Jones v. Rosenbaum et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: (1) Dfts' Motion to Dismiss 66 is GRANTED; and (2) The Court will enter an appropriate Judgment contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 3/21/2016.(AKR)cc: COR, paper copy to plaintiff via US Mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
ROBERT H. JONES,
Plaintiff,
V.
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE, ET
AL.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 15-20-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION &
ORDER
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Before the Court is the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. [R. 66.] For the reasons
explained below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff Robert H. Jones’s complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The Defendants’ motion is therefore GRANTED.
I
On April 21, 2012, Jones’s car was struck by Defendant Taylor Lenhart’s vehicle. The
resulting dispute between Jones and Lenhart’s insurance company, Liberty Mutual Fire
Insurance, formed the foundation of this lawsuit. Filing pro se, Jones first alleged a broad
conspiracy involving multiple defendants, including Lenhart, Liberty Mutual, Jones’s former
attorney, and many others. According to Jones, these Defendants collectively devised “A
SKEME TO CHEAT, SWINDlE, DEFRA,00UD, PLAINTIFF ROBERT HJONES OF OVER
$20,000.00 WITH A POTENTIAL LOSS OF OVER $1,000,000.00.” [R. 1-1 at 4.]
Most of the original defendants in this case were citizens of Kentucky, the same state in
which Jones resides, and all of Jones’s claims are grounded in state law. [Id. at 3-5.] In an order
entered on December 30, 2015, however, the Court found that, because Jones had stated “no
colorable cause of action” against the non-diverse defendants, these parties had been fraudulently
joined to the case. [R. 52 at. 8.] The Court thereafter dismissed the non-diverse defendants from
this action. [Id.] The only remaining Defendants before the Court are Liberty Mutual Fire
Insurance and David H. Long, the CEO of Liberty Mutual. For many of the same reasons
outlined in the Court’s order dismissing the non-diverse defendants from this case, the Court
now concludes that Jones’s allegations against the remaining Defendants fail at the pleading
stage.
II
A
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), this Court
must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as
true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487
F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Additionally, complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are held “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
Dismissal is ordinarily appropriate when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” DirecTV, Inc.,
487 F.3d at 476 (quoting Ricco v. Potter, 377 F.3d 599, 602 (6th Cir. 2004)). When measuring a
pleading against this standard, the Court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or
unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (quoting Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th
Cir. 2000)). Moreover, the facts pled in support of the plaintiff’s claims must rise to the level of
plausibility, not just possibility – “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability . . .
stop[ ] short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
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678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).
To demonstrate facial plausibility, “a plaintiff must plead factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). These requirements “serve[] the
practical purpose of preventing a plaintiff with ‘a largely groundless claim’ from ‘tak[ing] up the
time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment
of the settlement value.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545-46 (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
B
Jones makes two claims against Liberty Mutual. In addition to those joint allegations
against its CEO (discussed below), Jones also suggests that Liberty Mutual’s former counsel,
Jeffrey Taylor, somehow participated in a nebulous conspiracy with Jones’s former attorney,
Joseph L. Rosenbaum, 1 to settle Jones’s insurance claim with Liberty Mutual. Jones alleges that
Taylor and Rosenbaum conducted a ‘CLANDESTINE MEETING” resulting in an agreement
that “WOULD END ANY LIABILITY FOR LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY.”
[R. 1-1 at 5.] Although Jones apparently claims that Rosenbaum no longer legally represented
him at this stage of the litigation, he fails to plead any facts indicating that Taylor was aware of a
dispute regarding Rosenbaum’s status as Jones’s representative, or of Rosenbaum’s alleged
intention to enter this agreement without Jones’s permission. Further, Jones’s summary
allegation that the supposed agreement “END[ED] LIABILITY” for Liberty is directly
contradicted by the facts and Jones’s own statements in the complaint. As Liberty emphasizes,
“[n]ot only has no such [release agreement] been signed, Plaintiff’s action against Liberty
1
The Court dismissed Jones’s claims against Rosenbaum from this case because they were dismissed
with prejudice in state court prior to the filing of this action. [R. 52 at 7.]
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Mutual is still pending” in state court. [R. 19 at 7.] Liberty believes Jones “is confusing his
settlement with Lenhart with his claim against Liberty Mutual, which has not been settled.” [Id.
at 2.] And in the complaint itself, Jones concedes that his case against Liberty remains
unresolved, noting that Liberty “FOR WHATEVER REASON HAS REFUSED TO SETTLE.”
[R. 1-1 at 5.] Jones also apparently admits that no one has signed this alleged agreement,
speculating that “BASED ON PAST HISTORY JOSEPH ROSENBAUM WOULD HAVE NO
PROBLEM” forging his signature on such an agreement. [Id. at 5.] Given that (1) none of the
pleaded facts indicate Taylor was aware of Rosenbaum’s disputed status as Jones’s legal
representative and (2) Jones’s own pleading indicates Taylor never entered into this settlement
agreement, the Court finds no “reasonable basis for predicting that state law would impose
liability” on Liberty Mutual upon the facts presented. Walker, 443 Fed. Appx at 951.
C
Jones’s claims against Defendant David H. Long also appear on only two occasions. The
first is in the conclusory, catch-all allegation that all of the Defendants collectively devised “A
SKEME TO CHEAT, SWINDlE, DEFRA,00UD, PLAINTIFF ROBERT HJONES OF OVER
$20,000.00 WITH A POTENTIAL LOSS OF OVER $1,000,000.00.” [R. 1-1 at 4.] The second
is in the equally conclusory statement that Liberty Mutual and Long “DID CREATE AN
ENVIROMENT THAT FOSTERED AND LED TO ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES BY ITS
ATTORNEYS.” [Id.] Because neither of these summary allegations provide any factual
support, they are not entitled to a presumption of truth at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 664 (holding plaintiff’s claims that one defendant was the “principal architect” of a
disputed policy and another was “instrumental” in its adoption and execution, without supporting
facts, were “conclusory and not entitled to be assumed true.”); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc.
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v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2011) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims and noting
“[n]one of these bare allegations provide the factual context that would render them plausible
and thus entitle them to a presumption of truth at this stage in the litigation.”). In the absence of
this support, the Court concludes that Jones’s claims “stop[ ] short of the line between possibility
and plausibility.” 2 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III
For the reasons outlined above, the Court finds that Jones has failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Accordingly, having reviewed the record and being otherwise
sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
(1)
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [R. 66] is GRANTED; and
(2)
The Court will enter an appropriate Judgment contemporaneously herewith.
This 21st day of March, 2016.
2
In addition to maintaining that Jones’s allegations against Long are conclusory, the Defendants also argue at length
that (1) the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Long and (2) Jones did not properly serve Long. Because Jones so
plainly fails to state a claim against Long upon which relief can be granted, the Court need not address the
Defendants’ additional arguments here. [R. 66-1 at 7-12.]
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