Roehl Transport, Inc. et al v. Kirby
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: Defendant Kirby's Motion to Transfer Venue 8 is DENIED. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 11/13/2015. (CBD)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
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Civil No. 15-58-GFVT
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
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ORDER
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ROEHL TRANSPORT, INC. and
GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiffs,
V.
NEIL KIRBY,
Defendant.
This matter is before the Court on the motion of the Defendant Neil Kirby to transfer
venue to the Northern District of Illinois. [R. 8.] For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s
Motion to Transfer Venue will be DENIED.
I
Neil Kirby was an employee of Roehl Transport, Inc. [R. 8 at 1.] On May 31, 2013,
Kirby was driving a tractor trailer in the Lansing, Illinois, in the course of his employment with
Roehl when he was struck by another vehicle and seriously injured. [Id.] The driver was
uninsured, and Kirby subsequently brought suit for uninsured motorists claims against Roehl and
against Roehl’s insurance company, Great West Casualty Company. [Id. at 2.] Roehl and Great
West both denied that they owe Kirby such coverage and brought suit against Kirby in this
present declaratory judgment action in the Eastern District of Kentucky.
Roehl is a trucking company with its place of incorporation and its principal place of
business in Wisconsin. [R. 8 at 2.] The truck Kirby was driving at the time of the accident was
registered and principally garaged by Roehl in Wisconsin. [Id.] Great West has its principal place
of business in Nebraska. [Id.] Defendant Kirby is a resident of Trimble County, Kentucky. [Id.]
Kirby now seeks to transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) to the Northern District
of Illinois where the accident occurred.
II
A
A motion to transfer venue is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), which provides that
“[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). Thus, in analyzing such a motion, the court must consider (1) the convenience
of the parties, (2) the convenience of any witnesses, (3) the interests of justice, and (4) whether
the suit could have been brought in the forum to which the moving party requests a transfer.
Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 8 F.
Supp. 2d 1008, 1010 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (internal citations omitted); see also Reese v. CNH
America, LLC, 574 F.3d 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2013) (affirming district’s court consideration of the
following factors in determining whether to transfer venue: the convenience of parties and
witnesses, accessibility of evidence, availability of process to compel witness testimony, costs of
obtaining witnesses, practical problems of trying the case efficiently and inexpensively, and the
interest of justice). The district court has “broad discretion to determine when party convenience
or the interest of justice make a transfer appropriate.” Reese, 574 F.3d at 320 (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The purpose of § 1404(a) is “to prevent the waste of time, energy, and money, and to
protect litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (internal quotations and quotation marks omitted).
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The party moving for transfer bears the burden of establishing that venue should be transferred
by showing that the relevant factors “weigh strongly in favor of transfer.” Winnett v. Caterpillar
Inc., 2006 WL 1722434, at *2 (June 20, 2006 M.D.Tenn.) (citing other sources); see also Van
Dusen, 376 U.S. at 645-46) (specifying that transfer must be to a “more convenient forum” not
merely one that is equally convenient); Amphion, Inc. v. Buckeye Elec. Co., 285 F. Supp. 2d 943,
946 (E.D.Mich. 2003) (stating the moving party must show “by a preponderance of the
evidence” that “fairness and practicality strongly favor the forum to which transfer is sought”)
(quoting other sources). Any transfer, however, is restricted to federal districts where the action
“might have been brought,” thus requiring a threshold consideration of whether the action could
have been brought in the court to which transfer is requested. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 616.
B
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The parties do not dispute that venue in the Eastern District of Kentucky is proper. They
do, however, appear to dispute whether venue in Illinois would be proper. In general, venue is
proper in:
“(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents
of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a
substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there
is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this
section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s
personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.”
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Kirby contends that venue is proper in Illinois because the accident which
gave rise to this litigation occurred in Lansing, Illinois. [R. 8 at 4.] Plaintiffs, however, argue
that they could not have brought suit in Illinois or Wisconsin because neither of those states
would have personal jurisdiction over Kirby. [R. 12 at 2, 5.] Because Kirby resides in the
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Eastern District of Kentucky, Plaintiffs contend that is the only forum that has personal
jurisdiction over him.
It is understandable why Plaintiffs chose Kentucky since that is where Kirby resides and
there would be no question of the Court’s personal jurisdiction over him. It is not as clear,
however, that the Northern District of Illinois would necessarily lack jurisdiction. In particular,
Plaintiffs have not shown how the provision quoted above from § 1391(b)(2) would not apply,
nor have they addressed whether Kirby’s driving through Illinois could arguably suffice for
minimum contacts with the forum state such that it could exercise jurisdiction over him. See
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–19 (1945); Theunissen v. Matthews,
935 F.2d 1454, 1459–50 (6th Cir.1991). Moreover, regardless of his contacts with the forum,
Kirby’s request to transfer venue to the Northern District of Illinois operates as a consent to
personal jurisdiction. Since the 2011 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1404, courts may transfer
venue to another court that would otherwise lack personal jurisdiction over the parties if the
parties consent to such jurisdiction. American Energy Corp. v. American Energy Partners, 2014
WL 1908290, *2 (May 9, 2014) (citing Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act
of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, Title II, § 204, 125 Stat. 758, 764 (2011)); see also Tritt v.
Category 5 Records, LLC, 570 F. Supp. 2d 977, 981 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (noting that defendant
consented to jurisdiction of another forum by his motion to transfer venue to that forum and
therefore rejecting plaintiff’s argument that said forum lacked personal jurisdiction over
defendant). Therefore, Plaintiffs’ concern about the Northern District of Illinois’ potential lack
of personal jurisdiction over Kirby is mooted by Kirby’s motion, which effectively operates as a
consent to such jurisdiction.
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2
Next, the Court must consider whether the factors of convenience and the interests of
justice strongly favor transfer of venue. See Jamhour v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 211 F.Supp.2d 941,
945 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (analyzing the other factors of Section 1404(a) after first determining that
the case could have been brought in the transferee court). Kirby first contends that because the
collision occurred in Illinois, any possible witnesses would likely be located in Illinois, and an
Illinois court would be able to more easily compel their presence. [R. 8 at 5-6.] Additionally,
Kirby argues the necessary evidence, including the truck itself and associated documents, would
likely be located in Wisconsin which is much closer to Illinois than to Kentucky. [Id. at 6.]
Kirby also contends that Illinois or Wisconsin law would play an important role in resolving the
question of whether Plaintiffs must extend uninsured motorist coverage to Kirby. [Id.] Finally,
Kirby points out that the attorneys for both parties are all located in Illinois, and that under the
general “interest of justice” that fact should be considered because transferring venue to Illinois
would avoid scheduling problems and additional expense. [Id.] Although Kirby admits his own
location in Kentucky weighs against transfer, he does not think his personal presence in court
would be necessary in this case, and he is also the party requesting the transfer. [Id.]
In response, Plaintiffs point out that this is a declaratory judgment action that seeks a
declaration as a matter of law concerning whether Plaintiffs must provide uninsured motorist
coverage. [R. 12 at 2, 4.] As such, Plaintiffs contend that the issue before the Court is purely a
matter of law, and that no witnesses or other material evidence will be necessary for the Court to
make that determination. [Id.] As for convenience of the parties, Plaintiffs point out that they do
not find Kentucky inconvenient because they are the ones who chose that forum. [Id.] As for
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the interests of justice, Plaintiffs merely repeat their concern about Illinois lacking jurisdiction
over Kirby – a concern already resolved above.
On balance, the Court concludes that the factors weigh against transfer in this case. As
Plaintiffs correctly point out, the convenience of witnesses and ability to compel their appearance
is of little concern in a situation such as this where the Court must resolve the dispute as a matter
of law. Because of the nature of declaratory judgment actions, the location of evidence such as
the truck and potential witnesses is not likely to have any bearing on the outcome. Similarly,
because of the nature of this suit, the likelihood that any of the parties will need to appear in
court is extremely small – as Kirby himself concedes when acknowledging that the need for his
presence at a court proceeding is highly unlikely. Any necessary documents and records can be
filed electronically. Moreover, as Plaintiffs point out, the location of counsel is “irrelevant and
improper for consideration” in determining whether to transfer venue. In re Horseshoe
Entertainment, 337 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2003); Floyd’s 99 Holding, LLC v. Judes
Barbershop, Inc., 2013 WL 4607370, *3 (Aug. 29, 2013). The parties are free to choose counsel
located within the forum if desired, and particularly in this case, it is Kirby’s choice to retain
counsel located in Illinois instead of in Kentucky where he resides. While he is free to do so, the
fact that he did so should not be a reason to transfer venue to Illinois.
Concerning the interest of justice, neither party has presented a strong reason to the Court
to transfer venue or to retain jurisdiction. Kirby’s only argument in support of this factor is his
argument about the location of attorneys, which is not an appropriate consideration. Plaintiffs’
only argument is about personal jurisdiction which is not a concern in this matter. The Court is
hard-pressed to think of a reason why transferring venue to a location where none of the parties
reside would advance the interest of justice, particularly when evidence and witnesses from that
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location are not necessary. Indeed, when the defendant is the party seeking to transfer venue to a
location where he does not reside, and does not provide strong reasons for doing so, such a
request can give rise to speculations of forum shopping, which is an effort that the interest of
justice properly should discourage rather than enable. See, e.g., Central States, 8 F. Supp. 2d at
1011 (noting that although Sixth Circuit precedent provided a more advantageous forum to an
ERISA plaintiff, the factor concerning the interest of justice does not accommodate such private
interests because to do so would encourage forum shopping).
III
In conclusion, when determining whether to transfer venue, “unless the balance is
strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”
Reese, 574 F.3d at 320 (quoting Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 727 F.2d 608, 612 (6th
Cir. 1984)). Kirby has not shown that the balance of factors is strongly in favor of transfer.
Accordingly, and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant
Kirby’s Motion to Transfer Venue [R. 8] is DENIED.
This the 13th day of November, 2015.
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