Goods v. Stine et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) The constitutional claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in the complaint filed by Plaintiff Terrill Goods, Sr., 1 are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (2)The state law claims asserted in the complaint filed by Plaintiff Te rrill Goods, Sr. 1 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (3)Goods complaint is DISMISSED and this matter is STRICKEN from the active docket(4)The Court will enter an appropriate judgment. Signed by Judge William O. Bertelsman on 6/18/2013.(LMB)cc: COR Terrill Goods, Sr. by regular mail this date.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION AT COVINGTON

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TERRILL GOODS, SR.,
Plaintiff,
V.
FRED. A. STINE, V, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil Action No. 13-CV-19-WOB

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

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Plaintiff Terrill Goods, Sr., who lists his address as 115 Locust Street, Erlanger,
Kentucky, has filed a 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 civil rights complaint against various individuals1
who were involved in a 2005 Kentucky state court criminal proceeding in which Goods
pleaded guilty to the felony offense of Receiving Stolen Property (a firearem).
The Court must conduct a preliminary review of Goods=s complaint because he has
been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis and because he asserts claims against
government officials. 28 U.S.C. '' 1915(e)(2), 1915A. A district court must dismiss any
claim that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607-08 (6th Cir. 1997).

McGore v.

The Court evaluates Goods=s

complaint under a more lenient standard because he is not represented by an attorney.
1

The named defendants are: (1) Fred A. Stine, V, Judge, Kenton Circuit Court; (2) Steven R.
Jaeger; former Judge, Kenton Circuit Court; (3) Joseph Meadows, Prosecutor, Kenton Circuit Court; (4)
Eric L. Emmerson, Pro Bono Attorney; and (5) Dean Pisacano, Attorney.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Burton v. Jones, 321 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir.
2003). At this stage, the Court accepts Goods=s factual allegations as true, and liberally
construes his legal claims in his favor. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555-56 (2007).
Having reviewed the complaint, the Court will dismiss it because several of the
defendants are immune from liability and/or because Goods has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under ' 1983.
BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2005, Goods was charged in the Kenton County Circuit Court with two
offenses, First Degree Possession of a Controlled Substance (a felony) and Carrying a
Concealed Deadly Weapon (a misdemeanor). Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Terrill Goods,
No. 05-CR-00142 (Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Kenton Circuit Court, First Division) (Athe
State Court Case@). Goods pleaded not guilty to those offenses and the Commonwealth
subsequently provided Goods= attorney with discovery.
In May 2005, a third criminal count was filed against Goods, charging him with
Receiving Stolen Property (a firearm); the Commonwealth withdrew the two original
criminal charges, and Goods pleaded guilty to receiving a stolen firearm. On June 15, 2005,
Goods was sentenced to a two-year prison term to be served in the Kentucky State
Reformatory, but his sentence was probated for four years, conditioned on Goods
maintaining employment, providing proof that he obtained his G. E. D. diploma, undergoing
a substance abuse evaluation and any other recommended treatment, and paying court costs

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and a $1,000 fine in monthly payments of $100. According to the docket sheet of the State
Court Case, Goods did not appeal the June 15, 2005, AJudgment and Sentence on Plea of
Guilty.@ One year later, on May 16, 2006, a warrant was issued charging Goods with
committing a felony offense and violating the terms of his probation, and on May 17, 2006,
the State Court Case was reopened.
During the next two years, Goods was transferred among the Roederer Correctional
Complex, the Bell County Forestry Camp, and a facility identified as AKCDC.@ On April 23,
2007, Goods filed a motion under Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 to vacate or set
aside the Judgment entered on June 15, 2005. Between August 2006 and April 2008, several
probation revocation hearings were scheduled then continued, and on July 23, 2007, Fred A.
Stine, V, was appointed special judge to preside over the State Court Case. On April 15,
2008, an Order revoking Goods= probation was entered. Goods appealed, but on September
25, 2008, the Kentucky Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth=s motion to dismiss the
appeal. Goods v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2008-CA-000809 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008)
[R. 14, therein]
On February 5, 2013, Goods filed this ' 1983 civil rights action against Stine, Jaeger,
Meadows, Emerson, and Pisacano. On March 7, 2013, Goods filed another motion in the
State Court Case asking that the Judgment be vacated or set aside pursuant to Kentucky
Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. An order denying that motion was entered on the same day.

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PRIOR CIVIL FEDERAL LITIGATION
In October 2006, while confined in the Bell County Forestry Camp, Goods filed a
prior civil rights action against Kenton Circuit Court Judge Gregory M. Bartlett, Kenton
County Police Officer Brian Valenti, Attorney Dean Pisacano, and Public Advocates Mike
Hummel and Trisha M. Brunk.2 Goods v. Barlett, No. 2:06-CV-196-DLB (E.D. Ky. 2006)
Goods alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights during the State Court
Case, and he sought monetary damages and an order removing them from their respective
offices. [R. 1, therein]
On November 7, 2006, the Court screened Goods= ' 1983 complaint and entered an
Order and Judgment dismissing it sua sponte. [R. 6, 7 therein] The Court determined that
Goods could not recover damages from any of his attorneys because neither privately
retained nor public defender attorneys qualified as Astate actors@ under ' 1983; that the Court
lacked authority either to remove state court judges or police officers from their positions or
to direct state officials to prosecute them for alleged wrong-doing; that Goods= claims seeking
damages from Judge Bartlett were barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity; that Goods=
claims against Officer Valenti alleging racial discrimination lacked factual substance; and
that Goods= claim that Valenti violated his constitutional rights by arresting him and
testifying against him at trial were premature, based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994). [R. 6, pp. 2-6 therein] Goods did not appeal the dismissal of his 2006 civil rights
action.
2

Goods alleged that Pisacano had been his original privately retained attorney in the State Court
Case, and Hummel and Brunk were subsequently appointed to represent Goods in that proceeding.

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CLAIMS ASSERTED IN THIS CASE
Goods alleges that the criminal judgment entered in the State Court Case was obtained
in violation of the U.S. Constitution and various Kentucky statutes, and that between June 15,
2005, and February 5, 2013, the defendants violated his right to due process of law, violated
his right to be indicted by a grand jury, committed malfeasance of office and perjury, violated
several state laws, and engaged in a RICO conspiracy against him.
Specifically, Goods alleges that the indictment in the State Court Case and his
subsequent conviction for receiving a stolen firearm are illegal because: (1) the serial number
of the stolen firearm which he was convicted of receiving was not listed on the criminal
citation; (2) the grand jury indictment was illegal because (a) the grand jury was not provided
with the necessary Afelony info sheet@ concerning him, and (b) the citation charging him
with the offense did not contain the serial number of the firearm; (3) Judges Jaeger and/or
Stine improperly prolonged his case by waiting two years to conduct his probation revocation
hearing and six years to rule on his first motion to vacate his sentence; (4) Judge Stine
incorrectly determined that Goods= July 2007 motion to vacate his criminal judgment was
untimely; and (5) Prosecutor Joseph Meadows assured him that his case would be resolved
and then wrote him A...bribe letters to waive any appellate measures or grievances.@ [R. 1, p.
2, & III(A)]
Goods states that he is currently on parole for the Agun charge R.S.P. over $300.@
[Id., p. 5, ' IV (A) (4)]. Goods further alleges that he has complained about the defendants
to the ABar Association@ and the AJudicial Committee,@ but that Ano one would respect my

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position.@ [Id., ' IV (A)(5)]. The only relief which Goods seeks is Adue process.@ [Id., '
VI]
DISCUSSION
To the extent that Goods seeks only an order declaring that state court criminal
conviction was obtained in violation of his rights guaranteed under the federal constitution,
Goods must proceed by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254.
AThe proper vehicle to challenge a conviction is through the state's appellate procedure and, if
that fails, habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254.@

Jackim v. City of Brooklyn, No.

1:05CV1678, 2010 WL 4923492, at *4 (N.D. Ohio November 29, 2010) (citing Houston v.
Buffa, No. 06-CV-10140-DT, 2007 WL 1005715, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2007)).
If, alternatively, the Adue process which Goods seeks consists of monetary damages
from the defendants, he can not recover damages in this ' 1983 proceeding, based on the
doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey. Goods= allegation that the state court judges (Jaeger
and Stine), the prosecutor (Meadows), his privately retained attorney (Pisacano) and his
public advocate/pro bono attorney (Emerson) violated his constitutional rights during various
stages of the State Court Case amounts to nothing more than a collateral challenge of his
criminal conviction. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) holds that Ain order to recover
damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused
by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a ' 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been [overturned].@ Id. at 486-87.
In other words, before Goods can seek money damages in this federal civil rights proceeding

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in which he claims that his criminal conviction was unlawfully obtained, he must show a
favorable termination of his criminal conviction, i.e., that his conviction has been overturned
or set aside.
Goods cannot demonstrate a favorable termination of the State Court Case, which he
did not appeal and which it does not appear he has collaterally challenged by filing a habeas
corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254. Because Goods either has served, or currently is
serving a lawfully imposed state sentence which has not been reversed, set aside, or
otherwise called into question, he can not collaterally attack his criminal conviction in this '
1983 civil rights action by seeking damages from the defendants who were involved in his
criminal prosecution.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also bars Goods=s allegations against the state court
prosecutor and presiding judge. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts lack
jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court, as only the United States
Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments. District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413
(1923); Patmon v. Michigan Supreme Court, 224 F.3d 504, 506-07 (6th Cir. 2000). A party
raising a federal question must appeal a state court decision through the state system and then
proceed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16;
Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16; United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995).
Goods does not allege, and the docket sheet from the State Court Case does not indicate, that

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he appealed the criminal judgment through the Kentucky appellate court system or that he
asked the United States Supreme Court to review his conviction and sentence.
To the extent Goods may be seeking damages from Judges Jaeger and Stine, the
doctrine of absolute judicial immunity bars such claims.

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,

553-555 (1967); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial
immunity is overcome only when a judge engages in non-judicial actions or when the judge's
actions, though judicial in nature, are taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. See
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). Goods= allegation that the two judges delayed
taking certain actions and/or that they rendered incorrect rulings in his criminal case does not
deprive either of them of the absolute judicial immunity which shields them from liability in
this ' 1983 proceeding. A[A] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he
took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority....@ Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-359 (1978). An act Adoes not become less judicial by virtue of
an allegation of malice or corruption of motive.@

Sparks v. Character and Fitness

Committee of Kentucky, 859 F.2d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484
U.S. 219, 227 (1988)). Thus, Goods may not recover damages from Jaeger and Stine.
Prosecutor Joseph Meadows is also immune from damages under ' 1983. In Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that prosecutors
enjoy absolute immunity from ' 1983 suits for damages when they act within the scope of
their prosecutorial duties. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 420. Goods alleges nothing to suggest that

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Meadows was not acting in his capacity as a prosecutor during the pendency of the State
Court Case.
For the same reasons discussed in the order dismissing Goods= 2006 civil rights
action, Goods is also precluded from recovering damages from either his privately-retained
attorney (Pisacano) or his publically-appointed/ pro bono attorney (Emmerson). In order to
prevail in a ' 1983 action, the plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a constitutional
right and that the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S.
635, 640 (1980); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155B56 (1978); Searcy v. City of
Dayton, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).

Neither privately-retained attorneys nor

court-appointed public defenders are considered Astate actors@ under ' 1983. Washington v.
Brewer, 948 F.2d 1291, 1991 WL 243591 at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 21, 1991)(Table) (citing Polk
County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981)). For this reason, Goods fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted against either Pisacano or Emmerson under ' 1983.
Finally, having dismissed Goods= underlying federal claims, the Court declines to
exercise jurisdiction over his pendent claims alleging a violation of his rights guaranteed
under state law. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966); Taylor v. First of Am. BankBWayne, 973 F.2d 1284, 1287 (6th Cir. 1992).
Goods is free to assert his state law claims in state court, although the Court expresses no
opinion as to whether such claims would be time-barred and/or meritorious.

CONCLUSION

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Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:
1.

The constitutional claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 in the complaint

filed by Plaintiff Terrill Goods, Sr., [R. 1] are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
2.

The state law claims asserted in the complaint filed by Plaintiff Terrill Goods,
Sr.,

[R. 1] are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
3.

Goods= complaint [R. 1] is DISMISSED and this matter is STRICKEN from
the

active docket.
4.

The Court will enter an appropriate judgment.

This June 18, 2013.

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