Flanigan v. Butts et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Plaintiff Donald E. Flanigan's claims alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUD ICE, in light of Mr. Flanigan's admitted failure to exhaust his administrative remedies; 2. Plaintiff Flanigan's claims asserting violations of various Kentucky state statutes are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, in light of the dismissal of Flanigan's § 1983 claims; and 3. This proceeding is STRICKEN from the Court's active docket. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 9/28/2016.(AKR)cc: paper copy to plaintiff via US Mail
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
DONALD E. FLANIGAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
JEFFREY BUTTS, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:16-CV-65-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
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Plaintiff Donald E. Flanigan is an inmate confined by the Kentucky Department of
Corrections (“KDOC”) at the Little Sandy Correctional Complex (“LSCC”) located in Sandy
Hook, Kentucky. Proceeding without counsel, Flanigan has filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint, in which he asserts federal constitutional and pendant state law claims against eight
defendants, who are all either LSCC or KDOC officials.1 [See R. 1.] Flanigan has been granted
in forma pauperis status in this proceeding. [See R. 6.]
The Court conducts a preliminary review of Flanigan’s complaint because he asserts
claims against government officials, and because he has been granted pauper status. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A. In such cases, a district court must dismiss any action which (i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. Because Flanigan
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The named defendants are: (1) Jeffrey Butts, Production Manager of the Kentucky Correctional
Industries (“KCI”) at the LSCC; (2) Hershel Adkins, Operations Manager of the KCI at the LSCC; (3)
“Captain” Crouch, Captain of Internal Affairs at the LSCC; (4) Michael Finch, Captain in charge of
Disciplinary Hearings at the LSCC; (5) Joseph Meko, Warden of the LSCC; (6) Jerry Sudduth, Jr.,
employee of the Offender Information Services of the KDOC; (7) Kim Potter-Blair, Deputy
Commissioner of the KDOC; and (8) Rodney Ballard, Commissioner of the KDOC.
proceeds without counsel, the Court liberally construes his claims and accepts his factual
allegations as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). But as explained below, because Flanigan admits that
he has not exhausted his various claims through the KDOC’s multi-step administrative remedy
process, his complaint will be dismissed without prejudice at this stage of the proceedings.
I
Flanigan alleges numerous claims against the Defendants in his complaint. First,
Flanigan challenges the structure of KDOC’s Kentucky Offender Online Lookup System and
argues the current system violates his privacy interests. Through this system, the public at large
can electronically access information which includes, but is not limited to, the specifics of a
KDOC inmate’s criminal conviction(s), parole eligibility dates, and term(s) of incarceration. See
http://corrections.ky.gov/communityinfo/Pages/KOOL.aspx (last visited on September 20,
2016). Flanigan, who was convicted of first degree sodomy, contends that the public’s electronic
access to that information puts him “. . . at risk for unnecessary violence, extortion and possibly
even rape or death.” [R. 1 at 3.] While the “j-pay” system apparently allows KDOC inmates to
access only the “class” of the charge(s) against fellow inmates—for example, whether a
particular KDOC inmate was convicted of a Class “A,” “B,” or “C” felony—Flanigan maintains
incarcerated inmates can have friends and family look up other inmates and provide them with
more specific information regarding an inmate’s particular offense of conviction. [See id.]
Flanigan also challenges various conditions of his confinement at the LSCC. Flanigan
alleges he has “feared for his life” ever since his arrival, because other inmates have learned
through the Kentucky Offender Online Lookup System that he is a sex offender. He claims he
has suffered mental anguish over the past four years of his life and provides examples of times
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he specifically feared violence or exploitation. [See id. at 4.] For instance, Flanigan discusses an
altercation which occurred between himself and another LSCC inmate Daquan Buckner, during
which Buckner allegedly assaulted Flanigan and inflicted serious bodily injuries on him. [Id.]
The altercation resulted in the commencement of a disciplinary proceeding. Flanigan provides
little information about the disciplinary hearing, but he claims that KCI Supervisor Hershel
Butts, LSCC Warden Joseph Meko, and a defendant identified as “Crouch”—the alleged LSCC
Captain of Internal Affairs—violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. [See id. at
4-5.]
According to Flanigan, inmate Buckner was later assigned to the same dormitory in
which Flanigan was housed. [Id.] Flanigan alleges that, given the previous assault, LSCC
Warden Joseph Meko violated Flanigan’s Eighth Amendment right to remain free from cruel and
unusual punishment by assigning Buckner to his dormitory. Meko also allegedly failed to
protect Flanigan from future harm from Buckner. [Id.]
Ultimately, Flanigan seeks an order placing the LSCC “on hold;” he wishes to be
reinstated to a previous job he held, and he wants the LSCC prevented from transferring him to
any other prison where he may be subjected to violence in retaliation for having filed this § 1983
action. [Id. at 5.] Alternatively, he seeks an order directing the KDOC to transfer him to the
Kentucky State Penitentiary in Eddyville, Kentucky. [Id. at 5-6.] Flanigan also asks that the
KDOC be ordered to remove certain information from the Kentucky Offender Online Lookup
System, and to post information showing only that he is a Class “A” felony offender. [Id. at 6.]
Finally, Flanigan seeks significant compensatory and punitive damages from the Defendants to
compensate him for the physical injuries inflicted upon him by Buckner and for his emotional
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distress related to his physical injuries, the stress of the disciplinary proceedings, and the
Defendants’ negligence. [Id.]
Attached to Flanigan’s complaint is a one-page form entitled “Form Regarding
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.” By way of this form, Flanigan indicates and attempts
to explain why he did not administratively exhaust his various claims. Flanigan states:
I contacted internal affairs and filed a CPP 17.4 (Administrative review form). I
did not file a grievance because I knew it would not resolve the issue after internal
affairs got involved and I was assured the warden was informed of my situation
and would give me my job back at KCI. I also did not file a grievance because
the records dept. replied to my administrative review and informed me I would
have to contact D.O.C. main office in Frankfort. I also did not file a grievance
because inmates are in charge of filing grievances and 1 did not want to inform
another inmate of my charges in fear that it would be spread to the rest of the
yard. I also feared filing a grievance because everyone knows it causes problems
for whoever files them.
[R. 1-1.]
II
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides that “[n]o
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other
Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Exhaustion is mandatory, Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (“There is no question that exhaustion is mandatory under the
PLRA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.”), and it applies to any claim that
arises out of any aspect of prison life, whether it involves general circumstances or particular
episodes, and whether it alleges excessive force or some other wrong. See Booth v. Churner, 532
U.S. 731, 741 (2001); see also Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). In Woodford v. Ngo,
548 U.S. 81 (2006), the Supreme Court explained that exhaustion of administrative remedies
must be done “properly,” which means going through all steps that the agency holds out, obeying
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all directions, and adhering to all deadlines set by the administrative rules. Id. at 90. To further
the purposes behind the PLRA, exhaustion is required even if the prisoner subjectively believes
the remedy is not available, even when the state cannot grant the particular relief requested, and
even where the prisoner believes the procedure “to be ineffectual or futile.” Napier v. Laurel
Cnty., Ky., 636 F.3d 218, 222 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The KDOC’s administrative regulations, known as Corrections Policies and Procedures
(“CPP”), set forth the grievance procedures for KDOC inmates. See 501 KAR § 6:20.
Specifically, CPP 14.6 describes what inmates must do before filing a lawsuit about the
conditions of their confinement. See http://corrections.ky.gov/communityinfo/Policies%20and%
20Procedures/Documents/CH14/CPP%2014-6%20Grievance.pdf (last visited September 20,
2016). Pursuant to CPP 14.6, a KDOC inmate must begin the process by filing a written
grievance and seeking an informal resolution. See id. at § II(J)(1)-(4) (“Step 1”).2 If the inmate
is not satisfied at the end of that process, the inmate must submit a written request to the
Grievance Committee requesting a hearing. See id. at § II(J)(2) (“Step 2”). If still dissatisfied
with the Grievance Committee’s disposition of the matter, the inmate must appeal to the Warden.
See id. at § II(J)(3) (“Step 3”). Finally, if the inmate is unsatisfied with the Warden’s decision,
the inmate must file an appeal to the Commissioner of the KDOC. See id. at § II(J)(4) (“Step
4”).
As a KDOC prisoner, Flanigan was required to pursue all four steps of the KDOC’s
administrative remedy process before filing this § 1983 action. But Flanigan freely admits that
he opted to circumvent that process and instead file suit on his claims immediately in this Court.
While Flanigan explains his perception that pursuing the grievance process would have been
2
Grievances concerning healthcare claims must be pursued through the steps set forth in CPP 14.6,
§ II(K)(1)-(3).
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futile, that explanation does not suffice. As explained above, assertions of futility do not excuse
a plaintiff from the exhaustion requirements. See Napier, 636 F.3d at 224; Hartsfield v. Vidor,
199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n inmate cannot simply fail to file a grievance or
abandon the process before completion and claim that he has exhausted his remedies or that it is
futile for him to do so because his grievance is now time-barred under the regulations.”).
Further, where a plaintiff admits in his complaint that he did not exhaust his claims by
pursuing all of his administrative remedies before he filed suit, or that he started the exhaustion
process but not did not complete it, dismissal of the complaint is appropriate upon initial review.
Jones v. Bock, 549 U .S. 199, 214-15 (2007) (explaining that a district court can dismiss a
complaint sua sponte when it is apparent from the face of the complaint that claim is barred by
affirmative defense); Carbe v. Lappin, 492 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2007) (where complaint was
clear that prisoner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the district court could dismiss it
sua sponte for failure to state a claim); Washington v. Unknown C/O, No. 1:13-CV-10, 2013 WL
170173, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 16, 2013) (“…although exhaustion of administrative remedies
need not be pled specifically in the complaint, where it is apparent from the face of the complaint
that an inmate has failed to exhaust the prison grievance procedure, sua sponte dismissal for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is appropriate on initial review of the
complaint.”); Fletcher v. Myers, No. 5:11-141-KKC (E.D. Ky. May 17, 2012), aff’d, No. 125630 (6th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (“Because Fletcher’s failure to exhaust, or to attempt to exhaust,
administrative remedies is apparent from the face of his complaint, the district court properly
dismissed Fletcher’s complaint on that basis.”).
Based on this authority, and Flanigan’s admission that he has not exhausted his
administrative remedies as to his various allegations, Flanigan’s § 1983 claims must be
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dismissed without prejudice. And in light of that dismissal, Flanigan’s pendant state law claims
should also be dismissed at this time. Once a district court has dismissed all federal claims over
which it possessed original jurisdiction, a district court may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any remaining state law claims. See Gibbs v. Montgomery County Agricultural
Society, 140 F. Supp. 2d 835, 845 (S.D. Ohio 2001); see also Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112
F.3d 226, 233 (6th Cir 1997). Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that where all federal
claims are dismissed before trial, dismissing the remaining state claims is generally the
appropriate course of action. Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir.
2006). Consistent with that principle, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Flanigan’s state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), and Flanigan’s complaint is thus
dismissed without prejudice in its entirety.
III
Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
1. Plaintiff Donald E. Flanigan’s claims alleging violations of the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, in light of Mr. Flanigan’s admitted failure to
exhaust his administrative remedies;
2. Plaintiff Flanigan’s claims asserting violations of various Kentucky state statutes are
DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, in light of the dismissal of Flanigan’s § 1983 claims;
and
3. This proceeding is STRICKEN from the Court’s active docket.
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This the 28th day of September, 2016.
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