Lewis v. SSA

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. The decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and is hereby AFFIRMED; 2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 11 is hereby DENIED; 3. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 12 ) is hereby GRANTED; 4. A Judgment affirming this matter will be entered contemporaneously herewith.. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 02/16/2016.(KRB)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT COVINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-211-DLB
APRIL LEWIS

vs.

PLAINTIFF

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security

DEFENDANT
*** *** *** ***

Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review
of an administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Court, having
reviewed the record and the parties’ dispositive motions, will affirm the Commissioner’s
decision, as it supported by substantial evidence.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff April Lewis applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB) on November 29,
2011, alleging disability beginning on July 25, 2011. (Tr. 61-62). Plaintiff was 48 years old
at the time of filing. (Tr. 61). Plaintiff alleges that she is unable to work due to lumbar spine
degenerative disc disease, adhesive capsulitis of the shoulders, migraines, obesity,
depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 12).
Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and again on reconsideration. (Tr. 61-75;
76-92). At Plaintiff’s request, an administrative hearing was conducted on July 22, 2013
before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gregory G. Kenyon. (Tr. 27-60). On September

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18, 2013 ALJ Kenyon ruled that Plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to DIB.
(Tr. 7-21). This decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on October 28, 2014. (Tr. 1-3).
Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 24, 2014. (Doc. # 1). The matter has
culminated in cross-motions for summary judgment, which are now ripe for adjudication.
(Docs. # 11, 12).
II. DISCUSSION
A.

Overview of the Process
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is restricted to determining whether

it is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.
See Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence” is
defined as “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).
Courts are not to conduct a de novo review, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or make
credibility determinations. Id. Rather, we are to affirm the Commissioner’s decision,
provided it is supported by substantial evidence, even if we might have decided the case
differently. Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999). If supported
by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings must be affirmed, even if there is
evidence favoring Plaintiff’s side. Listenbee v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d
345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988). Similarly, an administrative decision is not subject to reversal
merely because substantial evidence would have supported the opposite conclusion.
Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 780, 781-82 (6th Cir. 1996).
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To determine disability, the ALJ conducts a five-step analysis. Step 1 considers
whether the claimant can still perform substantial gainful activity; Step 2, whether any of
the claimant’s impairments, alone or in combination, are “severe”; Step 3, whether the
impairments meet or equal a listing in the Listing of Impairments; Step 4, whether the
claimant can still perform her past relevant work; and Step 5, whether a significant number
of other jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. As to the last
step, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner to identify “jobs in
the economy that accommodate [Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity.” See Jones v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Preslar v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
B.

The ALJ’s Determination
At Step 1, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since July 25, 2011, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 12). At Step 2, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: lumbar spine degenerative disc disease,
adhesive capsulitis of the shoulders, migraines, obesity, depression, and anxiety. (Tr. 12).
At Step 3, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 12).
At Step 4, the ALJ found that Plaintiff possessed the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform less than the full range of light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567(b). (Tr. 15). The ALJ found the following limitations to Plaintiff’s ability to perform
light work:

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“(1) occasional crouching, crawling, kneeling, stooping, balancing, and
climbing of ramps and stairs; (2) no climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
(4)1 no work around hazards such as unprotected heights or dangerous
machinery; (5) no exposure to loud noise; (6) frequent overhead reaching; (7)
limited to performing unskilled, simple, repetitive tasks; (8) occasional contact
with co-workers and supervisors; (9) no public contact; (10) no jobs involving
teamwork or tandem tasks; (11) no jobs involving sales transactions or
negotiations; (12) no jobs involving rapid production pace work or strict
production quotas; and (13) limited to performing jobs in a relatively static
work environment in which there is very little, if any, change in the job duties
or the work routine form one day to the next.”
(Tr. 15). Based upon this RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is unable to perform her
past relevant work as an eligibility specialist, administrative assistant, medical assistant,
and preschool teacher. (Tr. 19).
Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to the final step of the sequential evaluation. At
Step 5, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was 48 years old on the alleged disability onset date,
which is defined as a younger individual. (Tr. 20); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(c). The
ALJ also found that Plaintiff has at least a high school education and is able to
communicate in English. (Tr. 20). Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE) and
considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ concluded that
there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform.
(Tr. 20-21). The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability, as
defined in the Social Security Act, from the alleged onset date through the date of her
decision. (Tr. 21).
C.

Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed two errors. First, she argues that he erred

1) The ALJ’s opinion appears to have inadvertently skipped the number “3" in its serial listing of
Plaintiff’s light work limitations.
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by failing to give controlling weight to the opinion of Ms. Lewis’s treating medical provider.
(Doc. #11 at 1). Second, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ should be reversed because
substantial evidence supports her psychological disability.2

(Doc. #11 at 1).

Each

argument will be addressed in turn.
1.

The ALJ did not err in discounting the treating physician’s opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s disability and mental health impairments.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by not giving controlling weight to the opinion of
Dr. Baluyot, her treating physician.3 (Doc. #11 at 10). However, because the ALJ gave
good reasons for discounting the treating physician’s opinion, his decision is supported by
substantial evidence.
Ordinarily, a treating physician’s opinion is given controlling weight if it is wellsupported and not contradicted by other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). But the
ALJ is not bound by a treating physician’s opinion that is inconsistent with the substantial
evidence in a case. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6); see also Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 287 (6th Cir. 1994)(holding that the Commissioner “is not
bound by treating physicians’ opinions, especially when there is substantial medical
evidence to the contrary.”); accord Cohen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d
524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992); Young v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 925 F.2d 146, 151 (6th
Cir. 1990). To discount the treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ needs to give “good
2) Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ’s findings related to her lumbar spine degenerative disc
disease, adhesive capsulitis of the shoulders, obesity, or migraines. Accordingly, the Court will
consider only the ALJ’s findings as they apply her mental impairments, namely anxiety and
depression. See Kennedy v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 87 F. App’x 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
issues for which no argumentation is attempted, or for which argumentation is merely perfunctory,
are deemed waived) (citing United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 1996).
3) The parties do not dispute that Dr. Baluyot was a treating physician.
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reasons” for doing so. See Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 380 (6th Cir.
2013) (holding that the Commissioner must provide “good reasons” when it gives little
weight to a treating physician’s opinion)(citing Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 939 (6th Cir.
2011).
Here, the ALJ has provided good reasons for giving little weight to Dr. Baluyot’s
opinion, and those reasons are supported by substantial evidence. Dr. Baluyot initially
gave Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 30. (Tr. 387). A GAF
score of 30 indicates an individual whose behavior is considerably influenced by delusions
or hallucinations and who has serious impairments to communication and judgment. AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 34 (4th ed.
1994). A person with that score may also exhibit an inability to function in almost all areas.
Id. The ALJ found that nothing in the record supported Dr. Baluyot’s GAF score of 30 for
Plaintiff. (Tr. 18). The ALJ determined that the Plaintiff did not exhibit the type of “frank
psychosis” typically associated with a score that low, and that Plaintiff’s level of functioning
was also too high for such a score. (Tr. 18).
Moreover, all of the other mental evaluations that Plaintiff received found Plaintiff to
have a GAF score of at least 50. (Tr. 19; 414; 426; 718). This includes subsequent
evaluations by Dr. Baluyot, who determined that Plaintiff was improving and showing only
moderate symptoms. (Tr. 18; 541). Dr. Baluyot’s later evaluations raised Plaintiff’s GAF
score to 55 (Tr. 426). Accordingly, the ALJ properly discounted Dr. Baluyot’s initial GAF
score of 30.
As for Dr. Baluyot’s determination that Plaintiff was totally disabled, this conclusion
is not entitled to any special weight.

Opinions on issues that are reserved for the
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Commissioner, such as the ultimate disability decision, are given no special weight, even
when they come from treating sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).
Additionally, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ erred by discounting the opinion of Dr.
McCann, who provided her with a consultative examination. However, the ALJ properly
weighted Dr. McCann’s opinion in this matter, and permissibly discounted it because the
substantial evidence conflicted with his opinion. Dr. McCann met with the Plaintiff once,
and is thus entitled to the weight given an examining physician.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(1). However, the ALJ noted that Dr. McCann’s GAF score for Plaintiff was a
55, high enough to perform competitive work activity, and that Plaintiff’s presentation and
level of functioning during that examination were not consistent with total disability. (Tr.
19). Further, the ALJ noted that Dr. McCann’s determination that Plaintiff should seek
disability benefits is not the same as him saying that Plaintiff is totally disabled.4 (Tr. 19).
Thus, the ALJ properly gave his opinion only some weight in making his disability
determination. (Tr. 19).
2.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to find her disabled since substantial
evidence supports her disability. Of course, it does not matter if the substantial evidence
does support her disability so long as it also supports her not being disabled. Her, 203 F.3d
at 389-90 (holding that “[e]ven if the evidence could also support another conclusion, the
decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if the evidence could reasonably

4) As previously noted, even if Dr. McCann was claiming that Plaintiff was totally disabled, the
ultimate disability determination is reserved for the ALJ; the disability determinations of others are
not entitled to any special weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1).
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support the decision reached)(citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997);
accord Smith, 99 F.3d 782; Listenbee, 846 F.2d at 349. As a result, it does not matter if
Plaintiff, or even this Court, believes substantial evidence supports a different disability
determination. All that is required of the ALJ is that he support his decision with substantial
evidence. The ALJ has done so here.
At Step 4 of his analysis, the ALJ carefully reviewed the record and found that
Plaintiff was capable of doing light work with the limitations specified. (Tr. 15). As noted
above, he properly discounted the opinions of Drs. Baluyot and McCann. He indicated, and
the evidence supports, that Plaintiff’s proper GAF score was somewhere between 50 and
55, indicating moderate levels of impairment. (Tr. 18-19). In addition to these scores and
Dr. Baluyot’s notes that Plaintiff was improving, the ALJ relied on the opinions of Drs. Laboy
and Vandivier, who both agreed Plaintiff had mild to moderate limitations, but could perform
work so long as certain limitations were permitted. (Tr. 18-19). The ALJ found that Dr.
Baluyot’s progress notes were inconsistent with her findings regarding Plaintiff’s ability to
work, and that Dr. McCann’s GAF score of 55 was consistent with a claimant capable of
performing competitive work activity. Accordingly, the substantial evidence here supports
the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s finding that
Plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act was supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, for the reasons stated,

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IT IS ORDERED as follows:
1.

The decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and

is hereby AFFIRMED;
2.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 11) is hereby DENIED;

3.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 12) is hereby GRANTED;

4.

A Judgment affirming this matter will be entered contemporaneously herewith.

This 16th day of February, 2016.

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