALJ implicitly provided sufficient
reasons for not giving those opinions controlling weight, and
indeed for giving them little or no weight overall.”); see also
SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (“the notice of determination or
12 

decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the
treating source’s medical opinion, supported by the evidence in
the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear
to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the
treating

source’s

medical

opinion

and

the

reasons

for

that

weight”).
Contrary

to

Plaintiff’s

argument,

the

ALJ

reasonably

discussed relevant medical evidence, including the reports and/or
opinions

from

consultative

treating

examining

physicians
medical

(including

consultants,

Dr.

Drs.

Workman),

Waltrip

and

Green; as well as state agency reviewing medical consultant, Dr.
Back, in reasonably determining that Plaintiff retained the RFC to
perform work at the light level of exertion with additional
specific

postural,

manipulative,

environmental

limitations (Tr. 24-32; Finding Nos. 4, 5).

and

mental

See Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. at 399 (1971) (“We . . . are presented with the
not uncommon situation of conflicting medical evidence. The trier
of fact has the duty to resolve that conflict.”)
V.
The real question before this Court is whether the ALJ’s RFC
finding was reasonable.

A claimant’s RFC is assessed by the ALJ

between steps three and four and is “the most [a claimant] can
still do despite [her] impairments.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4),

13 

404.1545(a)(1) & (5).

An ALJ is required to “assess a claimant’s

RFC based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3).

Thus, no medical source opinion is alone

conclusive on this issue. SSR 96-5p, 1996 WL 374183, at *2, 4-5
(stating that some issues, such as RFC, are not medical issues
regarding the nature and severity of an individual’s impairment(s)
but instead administrative findings that are dispositive of a case,
and

thus

are

reserved

to

the

Commissioner).

Similarly,

a

claimant’s subjective complaints of pain or other symptoms cannot
alone establish disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a).

Although

there is a limited burden shift to the Commissioner at Step Five
of

the

sequential

evaluation

to

identify

work

existing

in

significant numbers in the national economy that a claimant can
perform, the claimant retains the burden of establishing her RFC
limitations.
In her October 2016 decision, the ALJ carefully and reasonably
considered the entire record, including thoroughly considering
medical source statements in the making of her justifiable Step
Three and RFC findings (Tr. 23, 26; Finding No. 5).
Plaintiff

may

have

had

limitations

that

may

have

While

negatively

affected her ability to work, the mere existence of impairments
such as those alleged by Plaintiff, is insufficient to establish
disability under the stringent standards of the Act.

Instead,

Plaintiff had to show that her impairments caused functional
14 

limitations

so

severe

that

she

was

unable

to

engage

in

any

substantial gainful activity for a continuous period of at least
12 months through her date last insured of September 30, 2015.
See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002); 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A).

The disability, not just the impairment, must last

12 months. Walton, 535 U.S. at 220.
The ALJ reasonably declined to accord Dr. Workman’s opinions,
as to the extent of Plaintiff’s functional limitations more than
“little weight,” noting that treatment records (as set forth
above), including those of Dr. Workman and other providers, were
not consistent with Plaintiff’s alleged disabling limitations (Tr.
31-32).

See Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529-30

(6th Cir. 1997) (An ALJ may discount a doctor’s opinion when the
doctor’s findings are not supported by objective medical evidence
or are inconsistent with the record as a whole).
Moreover,

Dr.

Waltrip’s

September

2014

consultative

examination revealed that Plaintiff exhibited no memory loss;
lungs clear to auscultation and percussion; no loss of muscle mass
or tone of extremities; normal range of motion testing, and no
muscle tenderness or spasm.

Plaintiff also exhibited, inter alia,

an ability to make a fist; good grip strength; ability to perform
fine manipulations without limitation; normal gait; no loss of
motor strength; and no loss of sensation to fine touch.

Dr.

Waltrip opined that Plaintiff was very minimally limited in her
15 

ability to walk, stand, or sit, noting that Plaintiff did not
require use of a cane or an assistive device for ambulation.

Dr.

Waltrip further opined that Plaintiff should be able to lift
objects of 20-25 pounds without limitation, with good grip and the
ability to perform fine and gross manipulations (Tr. 378-387).
Further, as noted above, the ALJ’s mental RFC finding was
properly supported by the September 2014 opinion of consultative
examining psychologist, Dr. Green, who opined that Plaintiff would
likely be capable of understanding, remembering, and carrying out
instructions and sustaining persistence and pace; as well as
adapting to change in work environments that required completion
of simple, repetitive tasks (Tr. 388-391).

See Dyer v. Soc. Sec.

Admin, 568 F.App’x at 428 (6th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (the
opinions of consulting sources may be preferred over those of
treating sources when the latter are not well supported by the
record).
A review of Drs. Waltrip’s and Green’s objective findings as
set forth in their respective September 2014 examination reports
(Tr. 378-387, 388-391), reveals nothing that would be appreciably
at odds with the ALJ’s reasonable Step Three and RFC findings, as
well as her ultimate decision that through Plaintiff’s date last
insured for DIB on September 30, 2015, she could perform the
representative unskilled light and sedentary exertion occupations

16 

as identified by the vocational expert (Tr. 26, 31, 33-34, Finding
Nos. 4, 5; Tr. 378-387, 388-391). Dyer, 568 F.App’x at 428.
The

ALJ’s

reasonable

physical

RFC

finding

is

further

buttressed by the November 2014 opinion of the state agency medical
consultant, Dr. Back, who opined that Plaintiff retained the RFC
for medium exertion work (Tr. 97-100).
opinion

careful

consideration

and

The ALJ gave Drs. Back’s

appropriately

accorded

his

opinion “some weight” but added limitations based on evidence at
the hearing level including the objective findings and September
2014 opinion of consultative examining physician, Dr. Waltrip, to
which she accorded “significant weight” (Tr. 31; Tr. 378-387). See
McGrew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App’x 26, 32 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“State agency medical . . . consultants . . . are highly qualified
physicians and psychologists . . . who are also experts in Social
Security disability evaluation.”).
Here, the total evidence of record (including both objective
findings and credible opinions), as set forth above, simply does
not support Plaintiff’s claims of completely disabling limitations
from her alleged disability onset date of June 1, 2010, through
the date she was last insured for DIB on September 30, 2015. See
Key

v.

Callahan,

109

F.3d

270,

274

(6th

Cir.

1997)

(For

applications concerning disability benefits, “the only necessary
inquiry

is

whether

the

claimant

was

disabled

prior

to

the

expiration of her insured status.”) Plaintiff does not adequately
17 

explain why the ALJ’s assessment of her functional abilities
through her date last insured was unreasonable in light of the
probative evidence set forth above.

(Pl.’s Br. at 5-11).

At this

point, it is noteworthy that in late June 2015 (three months before
her date last insured for DIB), Plaintiff advised Dr. Workman that
she was staying “very active” and “doing a lot of work in the hay
fields.”

(Tr. 612).

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4) (stating an

ALJ must consider whether an opinion is consistent with the record
as a whole).
Although the evidence of record might support another outcome
favorable to Plaintiff, the Court must nonetheless affirm the
Commissioner’s

decision

substantial evidence.

where

as

here

it

is

supported

by

See Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772

(6th Cir. 2001); see also Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 780, 782 (6th
Cir. 1996).
VI.
The Court having found no legal error on the part of the ALJ
and that her decision is supported by substantial evidence, the
Acting Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED.
Accordingly,

IT

IS

ORDERED

that

Plaintiff’s

Motion

for

Summary Judgment [DE 12] be, and the same hereby is, DENIED and
that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 14] be, and the
same hereby is, GRANTED.

18 

A separate judgment in conformity herewith shall this date be
entered.
This the 20th day of September, 2018.

19