Bramble et al v. Campbell County, Kentucky et al
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) the motion of the Campbell Co defs for summary judgment as to plaintiff, Bryan Huffman 79 is GRANTED AS TO PLAINTIFF'S FEDERAL CLAIM; 2) the motion of Southern Health Partners for partial summary judgmen t as to plaintiff, Bryan Huffman, 80 is GRANTED AS TO PLAINTIFF'S FEDERAL CLAIM; 3) Plaintiff Bryan Huffman's state law claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge William O. Bertelsman on 9/27/2013.(TJZ)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2010-183 (WOB-JGW)
WILLIAM J. BRAMBLE, JR.,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
CAMPBELL COUNTY, KENTUCKY,
This is an action by former detainees at the Campbell
County Detention Center (CCDC) against the jail, and
against Southern Health Partners (SHP), alleging cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the 5th, 8th, and 14th
Amendments and plaintiffs= civil rights under 42 U.S.C. '
Plaintiffs also allege state law claims.
This matter is before the Court on the motion of the
Campbell County defendants for summary judgment as to
plaintiff, Bryan Huffman (Doc. 79), and the motion for
partial summary judgment of Southern Health Partners, as to
plaintiff, Bryan Huffman (Doc. 80).
Having reviewed the parties’ briefs, the Court
concludes that oral argument is unnecessary to the
resolution of these motions.
The Court therefore issues
the following Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Facts Common to All Claims
Since February 1, 2007, the CCDC has had a contract
with SHP pursuant to which SHP provides “all professional
medical, mental health, dental and related health care and
administrative services” for CCDC inmates, including sick
call, nursing care, regular and emergency physician care.
(Holt, Doc. 132 Ex. 1).1
SHP, in turn, contracts with a
physician and employs nurses to staff the CCDC.
arrangements were in place at all times relevant to this
Plaintiffs filed this case on August 27, 2010, as a
proposed class action.
On September 24, 2010,
plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint,
which is the operative complaint herein.
Plaintiffs allege that they were denied medical attention
for their serious medical needs in violation of their 5th,
8th and 14th Amendment rights.
(Doc. 5 ¶ 16, ¶¶ 366-69).
Plaintiffs also allege Kentucky statutory claims (Id. at ¶¶
370-71), negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress (Id. at ¶¶ 372-73), negligence (Id. at ¶¶ 374-75),
loss of consortium (Id. at ¶¶ 376-77), and wrongful death
This case is related to Holt v. Campbell County, Covington
Civil Action No. 09-82 and references to the Holt record
are cited as “Holt,____.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 378-79).
On March 25, 2011, the parties stipulated to dismissal
of plaintiffs’ class action allegations.
Discovery ensued and, after numerous extensions, the
pending motions for summary judgment were filed and
Plaintiff Bryan Huffman
Bryan Huffman (“Huffman”) was incarcerated at the CCDC
from April 25, 2010 to January 10, 2011.
Doc. 80 Ex. 3 p. 17).
(Doc. 79 Ex. 3;
This lawsuit was filed August 27,
2010 and the amended complaint was filed September 24,
(Doc. 1, Doc. 5).
When Huffman was admitted to the CCDC he indicated he
was being treated for a collapsed lung and diabetes.
79 Ex. 6, 7).
In addition, Huffman was advised that the
Rules and Regulations of the CCDC were displayed on
channels 1 and 6 of CCDC’s Television Broadcast System.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 5).
On April 25, 2010, the SHP staff saw
Huffman and completed a Medical Staff Receiving Form, again
noting the collapsed lung and diabetes.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 8).
However, Huffman’s only complaint in this lawsuit relates
to a hand injury.
(Doc. 80 Ex. 3. p. 93, 97; Doc. 5 ¶¶
In May or June 2010, Huffman was moved into Cell 109,
which had a sharp metal anchor protruding from the wall
where a table used to be attached.
(Doc. 80 Ex. 3 p. 94).
Huffman was assigned to the top bunk, even though during a
previous incarceration he had been “bottom bunk”
(Id. at p. 93-94).
Huffman alleges he spoke
to at least three people about his top bunk situation.
(Doc. 135-1 p. 108-09).
Huffman never submitted a
grievance to notify jail administrators about the danger of
the sharp metal wall anchor or his top bunk situation.
(Doc 135-1 p. 104-05, 109-10).
On June 12, 2010, Huffman was climbing off his bunk,
his “leg gave out,” and his hand hit the sharp metal
(Doc. 80 Ex. 3 p. 94).
As a result, Huffman’s
hand was severely injured, suffering major tendon damage.
(Doc. 135-1 p. 113-15, 124).
Huffman was transported to
the emergency room at St. Elizabeth Hospital where he was
diagnosed with a laceration, prescribed an antibiotic and
discharged with orders to follow up with a specialist.
(Doc 79 Ex. 10).
Huffman was returned to the CCDC and
placed on medical watch.
(Doc. 80 Ex. 4).
Huffman alleges he was to be taken for a follow-up
appointment on June 14, 2010, but the Emergency Room
discharge instructions informed Huffman to seek a
Further, Huffman alleges he was
prescribed Percocet after his injury on June 12 and denied
it until after the June 23 surgery, and that the SHP staff
failed to properly monitor his bandages during this time.
(Doc. 135-1 p 129-32, 135-36).
On June 15, 2010, SHP contacted Dr. Baker, a
specialist, and set up an appointment on June 21, 2010.
(Doc. 80 Ex. 4).
On June 21, Dr. Baker determined Huffman
needed surgery and scheduled it for June 23, 2010.
80 Ex. 7).
On June 23, Dr. Baker performed surgery on
Huffman and released him back to the CCDC.
After Huffman’s surgery on June 23, he was given
Percocet three times daily as well as an antibiotic.
80 Ex. 8).
On June 26, the jail physician increased his
Percocet to four times daily.
On June 29, 2010, Huffman removed his cast against Dr.
Baker’s instructions and the SHP medical staff rewrapped
(Doc. 80 Ex. 4).
On July 2, 2010, Huffman went
to Dr. Baker for a post-operative examination and Dr. Baker
recommended hand therapy.
(Doc. 80 Ex. 9).
recommended a walk-in appointment, that day, to begin hand
therapy, but the guards stated it was not possible.
On July 12, 2010, Huffman wrote a grievance directed
to Defendant Fickenscher about a deputy’s decision to place
Huffman in disciplinary segregation.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 15).
Defendant Fickenscher’s received stamp was used on the
grievance indicating he received it, but Capt. Talbot
actually responded to it.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 16).
denied Huffman’s grievance on July 13, 2010 because Huffman
had been in multiple arguments with, and made threats
against, CCDC and SHP staff in the days prior.
Huffman’s main complaint in the grievance was about
the disciplinary action taken against him.
(Doc. 79 Ex.
But Huffman also alleged in his grievance that he was
denied medication from July 8-12, which was the cause of
his bad behavior.
However, the CCDC records show he
was offered his medication but he refused to take it
because it caused him an upset stomach.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 17).
Huffman was offered Zantac along with his Ibuprofen to
address his stomach pain, but he still refused.
Huffman’s grievance also states he was given pain
medication on July 12, the date of the grievance.
Huffman never appealed Capt. Talbot’s denial of
(Doc. 79 Ex 4).
Huffman went to hand therapy on July 12 and 14, and
saw Dr. Baker again on July 19, 2010.
(Doc. 80 Ex. 12).
In addition, Dr. Baker notes that Huffman told him he had
been keeping his hand elevated at night, with extra
blankets, as requested by Dr. Baker.
On July 20, 2010, the SHP medical staff responded to
Huffman’s cell because he complained he fell.
(Doc. 79 Ex.
SHP ordered x-rays which came back as normal and
Huffman was moved to a bottom bunk at this time.
Doc. 80 Ex. 13).
Huffman also signed a Patient Consent
form, which Nurse Betty Dawes signed as a witness.
80 Ex. 13).
On August 27, 2010, Huffman again met with Dr. Baker
for a post-operative examination, and Dr. Baker noted that
Huffman had missed more than half of his hand therapy
(Doc. 80 Ex. 14).
One of the guards told
Dr. Baker that Huffman missed his hand therapy appointments
because he threatened the guards, saying that he has family
on the outside willing to help with escape.
guard requested a more “randomized” hand therapy schedule
for everyone’s safety.
Huffman states the
appointments were missed because there were not enough
guards to transport him.
(Doc. 135-1 p. 159).
there was at least one occasion where Huffman refused to go
to hand therapy because he was sick.
(Doc. 80 Ex. 3 p.
Huffman was released from CCDC custody on January 10,
2011, eventually ending up at the Kentucky State
Reformatory, where he underwent another hand surgery and
additional physical therapy, which has failed to yield
(Doc. 80 Ex. 3 p. 17, 163-65; Doc. 135-1
p. 173, 175).
Huffman offers Dr. Joseph Paris as an expert witness.
Dr. Paris details the pain medication schedule for Huffman,
noting that he received only eighteen of sixty Percocet
tablets and twenty-two of forty-five Norco tablets.
94 Ex. 1).
Dr. Paris opines:
Insufficient pain relief, well below levels
recommended by Huffman’s Surgeon, rises to the
level of deliberate indifference. The fact that
over 50% Physical Therapy appointments were
missed due to Correctional Officer shortages also
conforms to a pattern of denial of medically
necessary care, reflecting deliberate
(Doc. 94 Ex. 1).
SHP offers Dr. Grady Bazzel as an expert witness.
Dr. Bazzel stated: “I see no elements of malpractice
or deliberate indifference.”
(Doc. 58 Ex. A p. 10).
Dr. Bazzel notes that care for Huffman was immediate
(Id.) Huffman was rushed to the ER and
there was no significant delay in follow-up with a
Further, Dr. Baker noted
that there was “significant post-op non-compliance” on
the part of Huffman.
(Id. at p. 11).
Section 1983 prohibits any “person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State” from depriving any U.S. citizen “of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the constitution and
Plaintiff argues that his Fourteenth Amendment
right to adequate medical care was violated, which is
analogous to prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment.
“The Eighth Amendment
does not apply to pretrial detainees. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, however, pretrial detainees
have a right to adequate medical treatment that is
analogous to the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners.”
Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685-86 (6th
“As applied to prisoners, this constitutional
guarantee encompasses a right to medical care for serious
Perez v. Oakland County, 466 F.3d 416, 423
(6th Cir. 2006) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
However, because the Eighth Amendment
prohibits mistreatment only if it is tantamount to
“punishment,” courts have imposed liability upon prison
officials only where they are “so deliberately indifferent
to the serious medical needs of prisoners as to
unnecessarily and wantonly inflict pain.”
Perez, 466 F.3d
at 423 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
“Negligence or medical malpractice alone cannot
sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, absent a showing of
Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at
“Deliberate indifference” has both an objective and a
Id. (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273
F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001)).
With respect to medical
needs, the need “must be objectively, ‘sufficiently
Id. at 423-24 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).
“In considering the subjective component, this circuit
has emphasized that a plaintiff must produce evidence
showing that the official being sued subjectively perceived
facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner,
that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then
disregarded that risk.”
and citation omitted).
Id. at 424 (internal quotations
“[A]n official’s failure to
alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived
but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under
our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994).
See also id.
at 842 (official must act or fail to act “despite his
knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”).
The subjective component “prevents medical-malpractice
claims from being transformed into constitutional claims.”
Quigley v. Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2013)
Assuming a plaintiff raises a triable issue as to
whether a constitutional violation occurred, a public
official sued in his or her individual capacity may still
be shielded from suit under the doctrine of qualified
All defendants here assert this defense.
“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects
government officials ‘from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan,
129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
“The protection of qualified
immunity applies regardless of whether the government
official’s error is ‘a mistake of law, a mistake of fact,
or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.’”
Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
C. Prison Litigation Reform Act
The PLRA provides: “No action shall be brought with
respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
Under this provision, “a prisoner
must exhaust all of his available remedies before filing a
§ 1983 action in federal court.”
Brock v. Kenton County,
Ky., 93 Fed. App’x 793, 796 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation
“That is, under the PLRA, exhaustion of
available administrative remedies is a mandatory precondition to filing suit in federal court.”
Id. at 798
“The Sixth Circuit requires some affirmative efforts
to comply with the administrative procedures before
analyzing whether the facility rendered these remedies
Napier v. Laurel Jackson, Ky., 636 F.3d 218,
224 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
See also Brock, 93
F. App’x at 798 (noting that the prisoner “must make some
affirmative efforts to comply with the administrative
procedure” and that the procedures are “unavailable” only
where, despite the prisoner’s efforts, the facility thwarts
the inmate’s attempts at exhaustion).
Application to Huffman’s Claims
Prison Litigation Reform Act Exhaustion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) bars
Huffman’s claim because he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and was still a prisoner when the
lawsuit was filed.
Huffman was incarcerated when he filed this lawsuit
and thus is a prisoner for PLRA exhaustion purposes.
v. Mayer, 332 F.3d 422, 424-25 (6th Cir. 2003).
his claims allege he received inadequate medical care while
incarcerated at the CCDC, which clearly pertain to
“conditions of confinement.”
Thus, the PLRA exhaustion requirement applies to
Huffman, and all the defendants have pled this affirmative
(Doc. 17 at p. 33; Doc. 18 at p. 2).
CCDC defendants have attached to their motion for summary
judgment evidence of the CCDC’s grievance process, the
means through which inmates are informed of it, and that
Huffman was in fact informed of it.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 4, 5).
Once defendants put forward this evidence, plaintiffs are
“required to present ‘significant probative evidence’ to
defeat the motion for summary judgment on this ground.”
Napier, 636 F.3d at 225 (citation omitted).
Huffman argues that the PLRA exhaustion requirement is
not applicable to him because it was a sham process.
93 p. 4).
It was a sham because, as Buckler noted in his
affidavit, a grievance should be made out to “the Jailer.”
But Huffman’s grievance was made out to “Lt. Col.
Fickenscher,” in violation of the grievance process.
Huffman argues, his grievance should have been rejected for
being addressed to the wrong person, but instead, the CCDC
accepted and responded to his grievance in violation of
their own procedures.
(Doc. 93 p. 4).
Failure to reject all improperly addressed grievances
does not make the process a sham.
As Buckler stated in his
affidavit, it was CCDC policy that Buckler, his Chief
Deputy Jailer, or an authorized designee would investigate
and respond to grievances.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 4 ¶ 10).
Capt. Talbot, presumably an authorized designee, responded.
Huffman had the opportunity, under CCDC policy, to appeal
this grievance denial, but he failed to do so.
Huffman also argues that only the disciplinary portion
of his grievance was denied and not the portion that
related his to medical treatment.
(Doc. 93 p. 4).
However, it is clear, from the face of the grievance, that
the medical issue was being used as an excuse for the
behavior that caused Huffman to be disciplined and was not
part of the grievance itself.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 15).
Huffman states, in the grievance, that he received his
medication the day the grievance was filed.
15 p. 5).
(Doc. 79 Ex.
The only other complaint in the grievance was
the lack of water and the cleanliness of Huffman’s cell,
which was also addressed in Captain Talbot’s response.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 16).
Jail administrators are not required to
respond to grievances that are not made.
Thus, Huffman’s argument that the administrative
remedies were not available to him because they were a sham
Further, he did not file a grievance relating to
any medical complaint, and therefore, did not exhaust his
administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.
Additionally, Huffman’s § 1983 claims are barred by
the applicable one-year statute of limitations even if
refiled after exhaustion.
Holt v. Campbell Cnty., Ky.,
CIV.A. 2009-082 WOB, 2012 WL 2069653, at *2 (E.D. Ky. June
8, 2012); Burke v. Campbell Cnty. Fiscal Court, No. Civ.A.
06-CV-191-DLB, 2006 WL 3627711, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 11,
Objectively Serious Medical Need
Huffman’s hand injury was an objectively serious
medical need and is not contested.
SHP incorporates CCDC’s PLRA argument and it applies with
equal force to SHP. (Doc. 80 p. 1).
Deliberate Indifference: Subjective
Even though Huffman’s medical condition was a serious
medical need, there is no evidence from which a reasonable
jury could conclude that any of the defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
Plaintiff argues that defendants Buckler and
Fickenscher were aware of facts from which they could, and
did, draw an inference that a substantial risk of serious
harm existed as to Huffman’s health.
This argument fails
as a matter of law because there is no such evidence in the
There is no evidence that Buckler had any contact with
Huffman during his incarceration, was aware of his medical
condition, or was aware of any of his symptoms.
also no evidence that he was involved in any of the medical
decisions involving Huffman, and Plaintiff says as much.
(“Further, while Defendant Buckler had almost no contact
with the general population, much less with Mr. Huffman
specifically . . . .” Doc. 93 p. 7, Plaintiff’s Response in
Opposition to CCDC’s Motion for Summary Judgment).
Huffman filed a grievance to Fickenscher, which was
stamped with Fickenscher’s “received” stamp, but Capt.
Talbot responded to the grievance.
(Doc. 79 Ex. 15, 16).
Assuming Fickenscher read the grievance, it still would not
have conveyed facts from which to draw an inference that a
serious risk of harm existed as to Huffman.
grievance he states: “And yes I got my medicine today July
12, 2010 for the pain . . . .”
(Doc. 79 Ex. 15 p. 5).
Thus, the grievance could not give rise to facts alerting
Fickenscher to Huffman’s lack of medical care when Huffman
admits he was receiving medical care in his grievance.
Because there is no evidence that Buckler or
Fickenscher knew anything about Huffman’s health, they
could not have been deliberately indifferent and the
subjective element fails as a matter of law.
respondeat superior is not available as a basis for
liability under § 1983, Buckler and Fickenscher are
entitled to summary judgment.3
With no underlying constitutional violation, Huffman
can state no “municipal liability” claim as to Campbell
See Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890,
900 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A municipality or county cannot be
Huffman argues that Buckler and Fickenscher were aware of
general problems with the medical contractor at the CCDC.
That, however, provides no basis for the claim against them
in their individual capacities where it is undisputed that
they played no role in Huffman’s care.
liable under § 1983 absent an underlying constitutional
violation by its officers.”) (citation omitted).
For these reasons, all the CCDC defendants are
entitled to summary judgment.4
With respect to the SHP defendants, the Court first
notes that Huffman has abandoned his individual ' 1983 claim
against Dr. Waldridge.
(Doc. 94 p. 1).
his claim against Nurse Dawes is still viable, so only the
claim against her is addressed here.
Plaintiff’s argument that Nurse Dawes was deliberately
indifferent lacks evidentiary support.
simply asserts Nurse Dawes meets the subjective standard,
then lays out the subjective legal standard, with no
(Doc. 94 p. 5).
The only fact provided
is that Nurse Dawes began overseeing the CCDC facility in
However, to overcome summary judgment, the opposing
party must present some affirmative evidence showing there
is a genuine issue of material fact and cannot simply rest
on its allegations.
Hunley v. DuPont Auto., 341 F.3d 491,
The Court thus need not reach the issue of qualified
immunity, although the individual defendants would
obviously be entitled to that defense given the absence of
any constitutional violation.
496 (6th Cir. 2003).
Further, the trial court has no
obligation to “wade through” the record in search of
specific facts to support the party’s claim, nor is it
required to speculate as to which portion of the record the
United States v. WRW Corp., 986 F.2d 138,
143 (6th Cir. 1993).
The Sixth Circuit has held that, even
where evidence exists somewhere in the record, it is the
duty of the nonmoving party to bring that evidence to the
Parsons v. FedEx Corp., 360 F. App’x
642, 646 (6th Cir. 2010).5
The only evidence cited is the fact that Nurse Dawes
oversaw the CCDC beginning in August 2009.
also signed Huffman’s “Patient Consent for Treatment” form
as a witness, which Huffman does not mention.
(Doc. 80 Ex.
However, these facts alone are not enough to meet the
Because Plaintiff offers no other evidence on which it
relies for its conclusory statement that Nurse Dawes was
deliberately indifferent, his argument fails as a matter of
law, and Nurse Dawes is entitled to summary judgment.
Huffman also has adduced no admissible evidence of a
If a party knows of evidence that raises a genuine issue
of material fact, it is their burden to place the evidence
into the record and cite to it. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The
Court notes a lack of depositions in the record.
clear and persistent pattern of deliberate indifference to
inmate medical needs.
This Court has already held in
another case that the same affidavits submitted by
plaintiff here regarding allegedly poor care at the CCDC
are: (1) inadmissible for a variety of reasons, and (2)
even if admissible, inadequate as a matter of law to
support a municipal liability claim against Campbell County
Fryman v. Campbell County, Covington Civil Action
No. 09-114-WOB-JGW, Docs. 25, 30.
With no underlying constitutional violation, Huffman
can state no “municipal liability” claim as to SHP.
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir.
2004) (“A municipality or county cannot be liable under §
1983 absent an underlying constitutional violation by its
officers.”) (citation omitted).
Finally, the report of Huffman’s expert witness, Dr.
Joseph Paris, raises no triable issue.
(Doc. 94 Ex. 1).
According to Dr. Paris, Huffman’s insufficient pain relief
and missed hand therapy appoints, due to alleged correction
officer shortages, rises to the level of deliberate
(Doc. 94 Ex. 1).
This, however, is an
improper conclusion of law that goes to the ultimate issue
and is not admissible at trial.
Cutlip v. City of Toledo,
488 F. App'x 107, 119-21 (6th Cir. 2012).
As such, it
raises no genuine issue of material fact.
Finally, Dr. Paris’s report is silent as to the
subjective perception of these defendants, and the record
thus remains devoid of evidence that would satisfy this
All defendants are thus entitled to summary judgment
on Huffman’s § 1983 claim.
Given this disposition, the
Court will decline to exercise its supplemental
jurisdiction over Huffman’s state law claims.
U.S.C. § 1367(c).6
Therefore, having reviewed this matter, and the Court
being otherwise sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED (1) that the motion of the Campbell
County defendants for summary judgment as to plaintiff,
Bryan Huffman (Doc. 79) be, and is hereby, GRANTED AS TO
PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CLAIM; (2) the motion of Southern
Health Partners for partial summary judgment as to
plaintiff, Bryan Huffman (Doc. 80) be, and is hereby,
GRANTED AS TO PLAINTIFF’S FEDERAL CLAIM; and (3) Plaintiff
Bryan Huffman’s state law claims be, and are hereby,
The Court notes that Huffman concedes his state law claims
against Campbell County should be dismissed, as well as the
outrage claim against Buckler and Fickenscher. (Doc. 93 p.
1). The Plaintiff also concedes that the state regulatory
claim and the outrage claim should be dismissed. (Doc. 94
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
This 27th day of September, 2013.
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