Watson v. Western & Southern Financial Group Flexible Benefits Plan
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: Consistent with this Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that: (1) Defendants motion for judgment on the administrative record 24 , is DENIED; (2) Plaintiffs motion for judgment on the administrative record 23 , is GRANTED; (3) Watson is entitled to an award of short term disability benefits in an amount equal to two-thirds of her weekly rate of earnings for a period of 26 weeks (6 months), plus interest accrued from November 15, 2017; and (4) The parties shall file a joint status report no later than 10 days from entry of this order, setting forth a calculation of the amount to be awarded in exact figures.. Signed by Judge William O. Bertelsman on 08/16/2019.(KRB)cc: COR
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
NORTHERN DIVISION AT COVINGTON
CIVIL ACTION No. 2:18-cv-66 (WOB-CJS)
DEVONA WATSON
VS.
PLAINTIFF
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WESTERN & SOUTHERN FINANCIAL
GROUP FLEXIBLE BENEFITS PLAN
DEFENDANT
Plaintiff brought this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., after Defendant denied Plaintiff’s application
for short-term disability benefits, despite the fact that treating physicians and
medical records corroborate that Plaintiff is unable to perform the duties of her
occupation because she suffers from Grade IV osteoarthritis in her knees, a condition
that is compounded by her morbid obesity. Plaintiff seeks the benefits she was denied,
plus pre-judgment interest and attorney fees.
This matter is now before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for judgment
on the administrative record. (Docs. 23, 24).1 The Court dispenses with oral argument
1
Also before the Court is Defendant’s related motion (Doc. 29) to strike Plaintiff’s
supplemental authority; namely, this Court’s recent decision in Laake v. Benefits
Committee, Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Co. Flexible Benefits Plan, No. 1:17-cv611, 2019 WL 823575 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2019). Cf. (Doc. 28). The Court will deny
this motion at the outset.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
1
because the materials in the record adequately present the facts and legal
contentions. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Defendant’s
decision to deny Plaintiff short-term disability benefits was arbitrary and capricious.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.
General Background
Plaintiff Devona Watson worked as a Senior Case Analyst at Western &
Southern Life Insurance Co. (Doc. 22, AR at 270).2 Since at least 2013, Watson has
suffered from severe osteoarthritis in both knees, which is exacerbated by the fact
that she is morbidly obese. Id. at 248, 267–68. In August 2017, Watson applied for
short-term disability (“STD”) benefits. At the time, she had been an employee of the
company for over 28 years. Id. at 244, 270. As an employee, Watson was covered by
the Western & Southern Financial Group Flexible Benefits Plan (the “Plan” or
“Western & Southern”). (AR at 70, 72, 86).3
1. The Plan Terms
Under the Plan, STD benefits “are equal to two-thirds” of the employee’s
weekly earnings. (AR at 150). An individual who has been covered for at least four
2
The administrative record in this case is a conventional filing. (Doc. 22). To avoid
confusion, the administrative record is cited herein as (AR at ___), and the pages
referred to are the BATES numbers.
3
The Plan is an “employee benefit plan” as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3). (AR at 70).
It “is a self-insured plan, except that the life insurance benefits and disability
benefits . . . shall be provided by a group life insurance policy.” Id.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
2
years and “becomes Temporarily Disabled” can receive up to 26 weeks of STD
benefits. See (AR at 149–50). “Temporarily Disabled” or a “Short-term Disability” is
defined in the Plan as “a disablement resulting from Sickness or Injury of such a
nature that as a result” the employee “is unable to perform the normal duties of
[their] regular occupation for any employer.” Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
Although that definition includes more than what Watson’s employer deems
the “normal duties” of a Senior Case Analyst, Watson’s job description does state that
she “works in an office setting and remains continuously in a stationary position for
long periods of time while working at a desk, on a computer or with other standard
office equipment, or while in meetings.” Id. at 279.4 In addition, “[e]xtended hours
[are] required during peak workloads or special projects.” Id.
2. Watson’s Treatment History & STD Benefits Application
a. Dr. Kunath
On August 2, 2017, Watson weighed 411 pounds when she presented to her
rheumatologist, Dr. Arthur Kunath. (AR at 271–72; see id. at 266–67). Dr. Kunath
observed that Watson “just looks miserable.” Id. at 272. In his assessment, Watson
suffers from morbid obesity and Grade IV osteoarthritis of the knees, “with limited
4
The job description further explains that a Senior Case Analyst at Western &
Southern is a member of the “Insurance Operations” and is, inter alia, “[r]esponsible
for making informed decisions and manually calculating fund values for interestsensitive products”; “[c]onducts training with [the] Specialist and Processor to
ensure accuracy”; and [c]ollaborates with multiple areas” within the company. (AR
at 278).
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
3
capacity now to walk.” Id. at 272. Based on his review of Watson’s x-rays, Dr. Kunath
noted that “she does in fact have significant Grade IV [osteoarthritis] of the medical
compartments of her knees.” Id. Dr. Kunath’s instructions were for Watson to visit
Dr. Teresa Koesler at Western & Southern to “see if there is any way we can get
bariatric surgery approved.” Id. “If that is not possible,” Dr. Kunath concluded, “then
I’m going to have to put her on disability.” Id. (emphasis added).
In considering other alternatives, Dr. Kunath noted that a “regular
wheelchair” was not an option “because of significant problems starting now in her
right shoulder,” so the “only other option” at the time was “maybe a motorized
wheelchair.” But even this seemed “problematic” due to Watson’s weight. Id.
In summarizing the history of Watson’s condition, Dr. Kunath noted:
[Watson] states that the problems continue to slowly worsen. She is
having greater and greater difficulty getting to her desk at work and
getting back out to the car at night. Someone picks her up and drops her
off but she states it is getting more and more painful. Once she gets to
her desk she is able to do her work but if she has to do any more
walking during the day it is very difficult.
Now the problem is her weight is 411 pounds today. I told her the only
answer to her problems would be a gastric sleeve surgery or bariatric
surgery . . . and then get her weight down and then get her knees
replaced but [Watson] states that Western [&] Southern will not pay for
any type of bariatric surgery . . . The patient does look miserable. Other
than that, I think we’re going to just have to put her on
Disability.
(AR at 273) (emphasis added).
Watson later received a letter from Western & Southern, dated August 15,
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
4
2017, requesting medical documentation to substantiate an unspecified number of
absences from work. Id. at 264. To be considered for STD benefits, the letter advised
Watson that by September 14, 2017, she was required to submit the application form
attached to the letter and the following documentation: (1) a medical diagnosis; (2) a
medical treatment plan; (3) her anticipated return-to-work date; and (4) copies of
office records pertaining to the relevant period of disability. Id.
On August 16, 2017, the Benefits Department received a note from Dr. Kunath,
stating: “Patient no longer able to work. Will be on short term disability for
[the] next 60 days for her severe osteoarthritis of [her] knees.” Id. at 265
(emphasis added). Watson then submitted her short-term disability benefits
application. Id. at 270.
On August 25, 2017, Dr. Kunath sent a healthcare provider certification via
facsimile to Western & Southern. Id. at 267. Watson’s “essential job functions” and
“job description” were attached. Id. Dr. Kunath noted Watson’s diagnosis as “severe
O.A. [osteoarthritis] of [the] knees complicated by obesity which prevents patient
ambulating any distance.” (AR at 268). In response to the question whether the
associate is “unable to perform any of his/her job functions due to the condition,” Dr.
Kunath marked the box for “Yes” and wrote: “Unable to attend meeting/ get to
her desk/ or sit for extended periods of time.” Id. In the section at the bottom of
the form for “additional information,” Dr. Kunath restated the diagnosis and
reiterated that Watson is:
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
5
Unable to ambulate to desk, unable to walk to meetings or get around
in office. She needs both knees replaced but no surgery will do until loses
[sic] significant weight. We are taking her off work for [a] minimum [of]
6 months to see if knees will decrease in symptoms with limited
ambulation.
Id. As a result of her medical condition, Dr. Kunath noted that Watson would be
“incapacitated” and estimated that this would be the case for a period of six months
(August 7, 2017, to February 7, 2018). Id. During this time, Dr. Kunath stated:
Watson was to work “0 hour(s) per day; 0 days per week.” Id.
Dr. Kunath’s prognosis of Watson was anything but promising. He noted that
the probable duration of Watson’s condition was “indefinite” and her anticipated
return to work was “unknown at this time [sic] possibly 2/7/18.” Id. at 267.
b. Dr. Hummel
The Benefits Department requested that Watson be evaluated by an
orthopedic surgeon. See (AR at 235). Watson did just that on September 13, 2017,
when she visited Dr. Matthew T. Hummel’s office. He noted that Watson “comes in
today for evaluation from Dr. Kunath” and “for an opinion on her ability to do
activities.” Id. at 248. At the appointment, Watson weighed 420 pounds. Id. Dr.
Hummel related in his notes that:
[Watson is] in a wheelchair today, morbidly obese with a significant
history of long-term lower extremity pain, particularly with both knees.
She has undergone a series of treatments with Dr. Kunath, everything
ranging from anti-inflammatories, pain medications and injections with
minimal help. The pain itself has been going on for three to four years.
She has also seen her primary care physician, Dr. Allnutt. The pain she
describes in both knees . . . [is] an 8 or a 9/10 pain with activity. It even
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
6
hurts at a 4/10 at rest. It is a constant aching, grinding and stiffness and
she has trouble ambulating.
(AR at 248). Dr. Hummel’s physical examination of Watson was “difficult” and he
related that it “is really difficult for the patient to ambulate due to her size” and “[s]he
cannot really get up on the exam table.” Id. Dr. Hummel further evaluated Watson’s
functional capacity and reported that:
Range of motion of both knees is near full extension and flexion to about
90 but it is more of a mechanical block due to her thigh. She has crepitus
that is audible. She has pain with range of motion. The rest of the exam
is very difficult to do just due to size.
Id. at 249. Dr. Hummel reviewed Watson’s x-rays and concluded that they “show[ed]
severe tricompartmental osteoarthritis, bilateral knees, genu varum with bone-onbone articulation, eburnation and spurring in all three compartments without
evidence of bony lesion or fracture.” Id. Dr. Hummel’s diagnosis: “Severe bilateral
knee osteoarthritis.” Id.
Although Dr. Hummel concluded that Watson “is not a surgical candidate”
because “she is just too much of a high risk patient,” Dr. Hummel reported that
Watson needed to “find a way to get healthy enough to undergo knee replacements
simply due to the fact that that arthritis is probably significantly limiting.” Id. at 249.
3. Initial Denial of STD Benefits
Jen Segrist, a registered nurse with the Benefits Department of Western &
Southern, sent a denial letter to Watson on September 26, 2017. The letter stated
that the department “has reviewed the medical information submitted on 09/25/2017”
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
7
(the previous day). (AR at 247). The letter recited verbatim the Plan language that
defines a qualifying disability and then summarily stated:
The medical documentation submitted fails to support your claim for
short-term disability benefits under the Plan. Your request for
additional [STD] has been denied. No additional information is
necessary for you to perfect your claim.
Id. (emphasis added). The letter goes on to advise Watson on how to pursue an appeal:
[Y]ou may file an appeal by following the instructions on the enclosed
review procedure for rejected Benefits Claims. In your appeal, you
should submit all information in support of your claim, as the decision
of the appeals committee will be final.
Id. at 247.
4. Watson’s STD Benefits Appeal
On October 9, 2017, Watson filed her STD benefits appeal with the Benefits
Appeals Committee (the “Committee”). (AR at 237–42, 261–62). In support of her
appeal, Watson wrote a letter and attached: a copy of her history of prescription
medication refills, (AR at 261–62); Western & Southern’s record of her absences that
were covered by various forms of leave, id. at 239; and an article on osteoarthritis and
disability benefits from a website entitled, Can You Get SSDI Disability or SSI for
Osteoarthritis? DisabilitySecrets. Id. at 240–42. In the letter, Watson stated: “I can’t
get to the office to do my job duties.” Id. at 237. Watson described the impact her
condition has on her job as follows:
Before the pain became so bad and I was trying to get to work[,] I
couldn’t go to lunch, couldn’t walk to the mailroom to get rid of my work,
couldn’t stand at the printer to get my prints and I had a very difficult
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
8
time getting to the restroom.
Id.
On November 7, 2017, the Committee reviewed Watson’s appeal. Id. at 236.
The Committee did not solicit the opinion of another physician. Instead, the
Committee itself reviewed Watson’s appeal. Id. at 235–36. In less than one page, the
Committee provided a bullet-point summary of Watson’s circumstances. Of
significance, the Committee noted:
“[Watson]’s first day off of work was 8/14/2017.”
“Her diagnosis is severe osteoarthritis of both knees complicated by
morbid obesity.”
“[Watson] has been off of work more than 8 times in 6 months.”
“[Watson]’s rheumatologist, Arthur Kunath, MD, sent in a note
stating member is “no longer able to work. Will be on short term
disability for next 60 days for her severe osteoarthritis.”
“Dr. Kunath . . . [noted] the duration of her condition is indefinite
and her anticipated return to work is unknown at this time, possibly
2/7/18.”
“FMLA note states member is unable to attend meetings, get to her
desk or sit for long periods of time.”
“The length of disability based on MD Guidelines” for an individual
with a sedentary job is: (a) 2 days if the condition is obesity; and (b)
0–7 days if the condition is osteoarthritis.
Id. at 235. The Committee also referenced an excerpt of a statement taken from Dr.
Kunath’s notes regarding Watson’s August 2, 2017 visit, and stated that “Dr. Kunath
state [sic] the member is ‘able to do her work but if she has to do any more walking
during the day it is difficult.’” Id. at 235. Western & Southern relies heavily on this
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
9
statement on to support its position in this litigation.
The Committee stated its decision at the end of the appeal summary in one
handwritten sentence: “Denied – medical records failed to document sickness or
injury that would result in employee’s inability to perform the normal duties of her
regular occupation.” Id. at 236.
The Committee then notified Watson of its decision in a letter, dated November
15, 2017, and signed by the Vice President of Compensation and Benefits. Id. at 234.
The letter recites the Plan’s definition of disability and summarily concludes: “Since
medical records failed to document a sickness or injury that would result in your
[in]ability to perform the normal duties of your regular occupation, we are unable to
honor your request for additional short-term disability benefits.” Id. The letter
contains no further explanation.
Watson filed the instant lawsuit on April 24, 2018. (Doc. 1).
ANALYSIS
I.
The “Arbitrary-and-Capricious” Standard Applies
Before turning to the merits, there is some contention as to the appropriate
standard of review. A challenge to an ERISA plan’s denial of benefits is “reviewed
under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary
discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms
of the plan.” Kalish v. Liberty Mut./Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., 419 F.3d 501,
505–06 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101,
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
10
115 (1989)). If, and “only if the benefit plan contains ‘a clear grant of discretion [to
the administrator],’” Shelby Cty. Health Care Corp. v. Southern Council of Indus.
Workers Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 203 F.3d 926, 933 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 555 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc)), then
the decision to deny benefits is reviewed under “the highly deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard of review.” Evans v. UnumProvident Corp., 434 F.3d 866, 875
(6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the present case, the Plan clearly grants the administrator (the Committee)
discretionary authority. Watson agrees. (Doc. 23 at 10, 17). Indeed, the Plan explicitly
states that “[t]he Benefits Committee shall have the discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits and to construe the terms of the Plan,” and that
benefits under the Plan “shall be paid only if the Benefits Committee, as Plan
Administrator, decides in its discretion that the applicant is entitled to them.” (AR at
171). Thus, the Court reviews the Committee’s final decision to deny Watson Benefits
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
A separate analysis of the Benefits Department’s initial decision to deny
Watson’s STD benefits application is not required. Contrary to Watson’s position, “the
ultimate issue in an ERISA denial of benefits case is not whether discrete acts [or
intermediate decisions] by the plan administrator are arbitrary and capricious but
whether its ultimate decision denying benefits was arbitrary and capricious.”
McClain v. Eaton Corp. Disability Plan, 740 F.3d 1059, 1066 (6th Cir. 2014)
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
11
(emphasis added) (quoting Spangler v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 313 F.3d
356, 362 (6th Cir. 2002)).5
Therefore, because the Committee made the “ultimate decision” to deny
Watson STD benefits and the Plan grants the Committee “discretionary authority to
determine eligibility for benefits and to construe the terms of the Plan,” the decisive
question is whether the Committee’s final decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review is “the least demanding form
of judicial review of administrative action.” Farhner v. United Transp. Union
Discipline Income Prot. Program, 645 F.3d 338, 342 (6th Cir. 2011). Courts “will
uphold a plan administrator’s decision ‘if it is the result of a deliberate, principled
reasoning process and if it is supported by substantial evidence.’” Balmert v. Reliance
Standard Life Ins. Co., 601 F.3d 497, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Baker v. United
Mine Workers of Am. Health & Ret. Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991)). Thus,
“[a] decision is not arbitrary or capricious if it is rational in light of the plan’s
provisions,” or if “it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence,
for a particular outcome.” Shields v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., 331 F.3d 536, 541
(6th Cir. 2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
5
Even if the Benefits Department’s initial decision to deny Watson benefits was
reviewed separately, the arbitrary-and-capricious standard would apply because
the Plan also grants the Benefits Department discretionary authority to determine
eligibility for benefits. See (AR at 149 (“[I]f a Covered Employee becomes
Temporarily Disabled, as determined by the Benefits Department in its sole
discretion, [Watson’s employer] will pay Temporary Disability Benefits . . .”)).
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
12
“The court reviews only the evidence available to the administrator at the time
it made the final decision.” Corey v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., 858 F.3d 1024,
1027 (6th Cir. 2017); Moon v. UNUM Provident Corp., 405 F.3d 373, 378 (6th Cir.
2005) (a federal court’s “review is confined to the administrative record as it existed
on [the date], when [the administrator] issued its final decision”). That review is
conducted “in light of the administrative record as a whole.” Moon, 405 F.3d at 381.
II.
Western & Southern’s Decision Was Arbitrary and Capricious
In determining whether a plan administrator’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious, the Sixth Circuit has delineated several guideposts, including: “[1] the
quality and quantity of the medical evidence; [2] the existence of any conflicts of
interest; [3] whether the administrator considered any disability finding by the Social
Security Administration; and [4] whether the administrator contracted with
physicians to conduct a file review as opposed to a physical examination of the
claimant.” Shaw v. AT&T Umbrella Benefit Plan No. 1, 795 F.3d 538, 547 (6th Cir.
2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fura v. Fed. Express Corp. Long
Term Disability Plan, 534 F. App’x 340, 342 (6th Cir. 2013)).
In Shaw, the Sixth Circuit held that the plan administrator’s decision was
arbitrary and capricious because the administrator: (1) “ignored favorable evidence”
from treating physicians; (2) “selectively reviewed the evidence it did consider from
the treating physicians”; (3) “failed to conduct its own physical evaluation”; and (4)
relied on a physician consultant who had been routinely retained by defendant and
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
13
his conclusions had “been questioned in numerous federal cases.” 795 F.3d at 547,
548–551.
In this case, Western & Southern’ apparent conflict of interest does not call
into question its decision.6 But, in almost every respect, the same hallmarks of
arbitrary and capricious decision-making identified in Shaw are present. In
particular, Western & Southern failed to consider Watson’s relevant job duties; failed
to offer any reason(s) for rejecting the opinion of Watson’s treating physician; ignored
favorable (and conclusive) evidence from Watson’s treating physician (Dr. Kunath);
6
When a plan administrator “is both the payor of any . . . benefits and . . . vested
with discretion to determine . . . eligibility for those benefits,” this creates an
“inherent conflict of interest.” Schwalm v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 626 F.3d
299, 311 (6th Cir. 2010). But the existence of a conflict does not change the standard
of review. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 115 (2008); Curry v.
Eaton Corp., 400 F. App’x 51, 58 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he arbitrary-and-capricious
standard still applies . . .”). Rather, the apparent conflict is simply “one factor among
several in determining whether the plan administrator abused its discretion in
denying benefits.” Cox v. Std. Ins. Co., 585 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Glenn, 554 U.S. at 115); Lewis v. Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund, 484 F. App’x 7, 11 n.5 (6th Cir. 2012). However, for a conflict of interest to
affect whether a decision is arbitrary, “Sixth Circuit caselaw requires a plaintiff not
only to show the purported existence of a conflict of interest, but also to provide
‘significant evidence’ that the conflict actually affected or motivated the
decision at issue.” Cooper v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 486 F.3d 157, 165 (6th Cir.
2007) (emphasis added) (quoting Peruzzi v. Summa Med. Plan, 137 F.3d 431, 433
(6th Cir.1998)); Hunt v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 587 F. App’x 860, 862 (6th Cir. 2014).
Here, as explained, the Plan contains language sufficient to grant discretion to
Western & Southern. Further, Western & Southern both grants eligibility for
benefits and pays benefits. (AR at 149). But Watson has provided no evidence that
Western & Southern’s conflict of interest actually motivated its denial of benefits.
Thus, the mere existence of this conflict does not make Western & Southern’s
decision arbitrary and capricious. See Cooper, 486 F.3d at 165.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
14
selectively reviewed the evidence it did consider; failed to conduct an independent
physical examination; and conducted its own file review without the aid of a
consulting physician.
1.
Failing to Discuss the Physical Requirements of Watson’s Job
and Explain the Reasons for Concluding that Watson Can
Perform Her Job Duties.
The controlling question under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of
review, is whether a plan offered “a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for
its judgment that a claimant was not ‘disabled’ within the plan’s terms.” Elliott v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 473 F.3d 613, 617 (6th Cir. 2006). Therefore, based on the
language of the Plan, the relevant question is whether Western & Southern “made a
deliberate, principled, and reasoned decision” that is “supported by substantial
evidence,” id. at 617–18, in concluding that Watson’s condition would not preclude
her from “perform[ing] the normal duties of [her] regular occupation for any
employer.” (AR at 84, 234) (emphasis added).
When an administrator fails to discuss (i) the claimant’s job duties and (ii) the
reasons for concluding that the claimant is not precluded from working, this strongly
suggests that the decision is arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Elliott, 473 F.3d at
619 (finding in favor of claimant because consulting physician “presented no reasons
for his conclusion that [the claimant]’s condition would not preclude her from
working” and “never discussed [the claimant]’s job duties, which implies that he did
not conduct a reasoned evaluation of her condition to determine whether she could
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
15
perform those duties.”); Hunter v. Life Ins. Co., 437 F. App’x. 372, 376–77 (6th Cir.
2011) (concluding denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious where
administrator failed to “assess [the claimant]’s ability to perform [the employerprovided job requirements], or any other specific physical requirements of her prior
occupation.”).
Here, Western & Southern issued conclusory denial letters. There is no
mention of Watson’s job duties or a discussion of the reasons for concluding that she
can fulfill the demands of her position. (AR at 234, 247). In fact, there is no analysis
whatsoever. The letters simply recite Plan’s definition of short-term disability and
then parrot that language back in the form of a conclusion. Id. at 234; see id. at 247.
Thus, the fact that the final denial letter “offers a conclusory assertion that [the]
evidence is insufficient to support disability benefits,” counsels in favor of finding that
Western & Southern’s decision is arbitrary and capricious. Godmar v. HewlettPackard Co., 631 F. App’x 397, 403 (6th Cir. 2015).
Western & Southern, however, argues that Watson could perform her
“sedentary” job and that “there is no evidence that any assistance [Watson] needed
could not have been accommodated.” (Doc. 24 at 9–10, 13; Doc. 26 at 6–8). There are
two problems with this argument.
First, the “term ‘sedentary work’ appears nowhere in the plan’s terms.” See
Elliott, 473 F.3d at 620.7 Under the Plan, Watson is considered disabled if she is
7
“When interpreting ERISA plan provisions, general principles of contract law
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
16
“unable to perform the normal duties of [her] regular occupation for any employer.”
(AR at 84). Moreover, the final denial letter does not contain the term “sedentary”;
nor is the term “sedentary” found in Watson’s job description. Naturally, an
individual with a sedentary job does not arrive at work and then sit at their desk
until they return home. A “sedentary job,” as classified by the Department of Labor,
is one that involves “sitting” and “walking and standing are required occasionally.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a). Watson’s job description entailed occasional walking to, inter
alia, attend meetings, (AR at 278–79), and as discussed below, Dr. Kunath
specifically concluded that Watson was “unable to perform any of [her] job functions,”
including “walk[ing] to meetings.” (AR at 268). Western & Southern was required to
explain why it believed otherwise and it failed to do so. Shaw, 795 F.3d at 548–49.
Second, Western & Southern’s argument is contrary to the Plan’s language.
The Plan does not define a disability as one which prevents a claimant from
performing their job duties with an accommodation, and more importantly, the final
denial letter does not explain that the denial was based on Western & Southern’s
willingness to accommodate Watson’s condition by altering the duties of her position.
Rather, Western & Southern’s “denial letters simply quote[d] the plan language and
then conclude[d] [Watson]’s evidence fails to suffice.” Corey v. Sedgwick Claims
dictate that [courts] interpret the provisions according to their plain meaning in
an ordinary and popular sense.” Farhner, 645 F.3d at 343 (quoting Williams v. Int’l
Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
17
Mgmt. Servs., 858 F.3d 1024, 1028 (6th Cir. 2017). This was arbitrary and capricious
because it is well-established that an administrator “can’t issue a conclusory denial
and then rely on an attorney to craft a post-hoc explanation.” Id. (citing Univ. Hosps.
of Cleveland v. Emerson Elec. Co., 202 F.3d 839, 848 n.7 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Further, as detailed below, Western & Southern’s failure to discuss the
physical demands of Watson’s position is amplified by the fact that it failed to give
reasons for rejecting Dr. Kunath’s conclusion that Watson could not perform a specific
list of activities that fit within her regular job duties.
2.
Failing to Explain the Reason for Rejecting the Conclusions of
a Treating Physician
As a general rule, “plan administrators are not obliged to accord special
deference to the opinions of treating physicians,” and there is no “discrete burden of
explanation when [administrators] credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a
treating physician’s evaluation.” Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S.
822, 825, 834 (2003). Nevertheless, an administrator “may not reject summarily the
opinions of a treating physician, but must instead give reasons for adopting an
alternative opinion.” See, e.g., Shaw, 795 F.3d at 548–49 (quoting Elliott, 473 F.3d at
620); Nord, 538 U.S. at 834. Moreover, “those reasons must be consistent with the
terms of the plan and supported by the record.” Hayden v. Martin Marietta Materials,
Inc. Flexible Benefits Program, 763 F.3d 598, 608–09 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding for the
claimant in part because the plan failed to “‘give reasons’ for rejecting a treating
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
18
physician’s conclusions” (citation omitted)).
Dr. Kunath was aware of Watson’s “job description” and “essential job
functions” and he specifically opined that: (1) the osteoarthritis in her knees, further
complicated by obesity, “prevents patient ambulating any distance”; (2) she is
“unable to perform any of [her] job functions due to the condition” and in
particular, “[u]nable to . . . sit for extended periods of time . . . Unable to ambulate to
desk, [and] unable to walk to meetings or get around in office”; and (3) due to
her condition, she would be “incapacitated” and could work “0 hour(s) per day; 0 days
per week” for a period of at least six months, “possibly” ending February 7, 2018. (AR
at 267–68); see also Zuke v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 644 F. App’x 649, 654 (6th Cir. 2016)
(“[A] treating physician’s notes detailing the functional capabilities of a patient are
objective evidence.”). These physical limitations fall well within the demands of
Watson’s job. Yet Western & Southern’s denial letters are bereft of any explanation
as to why Dr. Kunath’s conclusions were rejected.8
In fact, when the Committee reviewed Watson’s appeal, it acknowledged that
Dr. Kunath had concluded that Watson’s “condition is indefinite and her return to
8
Dr. Hummel’s report substantiates Watson’s osteoarthritis and obesity diagnosis
and documents her difficulty ambulating. Although Western & Southern did not
state why Dr. Hummel’s report was irrelevant, his report does not address Watson’s
ability to perform her job functions and does not contain evidence that is any more
favorable to Watson than what is in Dr. Kunath’s report. See (AR at 248–49). At
any rate, Dr. Hummel’s report certainly does not contradict Dr. Kunath’s
conclusions; nor does it state that Watson could perform her job duties.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
19
work is unknown at this time,” and that Watson was “unable to attend meetings, get
to her desk or sit for long periods of time.” (AR at 235). But Western & Southern did
not give any reason for rejecting these conclusions. This is a textbook indicator that
Western & Southern acted arbitrarily and capriciously. See, e.g., Shaw, 795 F.3d at
548–49; Evans, 434 F.3d at 877 (“[A] plan administrator may not arbitrarily disregard
reliable medical evidence proffered by a claimant including the opinions of a treating
physician.”); Elliott, 473 F.3d at 620; Kalish, 419 F.3d at 510 (collecting cases); see
also Godmar, 631 F. App’x at 404; Calhoun v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 665 F. App’x
485, 493 (6th Cir. 2016) (reviewing physician never “explained why he believed that
the medical evidence did not support [the claimant]’s claim,” and instead, “baldly
asserted that ‘the observed activities of daily living are inconsistent with the
claimant’s self-reported limitations’”).
3.
Selectively Reviewing Treating
Ignoring Favorable Evidence
Physician
Evidence
and
“An administrator acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it ‘engages in a
selective review of the administrative record to justify a decision to terminate
coverage.’” Shaw, 795 F.3d at 548 (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Conger, 474 F.3d
258, 265 (6th Cir. 2007)). Such a finding is even more pronounced where, as in this
case, the administrator ignores favorable evidence from treating physicians that
contradicts the administrator’s decision. Butler v. United Healthcare of Tenn., Inc.,
764 F.3d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that the plan acted arbitrarily and
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
20
capriciously in part because it “ignored key pieces of evidence” and made “factually
incorrect assertions”); Conger, 474 F.3d at 265 (stating that a plan administrator
ignoring, “without explanation[,] a wealth of evidence that directly contradicted its
basis for denying coverage . . . [was] not deliberate or principled”).
Here, Western & Southern insists that Watson is not disabled because Dr.
Kunath stated in his notes for Watson’s exam on August 2, 2017, that “[o]nce she gets
to her desk she is able to do her work . . .” See (Doc. 24 at 4–5, 9, 11, 13; Doc. 26 at 5,
8, 10). But the Committee never offered this explanation, and therefore Western &
Southern cannot now “rely on an attorney to craft a post-hoc explanation.” Corey, 858
F.3d at 1028 (citing Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 202 F.3d at 848 n.7.9 Further, the
argument is fatally flawed for a several reasons.
First, the lone statement has been redacted; Dr. Kunath actually stated: “Once
she gets to her desk she is able to do her work but if she has to do any more walking
during the day it is very difficult.” (AR at 273). Second, Western & Southern ignores
the broader picture painted by Dr. Kunath’s notes and his ultimate conclusions on
August 2; namely, that: (1) Watson suffers from Grade IV osteoarthritis in both knees
9
Although it is true that in reviewing Watson’s appeal, the Committee noted that Dr.
Kunath had stated Watson is “able to do her work but if she has to do any more
walking during the day it is difficult,” (AR at 235), there is no analysis as to why
this statement was credited over Dr. Kunath’s more recent conclusions on August
25, 2017; specifically, that Watson was “unable to perform any of [her] job
functions,” including walking to meetings, and would be “incapacitated” for at least
six months. (AR at 267–68).
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
21
“with limited capacity now to walk” and; (2) “The patient does look miserable
. . . I think we’re going to just have to put her on Disability.” (AR at 272–73).
Third, as noted above, Western & Southern’s argument is belied by the plain
language of the Plan. The fact that “[o]nce she gets to her desk she is able to do her
work . . .” does not answer the question of whether Watson can, in fact, perform all of
“the normal duties of [her] regular occupation” as a Senior Case Analyst, including
walking to meetings during the day. (AR at 84, 278–79); see Kalish, 419 F.3d at 506–
07 (“[T]he fact that a claimant is able to engage in sedentary work is an appropriate
consideration in some cases” but in light of plan language “the fact that [the claimant]
might be capable of sedentary work cannot be a rational basis for finding that he was
not disabled” where there is some degree of walking and standing involved); Hunter,
437 F. App’x at 376–77 (same).
More importantly, Western & Southern’s post-hoc explanation for the denial of
benefits is simply not “consistent with the ‘quantity and quality of the medical
evidence’ that is available on the record.” Moon, 405 F.3d at 381 (quoting McDonald
v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 161, 172 (6th Cir. 2003)). The isolated statement
Western & Southern points to has been selectively lifted from Dr. Kunath’s notes of
August 2, 2017, and ignores Dr. Kunath’s more recent conclusions on August 25,
2017. On August 25, Dr. Kunath plainly stated several conclusions that directly
address the issue in a benefits determination under the Plan, supra Part B.2.,
including that Watson was “unable to perform any of [her] job functions” and
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
22
would be “incapacitated” for at least six months. (AR at 267–68). Western & Southern
reached a directly contrary conclusion, without any explanation, and “issue[d] a
conclusory denial.” Corey, 858 F.3d at 1028 (citing Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 202
F.3d at 848 n.7).
In short, Western & Southern “focused on [a] sliver[] of information that could
be read to support a denial of coverage and ignored—without explanation—a wealth
of evidence that directly contradicted its basis for denying coverage. Such a decisionmaking process is not deliberate or principled, and the explanation provided was far
from reasoned, as it failed to address any of the contrary evidence.” Conger, 474 F.3d
at 265 (collecting cases); Zuke, 644 F. App’x at 654 (holding that the plan
administrator’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because it “stated that no
objective evidence existed” and “defendants ignored key objective evidence and
engaged in a selective review of the record”); Calvert v. Firstar Fin., Inc., 409 F.3d
286, 297 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that record contained “conclusions which [the
reviewing physician] never addresses head-on and simply seemed to ignore”). It
follows then that Western & Southern’s decision-making was arbitrary and
capricious.
4.
Failing to Conduct a Physical Examination
Although “there is nothing inherently improper with relying on a file review .
. . the failure to conduct a physical examination, where the Plan document gave the
plan administrator the right to do so, raise[s] questions about the thoroughness and
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
23
accuracy of the benefits determination.” Shaw, 795 F.3d at 551 (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted; second alteration in original).
In this case, the Plan reserved the right to conduct a physical exam. (AR at
151, § 10.4(d)). The Sixth Circuit, however, has only “found fault with file-only
reviews in situations where the file reviewer concludes that the claimant is not
credible without having actually examined him or her” or where “the plan
administrator, without any reasoning, credits the file reviewer’s opinion over that of
a treating physician.” Judge v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 651, 663 (6th Cir. 2013)
(citations omitted).10 This case falls in the latter category, as concluded above,
because Western & Southern did not offer any reason for rejecting the conclusions of
Dr. Kunath, the physician who had conducted physical examinations of Watson.
Thus, Western & Southern’s failure to conduct a physical examination to rebut Dr.
Kunath’s findings is yet another reason to conclude that the benefits determination
was arbitrary and capricious. See, e.g., Calvert, 409 F.3d at 295; Kalish, 419 F.3d at
510; Elliot, 473 F.3d at 621.
5.
10
Conducting a File Review Without a Consulting Medical
Professional
Compare Shaw, 795 F.3d at 550 (“The Plan made a credibility determination when
it discounted [a treating physician]’s medical records because they were ‘based
solely on [the claimant]’s own subjective complaints of pain.’”), with Bell v.
Ameritech Sickness & Accident Disability Benefit Plan, 399 F. App’x 991, 1000 (6th
Cir. 2010) (“[N]either the Plan nor the [reviewing] doctors rendered credibility
determinations or second-guessed the medical opinions of [the claimant]’s
physicians.”).
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
24
Even if Western & Southern was not faulted for conducting a file-only review,
the fact that Western & Southern did not involve a medical professional in the file
review is inherently arbitrary and capricious.
Federal regulations set forth “minimum requirements for employee benefit
plan procedures” pertaining to claims for benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(a)
(emphasis added). One such requirement is that “[i]n deciding an appeal of any
adverse benefit determination that is based in whole or in part on a medical judgment
. . . [the plan administrator] shall consult with a health care professional who has
appropriate training and experience . . . “ Id. § 2560.503-1(h)(3)(iii). If a plan fails to
do so in the administration of disability benefits, the plan “will not, . . . be deemed to
provide a claimant with a reasonable opportunity for a full and fair review.” Id. §
2560.503-1(h)(4) (incorporating the requirements of § 2560.503-1(h)(3)(i)–(v)); Loan
v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 370 F. App’x 592, 597–98 (6th Cir. 2010). Here, there is
nothing in the administrative record that indicates a consulting physician or nurse
reviewed Watson’s medical records on appeal and offered an opinion.11
The universe of evidence in the record regarding the “review” of Watson’s STD
benefits appeal is a document that resembles a worksheet and is little more than a
page in length. (AR at 235–35). Handwritten at the end the document it states:
“Denied – Medical records failed to document sickness or injury that would result in
11
There is nothing arbitrary or capricious about having a nurse, rather than a
physician, conduct the file review. Judge, 710 F.3d at 663.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
25
employee’s inability to perform the normal duties of her regular occupation.” (AR at
236). There is no evidence that a medical professional was involved in the file review.
But now that Watson has filed suit, Western & Southern asserts in a passing
reference that it considered “all the evidence . . . in consultation with the Consulting
Physicians on the Benefits Appeals Committee.” (Doc. 24 at 12). However, there is
nothing in the administrative record to indicate that any physicians are part of the
Committee, not to mention the fact that the record is silent as to any analysis or
opinions offered by these unidentified physicians. As such, the Court cannot accept
Western & Southern’s bald assertion because a federal court’s “review is confined to
the administrative record.” Moon, 405 F.3d at 378; Corey, 858 F.3d at 1027.
The mere fact that Western & Southern considered the so-called
“ReedGroupMD Guidelines” and determined that Watson was not disabled is of no
import. (Doc. 24 at 11); (AR at 250–60).12 ERISA regulations explicitly require a
“health care professional” to evaluate the unique circumstances of a claimant’s
condition on appeal.13 An administrator is not excused from that requirement simply
12
The ReedGroupMD Guidelines (“MD Guidelines”) in the record contain a table that
lists various conditions along with a range of time for which an individual with
each condition may be considered disabled, depending on the level of physical
activity involved (ranging from “sedentary” to “very heavy”). In addition, the MD
Guidelines provide some general information about the condition (e.g., cause,
diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, costs, comorbidities, and ability to work). (AR at
250–260).
13
It is telling that in the MD Guidelines for osteoarthritis, under the heading “Factors
Influencing Duration,” it states that “the presence of comorbid illness . . . may
increase duration,” (AR at 256), and the “comorbidities” listed include “obesity.” Id.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
26
because it relied on general guidelines. Moreover, Western & Southern has not
directed the Court to any case where an administrator, in considering a claimant’s
appeal, was permitted to substitute guidelines for the judgment of a medical
professional.
Rather, a consulting medical professional has, at a minimum, conducted a file
review. See, e.g., Shaw, 795 F.3d at 543 (administrator “forwarded [the claimant]’s
file to two independent physician advisors to perform a medical review”); Elliott, 473
F.3d at 619 (a “physician consultant . . . conducted a file-only review”); Clavert, 409
F.3d at 291 (“In response to [claimant’s] appeal, [the administrator] engaged . . . a
neurosurgeon, to review [the claimant]’s medical records.”); Godmar, 631 F. App’x at
400 (administrator “sent [the claimant]’s records to two board-certified physicians to
conduct outside reviews”).
In sum, Western & Southern issued a conclusory denial and in the process:
failed to assess Watson’s relevant job duties; failed to offer any reason(s) for rejecting
the opinion of her treating physician; selectively reviewed her medical records,
ignored favorable (and conclusive) evidence from a treating physician (Dr. Kunath);
failed to conduct a physical exam; and performed its own file review without the
benefit of a consulting physician. “While none of the factors alone is dispositive,”
at 257. Further, in the “ability to work” section, it states that the “risk,” “capacity,”
and “tolerance” are “determined” by the “cause, location, and severity of the OA
[osteoarthritis].” (AR at 258). Thus, even the MD Guidelines recognize that the
practice of medicine cannot be reduced to a mechanical approach.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
27
Helfman v. GE Grp. Life Assurance Co., 573 F.3d 383, 396 (6th Cir. 2009), taken
together they compel the conclusion that Western & Southern’s decision was not “the
result of a deliberate, principled reasoning process” nor is it “supported by substantial
evidence.” Balmert, 601 F.3d at 501 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Therefore, Western & Southern’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
C.
Remedy
If a benefits plan has acted arbitrarily and capriciously, as in this case, there
are “two options: award benefits to the claimant or remand to the plan
administrator.” Shaw, 795 F.3d at 551. In this case, a benefits award is the
appropriate remedy.
The Sixth Circuit has consistently “awarded the claimant benefits where
objective medical evidence clearly established the claimant’s disability, even in
circumstances where the plan administrator’s decision-making process was
unquestionably flawed.” Calhoun, 665 F. App’x. at 497 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) (awarding benefits based on objective medical evidence
that claimant could not work “a sedentary occupation”); Shaw, 795 F.3d at 551
(collecting cases); Hayden, 763 F.3d at 609 (noting that the “errors were procedural
in nature,” but there was “no need to remand this matter for additional
consideration”); Kalish, 419 F.3d at 513 (granting immediate award of benefits in
light of objective medical evidence of disability); Cooper, 486 F.3d at 171–73 (same).
By contrast, “where the problem is with the integrity of the plan’s decision-making
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
28
process, rather than that a claimant was denied benefits to which he was clearly
entitled,
the
appropriate
remedy
generally
is
remand
to
the
plan
administrator.” Shaw, 795 F.3d at 551 (quoting Elliott, 473 F.3d at 622).
Here, Watson’s disability is clearly supported by objective medical evidence,
and therefore remand would “be a useless formality.” Shaw, 795 F.3d at 551. Watson’s
x-rays, as reviewed by both Dr. Kunath and Dr. Hummel, confirm that Watson has
severe, Grade IV osteoarthritis in both knees, and the condition is complicated by her
obesity. (AR at 272, 249). Dr. Kunath concluded that Watson was “unable to perform
any of [her] job functions,” and specifically noted that this included simple tasks such
as walking “around in the office” or to “meetings” and “sit[ting] for extended periods
of time.” (AR at 268). Dr. Kunath prescribed that Watson be “off work” for a
“minimum [of] 6 months” (August 7, 2017, to February 7, 2018). Id. Dr. Hummel’s
report did not contradict these findings and recommendations. Nor did Western &
Southern offer any credible evidence against Dr. Kunath’s finding. McDonald, 347
F.3d at 172 (explaining that the arbitrary-and-capricious standard “inherently
includes some review of the quality and quantity of the medical evidence and the
opinions on both sides of the issues.”). Given that the objective medical evidence is so
clearly one-sided, Watson is entitled to her STD benefits.
In a case such as this, Sixth Circuit precedent is clear: “Plan administrators
should not be given two bites at the proverbial apple where the claimant is clearly
entitled to disability benefits. They need to properly and fairly evaluate the claim the
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
29
first time around; otherwise they take the risk of not getting a second chance, except
in cases where the adequacy of claimant’s proof is reasonably debatable.” Cooper, 486
F.3d at 172. There is nothing debatable about Watson’s proof.
Accordingly, Watson is entitled to an award of STD benefits, plus prejudgment
interest accrued from November 15, 2017, the date on which Western & Southern
issued its final decision and denied Watson benefits. See Caffey v. Unum Life Ins. Co.,
302 F.3d 576, 585 (6th Cir. 2002).
III.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with this Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ORDERED that:
(1) Defendant’s motion for judgment on the administrative record (Doc. 24), is
DENIED;
(2) Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the administrative record (Doc. 23), is
GRANTED;
(3) Watson is entitled to an award of short-term disability benefits in an
amount equal to two-thirds of her weekly rate of earnings for a period of 26
weeks (6 months), plus interest accrued from November 15, 2017; and
(4) The parties shall file a joint status report no later than 10 days from entry
of this order, setting forth a calculation of the amount to be awarded in
exact figures.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
30
This 16th day of August 2019.
Watson v. Western & Southern Fin. Grp. Flexible Benefits Plan
31
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?