Little v. Carl et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1) Defs' motion for summary judgment 16 is GRANTED; 2) Plf's motion to request items/information 19 is DENIED; 3) A Judgment will enter concurrently herewith. Signed by Judge William O. Bertelsman on 7/15/2014.(ECO)cc: COR, cc mailed to Timothy Ray Little, Pro Se Pltf, at address on the docket sheet.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION AT COVINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-cv-154(WOB)
TIMOTHY RAY LITTLE
VS.

PLAINTIFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TERRY CARL, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

This is a pro se action in which inmate, Timothy Ray Little,
appears to claim that the Defendants (1) violated his due process by
removing him from his “job” at the jail and moving him to a dorm with
fewer privileges, (2) retaliated against him for submitting grievances
by moving him to a dorm with fewer privileges, and (3) failed to
protect him from assault by another inmate at the jail.
This matter is now before the Court on a motion for summary
judgment filed by Sergeant 1 Landrum, Deputy Boyle, and Sergeant Bell
(the “Defendants") (Doc. 16) and a motion to request items/evidence
filed

by

Plaintiff

(Doc.

19).

The

Court,

having

reviewed

the

pleadings and being sufficiently advised, hereby issues the following
Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Facts
A. Inmate Little’s Confinement
On June 6, 2012, Timothy Little (“Little”) was booked into the
Kenton County Detention Center (“KCDC”) as a pretrial detainee and
placed in a general population dormitory 106.

Doc. 16-1, Bell Decl.,

¶1.

deputies

1

The

opportunities

for

inmates

to

help

with

uniform

Plaintiff’s Complaint misspelled Sergeant, therefore the caption is also
misspelled.

exchanges

is

randomly

afforded

inmates

in

dorm

106.

Id.

at

¶2.

Inmates who are asked to help deputies with uniform exchanges receive
no tangible benefits or credits for helping.

Id. at ¶3.

There is no

dispute that Little began helping with uniform exchanges, although the
date he began assisting is unclear.
In January 2013, Deputy Boyle suspected Little was extorting food
trays, commissary items and chores from dormmates in exchange for
providing

the

correct

uniform

sizes

Doc. 16-2, Boyle Decl., p. 1, ¶1-2.
Boyle

stopped

asking

during her shift.

Little

to

during

the

uniform

exchanges.

At some point in January, Deputy

assist

her

with

uniform

exchanges

Doc. 1, Complaint; Doc. 16, Def. Motion and Memo,

p. 2; Id. at ¶3.
B. January 9, 2013 and January 11, 2013 Grievances
On January 9, 2013, Little filed a grievance complaining that
Deputy Boyle had a personal vendetta against him and harassed him.
Doc.

16-3,

1/9/13

Grievance.

The

grievance

outside the scope of available remedies.

Id.

was

denied

as

being

Sergeant Bell offered

to move Little to an isolation cell on days when Deputy Boyle was
assigned

to

dorm

106

to

avoid

any

conflict

that

existed between them, but Little declined this option.

Little

perceived

Id.

On January 11, 2013, Little filed another grievance, complaining
that Deputy Boyle was telling inmates and staff that she hated him.
Doc. 16-4, 1/11/13 Grievance.

Sergeant Landrum denied the grievance

on January 12, 2013, because it was not filled out correctly.

Id.

Sergeant Landrum advised Little he could resubmit a new grievance, but

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cautioned that how Deputy Boyle performed her job was not a grievable
matter.

Doc. 16-5, Landrum Decl., ¶¶1-2.

Sergeant Landrum met with Little on January 16, 2013, to discuss
the status of his grievance.

Id. at 3.

Little explained he was

satisfied that the matter had been fairly settled and did not want to
proceed with filing a revised grievance.

Id.

Later that day, Little complained verbally to Sergeant Bell about
Deputy

Boyle

after

she

limited

did

him

not

to

ask

thirty

him

to

seconds

assist
to

with

exchange

uniform

exchanges

and

his

own

uniform.

16-2, Boyle Decl., ¶3; Doc. 16-1, p. 8, 1/16/13 Incident

Report.
C. Transfer to Dorm with Lesser Privileges
An investigation into uniform exchange assistance revealed that
inmates Little and Beal were exchanging the correct uniform sizes for
items

and

completed

chores

from

dormmates.

Doc.

16-6,

1/16/13

Incident Report.
With the approval of Lieutenant Sprang, Sergeant Bell made the
decision
(“Tango”).

to

transfer

Little

to

a

dorm

Id.; Doc. 16-1, Bell Decl., ¶4.

did not change after his transfer.

with

lesser

privileges

Little’s classification

Id.

D. February 21, 2013 Grievance
On February 21, 2013, Little filed a grievance complaining that
he was brought to Tango on the same day for the same reason as inmate
Beal but was in Tango longer than Beal. Doc. 16-7, 2/21/13 Grievance.
Little proposed that he be transferred to dorm 102, 106, or 152.
Sergeant Landrum denied the grievance as non-grievable.

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Id.

Id.

E. Transfer to Dorm 152 & Altercation with Fellow Inmate
On February 22, 2013, Little was transferred to dorm 152.

Doc.

16-1, Sgt. Bell Decl., ¶5.
Little admits that on March 16, 2013, he and a fellow inmate
engaged

in

a

physical

altercation

over

a

card

game.

Doc.

16-8,

3/16/13 Incident Report and Witness Statements; see surveillance of
altercation,

Doc.

15.

following the incident.

Both

inmates

were

removed

from

dorm

152

Little did not request medical treatment for

any injuries allegedly suffered in the fight over the card game.

Doc.

16-1, Bell Decl., ¶6.
Analysis
A. Due Process
Summary judgment on Plaintiff’s due process claim is appropriate.
Whether an inmate has a liberty interest in avoiding a particular
condition of confinement or cell placement is governed by Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 132 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1995).
“[T]hese interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint
which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner
as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own
force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

Id. at

484 (internal citations removed).
Little’s transfer from dorm 106 to a different dorm with fewer
privileges did not impose “atypical or significant hardship” on him

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“in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”
record

establishes

that

Little’s

ability

to

assist

See id.
with

The

uniform

exchanges was randomly afforded to him and other inmates of that dorm,
and that he received no tangible benefit from assisting.
Bell Decl., p. 1, ¶¶1-3.

Doc. 16-1,

Even if Little’s suspected extortion was not

substantiated as Plaintiff contends, the jail has discretion in making
dorm assignments.
A holding that any deprivation of a privilege imposed by prison
authorities triggers the protections of the Due Process Clause would
subject a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally
have

been

the

business

of

detention

facility

administrators

to

judicial review. See Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S. Ct.
2532, 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976).
For

these

reasons,

summary

judgment

for

the

Defendants

on

Little’s due process claim is warranted.
B. Retaliation
Summary judgment for the Defendants on Little’s retaliation claim
is also appropriate.

To state a claim for retaliation, Little must

establish that (1) he engaged in protected conduct; (2) he suffered an
adverse action which would deter a person of ordinary firmness from
continuing to engage in the protected conduct; and (3) the adverse
action

was

motivated

at

least

in

part

by

the

protected

conduct.

Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Bloch
v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998)).
Little has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact that he
engaged in protected activity by complaining about how Deputy Boyle

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chose

to

have

inmates

help

with

uniform

exchange.

See

Smith

v.

Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hile a prisoner may
have a right to file grievances against prison officials, he or she
cannot exercise that right in a manner that violates legitimate prison
regulations or penological objectives.”); Ward v. Dyke, 58 F.3d 271,
274 (6th Cir. 1995)) (“The ability to transfer a prisoner who is
interfering with prison administration and staff morale goes to the
essence of prison management.”)

Deputy Boyle’s managerial decisions

about who she chose to assist with uniform exchange is not a grievable
dispute.

As such, Little’s complaints do not constitute protected

conduct.
The fact that Little disputes extorting items in exchange for
correct uniform sizes does not alter the conclusion that Little’s
complaints

were

not

protected.

Whether

the

allegation

could

be

substantiated is irrelevant, because Deputy Boyle may rely upon her
managerial discretion in how to conduct uniform exchanges during her
shift.
Plaintiff also failed to raise a material issue of fact that he
suffered an adverse action.

The Sixth Circuit recently recognized

that cell assignments are incidental to detention and do not typically
amount to an adverse action.

See LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944,

948 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the general rule but holding that the
prisoner sufficiently pled that prison officials retaliated against
him by forcing him into a cell with a mentally ill prisoner who
ultimately threatened the prisoner’s life).

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For

these

reasons,

summary

judgment

for

the

Defendants

is

appropriate

on

appropriate on this claim.

C. Failure to Protect
Summary

judgment

for

the

Defendants

Little’s failure to protect claim.
they

sound

in

the

Due

Process

is

also

“Pretrial detainee claims, though

Clause

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

rather than the Eighth Amendment, City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp.,
463

U.S.

239,

244,

103

S.

Ct.

2979,

77

L.Ed.2d

605

(1983),

are

analyzed under the same rubric as Eighth Amendment claims brought by
prisoners.”

Villegas v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 568

(6th Cir. 2013) (citing Roberts v. City of Troy, 773 F.2d 720, 723
(6th Cir. 1985)).
To

state

Amendment,

a

the

claim

for

plaintiff

failure

must

to

satisfy

protect
an

under

objective

the

Eighth

component

alleging his medical need was “sufficiently serious.”

by

Comstock v.

McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994)).

To satisfy the

subjective component, the plaintiff must show the official being sued
perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner,
that

the

official

did

in

fact

draw

official then disregarded that risk.

the

inference,

and

that

the

Id.

There is no evidence that any KCDC deputy possessed the requisite
culpable

state

Plaintiff
requested.

to

of

mind

dorm

152,

Doc.

16-7,

when
a

cell

the

decision

assignment

2/21/13

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was
that

Grievance.

made
the
The

to

transfer

Plaintiff
evidence

had
also

conclusively
occurred

establishes

abruptly

histories.

that

over

a

the

card

altercation

game,

not

with

either

another

inmate’s

inmate

criminal

Doc. 16-8, 3/16/13 Incident Report and Witness Statements;

Doc. 15, surveillance video.
Little is also unable to demonstrate that the Defendants failed
to protect him by being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.
There is no evidence Little made a request for medical attention on or
after the March 16, 2013 altercation.

Little was taking prescribed

medications for conditions unrelated to the fight and therefore had
access to medical personnel at least twice daily during medical pass
rounds.

Doc.

16-1,

Bell

Decl.,

¶7.

Despite

opportunities to request help, he did not do so.
Little’s

claim

that

he

told

a

nurse

he

having

Id. at 6.

felt

unsafe

these
Even if

could

be

substantiated by testimony or surveillance, Plaintiff never claims he
told an officer of his concerns.
Because Little is unable demonstrate a genuine issue of material
fact exists with respect to whether any defendant was aware of and
ignored an obvious substantial risk of harm to him or serious medical
need, summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is appropriate.
D. Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Items and Evidence
Little’s

requests

for

additional

evidence

is

futile.

While

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) provides that the Court may
postpone ruling on summary judgment to allow a party opposing summary
judgment to conduct discovery, the opposing party must demonstrate how
the discovery being requested will rebut the showing of the absence of
a genuine issue of material fact.

See Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d

-8-

351, 356-57 (6th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate how

daily logs, video surveillance, or names of inmates at KCDC would
further

assist

him

with

sufficiently

establishing

his

claims

of

constitutional violations against the Defendants.

Therefore, the Court being sufficiently advised, IT IS ORDERED:
(1)

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 16) be, and
hereby is, GRANTED; and

(2)

Plaintiff’s motion to request items/information (Doc. 19),
be, and hereby is, DENIED;

(3)

A Judgment will enter concurrently herewith.

This 15th day of July, 2014.

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