Waldroop v. SSA
Filing
13
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER; 1)Plaintiff's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment is overruled and Defendant's 12 Motion for Summary Judgment is sustained. Judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered. Signed by Judge Henry R. Wilhoit, Jr on 11/7/2018. (LST)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION
at COVINGTON
NOV 0 l 2018
Civil Action No. 17-222-HRW
JULIA WALDROOP,
v.
PLAINTIFF,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
NANCY A. BERRYHILL,
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
DEFENDANT.
Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) to challenge a final
decision of the Defendant denying Plaintiff's application for disability insurance benefits. The
Court having reviewed the record in this case and the dispositive motions filed by the parties,
finds that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is supported by substantial evidence and
should be affirmed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed her current application for disability insurance benefits on June 17, 2014,
alleging disability beginning on June c13, 2013, due to cardiomyopathy. This application was
denied initially and on reconsideration. Thereafter, upon request by Plaintiff, an administrative
hearing was conducted by Administrative Law Judge Anne Shaughnessy (hereinafter "ALJ"),
wherein Plaintiff, accompanied by counsel, testified. At the hearing, William T. Cody, a
vocational expert (hereinafter "VE"), also testified.
At the hearing, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920, the ALJ performed the following fivestep sequential analysis in order to determine whether the Plaintiff was disabled:
Step 1: If the claimant is performing substantial gainful work, he is not disabled.
Step 2: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work, his impairment(s) must
be severe before he can be found to be disabled based upon the requirements in 20 C.F .R.
§ 416.920(b).
Step 3: If the claimant is not performing substantial gainful work and has a severe
impairment (or impairments) that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period
of at least twelve months, and his impairments (or impairments) meets or medically
equals a listed impairment contained in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation No. 4, the
claimant is disabled without further inquiry.
Step 4: If the claimant's impairment (or impairments) does not prevent him from doing
his past relevant work, he is not disabled.
Step 5: Even if the claimant's impairment or impairments prevent him from performing
his past relevant work, if other work exists in significant numbers in the national
economy that accommodates his residual functional capacity and vocational factors, he is
not disabled.
The ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff was 48 years
old at the time of the hearing. She has a high school education. Her past relevant work
experience consists of work as a machine operator.
At Step 1 of the sequential analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of disability.
The ALJ then determined, at Step 2, that Plaintiff suffers from hypertrophic
cardiomyopathy, which he found to be "severe" within the meaning of the Regulations.
At Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiffs impairments did not meet or medically equal any
of the listed impairments
The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could not return to her past relevant work but
determined that she has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform sedentary work that
is unskilled with the following limitations: she can occasionally climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds;
frequent fingering with the left hand; avoid concentrated exposure to temperature extremes,
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vibrations and hazards .
The ALJ finally concluded that these jobs exist in significant numbers in the national and
regional economies, as identified by the VE.
Accordingly, the ALJ found Plaintiff not to be disabled at Step 5 of the sequential
evaluation process.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review and adopted the ALJ' s decision
as the final decision of the Commissioner . Plaintiff thereafter filed this civil action seeking a
reversal of the Commissioner's decision. Both parties have filed Motions for Summary
Judgment [Docket Nos. 10 and 12] and this matter is ripe for decision.
II. ANALYSIS
A.
Standard of Review
The essential issue on appeal to this Court is whether the ALJ' s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence" is defined as "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;" it is based on the record as a
whole and must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. Garner
v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (61h Cir. 1984). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the reviewing Court must affirm. Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human
Services, 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). "The court may
not try the case de novo nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility."
Bradley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 862 F.2d 1224, 1228 (6th Cir. 1988).
Finally, this Court must defer to the Commissioner's decision "even if there is substantial
evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion, so long as substantial
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evidence supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ." Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th
Cir.1997).
B.
Plaintiff's Contentions on Appeal
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ' s finding of no disability is erroneous because: ( 1) the
ALJ improperly weighed the opinion evidence in the record and (2) the ALJ improperly assessed
Plaintiffs credibility.
C.
Analysis of Contentions on Appeal
Plaintiffs first claim of error is that the ALJ improperly weighed the opinion evidence in
the record. Specifically, she argues that the ALJ should have given the opinion of her treating
physician, John Gurley, M.D., controlling weight.
"In order to determine whether the ALJ acted properly in disagreeing with a medical
source, we must first determine the medical source's classification," Ealy v. Comm'r ofSoc. Sec.,
594 F.3d 504, 514 (6th Cir.2010), as "not all medical sources need be treated equally," Smith v.
Comm'r ofSoc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 875 (6th Cir.2007). The Social Security regulations classify
"acceptable medical sources into three types: nonexamining sources, nontreating (but examining)
sources, and treating sources." Id at 875. Generally, more weight is given to the medical
"opinion of a source who has examined [the claimant] than to the opinion of a source who has
not examined [the claimant]." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(l); see also Norris v. Comm'r ofSoc.
Sec., 461 Fed.Appx. 433, 439 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that a nonexamining source's opinion is
given less deference than an examining (but not treating) source's opinion, which is given less
deference than a treating source). But "[i]n appropriate circumstances, opinions from State
agency medical and psychological consultants ... may be entitled to greater weight than the
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opinions of treating or examining sources." SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, at *3. One such
instance is where the "[s]tate agency medical or psychological consultant's opinion is based on a
review of a complete case record that includes a medical report from a specialist in the
individual's particular impairment which provides more detailed and comprehensive information
than what was available to the individual's treating source." Id. "The more a medical source
presents relevant evidence to support an opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory
findings, the more weight [the ALJ] will give that opinion." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(3).
Generally, more weight is given to opinions that are "more consistent ... with the record as a
whole," id. § 404.1527(c)(4), and opinions of "a specialist about medical issues related to his or
her area of specialty." Id.§ 404.1527(c)(5).
A treating physician's opinion will not be given controlling weight unless it is "well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 20 C.F.R.
§404.1527(d)(2). If an ALJ does not find a treating source's opinion to be entirely credible, the
ALJ may reject it, provided that good reasons are specified. Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342,
347-49 (6th Cir. 1993).
Dr. Gurley completed a cardiac residual functional questionnaire in January 2017. He
opined that Plaintiffs chest pain, shortness of breath, leg swelling, dizziness, tachycardia, and
morbid obesity that would basically preclude work (Tr. 892-98). Specifically, he stated that she
was incapable of even low stress jobs; her cardiac symptoms would frequently interfere with her
attention and concentration; she could walk zero city blocks at a time, sit for 30 minutes at a
time, and stand for five to 10 minutes at a time; she needed the ability to alternate between sitting
and standing at will and needed to elevate her legs above her heart 100% of the time; she could
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never lift any weight, crouch, or climb ladders; she could rarely twist, stoop, and climb stairs; she
should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and noise; she should avoid moderate
exposure to extreme heat, wetness, and humidity; she should avoid all exposure to pulmonary
irritants and hazards; and she would miss more than four days of work per month (Tr. 892-98).
In considering Dr. Gurley's opinion of dire limitation, the ALJ considered his treatment
notes, which showed regular treatment for her heart-related problems, including an ablation
procedure and an ICD implant. The ALJ noted that, following the ICD implant, in April 2015,
Plaintiff reported that she was slightly improved and was walking 20 minutes per day, three to
four times per week despite shortness of breath (dyspnea) on exertion (Tr. 794). At that time, Dr.
Gurley' s examination showed no increased work to breath or signs of respiratory distress with
a normal heart rate and rhythm but some leg swelling (edema). The ALJ noted that
Plaintiff reported fatigue in November 2015 (Tr. 868), but by July 2016 reported that she was
doing well with no changes since her last visit (aside from ongoing palpitations and chest
pain) (Tr. 863). The ALJ noted that, in January 2017, when Dr. Gurley's completed his opinion
questionnaire, Plaintiff reported chest pains related to exertional activities but his examination
was largely normal (Tr. 886-87).
The ALJ concluded that his opinion was not consistent with his treatment notes. For
example, while Dr. Gurley opined that Plaintiff would need to elevate her legs for 100% of the
workday, his treatment notes made no mention of such a directive or requirement. The ALJ also
found his opinion to beat odds with the other opinions in the record.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was extremely limited, but not disabled, by her heart
condition. Indeed, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to a range of sedentary work, the least strenuous
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work possible (Tr. 45).
The ALJ weighed the entire record, including the treatment notes and the three physical
medical source opinions of record, and reasonably found that Plaintiff was limited by her heart
problems but retained the ability to perform sedentary work. She gave good reasons for doing
so. As such, the Court finds no error in this regard.
Plaintiffs second claim of error is that the ALJ improperly assessed Plaintiffs credibility.
It is well established that as the "ALJ has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of a
witness, (her) conclusions with respect to credibility should not be discarded lightly and should
be accorded deference." Hardaway v. Secretary ofHealth and Human Services, 823 F.2d 922,
928 (6th Cir. 1987).
At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she was unable to work due to chest pain (Tr. 75).
She stated that she experienced chest pain every day, many times a day brought on by activity but
sometimes with rest (Tr. 76). The pain usually lasted from fifteen minutes up to an hour at a time
and at times radiated into her neck and left shoulder (Tr. 76, 79). Plaintiff experienced shortness
of breath with exertion and fatigue (Tr. 76). She estimated she could stand about fifteen minutes
and lift no more than a gallon of milk, but did not have difficulty sitting except for fatigue (Tr.
76-77). She testified that spent most of her day laying down, either in bed or on the couch (Tr.
79). She had swelling in her lower leg and ankles (Tr. 80). Plaintiff also elevated her legs above
her heart about twice a day for about thirty minutes to help with the swelling. Id. Plaintiff
testified that she did not cook or do dishes, laundry or grocery shopping due to standing and
lifting (Tr. 77-78). Plaintiff stated she did not believe she could perform a sedentary type job due
fatigue (Tr. 78).
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The ALJ found that although Plaintiff's impairment could reasonably be expected to
cause some symptoms, she concluded that Plaintiffs subjective complaints of disabling
symptoms were beyond reasonable, in light of the medical evidence which showed improvement
following the ablation and subsequent treatment.
Subjective claims of disabling symptoms must be supported by objective medical
evidence. Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 801 F.2d 847, 852-853 (61h Cir.
1986). The ALJ determined that the Plaintiffs subjective complaints did not pass Duncan
muster. Given the lack of objective evidence to support Plaintiffs allegations of disabling
symptoms, the Court finds no error in the ALJ's credibility determination; rather, the ALJ's
assessment of Plaintiffs credibility is supported by substantial evidence on the record.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The Court finds that the ALJ' s decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record. Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment be OVERRULED and the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be
SUSTAINED. A judgment in favor of the Defendant will be entered contemporaneously
herewith.
This
-;jJ°d:;, of
!Ji/~
,
2018.
Signed By:
Henry R. Wllltolt Jr.
United Stat11 District Judge
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