Hinkle et al v. Ford Motor Company

Filing 126

MEMORANDUM OPINION re objections to proposed jury instructions. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 5/23/2013.(AKR)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Frankfort)
KERRY HINKLE, Administrator of the
Estate of Kiara Hinkle, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
V.
FORD MOTOR COMPANY,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3: 11-24-DCR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

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During the jury instruction conference held on May 22, 2013, the plaintiffs objected to
the Court’s proposed jury instructions. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that a separate and
independent instruction was required for a negligence claim, despite the fact that such a claim
was not presented during trial. The Court overruled this objection because a separate negligence
instruction was not warranted under the facts presented. Additionally, the Court determined that
the plaintiffs had abandoned this claim. With regard to the requested instruction, this opinion
provides further explanation for the Court’s ruling.
I.
The plaintiffs’ proposed negligence instruction states:

It was the duty of the Defendant, Ford Motor Company
(“Ford”), and its employees to exercise ordinary care in its

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design of the subject Mercury Mountaineer.1 You will find for
Plaintiffs Kerry Hinkle, as the Administrator of the Estate of
Kiara Hinkle, Jason Turner, and Natya Stafford, if you are
satisfied from the evidence that Ford failed to satisfy its duty
and that such failure was a substantial factor in causing his
injuries.
“Ordinary care” as applied to Ford means such care and skill expected of an
ordinary company engaged in the same type of business as Ford and acting
under the same or similar circumstances as Ford.
...
State whether you believe from the evidence that:
(1)
Ford failed to exercise ordinary care in its design of the subject
Mercury Mountaineer, and
(2)
That such failure, if any, was a substantial factor in causing
injury to Kiara Hinkle, Jason Turner, and Natya Stafford.
[Record No. 55, p. 2 (emphasis added)]
Rather than include this request, the Court included the following products liability
instruction:
(1)
Plaintiffs Kerry Hinkle, as the Administrator of the Estate of Kiara Hinkle,
Jason Turner, and Natya Stafford, allege that Defendant Ford Motor Company
defectively designed the 2004 All-Wheel Drive (“AWD”) Mercury Mountaineer
by not equipping it with Electronic Stability Control (“ESC”). The plaintiffs
allege that this rendered the vehicle defective and unreasonably dangerous. The
elements of plaintiffs’ product liability claims are as follows:
(A)
First, Ford Motor Company’s design of the 2004 AWD Mercury
Mountaineer did not conform to the generally recognized and prevailing standards
or the state-of-the-art at the time the design was prepared and the vehicle was
manufactured;

1
The theory of liability put forth by the plaintiffs is limited to issues of design defect. The plaintiffs
never pursued relief under a theory of failure to warn.

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(B)
Second, the 2004 All-Wheel Drive Mercury Mountaineer was in
a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition to the user because it lacked
ESC at the time the vehicle was sold by the defendant;
(C)
Third, such a condition created such a risk of accidental injury to
users that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent company engaged in manufacture
of such a product, being fully aware of such risk, would not have put the vehicle
on the market in that condition;
(D)
Fourth, there was an alternative design for the product that would
have prevented the injuries at issue;
(E)
Fifth, the alternative design must have been practicable, feasible,
and safer than the design used by the manufacturer, such that the overall benefits
of the alternative design outweighed the overall risks of that design; and
(F)
Sixth, the lack of Electronic Stability Control was a substantial
factor in causing the injury.
(2)
The plaintiffs have the burden to prove every element of their claims by
a preponderance of the evidence.
[Jury Instruction No. 9, pp. 12-13; see also Record No. 123, p. 12-13.] Additionally,
Interrogatory No. 1 included each of these six elements and required the jury to answer whether
they believed by a preponderance of the evidence these factors were true. [See Verdict Form,
Interrogatory No. 1, pp. 1-2; see also Record No. 125.]
II.
Jury instructions must “adequately inform the jury of the relevant considerations and
provide the jury with a sound basis in law with which to reach a conclusion.” Burke v. U-Haul
Int’l, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 2d 930, 935 (W.D. Ky. 2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
Instructions are improper only if they are confusing, misleading or prejudicial, when viewed in

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their entirety. United States v. Wells, 211 F.3d 988, 1002 (6th Cir. 2000); see also In re Air
Crash Disaster, 86 F.3d 498, 520 (6th Cir. 1996).
As explained in this Court’s November 20, 2012 Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Kentucky courts have routinely held that the difference between negligence and strict liability
product liability claims alleging design defects “is of no practical significance so far as the
standard of conduct required of the defendant is concerned. In either event the standard required
is reasonable care.” See Jones v. Hutchinson Mfg., Inc., 502 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Ky. 1973); see also
Cameron v. DaimlerChrysler, Corp., No. 04-24, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24361, at *9-10 (E.D.
Ky. Oct. 20, 2005) (analyzing Kentucky state law). Moreover, both federal courts applying
Kentucky law and Kentucky state courts have consistently held that a party’s claims of negligent
design may be subsumed by a court’s strict liability instruction, thus negating any need for a
separate instruction. See, e.g., Shea v. Bombardi, No. 2011-CA-999-MR, 2012 Ky. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 746, at *9-11 (Ky. App. Oct. 12, 2012); see also Tipton v. Michellen Tire Co., 101 F.3d
1145 (6th Cir. 1996).
For instance, in Cardinal Indus. Insulation Co., Inc. v. Norris, 2009 WL 562614, at *1011 (Ky. App. Mar. 6, 2009), the Kentucky Court of Appeals found that a proposed negligence
instruction was redundant of the strict liability instruction. Therefore its omission was not
erroneous. Specifically, the court held:
[U]nder the circumstances of this case, we are persuaded that an instruction for
negligence would be redundant with the [Restatement §] 402A strict liability
instruction. It is unnecessary to give a redundant instruction. Reynolds v.
Commonwealth, 257 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Ky.1953).

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In order to state a cause of action based on negligence, a plaintiff must establish
a duty on the defendant, a breach of the duty, and a causal connection between the
breach of the duty and an injury suffered by the plaintiff. Lewis v. B & R
Corporation, 56 S.W.3d 432, 436–37 (Ky. App. 2001). The issues of causation
and injury would clearly be the same under either a negligence or a strict liability
standard. Huffman v. SS. Mary and Elizabeth Hospital, 475 S.W.2d 631, 633
(Ky.1972). Further, we are persuaded that the issue of duty is the same under
either theory. Under either a negligence or strict liability theory, the
manufacturers’ fundamental duty was not to place a product on the market in a
defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. In fact, Norris’ burden of proof
was simplified under the strict liability theory, in which case full knowledge of
the condition and dangers of a product is presumed, as opposed to its burden
under a negligence theory, in which case the manufacturer must have known or
reasonably should have known of the condition and dangers of the product. Thus,
the proposed negligence instruction is subsumed within the strict liability
instruction.
Id. at *11 (emphasis added).
The same is true here. The plaintiffs’ requested instruction states, in part, that it was the
duty of Ford to exercise ordinary care in its design of the subject vehicle and that the jury should
find for the plaintiffs if they find that Ford failed to exercise such care in its design of the subject
vehicle, and that such failure was a substantial factor in causing the injuries. [Record No. 55,
p. 2] The plaintiffs’ proposed instruction defines ordinary care as it applies to Ford to “mean[]
such care and skill expected of an ordinary company engaged in the same type of business as
Ford acting under the same or similar circumstances as Ford.” [Id.] As explained by numerous
other courts, this Court’s strict liability instruction takes into consideration any evidence of the
plaintiffs’ negligence claim, and that negligence claim is subsumed by the strict liability
instruction.2 For the jury to find that Ford was liable under a theory of strict liability, they would

2
In fact, Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Rice, 775 S.W.2d 924 (Ky. App. 1988), supports the Court’s ruling.
The plaintiffs contend that Ingersoll-Rand stands for the proposition that a separate negligence instruction

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necessarily have to find that a defective or unreasonably dangerous condition existed, and that
the condition created such a risk of accidental injury to users that an ordinary reasonable and
prudent company engaged in the manufacture of such a product, being fully aware of that risk,
would not have put the product on the market. Simply put, either theory requires the jury to
come to the same conclusion concerning these issues.
Further, the Court’s instructions specifically require the jury to examine the actions or
inactions of the defendant. The instructions state that to find the defendant liable the jury must
find the alleged defective and unreasonably dangerous condition “created such a risk of
accidental injury to users that an ordinary reasonable and prudent company engaged in the
manufacture of such a product, being fully aware of that risk, would not have put the product

is required. However, while the Ingersoll-Rand court found that a negligence instruction was warranted
under the facts presented, it went on to explain that “the negligence instruction given by the trial judge
appears to be couched in the language of strict liability. The instruction should contain some reference to [the
defendant’s] duty of ordinary care.” Id. at 932. Here, the Court provided a specific instruction concerning
Ford’s duty of ordinary care. [See Verdict Form, Interrogatory No. 1 ¶ 3; Record No. 125, p. 2.] The Court
is unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument on this issue. Simply put, reliance on the holding in IngersollRand is overstated and misplaced.
The plaintiffs also rely on Clark to support their contention that a separate negligence instruction
is necessary. 910 S.W.2d 247. In Clark, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that trial court erred by failing
to give an additional instruction on negligence in a products liability action against a manufacturer of a oilfired torch where the manufacturer sold products directly to the worker’s employer. Id. at 251. The court
found that it would have been easy to establish that the manufacturer had a duty to notify a purchaser of any
defects of which manufacturer became aware subsequent to sale of the product. Id. The court opined that
the duty of ordinary care embraces “such questions as the duty of the manufacturer to review design and[,]
if he knew or should have known that his design was defective[,] to make an effort to notify purchasers of
his equipment of these findings subsequent to the sale of the product.” Id. The court held that the evidence
in the record convinced it that it was reversible error to not give an instruction on both strict liability and
ordinary care. Id.
The plaintiffs’ reliance on Clark is also misplaced. Unlike, Clark there were no claims of failure
to warn in this case. Moreover, the facts simply do not lend themselves to allow this Court to reach the
finding that the Clark court reached, nor did the plaintiffs’ proffer any evidence to support such a finding.

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on the market.” [See Interrogatory No. 1 ¶ 3 (emphasis added).] The standard of care required
of Ford in this case — under either a theory of negligence or strict liability — requires the jury
to determine whether the defendant breached its duty of ordinary care.
In short, the plaintiffs’ negligence claim was subsumed by the strict liability claim, and
the Court’s Jury Instructions and Interrogatories satisfactorily contemplate both claims. The
instructions issued to the jury properly guided the jury, and because redundant jury instructions
are not necessary, the plaintiffs’ objection was overruled.
In addition to the Court’s ruling from the bench and the analysis set forth in this opinion,
the issue is now moot given the jury’s findings.

The Jury answered each question of

Interrogatory No. 1 in the negative, specifically finding that Ford did not breach its duty of
reasonable care. The jury also concluded that the subject vehicle was neither in a defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition, nor did the lack of electronic stability control play a
substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiffs. [See Verdict Form, Interrogatory No. 1; see
also Record No. 125, pp. 1-2.]
This 23rd day of May, 2013.

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