Kentucky Association of Counties Workers' Compensation Fund v. Continental Casualty Company
Filing
36
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: that the Plaintiff KACo's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 28] as well as the Defendant Continental Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 27] are both DENIED. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 1/8/2016.(AKR)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
KENTUCKY ASSOCIATION
OF COUNTIES WORKERS’
COMPENSATION FUND,
Plaintiff,
V.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY
COMPANY,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil No. 14-54-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
*** *** *** ***
Kentucky Association of Counties Workers’ Compensation Fund (“KACo”) seeks a
declaration of rights concerning an excess workers’ compensation policy issued by Continental
Casualty Company to KACo. Specifically, KACo asserts that Continental must cover KACo’s
excess liability for Pamela Thompson’s work-related cumulative trauma injury. Continental
insured KACo from July 1, 1994 to July 1, 2000, and KACo argues Thompson’s injury
manifested during that time period. Continental disputes its liability, arguing Thompson’s injury
manifested in February or March of 1994 before Continental provided coverage. After careful
review of the record, the Court finds a genuine issue of material fact exists as to when Ms.
Thompson’s injury manifested, under the definition articulated by the Court below. Therefore,
for the following reasons, the Court DENIES both parties’ motions for summary judgment.
I
Kentucky Association of Counties Workers’ Compensation Fund (“KACo”) is a workers’
compensation self-insured group created to allow a collaboration of Kentucky government
employers to self-insure against their workers’ compensation liabilities. From 1986 to 2000, the
group insured, among other employers, the Greenup County Fiscal Court. KACo was selfinsured up to $500,000 per occurrence, and then retained excess workers’ compensation
insurance from outside carriers to cover any outstanding liabilities. From July 1, 1993, to July 1,
1994, Transamerica Insurance Company insured KACo’s excess liabilities. [See R. 27-2.]
Subsequently, from July 1, 1994, to July 1, 2000, Continental Casualty Company was KACo’s
insurer. [See R. 27-3; R. 27-4; R. 27-5.]
Pamela Thompson was an employee of the Greenup County Fiscal Court from 1986 to
2000, during which time she performed data entry and answered telephone calls. In 1994, she
began developing chronic severe neck pain. Her condition worsened in 1998, and she ultimately
required surgery and other treatments. As a result of the pain, Ms. Thompson quit her job on
April 11, 2000, and filed for workers’ compensation. On July 25, 2001, the Administrative Law
Judge handling Thompson’s case granted her claim for total disability income benefits. The ALJ
cited April 11, 2000, as Thompson’s injury date.
After the ALJ’s resolution of the case, KACo began paying workers’ compensation
benefits to Ms. Thompson as required by the award. As of September 2013, KACo’s selfinsured retention of $500,000 was exhausted. KACo subsequently sought recovery from
Continental for Ms. Thompson’s award expenses above and beyond the $500,000 retention.
Through its claim consultant and counsel, Continental denied liability for Ms. Thompson’s claim
2
and asserted that, according to a 1998 amendment to its insurance policy, Thompson’s injury
occurred outside of the policy period during which Continental covered KACo.
Under the previous version of Continental’s insurance policy, an occurrence of an
occupational disease (which includes gradual injuries like Ms. Thompson’s) was deemed to take
place on the date upon which the employee was last exposed at work to the disease-causing
conditions. In 1998, this method of dating the occurrence of an injury was amended. The
relevant portion of the policy now reads “Occupational disease sustained by each employee shall
be deemed to be a separate occurrence for each injured employee and occurrence shall be
deemed to take place on the date the occupational disease is first manifested.” [R. 28-2 at 13,
emphasis added]. The term “manifested” is not defined in the original Continental policy or in
the amendment.
Continental argues that Thompson’s injury manifested prior to July 1, 1994, before it
insured KACo. Continental relies on the deposition testimony of Thompson as well as a letter
from a physician as evidence that Thompson’s symptoms first developed in February or March
of 1994. KACo vigorously disputes Continental’s conclusion. KACo alleges Thompson’s injury
manifested during Continental’s policy period, because the severe injuries which ultimately
became the basis for her workers’ compensation award were not diagnosed until well after July
1, 1994, when Continental’s liability began.
KACo filed suit in Franklin County, Kentucky Circuit Court, seeking a declaration of
rights that Continental is liable for the excess of Ms. Thompson’s award above and beyond the
$500,000 KACo has already paid. Continental removed the action to this Court on the basis of
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment and
3
responses to the respective motions. The Court now considers the parties’ arguments regarding
Continental’s liability.
II
A
When sitting in diversity, a federal court applies the substantive law of the state in which
it sits. Hayes v. Equitable Energy Resources Co., 266 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). However, when considering
summary judgment arguments, a federal court applies the standards of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56 rather than Kentucky’s summary judgment standard as expressed in Steelvest, Inc.
v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr. Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). See Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d
150, 165 (6th Cir. 1993). Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate where “the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A fact’s materiality is
determined by the substantive law, and a dispute is genuine if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is inappropriate where there is a genuine conflict
“in the evidence, with affirmative support on both sides, and where the question is which witness
to believe.” Dawson v. Dorman, 528 F. App’x 450, 452 (6th Cir. 2013). “Courts may not
resolve credibility disputes on summary judgment.” Id.
B
For purposes of jurisdiction, KACo is a citizen of Kentucky and Continental is a citizen
of Illinois. [R. 1.] Further, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. [Id.] Thus, this Court
4
has diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and must apply the laws of the state of
Kentucky concerning insurance policies to determine the scope of Continental’s coverage. See
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Flowers, 513 F.3d 546, 563 (6th Cir. 2008). In doing so, this Court must
follow the decisions of the highest court of Kentucky and may consider the appellate court’s
decisions as persuasive. Id. In Kentucky, “the interpretation of insurance contracts is a matter of
law for the Court” to decide, and is appropriately determined through summary judgment when
there are no other factual issues in dispute. West Am. Ins. Co. v. Prewitt, 401 F. Supp. 2d 781,
783 (E.D. Ky. 2005), aff’d, 208 F. App’x 393 (6th Cir. 2006).
Under Kentucky law, “[e]very insurance contract shall be construed according to the
entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy, and as amplified, extended, or
modified by any rider, indorsement, or application attached to and made a part of the policy.”
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 304.14-360. When interpreting an insurance contract, the policy “must be
construed without disregarding or inserting words or clauses, and ‘seeming contradictions should
be harmonized if reasonably possible.’” Kemper Nat. Ins. Cos. v. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc.,
82 S.W.3d 869, 875-76 (Ky. 2002) (quoting Am. Jur. 2d, Insurance, § 275).
Kentucky courts have long recognized that for public policy reasons, insurance contracts
“should be liberally construed and any doubts resolved in favor of the insured.” Dowell v. Safe
Auto Ins. Co., 208 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Ky. 2006). Courts should seek to interpret the policy
according to the intent of the parties at the time they entered into the contract. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Nolan, 10 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Ky. 1999). Where ambiguities in the policy exist, they
are to be construed in favor of the insured and so as to effectuate coverage. Wolford v. Wolford,
662 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky. 1984); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. PowellWaltonMilward, Inc., 870 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Ky. 1994) (stating that when provisions in an
5
insurance policy conflict, “the contract shall be resolved to afford maximum coverage”); James
Graham Brown Found., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Ky. 1991)
(“Kentucky has consistently recognized that an ambiguous policy is to be construed to effectuate
the purpose of indemnity.”).
Despite a policy inclination of favoring the insured, however, “‘[t]he rule of strict
construction against an insurance company certainly does not mean that every doubt must be
resolved against it and does not interfere with the rule that the policy must receive a reasonable
interpretation consistent with . . . the plain meaning and/or language of the contract.’”
Scottsdale, 546 F.3d at 564 (quoting St. Paul, 870 S.W.2d at 226). “Insurance policies, like
statutes, must receive a sensible construction.” Id. Indeed, Kentucky courts have recognized
that a “liberal interpretation [of an insurance policy] is not synonymous with a strained one.”
K.M.R. v. Foremost Ins. Group, 171 S.W.3d 751, 753 (Ky. App. 2005). Thus, “courts should not
rewrite an insurance contract to enlarge the risk to the insurer.” St. Paul, 870 S.W.2d at 226-27.
Rather, where the language of the policy is not ambiguous, it should not be construed to mean
anything other than what it says.
C
In this case, the parties dispute the meaning of the term “manifested” in the 1998
amendment to the Continental insurance policy. Defining the term is necessary to the resolution
of the parties’ summary judgment motions and the ultimate declaration of rights issue. Without
understanding the meaning of “manifested,” neither the parties nor the Court can determine
whether Ms. Thompson’s injury occurred during or outside of the policy period for which
Continental insured KACo. The Court, therefore, must first determine the proper meaning of the
term. As explained above, the Court follows Kentucky law in doing so. Subsequently, the Court
6
considers whether any genuine issues of material fact exist regarding when Ms. Thompson’s
injury manifested.
1
First, the Court decides the meaning of “first manifested” in the insurance policy. As
prefaced above, in 1998 Continental amended its policy to KACo, changing the definition of
when an injury occurs for the purposes of Continental’s liability. Before 1998, an occupational
injury occurred “on the date upon which the employee is last exposed at work to conditions
allegedly causing such occupational disease.” [R. 28-2 at 15.] In Ms. Thompson’s case, this
date would clearly be April 11, 2000, the date Thompson voluntarily left employment with the
Greenup County Fiscal Court. Accordingly, Continental would be liable for the excess workers’
compensation award, because Continental provided excess coverage to KACo for occupational
injuries occurring during the policy period—from July 1, 1994, through July 1, 2000. The
question before the Court, however, is more difficult in light of the 1998 amendment. Post-1998,
an occupational injury is deemed to have occurred “on the date the occupational disease is first
manifested.” [Id. at 13.] The term “manifested” is not defined, and both parties have presented
their suggested definitions of the word to the Court in their respective summary judgment
motions.
a
Between Continental’s motion for summary judgment and its response to KACo’s
motion, Continental sets forth two main proposals for defining “manifested.” First, Continental
argues that, even though the term is not defined in the insurance policy, it is not an ambiguous
term under Kentucky law. Instead, “first manifested” has already been defined by Kentucky
courts and, thus, has a plain, ordinary meaning the Court should follow. For support, Continental
7
cites Inter-Ocean Ins. Co. v. Engler, 632 S.W.2d 459, 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982), in which the
court found a patient’s tuberculosis for purposes of health insurance coverage to manifest when
“sufficient symptoms of the disease are present within the specified period that a physician
would be led to diagnose the disease.” Engler, 632 S.W.2d at 461. Continental asserts that
where a purported ambiguity may be resolved by giving a term its plain meaning, the court need
not rely on the doctrine of reasonable expectations or construe the alleged ambiguity against the
insurer. See Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Kevin Tucker & Associates, Inc., 64 F.3d 1001, 1007
(6th Cir. 1995).
Should the Court choose not to rely on Engler, Continental offers another possible
method for defining “manifested” in the 1998 policy amendment. According to Continental’s
motion for summary judgment, “[i]n cumulative injury cases, the insurance carrier on the risk
when the claimant first began to experience symptoms is liable for the claimant’s entire
benefits.” [R. 27 at 5.] As support for this argument, Continental relies upon a Kentucky
Supreme Court dispute between two insurance carriers. See Am. Printing House for the Blind ex
rel. Mut. Ins. Corp. of Am. v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145, 148-49 (Ky. 2004). In Brown, two
successive insurance carriers MICOA and KESA disagreed as to which carrier was liable for a
claimant’s benefits. The claimant suffered from a gradual onset of carpal tunnel syndrome, and
the parties disputed when her injury for purposes of workers’ compensation liability became
manifest under certain Kentucky workers’ compensation statutes. MICOA asserted that the
claimant’s injury could not become manifest until a physician informed her that she had a workrelated injury. Brown, 142 S.W.3d at 148. MICOA alleged that the same date triggering the
notice and limitations requirements for workers’ compensation claims should govern the dispute.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, disagreed and found the claimant’s injury manifested on
8
an earlier date. The Brown court reasoned that, although the claimant did not receive a workrelated diagnosis until January 11, 2001, her injury manifested on June 5, 2000, when “she began
to experience pain in her wrists and immediately informed the employer’s safety coordinator that
she thought her symptoms were caused by her repetitive work.” Id. at 147-48. The court held it
was “undisputed that the claimant sustained work-related trauma and that harmful changes from
the trauma were symptomatic on June 5, 2000. . . . [N]othing prohibits a worker who thinks she
has sustained a work-related gradual injury from reporting it to her employer before the law
requires her to do so, and nothing prevents her from reporting an injury that she thinks is workrelated before a physician confirms her suspicion.” Id. at 148-49. According to the Brown case,
Continental argues, Ms. Thompson’s injury manifested when she first began experiencing
symptoms, even though the medical records indicate she did not yet have an official work-related
diagnosis.
b
KACo argues Engler and Brown are both inapplicable and offers several other
approaches to defining the term. First, KACo asserts, to the extent the word “manifested” is
ambiguous, the reasonable expectations doctrine controls to resolve the ambiguity in favor of
KACo. See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Ky. 2005) (“The
rule of interpretation known as the ‘reasonable expectations doctrine’ resolves an insurance
policy ambiguity in favor of the insured’s reasonable expectations.”); see also State Mut. Life
Assur. Co. of Worcester, Mass. v. Heine, 141 F.2d 741, 746 (6th Cir. 1944) (“The rule prevails in
Kentucky that in the interpretation of all insurance policies, the language must be construed most
favorably toward insured and if the language is susceptible to two constructions, one of which
will enforce payment of the benefits and the other excuse the company, the former should always
be adopted.”).
9
Next, KACo looks to a dictionary’s definition of the word. KACo cites to Webster’s New
World Dictionary of American English, Third College Edition, 1988, as defining “manifest” to
mean “to make clear or evident; show plainly; reveal; evince.”
In addition, KACo provides the Court with a series of cases which KACo argues define
“date of manifestation” as “the date when the worker knew or should have known he has [the
condition], or the date that [the condition] is medically diagnosed, whichever came first.” [R.
28-1 at 10, citing, e.g., Ins. Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212,
1216-17, 1220 n. 13 (6th Cir. 1980).] The Forty-Eight Insulations case concerned a dispute over
which insurance carrier was liable for a claimant’s asbestosis. The Sixth Circuit noted two
theories of construction used to construe uniform provisions in Comprehensive General Liability
insurance policies: the manifestation theory and the exposure theory. Under the manifestation
theory of liability, the date of manifestation was “the date when the worker knew or should have
known he has asbestosis, or the date that asbestosis is medically diagnosed, whichever came
first.” Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d at 1216-17. Ultimately, the Forty-Eight Insulations
court did not adopt the manifestation theory of liability for products liability asbestosis claims.
Id. at 1223. KACo relies on the case, however, not for its ultimate conclusion, but to
demonstrate the way “manifested” has been defined and explained by the Sixth Circuit in a
different context.
c
After reviewing Kentucky state law on the matter, the Court finds American Printing
House for the Blind v. Brown to be the most on point. 142 S.W.3d 145 (Ky. 2004). While InterOcean Ins. Co. v. Engler defines the similar phrase “first manifesting itself” in the context of
health insurance exclusion clauses, Brown involves a more analogous, workers’ compensation
10
situation. The Brown court found the manifestation date to be the date on which it was
“undisputed that the claimant sustained work-related trauma and that harmful changes from the
trauma were symptomatic.” Id. at 148. The Court uses Brown to guide its interpretation of the
Continental policy language in the case at hand.
The Court recognizes the difficulties intrinsic in determining when a cumulative trauma
injury manifests. In certain situations, the manifestation date of a work-related injury is clear: a
railroad employee drops a tool on his foot while maintaining the track, or a manual laborer lifts a
heavy item and immediately experiences back pain as a result of his efforts. In those cases, the
link between the individuals’ pain and their employment is apparent. Cumulative trauma
situations like Pamela Thompson’s, however, are far less obvious. For example, an employee
may experience minor aches and pains leaving work one day. Those aches and pains might be
work-related, but they could also stem from recent exercise, or a restless night’s sleep. Over
time, however, those aches and pains could continue to progress, culminating in symptoms that
ultimately constitute an injury sufficient for a workers’ compensation claim. Where along the
spectrum the injury manifests is the question facing the Court, and a measurable rule is needed
for situations exactly like the one raised by this lawsuit.
Thoughtful consideration of Brown suggests that causation is the key piece of the
analysis when determining a manifestation date. In order for an injury to truly manifest, there
must be some link between the individual’s symptoms and the employment such that the
individual could recognize her employment is causing the pain. This causal link was present in
Brown, where the Kentucky Supreme Court found the manifestation date of the claimant’s injury
to be the date on which “she began to experience pain in her wrists and immediately informed
the employer’s safety coordinator that she thought her symptoms were caused by her repetitive
11
work.” Id. at 147 (emphasis added). See also Brummitt v. Southeastern Kentucky Rehabilitation
Industries, 156 S.W.3d 276, 282 (Ky. 2005) (J. Cooper, dissenting) (“[O]ur cases do not require
that the worker be aware of the precise diagnosis of the disabling condition, so long as the
worker is aware of the existence of the condition and the fact that it is work related.”) (emphasis
added). The Court finds the appropriate date of manifestation, then, to be the date on which the
claimant recognizes such a causal connection.
Accordingly, the manifestation date cannot be the date on which the injured party first
begins experiencing symptoms if nothing links those symptoms to the injured’s employment.
Such a rule falls short of what Brown requires. Further, the manifestation date need not be the
date on which the injured party finally leaves her job because of the injury. A requirement to
cease working altogether would over-extend Brown. Importantly, the required causal connection
need not be established by a physician’s diagnosis, although that is certainly a way it could be
established. The Brown court determined that an employee need not wait to receive an official
diagnosis where she already knows her symptoms are work-related. See 142 S.W.3d at 149.
Therefore, a causal link made by the employee herself, as in Brown, is capable of triggering the
manifestation date. However, the Kentucky Supreme Court has also indicated that, in the
worker’s compensation notice and limitations context, an employee suffering from a gradual
injury should not be required to self-diagnose a cumulative trauma injury. Hill v. Sextet Mining
Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Ky. 2001). The Hill court considered whether a claimant suffering
from a gradual cervical spine injury gave proper notice to his employer. The Kentucky Supreme
Court reasoned that “[m]edical causation is a matter for the medical experts and, therefore, the
claimant cannot be expected to have self-diagnosed the cause of the harmful change to his
cervical spine as being a gradual injury . . . .” Id. Accordingly, an employee may recognize
12
causation and, thus, trigger the manifestation date before receiving an official diagnosis, but an
employee is not required to do so.
The Court’s emphasis on causation is supported not only by the previously discussed
Kentucky workers’ compensation opinions, but also by federal law considering manifestation in
other contexts. For example, in the Forty-Eight Insulations case cited by KACo, the Sixth
Circuit considered the applicable theory of liability to impose in products liability asbestosis
cases. 633 F.2d 1212 (1980). In doing so, the court articulated the manifestation theory of
liability as follows: “The date of manifestation is the date when the worker knew or should have
known he has asbestosis, or the date that asbestosis is medically diagnosed, whichever came
first.” Id. at 1216. In light of the Kentucky Supreme Court’s Hill opinion, the Court will not
here impose a “should have known” requirement, requiring an employee to reasonably selfdiagnose her gradual injury. See Hill, 65 S.W.3d at 507. Nonetheless, the Court finds the
definition of manifestation in asbestosis products liability claims to be persuasive and to confirm
the propriety of an emphasis on causation. For a cumulative trauma injury to manifest, there
simply must be some apparent relationship between the employment and the employee’s
symptoms such that a doctor diagnosed the injury, see id., or such that the employee is confident
enough in the causation to take action on her own, before a physician’s diagnosis. See Brown,
142 S.W.3d at 148-49.
2
Now that the Court has determined the meaning of the term “manifested” in the
Continental insurance policy, the Court considers whether summary judgment is appropriate in
this case. The parties have indicated to the Court that they do not believe any genuine issues of
material fact exist, but after reviewing the evidence filed in the record, the Court disagrees. The
13
Court has thoroughly considered all of the exhibits attached to the parties’ filings and, upon this
review, concludes that a reasonable juror could find Ms. Thompson’s injury manifested either
before or after Continental began insuring KACo. Because of this, the Court denies both
summary judgment motions.
As explained above, the key to determining the manifestation date is causation. Some
evidence in the record plainly suggests Ms. Thompson had no recognition of a causal link until
April 12, 2000. Ms. Thompson testified that, on that date during her medical appointment with
Dr. Tibbs, she first understood her symptoms to be work-related. [R. 27-1 at 15, ¶¶ 11-18.]
Seemingly, then, April 12, 2000, would be the manifestation date. This conclusion is bolstered
by another statement in Thompson’s deposition, where she indicates that she began having
severe neck pain in 1994 but “[she] just tolerated the pain, because [she] wasn’t sure why [she]
had the pain.” [R. 27-1 at 3, ¶¶ 16-17.] Further, a January 11, 2000, physical therapy record
states, “Thompson is a 46 year old female who relates 5 years ago, she began experiencing neck
pain for no apparent reason.” [R. 28-6 at 1, emphasis added; see also R. 28-6 at 33.]
Other evidence in the record, however, indicates Ms. Thompson may have had some
understanding of a causal link prior to Dr. Tibbs’ April 2000 diagnosis. Various medical records
suggest she may have recognized at least some connection between her pain and increased phone
duties at work, and that she expressed that recognition to certain medical providers. [R. 27-6 at 2
(“Ms. Thompson is a 46-year-old married white female who reports that about February or
March 1994, she was doing a lot of phone work and developed cervical pain.”) (emphasis
added); R. 28-8 at 1 (“This is a 47 year old deputy clerk who states that she initially began to
have problems in 1994 when she was ‘very busy on the phones due to lay off at work.’”)
(emphasis added).]
14
These latter statements seemingly contradict Ms. Thompson’s assertion that she did not
recognize causation until April 12, 2000. The medical records are especially puzzling because,
as KACo’s motion for summary judgment points out, they likely relate what Ms. Thompson
personally told medical providers about her understanding of her physical condition at the time
she sought treatment. [See R. 28-1 at 4-5.] A reasonable jury could find Thompson’s injury did
not manifest until April 12, 2000, after her appointment with Dr. Tibbs, or it could find she
recognized a causal link between her employment and pain so as to trigger the manifestation date
as early as the spring of 1994 when she first began experiencing the pain. Because there is a
genuine conflict in the evidence with affirmative support on both sides, summary judgment is
inappropriate. See Dawson, 528 F. App’x at 452. The Court may not, at this stage of the
litigation, determine whether Thompson’s injury manifested during the time Continental insured
KACo so as to hold Continental liable for the excess costs of Ms. Thompson’s workers’
compensation claim.
III
Accordingly, and the Court being otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED
that the Plaintiff KACo’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 28] as well as the Defendant
Continental Casualty Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 27] are both DENIED.
This the 8th day of January, 2016.
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?