Cooper v. Thames Healthcare Group, LLC et al
Filing
19
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 14 is DENIED; 2. Plaintiff's Motion to Remand 13 is DENIED; and 3. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Allow Limited Discovery Regarding Zettie M. Parker Turners Domicile and to Hold Ruling on Plaintiff's Motions in Abeyance Pending Completion of Limited Discovery 17 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove on 3/11/2014.(CBD)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
HUGH COOPER, administrator of the
ESTATE OF WANDA COOPER
Plaintiff,
V.
THAMES HEALTHCARE GROUP, LLC;
PRINCIPLE LONG TERM CARE, INC;
PRINCIPLE IT SERVICES, INC.; and
ZETTIE M. PARKER TURNER, in her
capacity as administrator of Rivers Edge
Nursing and Rehabilitation Center
Defendants.
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Civil No. 13-14-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
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Plaintiff Hugh Cooper, administrator of the Estate of Wanda Cooper, seeks leave to
amend his complaint to join Tamika Gidron as defendant to this action. [R. 14]. Cooper’s Estate
simultaneously filed a motion to remand on the grounds that joining Gidron would destroy
diversity and divest this Court of jurisdiction. [R. 13]. Further, Cooper’s Estate has moved for a
period of limited discovery, during which time it expects to find that Defendant Zettie Parker
Turner is also not a diverse party. [R. 17]. Defendants Thames Healthcare Group, Principle
Longterm Care, and Principle IT Services, oppose all three motions. [R. 15, 16, 18]. Because
the Court finds that the 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) factors do not counsel joinder of Tamika Gidron and
that no further discovery is necessary for a determination that complete diversity is present in
this case, the Estate’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint, motion to remand, and
motion for leave to allow limited discovery, shall be DENIED.
I
Cooper’s Estate initiated this action on February 27, 2013 in Franklin Circuit Court. [R.
1-1 at 3]. The Estate alleges that the Defendants’ negligence caused the decedent injuries during
her residency at the Rivers Edge Nursing and Rehabilitation facility, including Clostridium
difficile, acute respiratory failure, acute anemia, dehydration, malnutrition with hypoalbumenia,
pneumonia, infections, metabolic encephalopathy, pressure sores with necrotic and gangrene
tissue, sepsis, and poor hygiene. [R. 13-1 at 2]. Further, Cooper’s Estate claims that Wanda
Cooper died as a result of the Defendants’ negligence. [R. 13-1 at 2]. The Estate’s complaint
named the aforementioned defendants, as well as five “Unknown Defendants.” [R. 1-3 at 1].1
On March 11, 2013, Cooper’s Estate filed a first amended complaint, which did not add, remove,
or provide additional identification for any of these defendants. [R. 1-12].
The Defendants removed the case to this Court on March 18, 2013 on the grounds of
federal diversity jurisdiction.2 [R. 1]. On April 12, 2013, before any additional discovery had
taken place, Cooper’s Estate filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. [R.
14]. The principle addition to the tendered second amended complaint is that it asserts claims
against Tamika Gidron. [R. 14-1]. Specifically, Cooper’s Estate alleges that in her capacity as
the Director of Nursing Services at Rivers Edge, Gidron was negligent in caring for Wanda
Cooper, causing her injuries. [R. 14]. It is notable that the Estate does not suggest that Gidron
was one of the original “Unknown Defendants,” and, in fact, the second amended complaint still
1
These “Unknown Defendants” were described as, “entities and/or persons, either providing care and services to
Wanda Cooper, or directly or vicariously liable for the injuries of Wanda Cooper.” [R. 1-3 at 5].
2
It is undisputed that the Estate is considered a resident of Kentucky, while Thames Healthcare Group, Principle
Longterm Care, and Principle IT Services are all considered citizens of North Carolina. It is also undisputed that the
amount in controversy is in excess of this Court’s jurisdictional minimum. Zettie Turner is the only party named in
the original complaint whose residency is in dispute.
2
purports to assert claims against five “Unknown Defendants” in addition to Gidron. [R. 14-1].
Simultaneously with the motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, Cooper’s Estate
also filed a motion to remand the case to state court. [R. 13]. As grounds for that motion, the
Estate notes that Gidron is a Kentucky resident, who, if joined, would destroy diversity and
divest this Court of jurisdiction. The Defendants do not disagree that Gidron would be a nondiverse defendant, but oppose the motion on the grounds that joining Gidron is unnecessary and
improper under the jurisdictional rules. [R. 16].
Rather than reply to the Defendants’ opposition to its motion to remand, Cooper’s Estate
moved the Court to allow a period of limited discovery so that it could investigate the domicile
of named defendant Zettie M. Parker Turner, who the Estate believes is actually a resident of
Kentucky as well. [R. 17-4]. Cooper’s Estate lists several reasons for its belief that Turner lives
in Kentucky rather than Tennessee. First, the Estate notes that Turner owns property in
Louisville, Kentucky. [Id.] During a deposition in November 2012, Turner testified under oath
that she currently lived in Louisville. [Id.] Additionally, when the Estate’s process sever went to
that Louisville residence on May 6, 2013, he was able to contact Turner from the lobby of her
condominium complex. [Id.] According to the server, Turner told him that she was traveling
and disconnected the phone call. [Id.] Based on these facts, Cooper’s Estate believes additional
discovery is merited as to the actual residence of Turner, and whether she is actually a diverse
defendant. The Defendants do not attempt to argue that Turner is not an appropriate party to the
action, but tender an affidavit to their response wherein she swears under oath that she is a
resident of Tennessee and explains the aforementioned facts. [R. 18-1]. The Defendants claim
that this affidavit alleviates the need for further discovery into Turner’s residence. [R. 18]. As
the response time has elapsed on this final issue, all three of these related motions are now ready
3
for resolution by the Court.
II
A
Amendments to pleadings are generally governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15,
which provides that even if the party does not seek the amendment within the of right period, the
court may give leave to permit such an amendment and should “freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The United States Supreme Court has read this provision
broadly and the Sixth Circuit has recognized that “where the underlying facts would support, a
motion for leave to amend should be granted, except in cases of undue delay, undue prejudice to
the opposing party, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
amendments previously allowed, or futility.” Duggins v. Steak’n Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828 (6th
Cir. 1999) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962)).
However, when a case has been removed to federal court and the amendment to the
complaint would divest the court of jurisdiction, Congress has left the decision to the discretion
of the courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). (“If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional
defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder,
or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.”); See also, Collins ex rel. Collins v.
Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co., CIV. 10-13344, 2010 WL 4259949 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 25, 2010). Though the
Sixth Circuit has provided little guidance on this statutory section,3 courts in this district
generally consider the following factors when reviewing a motion to amend a complaint under
3
The Sixth Circuit has referenced the following factors with approval while addressing the effect of substituting a
non-diverse party for a fictitious defendant. Curry v. U.S. Bulk Transp., Inc., 462 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.
2006)(citing 14B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice And Procedure §
3723 (3d ed.1998)); see also Walters v. Lowe's Home Imp. Warehouse of Georgetown, CIV.A. 5:10-302-JMH, 2011
WL 3319717 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2011) (Discussing the applicability of Curry to the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e)).
4
Section 1447(e): “(1) the extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat federal
jurisdiction; (2) whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in seeking amendment; (3) whether the
plaintiff will be significantly prejudiced if amendment is not allowed; and (4) any other equitable
factors.” Premium Fin. Grp., LLC v. MPVF LHE Lexington LLC, 5:13-CV-362-KKC, 2014 WL
112308, at *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 9, 2014) (citing Bridgepointe Condominiums, Inc. v. Integra Bank
Nat. Ass'n, CIV.A. 08-475-C, 2009 WL 700056, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 13, 2009)); see also,
Harmon v. McCreary, CIV.A. 07-3-DLB, 2007 WL 4163879 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 20, 2007); Lester v.
Extendicare, Inc., 6:13-CV-21, 2013 WL 3781300, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 18, 2013); Collins ex
rel. Collins, 2010 WL 4259949 at *2 (citing Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th
Cir.1987)). Among these factors, the first is ‘“of paramount importance,’ because these factors
are intended to determine whether ‘the primary purpose of the proposed joinder is to oust the
case from the federal forum.’” Premium Fin. Grp., LLC, 2014 WL 112308, at *4 (citing
Bridgepointe Condos, Inc., 2009 WL 700056 at *2; City of Cleveland, 571 F.Supp.2d at 823; J.
Lewis Cooper Co. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 370 F.Supp.2d 613, 618 (E.D.Mich.2005)).
Before turning to the application of these factors, it is important to note the absence of the
factor exclusively discussed by Cooper’s Estate. In its motion to remand, Cooper’s Estate stated
that, “[t]he only issue before this Court is whether Plaintiff can establish a cause of action against
Director of Nursing Services Tamika Gidron in a State Court Action.” [R. 13]. However, this
inquiry is the general standard for determining whether a fraudulent joinder has occurred. Wise
v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 1:12CV-00100-JHM, 2013 WL 495408, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 7,
2013) (quoting Coyne v. American Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.1999)) (“To prove
fraudulent joinder, the removing party must present sufficient evidence that a plaintiff could not
have established a cause of action against non-diverse defendants under state law.”). Though
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they are related, the Section 1447(e) factors and the fraudulent joinder analysis “differ
significantly,” and cannot be substituted for each other. Bridgepointe Condominiums, Inc., 2009
WL 700056, at *2; Walters v. Lowe's Home Imp. Warehouse of Georgetown, CIV.A. 5:10-302JMH, 2011 WL 3319717, at *1 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 1, 2011). “Courts use the doctrine of fraudulent
joinder to prevent a plaintiff from naming ‘non-diverse nominal or irrelevant parties’ in order to
avoid removal….In contrast, Section 1447(e) enables a court to prevent a party from singlehandedly depriving it of jurisdiction by giving the court the discretion to prohibit joinder of nondiverse parties after removal. Bridgepointe Condominiums, Inc., 2009 WL 700056 at *2 (citing
City of Cleveland, 571 F.Supp.2d at 824 n. 27)) (emphasis added); see also Cobb v. Delta
Exports, Inc., 186 F.3d 675, 677 (5th Cir.1999) (“The fraudulent joinder doctrine does not apply
to joinders that occur after an action is removed.”) (emphasis in original). Because the motion
for leave to file an amended complaint asserting claims against a non-diverse party occurred after
removal, the Section 1447(e) factors apply and the Estate’s discussion of fraudulent joinder is
inapposite.
While a plaintiff’s motive is irrelevant to the fraudulent joinder analysis, it is the first and
primary Section 1447(e) factor, which asks to what extent the purpose of the amendment is to
defeat federal jurisdiction. Premium Fin. Grp., LLC, 2014 WL 112308, at *4; Wise, 2013 WL
495408, at *2. Cooper’s Estate claims that it “has a good-faith basis for seeking to name Tamika
Gidron as DNS, as the individual who was in charge of caring for and supervising the nursing
staff at Defendants’ facility for failing to do so.” [R. 14 at 3]. This explanation would be more
compelling had the Estate learned of the identity of Gidron after a period of discovery following
removal and then moved for leave to file an amended complaint substituting her for one of the
original “Unknown Defendants.” However, that was decisively not the circumstances
6
underlying this motion to amend. The Defendants claim, and the Estate does not deny, that
Cooper’s Estate was aware of Gidron and her position at the time of the filing of the original
complaint in state court. [R. 16 at 9]. In fact, the record reveals that Gidron was identified to
Plaintiff’s counsel as the Director of Nursing during the deposition of Robin Marie Clark on May
24, 2012, nearly a year before the notice of removal was filed. [R. 16-1].4 Even so, the Estate
did not seek to join Gidron until after removal.
Moreover, Cooper’s Estate filed the motion to amend less than a month after removal and
simultaneously with its motion to remand, which was based solely on the joinder of Gidron. The
parties exchanged no new discovery from the time of the removal to the time of the filing of the
motion to remand to prompt the need for this amendment. [R. 16 at 9]. Under circumstances
such as these, courts have previously made the logical inference that the motion to remand was
made for the purposes of divesting the federal court of jurisdiction. See, Mayes v. Rapoport, 198
F.3d 457, 463 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Especially where, as here, a plaintiff seeks to add a nondiverse
defendant immediately after removal but before any additional discovery has taken place, district
courts should be wary that the amendment sought is for the specific purpose of avoiding federal
jurisdiction.”); McGee v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 684 F. Supp. 2d 258, 264 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (“The amended complaint was filed contemporaneously with McGee's motion to remand.
The inference is all but compelled that the complaint was amended with the deliberate purpose of
divesting this Court of jurisdiction.”). Additionally, the Estate has not only moved to amend its
complaint, but has also filed a subsequent motion to conduct discovery in order to see whether
remand might be had through some other means. Taken together, the Court finds that the
4
This deposition was taken in the course of a separate litigation that also featured the Plaintiff’s counsel.
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circumstances surrounding the motion to amend suggest that the true purpose of joining Gidron
is to destroy the jurisdiction of this Court. As such, the first factor weighs against Cooper’s
Estate.
The conclusion of the first factor is further supported by that of the third factor, under
which the Court finds that the Plaintiff would suffer no substantial prejudice if joinder were to be
disallowed. Specifically, it appears that, while Cooper’s Estate might have colorable claims
against Gidron, it may obtain full relief without joining her to this action. The Estate’s claims
are based on allegations of “negligence, medical negligence, administrator negligence, violations
of Ms. Cooper’s rights as a long-term care residence pursuant to KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
216.510 et seq., and wrongful death.” [R. 13-1 at 3]. However, as stated by the Defendants, each
of the Estate’s claims against Gidron for negligence are based on conduct occurring in the course
and scope of her employment as the Director of Nursing Services at Rivers Edge Nursing and
Rehabilitation facility. [R. 16 at 12]. As a result, the doctrine of respondeat superior would
likely render her employers, who are already named defendants in this action, liable for any of
the tortious acts that she is found to have caused. See O'Bryan v. Holy See, 556 F.3d 361, 383
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Papa John's Int'l, Inc. v. McCoy, 244 S.W.3d 44, at 56 (Ky.2008))
(“[u]nder the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer can be held vicariously liable for an
employee's tortious actions if committed in the scope of his or her employment.”). Cooper’s
Estate does not deny that this is the case under Kentucky law. Further, the Defendants note that
the particular statutory sections cited by the Estate in its complaint, provide a cause of action
against the facility rather than an individual employee of the facility operating in the course and
scope of her employment. KRS § 216.515 (“Any resident whose rights as specified in this
section are deprived or infringed upon shall have a cause of action against any facility
8
responsible for the violation.”)). Once again, the Estate does not dispute that this is an accurate
statement of Kentucky law. That the Estate could likely obtain full recovery without joining
Gidron, shows that it would not suffer substantial prejudice if the joinder was disallowed and
suggests that the true purpose of the joinder was to destroy federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the
third factor weighs against Cooper’s Estate.
The second factor – whether the plaintiff has been dilatory in seeking amendment – is
somewhat neutral in this case. As a scheduling order has not been entered and no discovery has
taken place, this case is in its infancy. Further, a two month interval after the original complaint
is filed is not an overwhelmingly extensive period of time, and courts have found that a longer
period was not dilatory. See, e.g., Bridgepointe Condominiums, Inc., 2009 WL 700056 at *3
(wherein four months had elapsed from the filing of the original complaint, although only two
weeks had passed since the deposition in which the removing party learned facts necessitating
joinder). However, courts have also found similar time frames to be dilatory. See, Multi-Shot,
LLC v. B & T Rentals, Inc., 2010 WL 376373 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (noting two months after the
filing of the original complaint and almost thirty days after removal had been considered
dilatory); Wells v. Certainteed Corp., 950 F. Supp. 200, 201 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (two months);
Johnson v. Pharmacia & Upjohn Co., 4:99-CV-96, 1999 WL 1005653 at *1 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
12, 1999) (three weeks). The trouble with these two months is that, as previously discussed, it is
undisputed that the Plaintiff and his counsel knew about Gidron and her position at the nursing
facility at the time of the filing of the original complaint. [R. 16 at 10 n. 4]. Further, the Estate
has made no efforts to counter the Defendants’ assertion that it was dilatory in filing its
amendment or to explain the reason for the delay. Thus, while two months is not a lengthy
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period of time in general, the fact that the Estate had knowledge of the reason for the amendment
the entire time does not permit this factor to weigh in favor of joinder.
Finally, the Estate does not suggest, nor does the Court find, any additional equitable
factors that would counsel using its discretion to allow joinder of Gidron in this case. On the
other hand, under this factor, courts often take into consideration the defendant’s “substantial
interest in proceeding in a federal forum.” Bridgepointe Condominiums, Inc., 2009 WL 700056
at *4. Here, the Defendants are truly North Carolina citizens facing suit in Kentucky state courts
by a Kentucky resident. Thus, as the Defendants’ interest in a neutral forum is significant in this
case, the final factor weighs in favor of denying the motion to amend and refusing joinder.
The balance of the factors in this case weigh against permitting joinder under Section
1447(e). Though the Defendants removed the case soon after the filing of the initial complaint,
the Estate knew about Gidron at the time it initiated this action. Cooper’s Estate did not seek to
add Gidron until after removal, even though no discovery had taken place from the time of
removal to the time of the motion to amend. Further, the motion to amend was filed
simultaneously with a motion to remand and shortly before the entry of another motion
concerning jurisdiction. Finally, even if Gidron is not joined, Cooper’s Estate may still obtain
complete relief in this action. Thus, the Court finds that the purpose of the amendment is to
destroy jurisdiction, the plaintiff would suffer no substantial prejudice if the amendment were not
allowed, and the Defendants would be denied their substantial interest in a federal forum if the
amendment were allowed. As such, the motion for leave to file an amended complaint and the
related motion to remand shall be denied.
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B
Campbell’s Estate has also requested leave to conduct limited discovery as to whether
named defendant Zettie M. Parker Turner is actually a Kentucky domiciliary. [R. 17-4]. The
Estate’s suspicions as to Turner’s residency were aroused when it discovered that she owned a
dwelling in Louisville, Kentucky. [R. 17-4 at 3]. On November 30, 2012, Turner testified under
oath at a deposition that she currently lived in Louisville.5 [Id.] Brian Carrier, the Estate’s aptlynamed process server, sought Turner at that Louisville address on May 6, 2013. [Id.] He called
and connected with Turner from the lobby of her condominium complex. [Id.] Though she
indicated to him that she was traveling, this suggested to the Estate that she was actually residing
in Louisville, Kentucky rather than Tennessee. [Id.] Based on these facts, Cooper’s Estate seeks
leave to conduct additional discovery as to Turner’s actual address.
For the purpose of determining diversity jurisdiction, the relevant inquiry is the
defendant’s domicile at the time of the filing of the complaint. Von Dunser v.. Aronoff, 915 F.2d
1071, 1072 (6th Cir.1990) (citing Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d 1176, 1180 (7th Cir.1980)); Emlyn
Coal Processing of Minnesota, LLC v. Xinergy Corp., 6:09-CV-128-HAI, 2011 WL 1988249 at
*6 (E.D. Ky. May 19, 2011). “To establish a domicile of choice a person generally must be
physically present at the location and intend to make that place his home for the time at least.”
Emlyn Coal Processing of Minnesota, 2011 WL 1988249 at *6 (citing Sadat v. Mertes, 615 F.2d
1176, 1180 (7th Cir. 1980)). Courts look to various factors in determining an individual’s
domicile:
Current residence; voting registration and voting practices; location of personal
and real property; location of brokerage and bank accounts; membership in
5
It is noteworthy that this deposition was not taken in connection with this case, as it was taken before the complaint
was filed.
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unions; fraternal organizations, churches, clubs and other associations; place of
employment or business; driver licenses and other automobile registration; [and]
payment of taxes.
Persinger v. Extendicare Health Servs., Inc., 539 F.Supp.2d 995, 997 (S.D.Ohio 2008) (quoting
13B Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3612 (2d ed.1984)) (internal
brackets omitted). One manner in which a defendant may demonstrate to the Court that she is a
domiciliary of a certain place is to tender an affidavit addressing these factors and her
citizenship. Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 913 F. Supp. 517, 521 (E.D. Ky.
1996).
Turner has tendered an affidavit to this Court, in which she states, “I consider Tennessee
my home and I intend to make Tennessee my home for the foreseeable future.” [R. 18-1 at 2].
In this affidavit, she sets forth the following facts in support of the affirmation that she is a
Tennessee Domiciliary: her residence has been in Tennessee since December 8, 2012, she is
registered to vote in Tennessee, she maintains her bank account in Tennessee, she regularly
attends church in Tennessee; she has a Tennessee driver’s license, she works in Tennessee6; she
has paid taxes as a Tennessee resident; and her vehicle is registered in Tennessee. [R. 18-1 at 2].
Certainly, these factors suggest that Turner is a Tennessee domiciliary.
The affidavit also addresses the issues raised by the Estate’s motion for leave to conduct
discovery as to Turner’s domicile. Turner readily admits that she continues to own
condominium unit in Louisville, Kentucky. [R. 18-1 at 2]. However, she notes that it has been
up for sale since November 13, 2012, and that she relocated from that residence to Tennessee on
December 8, 2012. [Id.] Thus, Turner was living in the Louisville condominium on November
6
Turner resigned from Rivers Edge Nursing and Rehabilitation Center in November 2012, and accepted a position
at Grace Healthcare in Cordova, Tennessee on December 3, 2012. [R. 18-1, at 1-2].
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30, 2012, the date of the previous deposition, but she had moved out by the time of the filing of
the complaint on February 27, 2013. [Id.] Turner further states that, while the Louisville
condominium is vacant and for sale, she remains connected to a “resident unit directory and a
call box,” such that any calls to the residence are redirected to her cellular telephone number.
[Id.] As a result, Turner maintains that she does not have to be present at the Louisville
condominium to answer a call from its lobby, and that she was not, in fact, residing there on the
day she was contacted by the Estate’s process server. [R. 18-1 at 3].
The Court is satisfied by Turner’s sworn statements that she is domiciled in Tennessee,
and thus a diverse defendant for the purposes of the jurisdiction analysis. The affidavit has
provided a reasonable explanation for each of the Estate’s concerns, and Cooper’s Estate has not
responded with any further facts that might call Turner’s citizenship into question. As a result,
the Court finds that a period of limited discovery to inquire further into Turner’s domicile is
unnecessary, the Estate’s motion to that effect shall be denied.
III
Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1.
The Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [R. 14] is
DENIED;
2.
The Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [R. 13] is DENIED; and
3.
The Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Allow Limited Discovery Regarding Zettie
M. Parker Turner’s Domicile and to Hold Ruling on Plaintiff’s Motions in Abeyance Pending
Completion of Limited Discovery [R. 17] is DENIED.
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This 11th Day of March, 2014.
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