Medley v. Shelby County, Kentucky et al

Filing 44

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Mtn for Judgment on Pleadings by Dfts Ronald Waldridge, MD, Dana Aldridge, and Christina Peach (R. 35 ) is GRANTED; and 2. All of Plff Robert Medley's claims as agnst Dfts Ronald Waldridge, MD, Dana Aldridge, and Christina Peach are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and 3. Dfts Ronald Waldridge, MD, Dana Aldridge, and Chritina Peach are DISMISSED as party dfts. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 4/30/2015.(AKR)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT

ROBERT MEDLEY,

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Plaintiff,
V.
SHELBY COUNTY, KENTUCKY,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No: 13-cv-35-GFVT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER

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While in custody at the Shelby County Detention Center on June 9, 2010, Plaintiff
Robert Medley was attacked by his cellmate, who threw boiling water on his face and
chest. About a year later, he filed this § 1983 lawsuit alleging that the County and
various staff members, among others, failed to protect him from the attack. [R. 1].
Medley’s First Amended Complaint, which was filed within the limitations period, refers
to “unknown doctor(s)” and “unknown nurse(s),” and his Second Amended Complaint
specifically names Dr. Ronald Waldridge, Jr., Nurse Dana Aldridge, and Nurse Christina
Peach as individual defendants. Those defendants have now moved for judgment on the
pleadings on the ground that Medley’s claims against them are time-barred. [R. 35]. The
Court agrees and will GRANT the defendants’ motion.
I
After he was charged with manufacturing methamphetamine, Plaintiff Robert
Medley was delivered to the custody of the Shelby County Detention Center in May

2012. On June 9, another inmate named Anthony Howell, Jr. attacked him. Howell, who
was boiling water in a hot-pot as permitted by SCDC, threw boiling water onto Medley’s
face and chest. Medley’s injuries were initially treated with topical creams. The
following morning, he was taken by ambulance to the University of Louisville’s burn
center, where he was diagnosed with second degree burns, as well as severe damage to
his left ear and left eye. [R. 21 at ¶ 14]. Medley claims to have suffered complete
hearing loss in that ear and decreased vision in his left eye. [Id.]
Medley filed this § 1983 action on June 7, 2013, alleging a failure-to-protect
claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a number of state law tort
claims. [R. 1; see also R. 21]. His initial complaint named Shelby County, Anderson
County, several individually-named officials and staff members, and unknown guards.
[R. 1]. Three days later, he amended his complaint as of right to include SHP, “unknown
doctors,” and “unknown nurses” as additional defendants. [R. 2]. The parties proceeded
to discovery, and on January 27, 2014, Medley moved for leave to amend his complaint
to add Dr. Robert Waldridge, Nurse Dana Aldridge, and Nurse Christina Peach – SHP
employees who were on duty at the time of the incident – as named defendants. [R. 18].
The Court granted the unopposed motion and filed the Second Amended Complaint on
April 9. [R. 20; R. 21]. Dr. Waldridge, Nurse Aldridge, and Nurse Peach have now
moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c),
on the ground that Medley’s claims against them are time-barred. [R. 35].
II
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the

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pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “The standard of review for a Rule 12(c) motion is the
same as for a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fritz v. Charter Tp. of Comstock, 592 F. 3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing Zeigler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001)).
To satisfy the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, a complaint must not only contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2); it must also “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). As is the case with a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court reviewing a 12(c) motion must “accept all
the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as true and construe the complaint in the light most
favorable to the Plaintiffs,” Hill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 409 F.3d 710, 716
(6th Cir. 2005), but it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also JP
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007). A motion for
judgment on the pleadings may be granted only if, after accepting “all well-pleaded
material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party . . . as true, . . . the moving
party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” Winget, 510 F.3d at 581.
Kentucky law provides the statute of limitations for Medley’s federal § 1983
action, Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (the statute of limitations for § 1983
claims is “that which the state provides for personal-injury torts”); Sevier v. Turner, 742
F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984), as well as his supplemental state law claims, Bradford v.
Bracken Cnty., 767 F. Supp. 2d 740, 746 (E.D. Ky. 2011); see also French v. Daviess

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Cnty., No. 4:07-cv-105, 2009 WL 1766928, *5 (W.D. Ky. June 23, 2009). Under
Kentucky Revised Statute § 413.140(1), then, Medley’s § 1983 claim and each of his
state law tort claims1 are subject to a one-year statute of limitations. See id.; see also
West v. City of Paris, No. 5:13-CV-193-JMH, 2014 WL 2800831, *1 (E.D. Ky. June 19,
2014) (“There is no dispute that the statute of limitations for both a federal § 1983 action
and a claim for assault and battery under Kentucky law is one year.”).
These claims accrued, at the latest, on June 10, 2012, when the attack took place
and Medley’s injuries were treated. Asher v. Unarco Material Handling, Inc., 596 F.3d
313, 322 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Kentucky law is clear that, absent a latent injury, the statute of
limitations begins to run on the date the injury is inflicted even where . . . its full extent is
not known until years later.”). Medley moved to file his Second Amended Complaint,
which included Dr. Waldridge, Nurse Aldridge, and Nurse Peach, on January 27, 2014,
and it was filed in the record on April 9. Because his claims against these defendants
were commenced more than one year after the incident, they are time-barred.
Medley does not disagree that this one-year limitations period applies, but argues
that his claims against Dr. Waldridge, Nurse Aldridge, and Nurse Peach are saved
because they relate back to the date of his First Amended Complaint under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15(c). Rule 15(c) provides that an amendment that changes a

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Medley has alleged counts of negligence or gross negligence, [R. 21 at ¶¶ 21-24], the tort of outrage, [R.
21 at ¶¶ 25-26], intentional infliction of emotional distress, [R. 21 at ¶¶ 27-28], assault and battery, [R. 21
at ¶¶ 29-30], and medical malpractice, [R. 21 at ¶¶ 31-32]. Each of these claims is subject to the one-year
statute of limitations. See Litsey v. Allen, 371 S.W.3d 786, 790 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (citing KRS
413.140(1)(e)) (holding that the one-year statute of limitations, not the general five-year statute of
limitations, applies to any personal injury tort claim brought against a medical professional). Medley offers
no argument or authority to the contrary and concedes that his claims are subject to a one-year statute of
limitations under Kentucky law. [[R, 38-1 at 2].

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defendant and arises from the same transaction or occurrence relates back to the date of
the original pleading if the new party “(i) received such notice of the action that it will
not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the
action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper
party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). Both of these requirements must have
occurred within 120 days of the filing of the original complaint. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 4(m)).
Medley contends that, because he included “unknown doctor(s)” and “unknown
nurse(s)” in his First Amended Complaint and has since discovered their identities, his
“mistake in knowing the true identit[ies]” of Dr. Waldridge, Nurse Aldridge, and Nurse
Peach warrants relation back. [Pl.’s Resp., R. 38-1 at 3]. The Sixth Circuit, however,
holds that “adding new, previously unknown defendants in place of ‘John Doe’
defendants is considered a change in parties, not a mere substitution of parties,” and
“such amendments do not satisfy the ‘mistaken identity’ requirement of Rule 15(c).”
Smith v. City of Akron, No. 10-4418, 476 Fed. App’x 67 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Cox v.
Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996)). In other words, “absence of knowledge is
not a mistake” within the meaning of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Brown v. Cuyahoga Cnty.,
No. 12-3562, 517 Fed. App’x 431 (6th Cir. 2013).
The Supreme Court recently clarified the “mistaken identity” prong of Rule 15(c).
Krupski v. Costa Crociere, S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010). The plaintiff in Krupski knew of
two potential parties when she filed suit, but sued the wrong party due to a
misunderstanding of its role in the events. This kind of “deliberate but mistaken choice,”

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the Court held, “does not foreclose a finding that Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) has been satisfied.”
Id. at 549.
But Medley’s situation is distinct from Krupski’s. He did not “make a mistake
about which defendant to sue; he simply did not know whom to sue or opted not to find
out within the limitations period.” Smith, 476 Fed. App’x at 69. In two unreported cases,
the Sixth Circuit has confirmed that even after Krupski, Rule 15(c) only permits relationback for misnomers or mistaken identities – not for “defendants to be named later
through ‘John Doe,’ ‘Unknown Defendants,’ or other missing appellations” like the
“unknown doctor(s)” and “unknown nurse(s)” here. Id. (collecting cases from other
circuits); see also Brown, 517 Fed. App’x at 434 (confirming that the Cox rule still
applies even after Krupski). Medley cannot satisfy the “mistaken identity” prong of Rule
15(c)(1)(C).
Medley focuses on the notice prong of Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii): Since the First
Amended Complaint named SHP, “unknown doctor(s),” and “unknown nurse(s)” as
defendants, Medley contends that Dr. Waldridge, Nurse Aldridge, and Nurse Peach – as
SHP’s employees – must have had constructive notice of the suit or can be imputed with
the knowledge that they too would be sued. But the requirements of the relation back
rule for changing parties are not disjunctive. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C) (emphasis
added) (requiring that the new party “(i) received . . . notice of the action . . .; and (ii)
knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”); see also, e.g., Smith, 476 Fed. App’x at
69 (declining to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s notice argument because he could not
satisfy the mistaken identity prong); Bradford, 767 F. Supp. 2d at 748-49 (“[A]ll three of

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Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s elements must be satisfied for an amended pleading to relate back.”).
Because Medley cannot satisfy the mistaken identity prong of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) as a
matter of law, the Court need not decide whether these three defendants had constructive
or actual notice of the suit. Medley’s claims against Dr. Waldridge, Nurse Aldridge, and
Nurse Peach do not relate back to his First Amended Complaint, and he has conceded
that all of his claims are subject to Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations. [R. 38-1 at
2]. As such, the claims against these three defendants are time-barred and must be
dismissed.
III
Accordingly, and for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. The Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings by Defendants Ronald Waldridge,
M.D., Dana Aldridge, and Christina Peach [R. 35] is GRANTED; and
2. All of Plaintiff Robert Medley’s claims as against Defendants Ronald
Waldridge, M.D., Dana Aldridge, and Christina Peach are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE; and
3. Defendants Ronald Waldridge, M.D., Dana Aldridge, and Christina Peach are
DISMISSED as party defendants.
This the 30th day of April, 2015.

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