Thurman et al v. Hawkins et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) The summary judgment motions of Troopers William Lindon and John Hawkins [R. 29, 31] are GRANTED; (2) Plaintiffs' federal claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; (3) The Court declines to exercise supplemen tal jurisdiction; therefore, the state law claims against Troopers Lindon and Hawkins are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; (4) This case is hereby STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court; and (5) This is a FINAL and APPEALABLE order. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 1/7/2015.(AKR)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT

ROSEMARY THURMAN,
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF
PAUL D. DEMAREE, deceased,
and
LORI OSBOURNE, mother and next friend of
KAYCEE DEMAREE, a minor,
Plaintiffs,
V.
JOHN HAWKINS and
WILLIAM LINDON,
Defendants.

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Civil No.: 13-50-GFVT

MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER

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This case arises from an encounter between Paul Demaree, the intoxicated subject of a
domestic violence call, and Kentucky State Police Troopers Derran Broyles, John Hawkins, and
William Lindon. After he refused to lay down his handgun, Demaree was shot and killed in the
incident. Demaree’s Estate1 brought this § 1983 action alleging that the Troopers’ use of deadly
force constituted an unlawful seizure; the Estate also advances state law claims of wrongful
death, battery, negligence and gross negligence, inadequate supervision, and loss of parental
consortium against the Troopers in their individual capacities. This Court previously granted
Sergeant Derran Broyles’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the grounds that he was shielded from

1

The plaintiffs in this action are Rosemary Thurman, as the administratrix of Paul Demaree’s estate, and Lori
Osborurne, as the mother of Kaycee Demaree. For brevity, these Plaintiffs are referred to collectively as “Demaree’s
Estate.”

suit by the doctrines of qualified immunity and qualified official immunity, and the claims
against Broyles were dismissed. [R. 27]. Now Troopers John Hawkins and William Lindon,
who reported to Sergeant Broyles, have moved for summary judgment on the same grounds. [R.
29, 31].
In this context, qualified immunity on the Estate’s federal claims turns on whether an
officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time of the
alleged violation. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
223, 231 (2009). The Sixth Circuit holds that, although the defendant must raise the defense,
ultimately “the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that the defendants are not entitled to
qualified immunity.” Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2013).
Demaree’s Estate, however, has conceded that Hawkins and Lindon are entitled to
qualified immunity. It does not contest the substance of the Troopers’ qualified immunity
arguments and admits that it is “unable to describe any significant distinction” from the qualified
immunity analysis this Court undertook for Sergeant Broyles. [Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ.
J., R. 35 at 1.] While Sergeant Broyles was the superior who authorized the actions of Troopers
Hawkins and Lindon during the incident, the Troopers’ conduct is – as the Estate admits – nearly
identical under the lens of the qualified immunity analysis. [See id.] In accordance with the
Estate’s concession, Troopers Hawkins and Lindon are entitled to qualified immunity, and the
federal claims against them must be dismissed.2

2

Though Demaree’s Estate concedes the merits of the Troopers’ qualified immunity arguments, it
raises one procedural argument which is ultimately unavailing. It contends that Trooper Lindon’s motion is
actually a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which was converted into a motion for summary judgment when he
attached exhibits outside the pleadings to his motion. [Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 35 at 1]. As
such, the Estate argues that this Court should exclude the supplemental matter or allow the plaintiff to
engage in discovery. [Id.] But there is no prohibition against a party submitting a motion for summary
judgment before any discovery has been conducted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (emphasis added) (“[A] party

Demaree’s Estate also advances several state law claims against Troopers Hawkins and
Lindon in their individual capacities. The Troopers claim they are protected by qualified official
immunity under Kentucky law for these claims as well. [Def. Lindon’s Mem. in Supp. Mot.
Summ. J., R. 29-1 at 3; Def. Hawkins’ Mem. in Supp. Mot. Summ. J., R. 31-3 at 7]. The Estate
argues that even if the federal claims are dismissed on qualified immunity grounds, this Court
should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. [Pl.’s Resp. to
Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., R. 35 at 1-2]. A district court may, in its discretion, decline to exercise
jurisdiction over state law claims after it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction . . . .” 28 U.S. C. § 1367(c)(3) (2012); e.g., Robert N. Clemens Trust v. Morgan
Stanley DW, Inc., 485 F.3d 840, 853 (6th Cir. 2007). In determining whether to “retain
jurisdiction over state-law claims, a district court should consider and weigh several factors,
including the ‘values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Gamel v. City of
Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). Generally, “[w]hen all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the
balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding
them to state court if the action was removed.” Gamel, 625 F.3d at 952 (quoting Musson
Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir. 1996)).

may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of discovery.”). Further,
the defense of qualified immunity is a threshold question, so the court has an obligation to address the
issue even if raised prior to discovery. E.g., Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002)
(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)) (“‘[The] principle that ‘unless the plaintiff's
allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is
entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery,’ . . . still stands at the threshold of the
qualified immunity analysis.”). It was thus proper to frame these motions as motions for summary
judgment. Further, contrary to the Estate’s contention, no additional discovery is warranted here. The
contents of Lindon’s exhibits, which recount state police investigatory interviews, are – as the Estate itself
concedes – “not contradictory of the complaint,” and no material facts are in dispute. [Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s
Mot. Summ. J., R. 35 at 1].

Since the Estate’s concessions rendered an analysis on the merits of the qualified
immunity issue unnecessary, it would be inappropriate for this Court to consider the Troopers’
qualified official immunity defense on these state law claims. In the interests of comity, the state
law claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
(1)

The summary judgment motions of Troopers William Lindon and John Hawkins
[R. 29, 31] are GRANTED;

(2)

Plaintiffs’ federal claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE;

(3)

The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction; therefore, the state law
claims against Troopers Lindon and Hawkins are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE;

(4)

This case is hereby STRICKEN from the active docket of this Court; and

(5)

This is a FINAL and APPEALABLE order.

This the 7th day of January, 2015.