Holliday v. Leigh et al

Filing 56

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: For the reasons above, defendants' motions for summary judgment with regards to Holliday's substantive and procedural dueprocess claims, as well as her IIED claim, are DENIED as defendantsare not entitled to qualified immunity. (Docs. 39 , 40 ). Defendantsmotions for summary judgment are, however, GRANTED with respect toHolliday's claim for punitive damages as Holliday cannot show thatdefendants acted with callous indifference. Signed by Judge William O. Bertelsman on 6/15/2020.(ECO)cc: COR

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION AT COVINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-113 (WOB-CJS)
MAUREEN HOLLIDAY
VS.

PLAINTIFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ALECIA LEIGH, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS

This is the second § 1983 action of its kind filed with this
Court involving allegations that social workers for the Kentucky
Cabinet for Health and Family Services (“CHFS”) coerced a mother
into signing a restrictive Prevention Plan without reasonable
cause to believe that the child was in immediate danger and then
maintained the Plan’s restrictions in the face of compelling
evidence that the child was safe. See Schulkers v. Kammer, 955
F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2020); Schulkers v. Kammer, 367 F. Supp. 3d
626, (E.D. Ky. 2019).
This case is now before the Court on defendants’ motions for
summary judgment seeking the dismissal of Holliday’s claims that
defendants

violated

her

Fourteenth

Amendment

procedural

and

substantive due process rights to family integrity; her claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and her claim for

punitive damages. (See Docs. 39, 40). For the reasons below,
defendants’ motions will be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At the relevant time, plaintiff Maureen Holliday was the
thirty-year-old single mother to her daughter AH, age three. On
October 13, 2016, Holliday dropped AH off at daycare. Holliday
contends that one of the other children at daycare, Lola, bit AH
on her backside while they were playing a game in the daycare’s
gym. (Doc. 42-3, at 50-52, 54). AH neither complained to the staff
about the bite nor told Holliday about the incident when she picked
her up that day. (Id. at 50-52).
That evening, AH attended a family dinner hosted by Holliday’s
grandmother, Phyllis Walz. Several of Holliday’s other family
members attended the dinner, but Holliday was ill, so she stayed
home and allowed AH to spend the night at Walz’s house. (Id.). The
next morning, on Friday October 14, 2016, Walz was bathing AH and
noticed a bruise that resembled a bite mark on her backside. (Id.).
When Walz asked AH how she got the bruise, AH said that Lola had
bitten her at daycare. (Id.) When Walz called Holliday to tell her
about the bite mark, Holliday asked her to report it to the daycare
staff and to ask whether they had completed an incident report.
(Id.).
As instructed, Walz reported AH’s bite mark to a daycare
supervisor that morning when she dropped AH off. AH showed the

2

supervisor the bite mark and told her that Lola had bitten her the
previous day. (Doc. 30-4, at 5). Nevertheless, a daycare worker
reported the bite mark to CHFS, stating that AH had bruises across
the middle of her buttocks and that the bite mark did not look
like it came from a child. (Id.). Because AH was under four, her
case was automatically considered high risk and a social worker
was assigned to investigate. (Doc. 30-2, at 20).
Later that afternoon, the daycare’s director called Holliday
to let her know that a CHFS social worker was at the daycare.
Holliday rushed from work to the daycare, where she met defendant
Alicia Leigh. Leigh had already interviewed AH, and AH had told
Leigh that Lola had bitten her. (Doc. 42-1, at 11). AH was,
however,

fuzzy

on

the

details

and

also

reported

that

she

occasionally got spanked, allegedly telling Leigh that it “left a
blue mark like the [pen] [Leigh] was writing with at the time.”
(Id. at 10-11). Leigh asked more questions but eventually stopped
the interview because AH was having trouble understanding the
questions and was providing mostly nonsensical responses. (See
Doc. 30-4, at 17-18).
When Holliday arrived, Leigh prevented her from seeing AH and
insisted upon interviewing Holliday alone in another room. (Doc.
42-3, at 57, 72). Holliday asked that someone from the daycare be
present, but Leigh refused. (Id. at 57). Once alone in the room,
Holliday told Leigh that she learned of AH’s bite mark from Walz.

3

Leigh then questioned Holliday about how she disciplined AH, and
Holliday explained that she used time outs and occasionally smacked
her hand or spanked her over her clothing with her hand but
emphasized that she never left a mark on AH. (Id. at 172-73).
a.

The Prevention Plan

Leigh next told Holliday that she was under a Prevention Plan
and informed her that she was limited to “supervised contact with
AH until notified by CHFS,” meaning that any contact with AH would
be permitted only when an approved supervisor was present. (Doc.
42-3, at 58, 247). The Plan precluded anyone who had access to AH
within the past forty-eight hours from supervising Holliday’s
contact with AH. Because of the family gathering the night before,
this

requirement

prevented

much

of

Holliday’s

family

from

supervising Holliday or watching AH. (Id.). Finally, the Plan
required Holliday to take AH to Cincinnati Children’s Hospital to
have doctors assess the bruising and check for any other injuries.
(Id.).
Leigh

handwrote

these

conditions

on

a

one-page

document

labeled “Prevention Plan.” (Id.). The document did not indicate
that consent was voluntary, nor did it contain instructions about
what to do if Holliday could not comply with the Plan’s terms.
(Id.). The document did, however, include a stamp at the bottom,
in

all

capital

lettering,

which

read:

“ABSENT

EFFECTIVE

PREVENTATIVE SERVICES, PLACEMENT IN FOSTER CARE IS THE PLANNED

4

ARRANGEMENT

FOR

THIS

CHILD.”

(Id.).

And

under

the

heading,

“Potential Consequences if the Prevention Plan is not successful,”
Leigh wrote: “Court Action/Foster Care.” (Doc. 42-3, at 247). But
as defendants admit, they had no planned foster care arrangement
for AH. (Doc. 30-1; Doc. 30-2, at 51; Doc. 42-1, at 31, 33).
Leigh signed the Prevention Plan and presented it to Holliday
for her signature. Holliday refused. (Doc. 42-3 at 71-72). Holliday
testified that she told Leigh that the Plan was ridiculous because
AH was bitten by another child and that they were the ones that
notified

the

daycare

of

the

bite.

(Id.).

Holliday

says

she

repeatedly told Leigh that she did not want to, and was not going
to, sign the Plan. (Id.). Holliday testified that, in response to
her refusal, Leigh told her that if she did not sign the Plan then
she would take AH into immediate custody. (Id. at 81-82). Barred
from seeing AH and faced with Leigh’s threat to immediately take
her, Holliday signed the Prevention Plan. (Id. at 69-72, 81-82).
b.

Children’s Hospital

The Plan limited Holliday to supervised contact with AH and
prevented her family from helping, which made the task of having
AH evaluated at Children’s Hospital difficult. While still at the
daycare, Holliday phoned her grandmother, Walz, and advised her of
the situation. After learning that Walz and other family members
could not help and having been told by Leigh to “figure it out,”
Holliday called her cousin, Kim Reed. (Id. at 80, 101-02). Reed

5

hurried from work, but by the time she arrived at the daycare it
was past 5:00 p.m., and Leigh had left because she does not work
past five. (Id. at 122-24). Holliday called Leigh to make sure
Reed

was

approved,

but

Leigh

neither

answered

nor

returned

Holliday’s voice messages. (Doc. 42-1, at 28-29; Doc. 42-3, at
80).
Though Reed had not been officially approved as a supervisor,
she accompanied Holliday and AH to Children’s Hospital. There,
multiple doctors, other medical staff, and a social worker examined
AH. (See Doc. 44-1, at 1, 12). Holliday claims that the doctors
and staff were confused as to why she had brought AH to the
Emergency Room for such faint bruising. (Doc. 42-3, at 205-06).
AH’s discharge notes state that:
AH was seen and evaluated [by] the emergency department.
She explained to me that she was “bitten on the butt” by
her friend Lola. My exam was consistent with bite marks
on both butt cheeks. The marks were simply minor bruises
and no puncture marks. There were no other injuries
noted. AH otherwise appears to be a healthy and happy
child.
(Doc. 44-1, at 26). (emphasis added).
That same night, Leigh phoned Children’s Hospital and a
hospital employee told her that:
There are no concerns with the mark and they can’t say
if the marks are bite marks or not because the bruises
are faint and if the child reported that another child
bit her it was likely that this is how the injury
occurred.
(Doc. 42-8, at 19; see also Doc. 44-1, at 12-13) (emphasis added).

6

Notes from a hospital social worker also indicated that there were
no

concerns

and

that

there

was

no

further

social

worker

intervention needed. (Doc. 44-1, at 12-13, 16).
After Leigh confirmed that medical staff at Children’s had no
concerns, Leigh consulted with her supervisor defendant Danielle
Sneed. (Doc. 42-8, at 19). Though AH had told Leigh that Lola had
bitten her during the one-on-one interview, and doctors and another
social worker had expressed no concerns, Leigh and Sneed decided
to

continue

their

investigation

and

keep

Holliday

under

the

restrictions due to their concern that AH had been coached to tell
the hospital staff that Lola had bitten her. (Doc. 42-1, at 26).
Over the course of the weekend, October 14-16, 2016, Reed and
Holliday called Leigh to report the results of AH’s hospital
evaluation. Though Leigh had spoken with the hospital’s social
worker and knew there were no concerns, she declined to respond.
(Doc. 42-8, at 19). With no response from Leigh, Holliday was
forced to move out of her home in Florence, Kentucky, and onto
Reed’s couch in Amelia, Ohio. (Doc. 43, at 10; supported by
Holliday Affidavit [43-1]).
On Monday, October 17, Reed’s husband drove AH to daycare
with Holliday following. (Id.) At around 10:00 that morning, Leigh
responded to Holliday’s voicemails and made clear that she does
not work after 5:00 p.m. or on weekends. (Doc. 42-3, at 123-24;
Doc. 42-8, at 19). She also told Holliday that the Prevention Plan

7

would remain in effect despite the doctors and a social worker
from Children’s Hospital having no concerns.
That afternoon, Leigh continued her investigation. (Doc. 428, at 19-22). First, Leigh interviewed Walz, who told her that she
had no concerns regarding Holliday’s parenting. (Id. at 20). Next,
Leigh went to the daycare, where she interviewed several employees.
(Id. at 20-22). While one of the employees reported “that the mark
[did] not resemble a bite mark,” none of them had any concerns
about AH or Holliday. (Id.). Leigh also learned that Lola was not
an imaginary person. (Id.). She attempted to interview her, but
stopped the interview because Lola was shy and refused to speak.
(Id. at 21). Leigh then drove to Holliday’s home to interview her
again.

(Id.

at

22).

She

also

interviewed

her

neighbor,

who

expressed no concerns regarding AH or Holliday. (Id.).
c. Ongoing Investigation
But Leigh was persistent. On October 18, she spoke with Sneed,
and they again decided to continue the investigation. (Id. at 22).
The next day, Leigh returned to the daycare where she attempted to
interview several three-year-old children. (Id. at 22-23). None of
the students revealed negative information. (Id.). The first child
reported that she liked everything about her teachers, the second
reported that teachers were always present, and the third “was
crying and would not talk.” (Id.). Leigh did, however, interview
another daycare employee, who like everyone else at the daycare,

8

said that she had no concerns. (Id.).
Leigh then obtained a second opinion regarding AH’s bruises
from Dr. Shapiro, a child-abuse specialist at the Mayerson Center
whom CHFS had consulted in the past. (Id. at 23). CHFS provided
Dr. Shapiro with photos of AH, but he neither met nor examined
her. (Id.). Dr. Shapiro reviewed the photos and allegedly told
Leigh during a phone conversation that the photos from Children’s
Hospital “show[] a bite mark on the right bottom cheek and the
left bottom cheek shows multiple marks but cannot say if they are
bite marks or not.” (Id.). Leigh and Sneed continued to discuss
the case, and Leigh noted that she intended to interview those
present at the family dinner. (Id.).
On October 24, 2016, Leigh went to two different schools and
interviewed two of Holliday’s minor relatives who had attended the
family dinner: JW, age 13, and BW, age 9. (Id. at 23-24). Neither
child revealed information that suggested AH had been abused.
(Id.). That same day, social worker Kelsey Tucker interviewed Paula
Tobergate,

Holliday’s

boyfriend.

Neither

aunt,

and

Tobergate

nor

Tyrone
Patel

Patel,
expressed

Holliday’s
concerns

regarding abuse. (Id.). After Leigh consulted with Sneed on October
26, 2016, Sneed advised Leigh to lift Holliday’s supervised contact
restriction. (Id. at 26). From October 14 to October 28, 2016, the
Plan’s restrictions had forced Holliday and AH to live in three
different homes and had prevented them from visiting with most of

9

their family absent supervision. (Doc. 43, at 11).
On

October

28,

2016,

a

different

CHFS

worker

presented

Holliday with a second Prevention Plan. (Doc. 42-3, at 108). There
was once again a stamped notice which stated that foster care was
the planned arrangement for the child. (Id.). This Plan differed
in that it limited only the family members present at the dinner
to supervised contact with AH. (Id.). The new Plan still prevented
Holliday’s family from helping with AH’s care while Holliday worked
two jobs and attended her college social work classes. (Doc. 43,
at 11).
Leigh interviewed more of Holliday’s family, friends, and
other daycare employees from October 26 to November 15, 2016, and
no one expressed concerns that AH had been abused. (Doc. 42-8, at
26-27). Holliday continued to call Leigh, asking that she be
released from the Prevention Plan. (Doc. 42-3, at 138; Doc. 43, at
12). But defendants kept the restrictions in place despite Leigh
conducting

no

additional

interviews

from

November

15

through

December 27, 2016, and Holliday’s repeated requests for relief.
(See Doc. 42-3, at 138; Doc. 42-8, at 27-28).
As Leigh explained to Holliday, CHFS had to complete its
investigation before she could be released from the Prevention
Plan, and it had not yet done so. (Doc. 43, at 12). Between October
26, and December 27, 2016, Leigh placed multiple calls to Dr.
Shapiro’s office at the Mayerson Center, requesting that his

10

opinion be reduced to writing. (Doc. 42-8, at 27-28). Holliday
testified that she was never told that the social workers were
waiting for a written opinion from Dr. Shapiro and testified that
she would have taken AH to the clinic herself had she known. (Doc.
42-3, at 67, 138, 141, 149). On December 27, 2016, a staff member
from the Mayerson Center reported to Leigh via e-mail that:
Dr. Shapiro as well as other doctors in the Mayerson
Center are no longer allowed to consult on cases or
follow up on cases unless the child has been seen by
them in the office. Heidi reported that what the ER
reported to CHFS would be the standing explanation due
to this.
(Id. at 28). (emphasis added). Later that day, Leigh and Sneed
concluded

they

would

close

Holliday’s

case

and

mark

it

as

unsubstantiated. (Id. at 30). The case was officially closed on
January 4, 2017. (Doc. 30-2, at 83). But Holliday was not notified
of the decision. (See id. at 83-85).
Finally, on January 13, 2017, almost three months after
Leigh’s first visit to the daycare, Leigh told Holliday that the
CHFS had closed the case against her because the investigation
revealed no evidence of abuse by a caretaker. (Id. at 83; see also
Doc. 42-8, at 30-31). In the closing documents, Leigh reported
under the heading “Incident Results” that “Child presented with
injuries to both buttocks—round mark which could be bite mark on
one buttock and a linear mark on the other per Dr. Shapiro.” (Doc.
42-8, at 30) (emphasis added). The term “linear mark” is apparently

11

indicative of someone committing an intentional abusive act. (See
id.). That term, however, is found only in Leigh’s final summaries
and is absent from her initial, contemporaneous summary of her
October phone call with Dr. Shapiro. (Compare Doc. 42-8, at 23,
with Doc. 42-8, at 29-30).
II. ANALYSIS
In evaluating Holliday’s claims, the Court views the facts in
a light most favorable to Holliday as the nonmovant. Pittman v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 723
(6th Cir. 2011).
A.

Substantive & Procedural Due Process Claims

Defendant social workers are employed by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky, which is immune from suit in federal court under the
Eleventh Amendment. But Holliday can sue state actors such as these
defendants in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
if they violated her federally protected constitutional rights and
are not entitled to qualified immunity.
“Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from
money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2)
that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the
challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)
(quoting

Harlow

v.

Fitzgerald,

457

U.S.

800,

818

(1982)).

Accordingly, this Court must decide whether the CHFS defendants

12

violated Holliday’s substantive and procedural due process rights
and, if so, whether those rights were clearly established “beyond
debate.”
Before

turning

to

the

merits

of

the

qualified

immunity

defense, it is worth addressing defendant Sneed’s argument that as
a supervisor she cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the theory
of respondeat superior. While true, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 676 (2009), a § 1983 plaintiff need only show that a
supervisory official implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced

in

the

unconstitutional

conduct

of

the

offending

subordinate. See, e.g., Coley v. Lucas Cty., 799 F.3d 530, 542
(6th Cir. 2015.
Sneed

authorized

or

knowingly

acquiesced

to

the

alleged

deprivation of Holliday’s constitutional rights. While it appears
Sneed had no involvement in Leigh’s allegedly coercive behavior
when the Plan was first signed, Leigh and Sneed made a joint
decision

to

put

Holliday

under

a

Prevention

Plan,

and

they

consulted multiple times throughout the investigation. Sneed also
refused to lift the Plan’s restrictions despite evidence that AH
was safe. Instead, Sneed deemed it advisable to keep Holliday under
supervised contact with AH for two weeks and prevent close family
from watching AH for three months. Sneed’s conduct is therefore
sufficient for purposes of liability under § 1983.

13

1.

Substantive Due Process

While procedural due process principles protect persons from
deficient procedures that lead to the deprivation of cognizable
liberty

interests,

substantive

due

process

provides

that,

irrespective of the constitutional sufficiency of the processes
afforded, government may not deprive individuals of fundamental
rights unless the action is necessary and animated by a compelling
purpose.

Mathews

v.

Eldridge,

424

U.S.

319,

333–34

(1976);

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
The touchstone of substantive due process is the protection
against arbitrary governmental action, including “the exercise of
power without any reasonable justification in the service of a
legitimate governmental objective.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986)). “While due process protection in the substantive
sense limits what the government may do in both its legislative,
see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and its
executive capacities, see, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952), criteria to identify what is fatally arbitrary differ
depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of a
governmental officer that is at issue.” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847.
This case challenges executive action (i.e., the imposition
of a restrictive prevention plan), not legislation. The Supreme
Court has said “that the substantive component of the Due Process

14

Clause is violated by executive action only when it ‘can properly
be

characterized

as

arbitrary,

or

conscience

shocking,

in

a

constitutional sense.’” Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847 (quoting Collins v.
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1998)); but see Pittman., 640
F.3d at 728 n.6.1
“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the existence
of a constitutional right to the maintenance of a parent-child
relationship.” Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 689 (6th Cir. 2006).
The right encompasses the right of parents to “make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.

But that right is neither absolute nor

unqualified. Kottmyer, 436 F.3d at 690. Instead, it “is limited by
an equal[ly] compelling governmental interest in the protection of
children, particularly where the children need to be protected
from their own parents.” Id. As a result, “the right to familial
association is not implicated merely by governmental investigation
into allegations of child abuse.” Id. And such investigations will
not infringe on a family’s fundamental rights absent evidence of
bad faith, improper motive, or investigation tactics that shock

1

The Sixth Circuit used a different and less stringent test in
Pittman. And the Circuit acknowledged the use of different methods
of analysis in Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 544 n.5 (6th
Cir. 2020), but it declined to resolve the issue because it
determined that the conduct would have been unconstitutional
under either standard.

15

the conscience. Id. at 691 & n. 1; see also Teets v. Cuyahoga Cty.,
Ohio, 460 F. App’x 498, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2012).
A reasonable jury could find that defendants acted with
deliberate indifference. Holliday contends that she signed the
Prevention Plan under protest because Leigh threatened to take AH
into custody immediately. That threat amounts to duress. While it
is not duress to threaten to exercise a legal right in good faith,
Leigh knew she had neither legal authority to remove AH herself
nor legal grounds to pursue removal. To obtain an emergency custody
order

and

remove

AH

from

Holliday’s

care,

defendants,

under

Kentucky law, would have needed to provide sworn testimony to a
judge which showed both that removal was in AH’s best interest and
that there were reasonable grounds to believe that AH was either
being sexually abused or in imminent danger of death or serious
physical injury if she were left in her mother’s care. See Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 620.060.
Defendants had neither provided sworn testimony to a judge
nor signed an affidavit. There were no plans to pursue an emergency
order. And at the time Leigh allegedly threatened Holliday with
immediate removal, the faint bruising and the daycare report did
not provide reasonable grounds to believe that AH was in imminent
danger of Holliday inflicting a severe physical injury upon AH or
that Holliday was sexually abusing her or failing to protect her
from sexual abuse. While defendants had a daycare worker’s report

16

stating that the bruise did not look like a child’s bitemark, they
also knew that AH had been consistent in claiming that Lola had
bitten her.
But

despite

AH’s

consistent

explanation,

defendants

unilaterally determined that Holliday was unfit to care for her
child. Defendant Leigh allegedly threatened to immediately remove
AH and thus coerced Holliday into signing a Plan that contained no
indication that compliance was voluntary and twice stated that
foster care was the plan for AH should Holliday fail to comply.
Defendants put Holliday in the position where she felt that she
had no reasonable alternative but to sign the Plan and comply with
its restrictions.
A prevention plan that bars the child from being alone with
her mother and close family curtails the mother’s right to make
decisions concerning the child’s care. See Schulkers v. Kammer,
955 F.3d 520, 540-41 (6th Cir. 2020). And forcing a parent to sign
such a plan under duress, with knowledge that she is a single
mother, and telling her to “figure it out” when she expresses
concerns,

displays

deliberate

indifference

to

the

parent’s

fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care and control
of her child and shocks the conscious. Leigh knew that Holliday
was a single mother who lived on her own and that she relied upon
her family for help with AH, yet she coerced Holliday into signing
a Plan that immediately disrupted her life. Since the agreement

17

restricted Holliday’s and her family’s contact with AH, she had to
turn to a distant relative to comply with the Plan’s supervision
requirement. Although these curtailments of parental rights were
less extreme than removing AH from Holliday’s custody and placing
AH in foster care, they were invasive enough to constitute a
deprivation of a fundamental right. See Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d
757, 760 (7th Cir.2006) (alluding to fact that prevention plans
could violate due process rights).
Where social workers are afforded a reasonable opportunity to
deliberate various alternatives before deciding on a course of
action, their actions will be deemed conscience shocking if they
were taken with “deliberate indifference” towards the plaintiff’s
federally protected rights. Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350,
359 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Lewis, 523 U.S. at 852-53); see also
Farley v. Farley, Nos. 98-6114, -6115, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17580,
at *4 (6th Cir. July 19, 2000).
Deliberate indifference requires that the officials knew of
facts from which they could infer a substantial risk of serious
harm, that they did infer it, and that they acted with indifference
toward the individual’s rights. Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573,
590 (6th Cir. 2014). More than negligence is required to satisfy
the deliberate indifference standard. The conduct must be that
“which is ‘intended to injure’ without any justifiable government
interest” or at the very least, in appropriate cases, the actions

18

must

reflect

“recklessness

or

gross

recklessness”

and

offend

traditional notions of fair play and decency. Lewis, 523 U.S. at
846-49.
Here,

there

was

no

compelling

purpose

to

impose

such

restrictions on Holliday. See Croft v. Westmorland Cty. Children
and Youth Servs., 103 F.3d 1123 (1997). Croft involved a child
abuse investigation that started after social workers received an
anonymous report that a father had sexually abused his daughter.
Id.

at

1124-25.

The

investigating

social

worker

secured

the

father’s compliance with a prevention plan by issuing an ultimatum
to immediately have his child removed from the home and placed in
foster care. Id. The plan’s restrictions forced the father from
his home and would not allow him to be alone with his daughter.
Id.
While recognizing that states have an interest in preventing
child abuse, the Third Circuit found the social worker’s threat
problematic because at the time she made it, she did not have a
legal basis for removing the child from the home, i.e., she did
not have objectively reasonable grounds to believe the father was
sexually abusing the child and thereby could not have obtained an
emergency custody order. Id. at 1125-27. She lacked a reasonable
basis because her initial interviews, like the interviews here,
failed to corroborate the details of the report. Id. The Third
Circuit held that the baseless threat was an arbitrary abuse of

19

government

power

interfered

and

with

the

that

the

father’s

prevention
fundamental

plan
right

impermissibly
to

familial

integrity. Id. at 1127.
Leigh

and

Sneed’s

investigation

went

beyond

unfounded

ultimatums. Defendants kept Holliday under the Plan’s restrictions
despite mounting evidence that AH was safe. That evidence began
accumulating

when

Holliday

took

AH

to

Cincinnati

Children’s

Hospital soon after leaving the daycare. AH told the doctors at
Cincinnati Children’s that Lola had bitten her, and the doctors
reported that the marks were consistent with that explanation. An
examining

social

worker

said

that

no

additional

social

work

intervention was needed. Leigh learned of these conclusions when
she called the hospital that night. Leigh nevertheless declined to
return Holliday’s phone calls. At that point, the restrictions
forced Holliday and AH to move out of their home.
In the face of this information, defendants decided to keep
Holliday under the restrictions and continued their investigation.
In the process, Leigh continued to conduct interviews and continued
to collect nothing but exonerating evidence. Holliday testified
that she protested the Plan’s restrictions from the start, but
Leigh was nonresponsive to her concerns and simply plugged along
with the investigation. After twelve days of ER visits, interviews,
and consults between Leigh and Sneed, defendants decided to lessen
the restrictions on Holliday. While that eased some of the burden,

20

defendants then enacted another Plan that still prevented Holliday
from leaving AH alone with much of her close family and thereby
continued to impinge upon her right to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of her daughter.
Leigh continued to conduct interviews for three more weeks,
with none revealing evidence of abuse. The case then sat cold for
a month with Holliday in the dark and the restrictions still in
place. While Leigh and Sneed insist that they were waiting to
obtain a consult from Dr. Shapiro at the Mayerson Clinic, Holliday
claims that she was never told that this was the reason the
investigation could not be closed and testified that she would
have taken AH to the clinic herself had she known.
In late December, Mayerson said it was not going to issue a
written report because Dr. Shapiro had not evaluated AH in person.
Leigh then submitted her final report on December 28, with a
statement that Dr. Shapiro had described one of the bruises as a
linear mark, a statement that is absent from her contemporaneous
summary of a call with Dr. Shapiro several weeks earlier. Sneed
approved the final report on January 4, yet Holliday continued to
live under the Plan’s restrictions until January 13, the date Leigh
finally notified her that the case had been closed.
While the supervision restrictions did not deprive Holliday
of the physical companionship of her child, they nevertheless
constituted

an

interference

with

21

the

natural

“parent-child

relation.” Kottmyer, 436 F.3d at 689. By arbitrarily mandating
when Holliday could be with her child and who else would have to
be present, the Plan abridged Holliday’s due process right to
family integrity under Troxel and contravened “the traditional
presumption” articulated by the Supreme Court in Troxel “that a
fit parent will act in the best interest of his or her child.”
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69; see also Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d
520, 541–42 (6th Cir. 2020). Consequently, a reasonable jury could
find that defendants acted with deliberate indifference towards
Holliday’s right to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of her daughter as it is not a stretch to say that
their

investigation

tactics

were

arbitrary

and

reckless

and

therefore violated traditional notions of fair play and decency.
This

right

was

also

clearly

established.

“A

clearly

established right is one that is sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would have understood that what [she] is doing
violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015)
(per curiam). While a case “directly on point” is not required,
existing precedent must have placed the constitutional question
beyond debate. Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. ,1148 1152 (2018) (per
curiam); Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308; al-Kidd, 563 U. S. at 741.
The contours of the right at issue are “beyond debate” if there
exists “either controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases
of persuasive authority” that clearly define the contours of the

22

right. See Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2023 (2014)
(citations

and internal quotations

omitted). However,

general

statements of the law can give fair and clear warning where a
constitutional

rule

already

identified

in

the

decisional

law

applies with obvious clarity to the conduct in question. United
States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997).
Defendants’ conduct strikes at the heart of Holliday’s right
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of her
child. While mere investigations into allegations of child abuse
do not implicate that right, implementing restrictive prevention
plans and using baseless threats to secure and ensure compliance
do, and it has been so for several years.
Numerous Supreme Court cases have found that a parent has a
fundamental

right

to

“the

companionship,

care,

custody

and

management of his or her children,” Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27, and
that “so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children
(i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to
inject itself into the private realm of the family to further
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” Troxel, 530
U.S. at 68–69. Thus, defendants are not entitled to qualified
immunity on Holliday’s substantive due process claim.

23

2.
Three

Procedural Due Process

factors

guide

the

inquiry

into

whether

Holliday’s

recognized liberty interest in making decisions concerning the
care

custody

and

control

of

her

children

received

adequate

procedural due process protection: first, courts consider the
private interest affected by the official action; second, courts
consider the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, courts consider
the government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal

and

substitute

administrative
procedural

burdens

requirements

that
would

the

additional

entail.

Matthews

or
v.

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1876).
The Sixth Circuit has long recognized that an analysis of the
above factors leads to the conclusion that “notice and opportunity
to

be

heard

are

necessary

before

parental

rights

can

be

terminated.” Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625, 632 (6th Cir. 1978).
Although the curtailments of parental rights at issue here are
less extreme than removing the child from parental custody, “they
may be invasive enough to count as a deprivation of liberty, thus
triggering the right to a hearing” or other procedural safeguards.
Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 760.
Appellate courts have found prevention plans procedurally
problematic based on facts similar to those of this case. See

24

Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 542-49 (6th Cir. 2020). While
it is not improper to threaten legal actions one has the right to
take,

securing

unfounded

and

compliance

with

unenforceable

a

prevention

threats

can

plan

by

amount

making
to

an

unconstitutional circumvention of procedural protections. Leigh
had no authority to leave with A.H. immediately and possessed no
grounds for even pursuing that as an option. This situation is
comparable to the one in Croft where the social worker made a
threat to pursue immediate removal when she had only shaky evidence
that the child was being sexually abused and thus had no reasonable
belief that she could make good on her ultimatum to remove the
child by pursuing an emergency custody order.
The involuntary imposition and maintenance of prevention
plans

can

also

result

in

an

unconstitutional

deprivation

of

procedural process. In Smith v. Williams-Ash, 520 F.3d 596 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“Smith II”), the Sixth Circuit concluded that a social
worker was entitled to qualified immunity when the prevention plan
at issue stated that adherence to the plan, which prevented the
children from staying in their parents’ dangerously dirty house,
was voluntary. The Sixth Circuit had reached a different conclusion
and had denied qualified immunity when the case was first before
it. In Smith v. Williams-Ash, 173 F. App’x 363 (6th Cir. 2005)
(“Smith I”), the district court denied qualified immunity and the
Sixth Circuit affirmed because based on the record and allegations

25

in the complaint, it appeared that the plaintiffs had expressed
opposition to the plan and had never consented to the restrictions.
Id. at 366-67. The change in decision from Smith I to Smith II
suggests that consent and evidence that consent was voluntary are
key factors in determining whether a parent’s due process rights
were violated.
Impingements on a parent’s right to make decisions concerning
the care and control of her child imposed over objection and
maintained with no clear procedural redress are unconstitutional
deprivations of procedural due process. See Smith II, 520 F.3d at
600 (citing Dupuy, 465 F.3d at 761-62). On a fully developed record
in Smith II, the Sixth Circuit found that the defendant social
worker had persuaded the plaintiffs to voluntarily consent to the
safety plan. The plan in question told the parents, in writing,
that their “decision to sign this safety plan [was] voluntary . .
. .” Id. In contrast, the Plan Holliday signed contained no
indication that it was a voluntary agreement, she protested before
she signed it, and she contends that she only signed it because
Leigh threatened to immediately take AH. Unlike Smith II, there is
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Holliday’s consent
was voluntary. See Schulkers v. Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 542-43 (6th
Cir. 2020).
Further, the Smith II court also found that the plaintiffs
voluntarily remained in compliance with the safety plan because

26

they admitted they never attempted to use the plan’s “clear, simple
mechanism for rescinding . . .” Id. at 761. The Smith II plan
indeed told the plaintiffs, in writing, that they must contact the
case worker immediately if they decided that they could not or
would not be able to abide by the plan’s terms. The Plan Holliday
signed contained no such notice and failed to provide Holliday
with a procedural road map for how to obtain relief from its
restrictions.
Holliday had no notice of her rights. She had no notice that
her consent should be voluntary, and defendants gave her no means
to contest their actions. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could
conclude that defendants violated Holliday’s constitutional right
to procedural due process when they allegedly coerced her into
agreeing to the restrictions and then maintained the restrictions
despite her protests.
While the state certainly has an interest in preventing child
abuse, that interest does not permit social workers to circumvent
the procedural protections afforded by state law, e.g., reasonable
cause requirements and mandated hearings. Leigh, under Sneed’s
guidance, put Holliday under a Prevention Plan that impinged her
right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control
of

her

daughter

and

maintained

those

restrictions

for

an

unnecessarily long time period. Unlike the plan in Smith II, the
Plan here contained no indications that consent and compliance

27

were voluntary, and because of a large stamp at the bottom, the
Plan implied that foster care was the immediate alternative to
compliance. Further, the defendants left the restrictions in place
despite Holliday’s requests and cooperation.
A reasonable jury could thus find that defendants’ conduct
violated

a

indicates,

clearly
the

right

established
to

make

procedural

decisions

right.

concerning

As
the

Troxel
care,

custody, and control of a child encompasses the right to make
decisions concerning who the child spends time with. Troxel, 530
U.S. at 66-70. The above-mentioned cases (Croft, Smith I, and Smith
II) establish that a social worker cannot impose such significant
restrictions under duress and then maintain them in light of
protest without offering procedural safeguards. In Smith II, the
Sixth Circuit echoed a principle articulated in Dupuy v. Samuels
and stated that “when a parent voluntarily consents to a safety
plan, ‘no hearing of any kind is necessary; hearings are required
for deprivations taken over objection, not for steps authorized by
consent.’” Smith II, 520 F.3d at 600. That principle and the cases
discussed above have been around for several years. And in two of
the cases (Smith I and Farley), the Sixth Circuit found that the
procedural rights at issue were clearly established rights in 2000
and 2005 respectively and denied qualified immunity. Accordingly,
Holliday has provided sufficient evidence to show that defendants
violated her clearly established right to procedural due process.

28

B.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Kentucky law recognizes the tort of outrageous conduct, also
known as intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).
Craft v. Rice, 671 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Ky. 1984). The Kentucky Supreme
Court has adopted Section 46(1) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which provides that “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous
conduct

intentionally

or

recklessly

causes

severe

emotional

distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress. . . .” Craft, 671 S.W.2d at 251. In recognizing the tort
of IIED, the Kentucky Supreme Court adopted a cause of action “for
severe emotional distress, caused by truly outrageous behavior,
where there was no remedy because the victim did not have an injury
directly to his person or intangible personal attributes such as
reputation.” Childers v. Geile, 367 S.W.3d 576, 581 (Ky. 2012).
Generally speaking, IIED is a “gap-filler tort.” Childers,
367 S.W.3d at 581. That is, “[w]here the alleged conduct makes out
a claim for another tort for which emotional distress damages are
available, IIED is not a valid cause of action. . . .” Farmer v.
Dollar Gen. Corp., No. 4:11–CV–00027–JHM, 2012 WL 4364108, at *7
(W.D. Ky. Sept. 24, 2012); Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 481
(Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming a directed verdict for defendant on
intentional infliction claim where plaintiff could potentially
recover

emotional

damages

arising

from

false

imprisonment,

assault, or battery). In rare occasions, an IIED claim can stand

29

alone—but only if the alleged conduct was “intended only to cause
extreme emotional distress in the victim.” Brewer v. Hillard, 15
S.W.3d

1, 8 (Ky.

Ct.

App.

2000).

Accordingly,

a

plaintiff

generally cannot maintain an IIED claim if another tort also
contemplates the emotional damages she seeks. Walden v. Pryor, No.
5:18-CV-171-TBR, 2019 WL 2441838, at *8 (W.D. Ky. June 11, 2019).
Borrowing the logic of the “gap-filler” argument, defendants
insist that Holliday’s IIED claim should be dismissed because she
can recover emotional distress damages if her § 1983 claims
succeed.

But

defendants’

argument

distorts

the

reasoning

underlying the gap-filler rationale and overextends it. Kentucky
courts, and federal courts interpreting Kentucky law, tend to
dismiss IIED claims when a plaintiff pleads another tort such as
assault,

battery,

or

malicious

prosecution

that

provides

essentially the same recovery, i.e., instances where IIED is a
tag-along state-law claim. This practice of dismissing tag-along
claims helps cabin IIED claims to instances where the plaintiff
has suffered emotional distress due to conduct that does not also
cause a physical injury or an injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.
That is, IIED fills the gap.
But some courts have also dismissed IIED claims when they are
brought alongside Title VII and § 1983 claims. See Walden, 2019 WL
2441838, at *8; Farmer, 2012 WL 4364108, at *7. The reasoning
underlying those decisions should not, however, be extended to

30

this case. The primary issue with extending the gap-filler argument
to cover a case like this one is that Holliday’s due process claims
could fail due to a grant of qualified immunity or for other legal
reasons irrelevant to her IIED claim. Hypothetically, actions
taken in bad faith could cause severe emotional distress even
though they fail to offend a clearly established constitutional
right or be undertaken by someone who a court decides is not a
state actor. In other words, a plaintiff’s § 1983 claims could
fail, and the plaintiff still recover for IIED. Here, Holliday’s
IIED claim is not inextricably bound up in her succeeding on her
constitutional due process claims. The latter could fail for
reasons that do not apply to the former.
To prevail on her IIED claim, Holliday must establish that:
(1) the wrongdoer’s conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the
conduct

was

outrageous

and

intolerable

such

that

it

offends

generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (3) there is
a

causal

connection

between

the

wrongdoer’s

conduct

and

the

emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress caused was
severe. Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165, 173 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006)
(citing Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, 920 S.W.2d 61, 65 (Ky. 1996)).
Here, the above analysis shows that the conduct in question
could reasonably be considered reckless, and Holliday has provided
medical records from her counselor showing that the defendants’
actions caused severe emotional distress. (Doc. 44-2). Thus, the

31

only legal issue at this juncture is whether the conduct alleged
was outrageous and intolerable. Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins.
Co., 40 F.3d 796, 806 (6th Cir. 1994) (“It is for the court to
determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery.”) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46
cmt. n.(h) (1965)); Stringer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d
781, 788-89 (Ky. 2004).
Making material misrepresentations in order to coerce someone
into making life-altering decisions can constitute outrageous and
intolerable conduct. In Kroger Co. v. Willgruber, the plaintiff’s
employer “engaged in a calculated attempt to coerce him to sign
release papers exonerating [it] for its wrongful discharge of
[plaintiff].” 920 S.W.2d at 66. The coercion was the product of
the employer “misrepresent[ing] to [plaintiff] that he would be
eligible for another position, knowing full well that no such
position was available.” Id. The court found that a reasonable
jury could conclude that the defendants had orchestrated a plan of
attempted deceit and interference with contractual rights in a
carefully

designed

attempt

to

make

plaintiff

relinquish

his

rights. Id. at 67.
Here,

like

in

Willgruber,

defendant

Leigh

allegedly

misrepresented her legal authority by stating that she would take
AH into custody immediately. She is alleged to have made that

32

threat in order to coerce Holliday into signing the Prevention
Plan, all while knowing full well that a social worker cannot
immediately take a child in AH’s position into state custody. In
light of AH’s consistent story that Lola had bitten her at daycare,
she also harbored no objectively reasonable belief that AH was in
imminent danger of severe physical injury or was being sexually
abused, meaning that she could not have obtained an emergency
custody order even if she had sought one. Because Holliday’s access
to her child was restricted, she was forced to become transient,
and her and AH’s sense of home and stability disintegrated as a
result of being placed under the Plan. Holliday alleges she
informed defendants of these hardships and that they ignored her
concerns because defendants maintained the restrictions despite
evidence that AH was safe. Defendants’ conduct is on par with the
coercion deemed outrageous in Willgruber. Id. at 67. Therefore, a
jury could conclude that defendants’ investigation was taken with
deliberate indifference towards Holliday and AH’s needs and was
thus

outrageous and intolerable.

Accordingly, Holliday’s IIED

claim will not be dismissed.
Defendants

are

also

not

entitled

to

state-law

qualified

immunity. “Qualified official immunity applies to the negligent
performance by a public officer or employee of (1) discretionary
acts or functions, i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion
and judgment, or personal deliberation, decision, and judgment[;]

33

(2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the employee’s
authority.” Knott Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Patton, 415 S.W.3d 51, 57
(Ky. 2013) (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 415 S.W.3d 510, 522 (Ky.
2001)). In contrast, an officer does not enjoy immunity from tort
liability “for the negligent performance of a ministerial act,
i.e., one that requires only obedience to the orders of others, or
when the officer’s duty is absolute, certain, and imperative,
involving merely execution of a specific act arising from fixed
and designated facts.” Id. (citation omitted).
The parties do not dispute that defendants were acting in the
scope of their authority. Thus, the critical inquiry at this point
involves the “function performed,” not the “status or title of the
officer.” Yanero, 415 S.W.3d at 521. This requires “a more probing
analysis than may be apparent at first glance” because “few acts
are ever purely discretionary or purely ministerial.” Haney v.
Monskey, 311 S.W.3d 235, 240 (Ky. 2010). As such, courts look to
“the dominant nature of the act.” Id.
Defendants’

actions

were

discretionary.

Child

abuse

investigations entail “certain mandated statutory requirements as
to

who

shall

be

interviewed,

etc.,

but

they

also

involve

discretionary decisions by the case workers, just as in police
investigations.” Stratton v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 516, 521
(Ky. 2006). Thus, while there are procedures in place, the decision
to implement a safety plan, choosing the restrictions to put in

34

said plan, and the decision to continue an investigation are
predominately discretionary functions.
Once the defendants have shown prima facie evidence “that the
act

was

performed

within

the

scope

of

his/her

discretionary

authority, the burden shifts to the plaintiff.” Yanero, 65 S.W.3d
at 523. By direct or circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff must
then establish that the discretionary act was performed in bad
faith, rather than good faith. Rowan Cty. v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d
469, 481 (Ky. 2006). As the Yanero court explained, “if the officer
or employee willfully or maliciously intended to harm the plaintiff
or acted with a corrupt motive,” he acted in bad faith. Yanero, 65
S.W.3d at 523; Autry v. Western Kentucky Univ., 219 S.W.3d 713,
717 (Ky. 2007).
But a showing of bad faith can also be founded on a violation
of a clearly established constitutional right, i.e., situations
where the official acted with objective unreasonableness. Yanero,
65 S.W.3d at 523; Sloas, 2001 S.W.3d at 481. The same “objective
reasonableness test” utilized in federal § 1983 actions, applies
under Kentucky’s qualified official immunity doctrine. See Yanero,
65

S.W.3d

at

523.

Given

that

the

above

analysis

finds

that

defendant’s actions violated a clearly established constitutional
right, defendants are not entitled to state-law qualified immunity
for the same reasons.

35

C.

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are available in actions under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 when the defendant’s conduct “is shown to be motivated by
evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith
v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983). Conduct that rises to the level
of

deliberate

indifference

necessary

to

establish

liability

under § 1983 does not necessarily rise to the level of “callous
indifference” that warrants punitive damages.

2

See id.; Gibson

v. Moskowitz, 523 F.3d 657, 664 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Coleman v.
Rahija, 114 F.3d 778, 787 (8th Cir. 1997)). Thus, even where there
is sufficient factual support to raise a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to liability under § 1983, it does not follow
that such factual support exists for an instruction on punitive
damages.
Since § 1983 “presupposes that damages that compensate for
actual

harm

ordinarily

suffice

to

deter

constitutional

violations,” it follows that punitive damages should be permitted

2

Kentucky uses an even more stringent test for punitive damages.
Under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 411.184, punitive damages are limited to
situations involving oppression (requires intent to subject to
cruel and unjust hardship), fraud (requires intent to cause
injury), or malice (requires subjective awareness that conduct
will result in death or bodily harm).

36

only in particularly egregious situations. As a threshold, a
defendant’s misconduct must be determined “sufficiently serious”
in order to trigger the availability of punitive damages. See
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986);
Coleman, 114 F.3d at 787. In the present case, the evidence does
not suggest that defendants’ conduct was so egregious that it
cannot be remedied by compensatory damages.
Though defendants interfered with Holliday’s right to make
decisions

concerning

the

care,

custody,

and

control

of

her

daughter, and did so with deliberate indifference, it is difficult
to argue that their actions and decisions were taken with callous
indifference. Defendants did not completely bar Holliday from
seeing her daughter, and they eased the most onerous restrictions
two weeks after the investigation started.
Courts
defendant

have

has

denied

acted

in

claims

for

a

egregious

more

punitive

damages

manner.

In

where

a

Webb

v.

Jessamine Cty. Fiscal Court, No. 5:09-CV-314-JMH, 2011 WL 3847454,
(E.D.

Ky.

Aug.

26,

2011),

the

district

court

dismissed

a

plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages where the plaintiff went
into labor in the jail and complained of pain and other symptoms,
including

the

“breaking

of

her

water.”

Id.

at

*1.

The

jail

supervisor waited eight hours to call for medical services. Id.
While the court concluded that the defendant may have acted with
deliberate indifference, it found no evidence that the defendant

37

was

motivated

by

evil

intent

or

callous

indifference.

Id.

Considering this elevated and difficult-to-meet standard, Holliday
cannot show that she is entitled to punitive damages. Consequently,
her claim for punitive damages is dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

above,

defendants’

motions

for

summary

judgment with regards to Holliday’s substantive and procedural due
process claims, as well as her IIED claim, are DENIED as defendants
are not entitled to qualified immunity. (Docs. 39, 40). Defendants
motions for summary judgment are, however, GRANTED with respect to
Holliday’s claim for punitive damages as Holliday cannot show that
defendants acted with callous indifference.
So ordered this 15th of June 2020.

38