Trent v. Bierlen et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against Def Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania 46 is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claim for basic reparations benefits coverage and DENIED as to Pla intiff's claims for uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage; 2) Defendant Ins. Co. of the State of Pennsylvania's cross motion for summary judgment 52 is GRANTED as to Plaintiff's claim for uninsured and underinsured m otorists coverage and denied as to Plaintiff's claim for basic reparations benefits coverage; 3) Plaintiff's claim for basic reparations benefits against Defendant State Farm Auto Ins Co is DISMISSED; 4) Plaintiff is entit led to reasonable atty fees and 18% interest on his basic reparations benefits claim against Defendant Ins Co of the State of Pennsylvania from the date this lawsuit was originally filed in Boone Circuit Court until this Court's judgment is satisfied; 5) Plaintiff shall submit a proposed judgment to this Court within 10 days of this order. Signed by Judge William O. Bertelsman on 1/9/2014.(TJZ)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT COVINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2012-236 (WOB-JGW)
JAMES TRENT
AND
ZURICH AMERICAN INS. CO.
VS.

PLAINTIFF
INTERVENOR PLAINTIFF

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROGER BIERLEN, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

This matter came before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46)
and Defendant Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania’s cross motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 52). The Court, finding oral argument unnecessary, hereby issues the following
memorandum opinion and order.
For the reasons that follow, the Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment and grants in part and denies in part Defendant Insurance Company of the
State of Pennsylvania’s cross motion for summary judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This dispute involves six parties: Plaintiff James Trent (“Trent”) and Intervening
Plaintiff Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”); Defendants Roger Bierlen
(“Bierlen”), Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (“Penn Insurance”), KCI Insurance
Agency Inc. (“KCI”), and State Farm Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”).
On or about November 5, 2010, Bierlen’s tractor trailer rear-ended Trent’s semi-tractor
trailer. See Doc. 46-1, pp. 1-2. Trent seeks to recover against Bierlen, against KCI and State
Farm based on insurance coverage, and against Penn Insurance based on its insurance policy

issued to Medallion Transport (“Medallion”). (Exh. A, pp. 3-4). The Court previously granted
KCI’s motion for summary judgment and Trent has settled his claims against Bierlen. See Doc.
41; Doc. 55. Accordingly, Trent’s only claims remaining are those against State Farm and Penn
Insurance.1
“Several months” before the accident, Trent leased the semi-truck from Great American
Leasing (“GAL”) in a lease-purchase agreement. See Doc. 26-2 at p. 1; Doc. 36, pp. 2. On June
14, 2010, Trent then leased his interest in the truck to Medallion. See Doc. 52-3.
Medallion is a certified motor carrier and Trent entered in this agreement so that he could
operate the semi-truck as Medallion’s independent contractor. Id. The lease agreement states
that “DOT regulations require that for the protection of the public, [Medallion] have exclusive
possession, control and use of leased motor vehicle equipment.” Id. at ¶ 2. The lease agreement
also states that “[p]rovisions in this agreement that relate to control of the use of the Equipment
are for the sole purpose of compliance with applicable DOT regulations . . . .” Id. at ¶ 9.
Further, in the lease agreement, Medallion agreed to maintain “public liability and
property damage insurance covering the operation of the [semi- truck] while it is engaged in
performing Transportation Services.” Id. at ¶10. Pursuant to that agreement, Medallion
purchased a policy from Penn Insurance covering the semi-truck. See Doc. 51 at p. 2, Ex. C.
Additionally, at the time of the accident, Trent had an insurance policy with State Farm
which covered Trent’s 2004 Chevrolet pick-up truck. See Doc. 26-2 at Ex. B. The policy State
Farm issued on Trent’s Chevrolet pick-up excludes basic reparation benefits2 (“BRB”) coverage

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Intervening Plaintiff Zurich, the insurer of a Truckers Occupational Accident Insurance Policy for and on
behalf of Medallion, also has claims against the Defendants for the monies it has paid Trent for medical bills and
temporary total disability benefits. See Doc. 23-2.
2

Basic reparations benefits are also known as “No-Fault benefits” and “Personal Injury Protection (PIP).”

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for bodily injury to any insured “while occupying or through being struck by a motor vehicle
owned by such insured if it is not insured for basic reparation benefits.” 3 Id. at Ex. C, p. 15.
Previously, State Farm moved for partial summary judgment against Trent, arguing that it
did not owe Trent any basic reparations benefits because Trent’s policy with State Farm covered
the 2004 Chevrolet truck, not the semi-truck involved in the accident.4 See Doc. 26. Trent
countered, arguing that State Farm’s motion was premature because discovery still had to be
completed on the issues of ownership regarding the semi-truck and whether Trent was entitled to
BRB coverage from the Penn Insurance policy. See Doc. 36. After oral argument, the Court
denied State Farm’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice and ordered the parties to
continue discovery, with a deadline of February 15, 2014. See Doc. 43.
Nonetheless, both Trent and Penn Insurance have moved for summary judgment on the
issue of whether Medallion’s policy through Penn Insurance covered Trent for basic reparation
benefits.5 See Docs. 46, 52.

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Trent also asserted in his complaint that he had coverage through KCI. However, KCI previously filed a
motion for summary judgment refuting this allegation on the ground that it was merely a broker between Medallion
and Penn Insurance. See Doc. 37. No party responded KCI’s motion for summary judgment, and the Court granted
that motion on May 16, 2013. See Doc. 41.
4

Trent also asserted claims against State Farm for uninsured motorists coverage (UM) and underinsured
motorists coverage (UIM). See Doc. 1-1. Recently, the Court entered an agreed order of dismissal regarding
Trent’s claim for UIM coverage against State Farm. See Doc. 61.
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Trent also asserts a claim against Penn Insurance for uninsured motorists coverage (UM) and
underinsured motorists coverage (UIM). See Doc. 1-1. Penn Insurance asserts that Medallion specifically rejected
UM and UIM coverage. See Doc. 52-1 at p. 4; Doc. 52-5. Trent acknowledges that Medallion rejected UM and
UIM coverage and he does not provide any reason why he would be entitled to such coverage under the Penn
Insurance policy. See Doc. 46-1 at p. 2. Accordingly, Penn Insurance’s motion for summary judgment is granted as
it relates to Trent’s claims for UM and UIM coverage.

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ANALYSIS
A. The Policy
Defendant Penn Insurance does not dispute that its policy provided for public liability
and property damage coverage for the semi-truck. However, Penn Insurance asserts that its
policy only provides BRB coverage for vehicles owned by Medallion. See Doc. 52-1 at p. 3.
In fact, Penn Insurance points to the Declarations Page for the Medallion policy which
provides that BRB coverage, or equivalent No-Fault coverage, is only provided to “those ‘autos’
you own that are required to have No-Fault benefits in the state where they are licensed or
principally garaged.” See Doc. 52-4 at pp. 2, 7. Penn Insurance asserts that, “Because Medallion
did not own Trent’s Truck, the Policy did not provide any BRB coverage for the Truck.” See
Doc. 52-1 at p. 5.
Trent’s argument that he is entitled to BRB coverage under the actual Penn Insurance
policy language could, at best, be considered perfunctory. In fact, Trent’s entire argument
regarding BRB coverage under the actual policy language is: “By examining the policy itself, it
is evident that PIP benefits were included.” See Doc. 46-1 at pp. 3-4. Additionally, after Penn
Insurance argued that the policy language only provides BRB coverage for those autos owned by
Medallion, Trent abandons that argument in his reply brief. Rather, Trent focuses his argument
on his assertion that the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (“MVRA”) requires Penn
Insurance to provide BRB coverage regardless of the policy language. Id.; see also Doc. 54.
Nonetheless, after examining the Trent-Medallion lease agreement and the Penn
Insurance policy, the Court concludes that Trent is entitled to BRB coverage under the actual
language of the policy.
Paragraph 2 of the Trent-Medallion lease agreement states, in part:

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[Department of Transportation] regulations require that for the protection of
the public, [Medallion] have exclusive possession, control and use of leased
motor vehicle equipment for the duration of the Agreement. [Trent] hereby
grants to [Medallion] such possession, control and use of the equipment . . . as
may be required to comply with the applicable DOT regulations.
See Doc. 51-2 at ¶ 2. Additionally, paragraph 12 of the lease agreement states:
[Medallion] shall have full authority to trip lease Equipment to other
authorized carriers during the term of this lease Agreement and only
[Medallion] can authorize such trip leasing. Should [Trent] or Personnel enter
into an unauthorized trip lease, [Trent] will be held to have immediately and
unilaterally terminated this Agreement simultaneous with such entry and to
have relieved [Medallion] of all of [Medallion’s] obligations under this
Agreement. All liability, claims, and damages involved in an unauthorized trip
lease are the sole responsibility of [Trent].
Id. at ¶ 12.
“Certified interstate motor carriers, such as [Medallion], are required to comply with the
provisions of Title 49 [of the United States Code] and the regulations promulgated thereunder.”
Johnson v. S.O.S. Transp., Inc., 926 F.2d 516, 521 (6th Cir. 1991). Under 49 U.S.C. §
14102(a)(4), the Secretary of Transportation may require motor carriers which use leased
vehicles to “have control of and be responsible for operating those motor vehicles in compliance
with requirements prescribed by the Secretary on safety of operations and equipment, and with
other applicable law as if the motor vehicles were owned by the motor carrier.”
Additionally, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(1) states that a lease between an authorized carrier
lessee and a lessor “shall provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall have exclusive
possession, control, and use of the equipment for the duration of the lease. The lease shall
further provide that the authorized carrier lessee shall assume complete responsibility for the
operation of the equipment for the duration of the lease.”

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Further, 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(c)(2) states that “[p]rovision may be made in the lease for
considering the authorized carrier lessee as the owner of the equipment for the purpose of
subleasing it under these regulations to other authorized carriers during the lease.”
“[T]he ‘control and responsibility’ regulations were initially prompted by concerns that
certified carriers were evading federal safety requirements by using equipment leased from
owner-operators who were exempt from the limitations placed upon certified carriers.” Johnson,
926 F.2d at 524 n. 17.
As stated above, the lease agreement between Trent and Medallion provided that
Medallion was to enjoy the “exclusive possession, control and use of the motor vehicle
equipment for the duration of the Agreement.” See Doc. 51-2 at ¶ 2. Additionally, the lease
agreement provided Medallion the right to sublease the semi-truck to other carriers at any point
during the term of the Trent-Medallion lease agreement. Id. at ¶ 12.
While Penn Insurance asserts that “[i]t cannot be seriously argued that Medallion owned
the Truck,” the Penn Insurance policy does not define the terms “own” or “owner.” However, §
376.2(d) of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations defines “owner” as: “A person (1) to
whom title to equipment has been issued, or (2) who, without title, has the right to exclusive use
of equipment, or (3) who has lawful possession of equipment registered and licensed in any State
in the name of that person.” 49 C.F.R § 376.2(d).
Additionally, Kentucky law “makes a lessee of a vehicle the ‘owner’ for insurance
purposes, if ‘[the] vehicle is the subject of an agreement for . . . lease, with the . . . lessee entitled
to possession of the vehicle, upon performance of the contract terms, for a period of three
hundred sixty-five (365) days or more . . . .’” Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 234 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting K.R.S. § 186.010(7)(b)).

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“Exclusions and limitations on coverage must be clearly stated and the operative terms
clearly defined. When language is capable of two reasonable interpretations, courts resolve
doubts or uncertainties concerning its meaning in favor of the insured.” Ky. Emp'rs' Mut. Ins. v.
Decker, No.2010–SC–000459–WC, 2011 WL 1642183, at *6 (Ky. April 21, 2011) (citing St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Powell–Walton–Milward, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Ky.
1994)). Moreover, “[u]nder the ‘doctrine of reasonable expectations,’ an insured is entitled to all
the coverage he may reasonably expect to be provided according to the terms of the policy.”
Hendrix v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991). “Only an
unequivocally conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation of the company's intent to exclude
coverage will defeat that expectation.” Simon v. Continental Insurance Co., 724 S.W.2d 210
(Ky. 1986) (citation omitted).
Here, based on the language in the Trent-Medallion lease agreement, it would be
reasonable that Medallion would be considered the “owner” of the semi-truck for purposes of the
Penn Insurance policy. Clearly, the lease agreement calls for Medallion to enjoy “such
possession, control and use of the equipment . . . as may be required to comply with the
applicable DOT regulations,” for a period of one year See Doc. 51-2 at ¶ 2.
Since the DOT regulations and K.R.S. § 186.010(7)(b) treat Medallion as if it were the
owner of the semi-truck during the term of the lease agreement, and the Penn Insurance policy
does not provide a definition of “owner” conflicting with the DOT regulations or the applicable
Kentucky statute, Kentucky insurance law favors a finding of entitlement to coverage.
Accordingly, Medallion is considered the owner of Trent’s semi-truck. Therefore, Trent
is entitled to BRB coverage under the Penn Insurance policy because the policy provides BRB

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coverage for “those ‘autos’ you own that are required to have No-Fault benefits in the state
where they are licensed or principally garaged.” See Doc. 52-4 at pp. 2, 7.
B. Requirement that an Insurer Provide Basic Reparations Benefits
Additionally, Trent asserts that even if the Penn Insurance policy does not expressly
provide coverage for BRB, the Kentucky Motor Vehicle Reparations Act (“MVRA”) requires
the Penn Insurance policy to provide BRB coverage to Trent.6 See Doc. 46-1 at pp. 4-5; Doc. 54
at pp. 3-5.
For this proposition, Trent relies on K.R.S. § 304.39-100, which states:
(1) An insurance contract which purports to provide coverage for basic
reparation benefits or is sold with representation that it provides security
covering a motor vehicle has the legal effect of including all coverages
required by this subtitle.
(2) An insurer authorized to transact or transacting business in this
Commonwealth shall file with the commissioner of insurance as a condition of
its continued transaction of business within this Commonwealth a form
approved by the commissioner of insurance declaring that in any contract of
liability insurance for injury, wherever issued, covering the ownership,
maintenance or use of a motor vehicle other than motorcycles while the
vehicle is in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to provide the basic
reparation benefits coverage and minimum security for tort liabilities
required by this subtitle, except a contract which provides coverage only for
liability in excess of required minimum tort liability coverage. Any
nonadmitted insurer may file such form.
(emphasis added).
In response, Penn Insurance cites to K.R.S. § 304.39-080(5), which states:
[E]very owner or operator of a motor vehicle registered in this Commonwealth
or operated in this Commonwealth with an owner's permission shall
continuously provide with respect to the motor vehicle while it is either present
or registered in this Commonwealth, and any other person may provide with
respect to any motor vehicle, by a contract of insurance or by qualifying as a
self-insurer, security for the payment of basic reparation benefits in accordance

6

It must be noted that Penn Insurance, as an insurer authorized to do business in Kentucky, does not
dispute that it is subject to the MVRA requirements.

8

with this subtitle and security for payment of tort liabilities, arising from
maintenance or use of the motor vehicle.
Additionally, Penn Insurance cites to K.R.S. § 304.39-020(12), which defines “owner” as:
[A] person, other than a lienholder or secured party, who owns or has title to a
motor vehicle or is entitled to the use and possession of a motor vehicle subject
to a security interest held by another person. The term does not include a lessee
under a lease not intended as security.
Relying on these provisions, Penn Insurance argues that since Medallion was a lessee of
the semi-truck and not an owner or operator, then it was not required under K.R.S. § 304.39, et
seq., to maintain BRB coverage for Trent’s semi-truck. See Doc. 52-1 at pp. 5-8.
However, Penn Insurance misinterprets the statutes. While K.R.S. § 304.39-080(5)
requires an owner or operator of a motor vehicle to maintain “basic reparations benefits” and
“security for payment of tort liabilities,” that statute allows that those insurance requirements can
be provided by “any other person . . . with respect to any motor vehicle.” Here, Trent maintained
an insurance policy on the semi-truck through Medallion. Pursuant to K.R.S. § 304.39-100, that
policy was required to cover Trent for both “basic reparations benefits” and “security for
payment of tort liabilities.”
Moreover, the Kentucky Supreme Court has stated:
An exclusionary clause in an insurance contract which reduces below
minimum or eliminates [BRB or tort liability coverage] effectively renders a
driver uninsured to the extent of the reduction or elimination. Because the
stated purpose of the MVRA is to assure that a driver be insured to a minimum
level, such an exclusion provision contravenes the purpose and policy of the
compulsory insurance act.
Bishop v. Allstate Ins. Co., 623 S.W.2d 865, 866 (Ky. 1981) (citation omitted).
Further, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has interpreted K.R.S. § 304.39-100(1) to
provide that “auto liability insurance contracts sold in Kentucky cannot cover less than the
minimum coverage required by the MVRA.” Hugenberg v. W. Am. Ins. Co./Ohio Cas. Grp., 249
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S.W.3d 174, 194 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006). In fact, in Hugenberg, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that an entitlement exclusion was void as against public policy to the extent that it did not
provide coverage for basic reparations benefits and tort liabilities because an insurer “would not
be permitted to offer [the insured] less coverage than the minimum required by the MVRA.” Id.
In support of its argument, Penn Insurance cites to Omni Ins. Co. v. Coates, 939 S.W.2d
879 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) and Brown v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 875 S.W.2d 103 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
In both of those cases, the plaintiffs were in accidents in their own vehicles that had no insurance
coverage. In Coates, the plaintiff sought coverage under a policy issued for a different vehicle
that she owned. 939 S.W.2d at 879. In Brown, the plaintiff sought coverage under his father’s
motor vehicle policy. 875 S.W.2d at 103. Both of those Courts denied BRB coverage, finding
that providing coverage under those circumstances would allow uninsured motorists to
circumvent the requirement of maintaining the minimum insurance requirements under the
MVRA. See Coates, 939 S.W.2d at 880; Brown, 875 S.W.2d at 104.
The situations presented in Coates and Brown are distinct from the situation presented in
the case at bar. Here, Trent obtained coverage for the semi-truck through the Penn Insurance
policy issued to Medallion. The public policy reason for declining to find coverage in Coates
and Brown is not present here because Trent did, in fact, procure insurance coverage through his
relationship with Medallion. Any lack of coverage for BRB is cured through application of
K.R.S. § 304.39-100(2), which provides that “in any contract of liability insurance for injury,
wherever issued, covering the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle other than
motorcycles while the vehicle is in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to provide the basic
reparation benefits coverage and minimum security for tort liabilities . . . .”

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The MVRA did not require Medallion or Penn Insurance to provide Trent with insurance
coverage. However, when Trent was offered general liability coverage for the semi-truck,
K.R.S. § 304.39-100(1) mandated that the Penn Insurance policy also provide coverage for basic
reparations benefits. “The terms of an insurance contract must control unless [they] contraven[e]
public policy or a statute.” York v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 156 S.W.3d 291, 294
(Ky. 2005) (quoting Meyers v. Kentucky Medical Insurance Co., 982 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1997)). Here, the clause in the Penn Insurance policy excluding Trent from BRB coverage
contravenes K.R.S. § 304.39-100.
Therefore, even if the Penn Insurance policy did not expressly provide BRB coverage,
the MVRA requires the Penn Insurance policy to provide BRB coverage to Trent. Any language
in Penn Insurance’s policy excluding BRB coverage for Trent’s semi-truck is void as against the
public policy provided by the MVRA.
Thus, Trent’s motion for summary judgment is granted as to his entitlement to BRB
coverage under the Penn Insurance policy.
C. Reasonable Foundation for Denial
Trent also asserts that he should be entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and 18% interest
on his BRB coverage from the date this lawsuit was originally filed in Boone Circuit Court until
this Court’s judgment is satisfied because Penn Insurance’s denial of BRB coverage was
“without reasonable foundation.” See Doc. 46-1 at pp. 5-6 (citing K.R.S. § 304.39-210(2);
K.R.S. § 304.39-220(1)).
“[T]he assertion of a legitimate and bona fide defense by the reparation obligor
constitutes reasonable foundation for delay under KRS 304.39-210 and KRS 304.39-220.” Auto.
Club Ins. Co. v. Lainhart, 609 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).

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Here, Penn Insurance argues that its assertion that it was not required to provide BRB
coverage under the MVRA because its insured, Medallion, was not the “owner or operator” of
the semi-truck was a legitimate and bona fide defense. While this factual scenario assuredly
provides an interesting situation as it applies to the MVRA, it does not change the clear mandate
in K.R.S. § 304.39-100 that the Penn Insurance policy covering Trent for general liability also
provide coverage for basic reparations benefits. With such a mandate provided via the MVRA,
Penn Insurance’s denial of Trent’s BRB coverage claim was without reasonable foundation. Cf.
Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. McQueen, 700 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding that insurer’s refusal to pay insured’s claim was without reasonable foundation because
Kentucky Supreme Court case law clearly rejected insurer’s basis for denying insured’s claim).
Accordingly, Trent is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and 18% interest on his BRB
coverage from the date this lawsuit was originally filed until this Court’s judgment is satisfied.
D. State Farm
Lastly, Trent still has a claim pending against State Farm for BRB coverage. However,
Trent’s claim against State Farm must be dismissed because “the statutory language [of the
MVRA] is unambiguous that the vehicle occupied by the injured person is responsible for the
payment of BRB.” Stewart v. ELCO Admin. Servs., Inc., 313 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky. Ct. App.
2010). Here, pursuant to the above analysis, Penn Insurance, the insurer of the policy providing
coverage to the semi-truck that Trent was occupying, is liable for payment of the BRB coverage.
Additionally, Kentucky law prohibits stacking of BRB coverage. See Stevenson ex rel.
Stevenson v. Anthem Cas. Ins. Grp., 15 S.W.3d 720, 723 (Ky. 1999). (“Since KRS 304.39–
020(2) provides that ‘[t]he maximum amount of basic reparation benefits payable for all
economic loss resulting from injury to any one (1) person as the result of one (1) accident shall

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be ten thousand dollars ($10,000),’ [Kentucky courts have] correctly concluded that this
coverage cannot be stacked.”).
Moreover, Trent admits that “[i]f BRB coverage is found to exist under the policy with
Pennsylvania Insurance, . . . then Plaintiff agrees that State Farm is not responsible for those
benefits.” See Doc. 36.
Accordingly, Trent’s claim for BRB coverage against State Farm is dismissed.
THEREFORE, THE COURT BEING ADVISED, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against Defendant Insurance Company
of the State of Pennsylvania (Doc. 46) be, and is hereby, GRANTED as to
Plaintiff’s claim for basic reparations benefits coverage and DENIED as to
Plaintiff’s claims for uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage;
2. Defendant Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania’s cross motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 52) be, and is hereby, GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s
claim for uninsured and underinsured motorists coverage and DENIED as to
Plaintiff’s claim for basic reparations benefits coverage;
3. Plaintiff’s claim for basic reparations benefits against Defendant State Farm
Automobile Insurance Company be, and is hereby, DISMISSED;
4. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and 18% interest on his basic
reparations benefits claim against Defendant Insurance Company of the State of
Pennsylvania from the date this lawsuit was originally filed in Boone Circuit
Court until this Court’s judgment is satisfied; and
5. Plaintiff shall submit a proposed judgment to this Court within ten (10) days of
the entry of this order.

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This 9th day of January, 2014.

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