Herald v. SSA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: It is ordered 1) Decision of Commissioner is found to be supported by substantial evidence and is hereby AFFIRMED; 2) Plaintiff's 11 MOTION for Summary Judgment is DENIED; 3) Defenant's 13 MOTION for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED; 4) Judgment in favor of Defendant Commissioner will be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge David L. Bunning on 6/7/2016.(TED)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
AT COVINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-47-DLB
DONNA HERALD
vs.
PLAINTIFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
DEFENDANT
*** *** *** ***
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review
of an administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Court, having
reviewed the record and the parties’ dispositive motions, and for the reasons set forth
herein, will affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On May 5, 2004, Plaintiff Donna Herald applied for disability insurance benefits
(DIB), alleging disability beginning on May 30, 2001. (Tr. 54-59). Plaintiff was forty-two (42)
years old at the time of filing. (Tr. 54). Plaintiff alleged that she was unable to work due to
the following disabling conditions: “osteo- and regular arthritis, hip and back problems,
nerve problems, and high blood pressure.” (Tr. 68-69).
Plaintiff’s application was denied initially, and again on reconsideration. (Tr. 25-30;
33-35). At Plaintiff’s request, an administrative hearing was conducted on February 27,
2007 before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Larry A. Temin. (Tr. 356-401). On April 10,
2007, ALJ Temin ruled that Plaintiff was not disabled, and thus, not entitled to DIB. (Tr. 24).
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This decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. 5-7).
Plaintiff then appealed to this Court and on July 9, 2008, her case was remanded
because the “hypothetical mental factors chosen by the ALJ [were] not supported by
substantial evidence” and the ALJ’s “rejection of the treating physician’s restrictions”
required reevaluation. (Tr. 450-454). On January 14, 2010, the remand hearing was
conducted before ALJ Don C. Paris. (Tr. 414-427). On February 10, 2010, ALJ Paris
issued an unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff was not under a disability and not eligible
for DIB. (Tr. 427). After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of ALJ
Paris’s decision, she again appealed to this Court. See Herald v. Colvin, 2:11-cv-00341WOB-CJS. Upon the Agency’s motion, this Court remanded Plaintiff’s claim once again
on October 30, 2012. Id. at Docs. # 25, 26. The Court instructed the ALJ to “reevaluate
the opinion of Dr. Banks and discuss the effects of Plaintiff’s obesity on restrictions
assessed by Dr. Banks” and evaluate his opinion “pursuant to the criteria in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527 and Social Security Ruling 98-6p.” Id. at Doc. # 26.
On remand, Plaintiff’s DIB application was denied for a third time. ALJ Larry Temin
conducted the third hearing on November 12, 2013 (Tr. 710-757) and issued an
unfavorable decision on December 26, 2013. (Tr. 544-564). Plaintiff requested review by
the Appeals Council, but her request was denied on February 6, 2015. (Tr. 532-535).
Plaintiff filed the instant action on January 15, 2015, alleging the ALJ’s “conclusions and
findings of fact ... are not supported by substantial evidence” and are “contrary to law and
regulation.” (Doc. # 1).
The matter has culminated in cross-motions for summary
judgment, which are now ripe for adjudication. (Docs. # 11, 13).
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II. DISCUSSION
A.
Overview of the Process
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is restricted to determining whether
it is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.
See Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 2007). “Substantial evidence” is
defined as “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994).
Courts are not to conduct a de novo review, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or make
credibility determinations. Id. Rather, the Court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision,
as long as it is supported by substantial evidence, even if the Court might have decided the
case differently. Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 389-90 (6th Cir. 1999). If
supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings must be affirmed, even
if there is evidence favoring Plaintiff’s side. Listenbee v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
846 F.2d 345, 349 (6th Cir. 1988). Similarly, an administrative decision is not subject to
reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported the opposite
conclusion. Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 780, 781-82 (6th Cir. 1996).
To determine disability, the ALJ conducts a five-step analysis. Step One considers
whether the claimant can still perform substantial gainful activity; Step Two, whether any
of the claimant’s impairments, alone or in combination, are “severe;” Step Three, whether
the impairments meet or equal a listing in the Listing of Impairments; Step Four, whether
the claimant can still perform her past relevant work; and Step Five, whether a significant
number of other jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. As to
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the last step, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner to identify
“jobs in the economy that accommodate [Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity.” See
Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Preslar v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
B.
The ALJ’s Determination
At Step One, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since September 6, 1999, the application date, through her date last insured, March
31, 2005. (Tr. 546). At Step Two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following severe
impairments: obesity, lumbosacral spine degenerative disc disease, early degenerative
changes of the knees, right hip mass excision, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and
adjustment disorder with anxious and depressed mood (chronic). (Tr. 547). At Step Three,
the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 547-548).
At Step Four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff possesses the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform light work, as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), with the following
limitations:
She could lift/carry/push/pull up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds
frequently. She could stand and/or walk for up to 6 hours in an eight-hour
workday, and could sit for up to 6 hours in an eight-hour workday. The
claimant could only occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and climb ramps/stairs.
She could never crawl, climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds, or work at unprotected
heights or around hazardous machinery. She could only occasionally
perform fingering (i.e. picking, pinching, or otherwise working primarily with
fingers rather than with the whole hand or arm) bilaterally. The claimant was
able to remember and carry out detailed but uninvolved instructions. She
could sustain concentration and attention for 2 hours at a time, and then
required a rest break of five minutes. Her job could not require more than
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superficial and occasional interaction with the general public, co-workers or
supervisors. The claimant could not work at a rapid production rate pace,
and her job could not require more than ordinary and routine changes in
work setting or duties.
(Tr. 549).
Based upon this RFC and relying on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (Tr. 562).
However, the ALJ noted that claimant was considered a younger individual on the date last
insured and has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English.
(Tr. 562-563). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that there were jobs that existed in significant
numbers in the national economy that the Plaintiff could have performed, and that Plaintiff
was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from the alleged onset
date through the date of the decision. (Tr. 563-564).
C.
Analysis
Plaintiff alleges two general errors in the hearing decision and asks this Court to
reverse the disability determination and remand for immediate payment of benefits. (Doc.
# 11). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “did not properly address the effect of
Plaintiff’s mental limitations on her ability to work” and “did not give proper weight to Dr.
Banks’[s] treating physician opinion.” (Doc. # 11, pp. 11-19). Each of plaintiff’s arguments
are targeted at Step 4 of the ALJ’s analysis and can be characterized as follows: (1) the
ALJ erred in weighing the medical opinion testimony, (2) the ALJ erred in assessing the
Plaintiff’s credibility, and (3) the ALJ’s RFC of light work is not supported by the record.
These three arguments will be addressed in turn.
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1.
The ALJ did not err in weighing the medical opinion testimony.
In social security disability cases, medical evidence may come from treating
sources, non-treating sources, and non-examining sources. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502. A
treating source is the claimant’s “own physician, psychologist, or other acceptable medical
source who provides [claimant], or has provided [claimant], with medical treatment or
evaluation and who has, or has had, an ongoing treatment relationship with [claimant].”
Id.; see also Abney v. Astrue, Civ. A. No. 5:07-394-KKC, 2008 WL 2074011, at *11
(E.D.K.Y. May 13, 2008) (stating that one meeting is insufficient to establish an ongoing
treatment relationship). A non-treating source is an acceptable medical source who has
examined the claimant but does not have an ongoing treatment relationship with him or
her, while a non-examining source has not examined the claimant but provided medical or
other opinion evidence in the case. Id. The Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s alleged
failure to accord sufficient weight to the medical opinion testimony provided by Dr. Banks,
a treating source, and Dr. Eggerman, a non-treating source, . The Court will consider each
of these opinions in turn.
a.
Dr. Banks
A treating source’s opinion is entitled to controlling weight if it is “‘well supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques’ and ‘not inconsistent
with the other substantial evidence in the case record.’” Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). If a treating
source’s opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, the ALJ must consider the following
factors in order to determine how much weight to give the opinion: (1) the length of the
treatment relationship and the frequency of the examination; (2) the nature and extent of
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the treatment relationship; (3) the supportability of the opinion; (4) the consistency of the
opinion with the record as a whole; and (5) the specialization of the treating source. Id.
The ALJ must provide “good reasons” for giving less than controlling weight to a treating
source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Specifically, “a decision denying benefits
‘must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source’s medical opinion,
supported by the evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make
clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s
medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.’” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188
at *5 (1996).
The “treating physician rule” only applies to medical opinions. While a medical
expert may opine “on issues such as whether [claimant’s] impairment(s) meets or equals
the requirements of any impairment(s) in the Listing of Impairments,” as well as claimant’s
residual functional capacity or the application of vocational factors, such opinions are not
entitled to controlling weight.
See 20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2) (stating that “the final
responsibility for deciding these issues is reserved to the Commissioner”). “Although the
ALJ may not entirely ignore such an opinion, his decision need only explain the
consideration given to the treating source’s opinion.” Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2010
WL 2294531, at *4 (6th Cir. June 7, 2010).
The Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to give Dr. Banks’s opinion, as a
treating source, controlling weight. Dr. Banks opined that Plaintiff would be limited by
several of her conditions and determined that “Plaintiff was not capable of performing more
than sedentary exertion.” (Tr. 561). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Dr Banks’s lifting,
standing, and walking restrictions are “supported by objective evidence” and “consistent
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with the evidence of record,” and thus, deserve controlling weight. Id. at 17. The Plaintiff
also takes issue with the ALJ’s decision to give “significant weight” to the opinion of Dr.
Brahms, who opined that Plaintiff was capable of performing light exertion. Plaintiff
challenges Dr. Brahms’s opinion because it “only pertains to Plaintiff’s knees,” is not
supported by substantial evidence, and because Dr. Brahms’s “has only a limited license
to practice medicine.” Id. at 18-21.
Despite Plaintiff’s claims, the ALJ thoroughly considered Dr. Banks’s opinions.
While the ALJ found that some of Dr. Banks’s opinions were not entitled to controlling
weight, many of his restrictions were incorporated into the RFC, including the following
restrictions/limitations: sitting for a total of six hours over an eight-hour workday; climbing
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; working around hazards such as heights or dangerous
machinery; occasional kneeling; and occasional crawling. The RFC does not incorporate
Dr. Banks’s limitation on sustained sitting to one-half hour because the ALJ determined
that opinion was inconsistent with the record. Specifically, the ALJ considered the opinions
and observations of two non-treating sources – Dr. Glaser and Dr. Eggerman – who both
noted that the Plaintiff appeared to be comfortable and did not display pain behaviors while
sitting. (Tr. 556).
The ALJ also declined to incorporate Dr. Banks’s complete restriction on postural
activity because it was not supported by substantial evidence. (Tr. 557). The objective
medical evidence showed “grossly symmetrical lower extremity motor strength,” “normal
gait and station,” and “no evidence of knee instability,” as well as only “mild osteoarthritis
changes in the lumbar spine, with full lumbar flexion and good spiral range of motion
overall,” which the ALJ determined was “not supportive of restriction on postural activity.”
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Id. Because Dr. Brahms’s postural limitation to “occasional activity” was consistent with
the record evidence, the ALJ accorded significant weight to Dr. Brahms’s opinion regarding
Plaintiff’s ability to balance, stoop, and crouch. Id.
Similarly, the ALJ did not incorporate Dr. Banks’s lifting limitation into the RFC. The
ALJ noted that “Dr. Banks completed his medical assessment for work activity on March
18, 2005, which was only seven days after the claimant’s right carpal tunnel release
surgery.” (Tr. 558). The ALJ relied on the lack of issues shown in Dr. Banks’s later
treatment notes, repeat x-rays of the right wrist and hand which were negative for any
issues, Plaintiff’s report of a “new issue” of right wrist tenderness to Dr. Gaines in 2006,
and the subsequent treatment record which indicates that the claimant’s right grip strength
improved. The ALJ then concluded that Dr. Banks’s “work activity limitation of lifting two
pounds occasionally and no frequent lifting, due to hand osteoarthritis and MCP swelling”
was not supported by the evidence. Id. Therefore, Dr Banks’s lifting restriction was not
incorporated in the RFC.
Dr. Banks’s standing limitation was also given little weight because the ALJ found
it was inconsistent with the evidence of record. Dr. Banks opined in his functional
assessment that “due to osteoarthritis in the knees, the claim ant was limited to one hour
of standing/walking over an 8-hour work day, and ten minutes of continuous standing.” Id.
at 559. Contrary to Dr. Banks’s opinion, the evidence showed “that the claimant was
treated with analgesic medication after her reported September 2003 fall,” “physical
examinations consistently showed normal gait, generally normal range of motion other than
decreased nee flexion, and no evidence of instability.” Id. Furthermore, Plaintiff had
“minimal knee tenderness on examination” and “mild degenerative changes on x-ray” and
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reported that “her knee pain had improved” to Dr. Banks in February 2005. Id. Instead, the
ALJ gave significant weight to Dr. Brahms’s opinion that Plaintiff should have been capable
of performing light work because the opinion was consistent with the medical evidence.
In short, the ALJ specifically stated that Dr. Banks’s opinions were not entitled to
controlling weight. (Tr. 561). Despite being a treating source, the ALJ found that Dr.
Banks’s “physical functional opinion [was] found to be overly conservative and inconsistent
with the overall medical record.”
Thus, several of his opinions regarding particular
restrictions were given less weight and not incorporated into the RFC. However, the ALJ
did not ignore all of Dr. Banks’s opinions, and instead, identified which portions of Dr.
Banks’s opinions he would still consider and incorporated many of those in the RFC.
Because the ALJ explained how he arrived at that determination, citing to several
inconsistencies between Dr. Banks’s opinions and the overall record, and specifically
considered the factors required by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c) - 416.927(c), and Soc. Sec.
Rul. 96-2, he has satisfied the “treating physician” rule and its “good reasons” requirement.
Accordingly, the ALJ engaged in the proper analysis and reached a conclusion that is
supported by substantial evidence, and the Court finds no error in his treatment of Dr.
Banks’s opinion.
b.
Dr. Eggerman
The 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) factors discussed above also guide the ALJ in
determining how much weight to accord a non-treating physician’s opinion. Davenport v.
Astrue, No. 3:06-cv-402, 2008 WL 641131 at *6 (S.D. Ohio March 4, 2008). Accordingly,
the ALJ must consider: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of the
examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship; (3) supportability of
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the opinion; (4) consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and (5) the
specialization of the treating source. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2).
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly weighed Dr. Eggerman’s opinions regarding
Plaintiff’s psychological impairment and “rejected some of Dr. Eggerman’s conclusions as
not wholly consistent with the weight of the evidence.” (Doc. # 11, p. 11-12). The Plaintiff
also alleged that the ALJ erred by failing to fully accept Dr. Eggerman’s opinions because
he was “the only physician who actually examined Plaintiff for a psychological impairment.”
Id. Furthermore, the Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly relied upon a “single
statement in a progress note” where Plaintiff reported walking her dog four to six blocks per
day, as well as her ability to perform some household chores, in rejecting “some of Dr.
Eggerman’s conclusions as not wholly consistent with the weight of the evidence.” Id. at
12-13. In support of her argument, Plaintiff cites to case law from other jurisdictions
establishing that “a claimant’s ability to perform limited and sporadic tasks does not mean
that she is capable of full-time employment” and that “survival is not the same as work
ability.” Id. The Plaintiff also claims that it was “improper for the ALJ to rely on” the single
statement regarding dog walking, which was in a “progress note, found early in the record”
and is “contradicted by numerous other progress notes.” Id. at 13.
However, the ALJ detailed and discussed Dr. Eggerman’s examination of Plaintiff
and the resulting opinions, and accorded significant weight to his opinions regarding the
effect of Plaintiff’s mental limitations on her ability to work:
[T]he record references the claimant’s tearfulness at Dr. Eggerman’s
evaluation, and subsequent tearfulness when discussing stressors at home,
which supports Dr. Eggerman’s opinion for moderate limitation in the
claimant’s ability to tolerate normal work stressors. Dr. Eggerman also
assessed the claimant’s overall concentration as fair at his evaluation. Dr.
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Eggerman was able to evaluate the claimant in-person, and issued a detailed
report supporting his conclusions. His opinion is given significant weight in
concluding that the claimant is subject to moderate limitation in
concentration, persistence, or pace.
(Tr. 562). In fact, the Court is unable to determine which of Dr. Eggerman’s opinions the
ALJ allegedly rejected. Both mental functional limitations found by Dr. Eggerman were
incorporated into the RFC. (Tr. 560). Moreover, because the ALJ explained how much
weight he gave to the opinion of Dr. Eggerman, a non-treating source, and because he
detailed his reasons for doing so in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), the Court
finds no error in this portion of the ALJ’s analysis.
Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s assertion that “the ALJ did not consider these limitations
in [Plaintiff’s] ability to sustain work” is repudiated by the record. The ALJ included in the
RFC that the Plaintiff “was able to remember and carry out detailed but uninvolved
instructions;” “could sustain concentration and attention for 2 hours at a time, and then
required a rest break of five minutes;” that her “job could not require more than superficial
and occasional interaction with the general public, co-workers, and supervisors;” that
Plaintiff could “not work at a rapid production rate pace;” and that her job “could not require
more than ordinary and routine changes in work setting or duties.” Accordingly, the ALJ
sufficiently considered Plaintiff’s mental health limitations, established through Dr.
Eggerman’s opinion, and incorporated them in the RFC.
3.
The ALJ did not err in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility.
Although relevant to the RFC assessment, a claimant’s description of his or her
symptoms is not enough, on its own, to establish the existence of physical or mental
impairments or disability. Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *2 (July 2, 1996).
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When evaluating a claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must determine whether there is an
underlying medically determinable impairment that could be reasonably expected to
produce the alleged symptoms. Id. Once that is established, the ALJ must “evaluate the
intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of the individual’s symptoms to determine the
extent to which the symptoms limit the individuals’ ability to do basic work activities.” Id.
When the Plaintiff’s complaints regarding the intensity and persistence of his or her
symptoms are unsupported by objective medical evidence, the ALJ must make a credibility
determination “based on a consideration of the entire case record,” including lab findings,
information from treating physicians, Plaintiff’s complaints of symptoms and other relevant
evidence. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Soc.
Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186 at *4). After making a credibility determination, the ALJ
must explain that decision with enough specificity “to make clear to the individual and to
any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual’s statements
and the reasons for the weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529; Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-7p, 1996 WL
374186, at *2. “Blanket assertions that the claimant is not believable will not pass muster,
nor will explanation as to the credibility which are not consistent with the entire record and
the weight of the relevant evidence.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 248. Once the ALJ has made
the credibility determination, the reviewing court must give great weight and deference to
that conclusion. Id.
Plaintiff complains that the ALJ “opted to find Plaintiff less than fully credible
regarding her psychological impairments in part because Plaintiff was never involved in
mental health treatment” and points to explanations and excuses in the record for Plaintiff’s
lack of treatment. (Doc. # 11, p. 14). Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ’s decision to
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discredit Plaintiff’s testimony was improper and that the ALJ failed to appropriately consider
Plaintiff’s psychological “limitations in her ability to sustain work.” Id. However, the record
belies these assertions.
At Step 4, the ALJ found that the Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments
could reasonably expected to cause the alleged symptoms.” (Tr. 555). However, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely credible.” Id. The ALJ further explained that
Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her symptoms and limitations was inconsistent with the
medical evidence:
The claimant testified in 2007 that before her date last insured, she hardly
walked at all, did not even sit very much, and spent most of the day lying in
bed watching TV. She testified at the current hearing that in 2005 she did
not want to get out of bed. However, the claimant said in June 2004 that she
was getting outdoors more. She told Dr. Eggerman in January 2005 that she
was able to drive and shop alone, made beds and cleaned up the house with
the exception of running the sweeper, and talked to friends on the phone.
The claimant also testified in 2007 that she did not go to physical therapy for
knees or hands because she could not afford it. She testified that she was
not able to exercise. The record indicates that Dr. Bilbo stated after the
claimant’s carpal tunnel surgery that she would be instructed in a home
program to improve hand and wrist function, the claimant never followed
through with therapy. In a rheumatology evaluation in 2007, it was noted that
the claimant did not exercise and in general was very inactive. The overall
record is not consistent with the level of limitation the claimant alleges
through March 2005, and does not support a condition of disability within the
meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations.
(Tr. 562) (internal citations omitted). As detailed above, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
manages many activities associated with daily living, such as shopping, driving, and
completing other household chores and errands. (Tr. 562). The ALJ further determined
that Plaintiff’s ability to perform these daily activities and lack of treatment did not comport
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with Plaintiff’s allegations of pain and severity. Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
statements regarding the intensity, frequency, and limiting effects of her symptoms were
not entirely credible. Having reviewed the ALJ’s credibility assessment, which carefully
detailed the inconsistencies between Plaintiff’s daily activities, subjective complaints of
pain, and the objective medical evidence, the Court finds no error.
4.
The ALJ’s RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
A RFC is “an administrative assessment of the extent to which an individual’s
medically determinable impairment(s), including any related symptoms, such as pain, may
cause physical or mental limitations or restrictions that may affect his or her capacity to do
work-related physical and mental activities.” Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34474,
34475 (Jul. 2, 1996). Stated another way, the RFC is “what an individual can still do
despite his or her limitations.” Id. “In assessing the total limiting effects of [the claimant’s]
impairment(s) and any related symptoms, [the ALJ] will consider all of the medical and
nonmedical evidence” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e). The ALJ is only required to
incorporate those limitations that she finds credible in the RFC assessment. Irvin v. Social
Sec. Admin., 573 F. App’x 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Casey v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1235 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Plaintiff broadly alleges that the ALJ erred by failing to find her disabled since
substantial evidence supports her disability and that the “ALJ’s RFC for light work is not
supported by the record.” (Doc. # 11, p. 20). Of course, it does not matter if the substantial
evidence does support her disability, so long as it also supports a finding of “not disabled.”
Her, 203 F.3d at 389-90 (holding that “[e]ven if the evidence could also support another
conclusion, the decision of the Administrative Law Judge must stand if the evidence could
15
reasonably support the decision reached”) (citing Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th
Cir. 1997)); see also Listenbee, 846 F.2d at 349. As a result, it does not matter if Plaintiff,
or even this Court, believes substantial evidence supports a different disability
determination. All that is required of the ALJ is that he render a decision that is supported
by substantial evidence. The ALJ has done so here.
At Step Four of the analysis, the ALJ carefully reviewed the record and found that
Plaintiff was capable of doing light work with the limitations specified. (Tr. 549). The ALJ
carefully went through each of Plaintiff’s impairments and described why they were not
disabling. (Tr. 549-564). He incorporated many limitations suggested by Plaintiff’s treating
physician, detailed why other non-treating sources’ limitations were incorporated instead
of Plaintiff’s treating physician’s, considered the objective medical evidence, and properly
discounted Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms to the extent that they lacked credibility.
Because the ALJ incorporated the limitations that he found credible in the RFC and
properly weighed the medical opinion testimony, there is no error. Accordingly, substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s finding that
Plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act was supported by
substantial evidence.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, IT IS ORDERED as follows:
(1)
The decision of the Commissioner is found to be supported by substantial
evidence and is hereby AFFIRMED;
(2)
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 11) is hereby DENIED;
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(3)
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 13) is hereby GRANTED;
(4)
A Judgment in favor of Defendant Commissioner will be entered
and
contemporaneously herewith.
This 7th day of June, 2016.
K:\DATA\SocialSecurity\MOOs\Covington\15-47 Herald MOO.wpd
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