Medley v. Shelby County, Kentucky et al

Filing 67

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 55] is GRANTED, with a Judgment to be entered contemporaneously herewith. This Order does not affect Medley's claims against the remaining Defendant(s) who did not join in the immediate motion. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 2/2/2016.(AKR)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT

ROBERT MEDLEY,

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Plaintiff,
V.
SHELBY COUNTY, KENTUCKY,
et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No: 13-cv-35-GFVT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER

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This matter is before the Court upon the Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 55] filed by
Southern Health Partners, Inc. Defendant Southern Health Partners contracted with the Shelby
County Detention Center to provide healthcare to inmates during the time Plaintiff Robert
Medley was incarcerated there and sustained a burn wound. Medley alleges a constitutional
violation of deliberate indifference to his medical condition as well as a claim for medical
malpractice against Southern Health Partners. Having reviewed the record, the Court GRANTS
the Defendant’s request for summary judgment.
I
A
On or around May 8, 2012, Plaintiff Robert Medley was incarcerated at the Shelby
County Detention Center (“SCDC”) as a pretrial detainee, charged with manufacturing
methamphetamine. [R. 49 at 21.] Medley was housed in a cell with approximately twenty-two
other inmates, and his confinement at SCDC was largely without incident for one month.

However, on June 9, 2012, Medley recalls lying down on his bunk around 5:30 p.m. to go to
sleep but waking to a sensation of ice water hitting him in the face. SCDC allowed hot-pots,
electrical devices that can rapidly boil water, within Medley’s cell, and fellow inmate Anthony
Howell—allegedly unprovoked and without warning—threw hot water from a hot-pot onto the
left side of Medley’s face. [Id. at 48-49; see also R. 21 at 6 (alleging water was thrown on
Medley’s “face, left ear, left eye, left arm, and chest”).]
The parties present somewhat different accounts of what occurred next. According to
Medley’s Second Amended Complaint, “the Jail staff or nurse(s) applied some sort of cream or
ointment to the Plaintiff’s face and then placed him in isolation for over 13 hours.” [R. 21 at 6.]
However, Medley’s response to the Defendants’ summary judgment motion admits he was
examined and monitored much more frequently. [See R. 58 at 2-3.] Medley’s deposition
testimony indicates that, to the best of his recollection, SCDC officials Sergeant Ann Doyle,
Deputy Larry Donovan, and Deputy Austin Sasser responded to the incident shortly after it
occurred. [R. 56-1 at 3.] According to Deputy Sasser’s Incident Report, Deputies Sasser and
Donovan entered the cell and saw that Medley appeared to be burned from the hot water.
Donovan immediately escorted Medley to the SCDC’s medical unit, while Sergeant Doyle and
Deputy Sasser escorted Howell, the perpetrator, to an interview cell for further investigation.
[Id. at 3-4.]
At the time of the incident, SCDC contracted with Southern Health Partners (“SHP”) to
provide medical care to SCDC inmates. SHP Nurse Dana Aldridge was on duty when Medley
was burned, and she testified to treating him at approximately 5:45 p.m. for superficial burns to
his face, neck, chest, and back. [Id. at 5.] She then notified her supervisor Nurse Angel
Robinson and SHP’s physician Dr. Ron Waldridge of the incident, and she sent photos of the

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burns to Dr. Waldridge for his recommendation. [Id.; R. 58 at 2.] Dr. Waldridge ordered
treatment for Medley’s burns, including cold compresses to cool down his skin, Silvadene cream,
and Ibuprofen. [R. 56-1 at 5; R. 58 at 2.] Subsequently, Medley was placed in a single cell for
observation, which took place at approximately fifteen to twenty minute intervals. [R. 56-1 at 6;
R. 58 at 3.]
Nurse Alridge testified that she conducted a follow-up examination of Medley around
6:45 p.m., during which she called Dr. Waldridge to report that Medley “had formed some
blisters and complained or not being able to see out of his right eye.” [R. 56-1 at 6.] Dr.
Waldridge continued to order a treatment of ice packs and cold compresses, Silvadene, and
Ibuprofen. 1 [Id.] Medley testified that, at some point, Sergeant Doyle applied Silvadene cream
to his face, but Sergeant Doyle denied doing so, and Nurse Aldridge’s notes and testimony
indicate Medley refused Silvadene application both times she examined him. [Id.] Nurse
Aldridge checked on Medley again before leaving her shift around 10:30 p.m., and she observed
him sleeping comfortably and thought the treatment orders from Dr. Waldridge were sufficient to
properly care for Medley’s injuries. [Id.]
Sergeant Ann Doyle, instructed to contact supervising Nurse Robinson if Medley’s
condition changed, was tasked with monitoring Medley from the time Nurse Aldridge left her
shift until 6:00 a.m. the next morning, when SHP Nurse Christina Peach arrived. [Id. at 6-7.] On
or around 2:00 in the morning, Sergeant Doyle noticed Medley’s face had blistered; he was
dripping fluids and complained he could not see or hear on his left side. [Id. at 7; R. 58 at 3.]
Sergeant Doyle contacted Nurse Robinson, who instructed Doyle to keep monitoring Medley and

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In his deposition, Dr. Waldridge testified that he did not recall being informed Medley’s eye was blistered and
swollen. He stated he would have recommended Medley be taken to the emergency room if he had known about the
blisters and swelling. [See R. 58 at 3, n. 1; R. 53 at 11.]

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to give him Gatorade for hydration until the next SHP shift nurse arrived. [R. 56-1 at 7.] Doyle
did not assess the situation as a life-threatening emergency. 2 [Id.] Sergeant Doyle spoke on the
telephone with Nurse Peach around 5:00 a.m., notifying Peach that she should evaluate Medley
as soon as she began her shift at 6:00 a.m. on June 10, 2012. [Id. at 8.] When Nurse Peach
arrived, Peach called Dr. Waldridge and updated him on Medley’s condition. [Id.] At that point,
Dr. Waldridge ordered Medley be sent to the emergency department. [Id.]
Emergency responders transported Medley to the University of Louisville Hospital
Emergency Department. Medley arrived around 7:15 a.m. and was treated for second degree
burns. [Id.; R. 58 at 4.] As a result of his injuries, Medley asserts he “lost all hearing in his left
ear and continues to experience bleeding from his left ear requiring repeated medical attention,
decreased eye sight from his left eye, and other disabilities on the left side of his face.” [R. 21 at
6-7.]
Thus far in the litigation, the Court has granted judgment on the pleadings to Dr.
Waldridge, Nurse Aldridge, and Nurse Peach [R. 44] and summary judgment to the Shelby
County and SCDC Defendants [R. 65]. Now the Court considers SHP’s dispositive motion,
which also seeks summary judgment on all of Medley’s claims.
B
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Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, discovery and disclosure
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

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SCDC staff have the authority to transfer inmates who are under SHP’s care to the hospital in lifethreatening emergency situations. [See R. 56-1 at 7, n. 3.] Sergeant Doyle worked previously as an EMT
in Shelby County and had also received CPR and first aid training as an employee of SCDC. [Id.] She
testified that she did not consider Medley’s condition during the night and early morning before Nurse
Peach arrived to be a life-threatening one. [Id. at 7.]

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and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). “A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, and
thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows ‘that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Olinger v. Corporation of the President of the Church, 521 F.
Supp. 2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986)). Stated otherwise, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and
identifying those parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its
burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s
case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific facts demonstrating
the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424
(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Moreover, “the nonmoving party must do more than show
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact. It must present significant probative
evidence in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” Hall Holding, 285
F.3d at 424 (internal citations omitted).
When applying the summary judgment standard, the Court must review the facts and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259
F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). However, the Court is
under no duty to “search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of

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material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, “the nonmoving party
has an affirmative duty to direct the court’s attention to those specific portions of the record upon
which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.
2
As the Court explained in its ruling on the Shelby County Defendants’ summary
judgment motion, Medley’s constitutional claims are properly brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Because Medley was a pretrial detainee when the incident occurred, his constitutional claims
should be considered under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than Eighth Amendment. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court have indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process
clause affords pretrial detainees “a right to adequate medical treatment that is analogous to the
Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners.” Harbin v. City of Detroit, 147 F. App’x 566, 569 (6th
Cir. 2005) (citing Weaver v. Shadoan, 340 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2003)). Consequently,
Medley’s claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs is properly brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment, but is analyzed under the same standards employed in evaluating Eighth
Amendment claims concerning cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
535, 545 (1979); Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001).
II
A
The Court first considers the constitutional claim raised against SHP. Medley asserts
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs on the part of all named Defendants,
including SHP. To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference against SHP, Medley must
satisfy two separate legal tests. First, he must prove deliberate indifference. To do this, Medley

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must show that he had “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm” and that SHP was
“subjectively aware of the risk.” Harbin, 147 F. App’x at 570. Second, because SHP is a private
corporation, he must demonstrate that an official policy or custom of the corporation caused the
alleged deprivation of his constitutional rights. Johnson v. Karnes, 398 F.3d 868, 877 (6th Cir.
2005); see also Hamilton v. Pike Cnty., Ky., No. 11-99-ART, 2013 WL 529936, at *8-9 (E.D.
Ky. Feb. 11, 2013). Medley has failed to satisfy either test.
First, Medley has not established deliberate indifference to his medical needs. As
mentioned above, the standard for this constitutional violation involves both an objective and a
subjective component. Medley argues he had “an objectively substantial risk of serious harm”
that was “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Blackmore v. Kalamazoo
County, 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004)). Even if this is true, however, Medley must still
establish SHP was subjectively aware of the situation, culpably disregarding an “excessive risk
to [Medley’s] health or safety.” Harbin, 147 F. App’x at 570 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
Regarding this second subjective component, Medley’s response to SHP’s summary
judgment motion contains conclusory statements but little evidence. [See, e.g., R. 57 at 10.]
Nowhere in his memorandum does Medley explain how or why SHP was subjectively culpable.
Further, SHP as a corporate defendant may only be liable if an official policy, custom, or
practice of SHP caused the constitutional violation. Karnes, 398 F.3d at 877. Even if Medley
could prove a constitutional violation occurred, the statement he offers to prove this second legal
standard amounts to little more than a bare assertion.

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Medley argues“[t]here is ample evidence to show a practice, as evidenced by Nurse
Peach, that medical care was suffering and there is ample controverted evidence to suggest
inadequate medical care, negligence, delay and malpractice.” [R. 57 at 12.] Medley seems to be
referring to certain statements in Nurse Peach’s deposition, where Peach described a policy
instituted by Supervising Nurse Angel that required caregivers to contact Angel prior to
contacting Dr. Waldridge directly. [See id. at 11.] Peach believed the policy wrongfully slowed
patient care [id.], and Medley ostensibly agrees. However, Medley does not explain if or how
this particular policy implemented by Supervising Nurse Angel motivated or caused an
unconstitutional indifference to his medical state. He points to no specific evidence in the record
to overcome the arguments made by SHP, and the Court need not go search for fact issues or
additional evidence contrary to what SHP has provided. See In re Morris, 260 F.3d at 655
(holding the Court has no duty to “search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a
genuine issue of material fact” and that “the nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct
the court’s attention” to the relevant portions of the record). Accordingly, the Court finds
summary judgment for SHP is appropriate on Medley’s deliberate indifference claim.
B
The Court next considers Medley’s medical malpractice claim against SHP. 3 “Under
Kentucky law, a plaintiff alleging medical malpractice must prove that a medical provider failed
to adhere to the standard of care of a reasonably competent practitioner in the same medical
field, proximately causing the plaintiff injury.” Matthews v. Robinson, 52 F. App’x 808, 809-10
(6th Cir. 2002) (citing Reams v. Stutler, 642 S.W.2d 586, 588 (Ky. 1982); Blair v. Eblen, 461

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Count VI of Medley’s complaint alleges medical malpractice against SHP, “by and through their respective
employees, Dana Aldridge, Christina Peach, and Dr. Ron Waldridge, and/or unknown doctor(s) and/or unknown
nurse(s).” The individual SHP employees named as Defendants were granted judgment on the pleadings in April
2015, because Medley’s claims against them were time-barred. [See R. 44.]

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S.W.2d 370, 373 (Ky. 1970)). To do so, a plaintiff ordinarily must put forth expert testimony.
Id. Notably, the Sixth Circuit has stated Kentucky law “requires expert evidence to survive
summary judgment on a medical-malpractice claim.” Wooler v. Hickman Cnty., Ky., 377 F.
App’x 502, 507 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Andrew v. Begley, 203 S.W.3d 165, 170 (Ky. App. 2006)
(“To survive a motion for summary judgment in a medical malpractice case in which a medical
expert is required, the plaintiff must produce expert evidence or summary judgment is proper.”).
Medley has not presented any expert medical testimony related to this claim. However,
he argues no expert testimony is needed to overcome SHP’s summary judgment motion because
this case falls within a res ipsa loquitur exception to the expert witness rule. [R. 57 at 8-9.]
Indeed, Kentucky recognizes two res ipsa loquitur exceptions to the expert witness rule
in medical malpractice cases. Begley, 203 S.W.3d at 170. One exception arises where “any
layman is competent to pass judgment and conclude from common experience that such things
do not happen if there has been proper skill and care.” Id. This exception is illustrated by cases
“where the surgeon leaves a foreign object in the body or removes or injures an inappropriate
part of the anatomy.” Id. The second exception applies where “medical experts may provide a
sufficient foundation for res ipsa loquitur on more complex matters,” such as where a “defendant
doctor makes admissions of a technical character from which one could infer that he or she acted
negligently.” Id. at 170-71.
Neither exception applies in this case. The second exception is clearly inapplicable, and
Medley has not persuaded the Court the first exception is warranted here either. Medley’s
situation is not one where a foreign object was inadvertently left in his body during surgery or
where the wrong part of his body was treated. See id. at 170. Instead, the heart of Medley’s
argument is that he should have been taken to the hospital sooner or treated differently for his

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burns. Courts usually find situations regarding the necessity of performing a medical procedure
or a failure to diagnose a particular disease to require expert testimony. See Wheeler v. Baptist
Healthcare Sys., Inc., 14 F. App’x 559, 561-562 (6th Cir. 2001) (comparing numerous cases
where the first res ipsa loquitur exception applied with other cases where expert testimony was
required). The Court cannot find a lay person could conclude whether or not Medley should
have been taken to the hospital sooner than he was. Likewise, a lay person could not conclude
whether an SHP nurse or physician should have recognized and treated the severity of his burns
differently, without the aid of expert testimony. Accordingly, a res ipsa loquitur exception does
not apply to the case, and Medley is required to present expert testimony to overcome SHP’s
summary judgment motion. Because he has not done so, summary judgment on the medical
malpractice claim is appropriate.
C
Medley’s complaint also asserts state law claims of negligence, outrage, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery. [R. 21.] Although SHP generally responds
to these claims, the complaint asserts them only against “the individual Defendants” [see id.],
and Medley does not address any of the claims in his response to SHP’s summary judgment
motion. Consequently, the Court finds that, to the extent Medley wished to assert these state law
claims against SHP as a corporate defendant, the claims are waived, and summary judgment is
proper. See, e.g., McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (indicating issues
“adverted to in a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation” may be deemed waived).
III
In conclusion, Plaintiff Medley has failed to present sufficient evidence in the record to

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create any genuine issues of material fact and to overcome Defendant SHP’s motion for
summary judgment. As a result, and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 55] is GRANTED, with a
Judgment to be entered contemporaneously herewith. This Order does not affect Medley’s
claims against the remaining Defendant(s) who did not join in the immediate motion.
This the 2nd day of February, 2016.

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