Easter v. Hendrix et al
Filing
44
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment shall be construed as a Response to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment; 2. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment 37 is GRANTED as to all counts; 3. Judgment in favor of Defendants shall be entered contemporaneously herewith. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 10/23/2018.(CBD)cc: COR, Easter Modified cc on 10/23/2018 (CBD).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
MICHAEL B. EASTER,
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Plaintiff,
V.
JASON HENDRIX, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 3:17-cv-00031-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
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Defendants seek summary judgment as to Plaintiff Michael B. Easter’s federal
claims, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Kentucky Constitutional claims, and Kentucky
state law claims. [R. 37.] For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’
motion.
I
On April 10, 2016 at approximately 2:30 a.m., Defendant-Officers Jason Hendrix and
Austin Sasser were dispatched to an apartment located in Shelbyville, Kentucky in response to
an excessive noise complaint. [R. 1 at 4; R. 37-2; R. 37-3.] The apartment was that of Plaintiff
Michael B. Easter, where he resided with his mother, Elizabeth “Libby” Easter, and his twelveyear old daughter. [R. 1.] Libby Easter called the officers to their home because Mr. Easter was
listening to music on his laptop computer at a high volume and refused to turn the music down.
[R. 1; R. 37-2 at 1.] Upon Defendants’ arrival at Mr. Easter’s residence, Officer Hendrix
knocked and Libby answered the door. [R. 1; R. 37-2; R. 37-3.] The parties disagree as to
whether Libby invited the officers into the home, but both agree that upon arrival, Libby Easter
1
told the officers that the noise disturbance had ceased, and Mr. Easter told the Officers to “get
the F out of my house.” [R. 1; R. 37-1, R. 39.]
Upon entering the residence, Officer Hendrix heard what he described as “a person
hyperventilating into a plastic bag.” [R. 37-2.] Among continued protestations from Mr. Easter,
Officer Hendrix sought the source of the noise, which turned out to be Mr. Easter’s twelve-yearold daughter. Id. Officer Hendrix found Mr. Easter’s daughter breathing heavily in her bedroom.
[R. 37-2.] It is undisputed that she and Mr. Easter were involved in a disagreement prior to
police being called to the home, but details of the disagreement are disputed. [R. 1 at 6; R. 38-2
at 2.] Mr. Easter asserts that his daughter “physically struck, shoved, and briefly confined” him.
[R. 1 at 6.] The Officers conducted an interview with Mr. Easter’s daughter outside of the
presence of Mr. Easter, with Libby Easter’s consent. [R. 1 at 7] Officers Hendrix and Sasser
claim that the daughter informed them that Mr. Easter had “hit her in the face and pushed her on
the bed causing her to hit her head on a mirror.” [R. 38-2 at 2.] Officer Hendrix noticed redness
on the right side of her face, and that she appeared to have a “bruise” or “knot” toward the back
of her head. Id. Because Officer Hendrix believed that Mr. Easter’s daughter needed medical
evaluation, EMS was called to the apartment. Id.
At some point Mr. Easter was handcuffed in his home. [R. 39; R. 38-2.] The parties
agree that officers informed Mr. Easter that he was not under arrest, and that the handcuffs were
for his own safety. Id. Following the interview with Mr. Easter’s daughter, the Defendants
believed they had probable cause to arrest Mr. Easter for Assault in the Fourth Degree, Child
Abuse, and Mr. Easter was informed he was under arrest. [See R. 1 at 7; R. 38-2 at 3.] The
parties agree that Mr. Easter verbally protested as Officer Sasser escorted him to a police cruiser.
[See R. 1 at 7; R. 38-2 at 3.] The Officers claim that Mr. Easter engaged in “violent, tumultuous,
2
and threatening behavior” such that he caused residents living in neighboring apartments to come
to their doors to see what was going on outside. [R. 38-2 at 3.] Mr. Easter disputes this claim
and says that no nearby residents came to investigate. [R. 39 at 2.]
Whatever occurred, Mr. Easter was subsequently charged with Disorderly Conduct in the
Second Degree. [R. 1.] Mr. Easter was transported to Shelby County Detention Center and
claims that, either during transport or booking at Shelby County Detention Center, Officer Sasser
“grabbed the hood of the [Mr. Easter’s] hoody and tightened it around his neck . . . and executed
a chokehold that caused the [Mr. Easter] to lose consciousness.” [R. 1 at 7–8.] At the time of
booking, a Standard Medical Questions form was prepared by the Detention Center in which
Plaintiff indicated that he was not in need of medical attention. [R. 37-2 at 12.] A photo taken
during the booking process shows no sign of injury to Mr. Easter’s neck or head. Id. at 13.
In a one-day jury trial on October 12, 2016, Mr. Easter was acquitted of the Assault in the
Fourth Degree, Child Abuse charge and convicted of the offense of Disorderly Conduct in the
Second Degree. [R. 1 at 9.] Mr. Easter subsequently filed this action on April 9, 2017 against
Defendants Jason Hendrix, Austin Sasser, and Danny Goodwin, both individually and in their
official capacities. Mr. Easter alleges violations of his Constitutional rights under the Fourth,
Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as §§ 10 and 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. [See
R. 1.] Additionally, Mr. Easter brings Kentucky state law claims for malicious prosecution, false
imprisonment, assault and battery, and outrage. Id. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment disputing these claims and putting forth the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
[R. 37-1.] Mr. Easter, now proceeding pro se, filed what he called a “Motion for Summary
Judgment and Response to Defendant’s Motion for Summary of Judgment.” [R. 39.] The
Defendants filed a reply to that motion, urging the Court to construe it as a Response to their
3
earlier motion for Summary Judgment, rather than as a cross-motion for Summary Judgment.
[R. 43.]
II
A
As an initial matter, the Court takes up the issue of how to interpret Mr. Easter’s motion.
It is styled as “Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Defendant’s Motion
for Summary of Judgment.” [R. 39.]
Generally speaking, filings by pro se litigants are construed liberally. See Spotts v. United
States, 429 F.3d 248, 249 (6th Cir. 2005). Where a party is without representation, pro se
pleadings “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
However, the Court is under no duty to “search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a
genuine issue of material fact.” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 655 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, “the
nonmoving party has an affirmative duty to direct the court’s attention to those specific portions
of the record upon which it seeks to rely to create a genuine issue of material fact.” Id.
Even applying a liberal construction, Mr. Easter’s motion [R. 39] falls short of the
standard for a Motion for Summary Judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Mr. Easter’s motion seeks
no affirmative relief aside from asking the Court “to honorably block [Defendants’] motion as it
is false.” Id. To the extent he cites to the record, Mr. Easter directs the Court’s attention to
whole affidavits, as well as a video recording of the entirety of his day-long jury trial. [R. 39.]
Mr. Easter puts forth no argument for Summary Judgment on his own behalf. See id.
Accordingly, Mr. Easter’s motion is most appropriately construed as a response to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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B
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56. “A genuine dispute exists on a material fact, and thus summary judgment is improper, if the
evidence shows ‘that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Olinger
v. Corporation of the President of the Church, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Stated otherwise, “[t]he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient;
there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477
U.S. at 252.
The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and
identifying those parts of the record that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its
burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s
case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the movant has satisfied this
burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and come forward with specific
facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Hall Holding,
285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Moreover, “the nonmoving party must do
more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material fact. It must present
significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the motion for summary judgment.”
Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (internal citations omitted). When applying the summary
judgment standard, the Court must review the facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259 F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
C
This case involves three Defendants, each of whom has been sued in both their official
and individual capacities: Officer Danny Goodwin, Officer Jason Hendrix, and Officer Austin
Sasser. [R. 1.] Defendants Hendrix and Sasser responded to Mr. Easter’s home on April 10,
2016, but Officer Goodwin was not involved in responding to the call. [See R. 1.] Instead,
Officer Danny Goodwin is sued in his individual and official capacity because he was, at the
time, Chief of the Shelbyville Police Department, and therefore established policies which
governed the employment, training, supervision and conduct of the officers of the Shelbyville
Police Department. [R. 1; R. 9.]
The law is clear that any federal charges asserted against the Defendants in their official
capacity are functionally equivalent to charges against the City of Shelbyville, because
“individuals sued in their official capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.”
Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,
165 (1985)). This is because a plaintiff seeking to “recover on a damages judgment in an
official-capacity suit must look to the government entity itself.” Id. Thus, the City of Shelbyville
is the true defendant, and Officers Goodwin, Hendrix, and Sasser are dismissed as defendants
with respect to the pending federal and state law claims. See Clark v. Kentucky, 229 F. Supp. 2d
718, 721-22 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (dismissing official capacity claims). Summary judgment is
GRANTED in favor of the Defendants on all claims made against them in their official capacity.
D
There are nine remaining claims against Officers Goodwin, Hendrix and Sasser in their
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individual capacities in this action. [R. 1.] Defendants oppose these claims on substantive
grounds as well as on the basis they are entitled to qualified immunity.
1
Mr. Easter claims that Defendants’ actions on April 10, 2016 violated his Fourth
Amendment rights first by the warrantless unlawful entry and search of his residence, and second
by his unlawful arrest. Id. Defendants deny that any constitutional violation occurred, and in the
alternative, that they are entitled to qualified immunity. We first consider Mr. Easter’s claim that
Officer Goodwin violated his Fourth Amendment rights.
Supreme Court precedent explains that a government official can only be individually
liable if he “caused the deprivation of a right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985).
To establish such liability, “[a]t a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least
implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the
offending officers.” Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1455 (6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). Mr.
Easter has not shown that Officer Goodwin had any direct involvement in the activities giving
rise to this action, and it is undisputed that Officer Goodwin was not present at Mr. Easter’s
residence on April 10, 2016. [R. 1; R. 9]. Although parties agree that part of Officer Goodwin’s
position included “establish[ing] policies which governed the employment, training, supervision
and conduct of the officers of the Shelbyville Police Department,” Mr. Easter has not presented
to the Court any facts tending to show that such policies implicitly or explicitly authorized or
condoned a violation of his Constitutional rights. [R. 1; R. 9.] The Court, accordingly, finds that
Mr. Easter has not demonstrated the existence of a material fact regarding Officer Goodwin’s
liability. Summary judgment is GRANTED for the Defendants on this claim.
Next, Mr. Easter’s claims that Officers Hendrix and Sasser unlawfully entered his home
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in violation of his Fourth Amendment Rights. “The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the
warrantless entry of a person’s home, whether to make an arrest or to search for specific
objects.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990). However, “[e]ntrance by the police
into a home—which constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes—is permissible . . .
where justified by a warrant, exigent circumstances, or valid consent.” Smith v. City of
Wyoming, 821 F.3d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 2016); see also Payton, 445 U.S. at 490. “Consent may
lawfully permit the police to enter even if it is not given by the occupant whose Fourth
Amendment rights are at issue.” Smith v. City of Wyoming, 821 F.3d 697, 709 (6th Cir. 2016).
Further, consent need not be explicit or even verbal, and may be in the form of “words, gesture,
or conduct.” Id. at 709. (citing United States v. Carter, 378 F.3d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (en
banc)). Because the language of § 10 of the Kentucky Constitution is meant to provide
protection equal to that of the Fourth Amendment with respect to this issue, the Court will
analyze them together. See LaFollete v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 747 (Ky. 1996).
In the case at hand, Officers Hendrix and Sasser admit they were without a warrant, and
no argument is made that there were exigent circumstances present justifying their warrantless
entry. See [R. 9; 37-2; 37-3.] Rather, the Defendants contend that Libby Easter consented to
their entry of her home. [R. 37-2; 37-3.] The Defendants cite to their own affidavits, which
state that Libby Easter “answered the door and motioned [the Officers] inside.” [R. 37-2; R. 373.] Mr. Easter disputes this claim. [R. 1; R. 39.] In disputing this, Mr. Easter makes no citation
to the record or anything that would bolster his version of the facts. According to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure:
a party asserting that a fact … is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations,
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stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a
genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence
to support the fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
Mr. Easter has failed to show that there exists a genuine dispute as to the material fact of
whether the Defendants had consent to search the home. In fact, Mr. Easter cites only to
Defendants’ own affidavits and the entirety of a video recording documenting the day-long jury
trial he underwent. [R. 39.] This court is not required to dig through the record to ascertain
whether some part of it might support Mr. Easter’s position. See Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev.
Corp., 600 F. App’x 393, 403 (6th Cir. 2015) (“‘Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles’
that might be buried in the record”) (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.
1991)). Similarly, even construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the
Court is not required to take Mr. Easter’s unsworn accusations, without more, as true. See
Whitehead v. Bowen, 301 Fed. Appx. 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2008). Therefore, summary judgment is
GRANTED to the Defendants on this claim.
Mr. Easter next raises a claim of unlawful arrest. While it is undisputed that Mr. Easter
was arrested, “seizure alone is not enough for § 1983 liability.” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489
U.S. 593, 599 (1989). To be lawful, an arrest must be accompanied by probable cause. Probable
cause is determined by “whether, at the time of the arrest, the ‘facts and circumstances within
[the arresting officer’s] knowledge and of which [the officer] had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient to warrant a prudent person to conclude that an individual either had
committed or was committing an offense.” United States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 555
(6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).
9
Probable cause does not require “any showing that [an officer’s] belief [is] correct or
more likely true than false.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983). Generally, “the
existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one
reasonable determination possible.” Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing
Yancey v. Carroll Cty., 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989)). Nevertheless, “the mere existence
of a colorable factual dispute will not defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
A genuine dispute between the parties on an issue of material fact must exist to render summary
judgment inappropriate.” Monette v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th
Cir.1996) (citation omitted).
Applying the test for qualified immunity, to simply state that the Fourth Amendment
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is clearly established would be the
definition of “defin[ing] clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Plumhoff v.
Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2013 (2014). Instead, the dispositive question is whether a reasonable
officer could have believed that a warrantless arrest of Mr. Easter was lawful under the
circumstances that Officers Hendrix and Sasser faced. This requires a fact-intensive inquiry,
“limited to ‘the facts that were knowable to the defendant officers’ at the time they engaged in
the conduct in question.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007 (2017) (citing White v.
Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 550 (2017)).
At the time of Mr. Easter’s arrest, the record indicates that Officers Hendrix and Sasser
knew the following, undisputed facts: (1) Somebody inside the residence had called the police in
order to summon law enforcement to Mr. Easter’s address; (2) there were sounds of somebody
“breathing into a plastic bag” inside the house [R. 37-2]; (3) Mr. Easter’s twelve year old
daughter was inside the house [R. 1; R 37-2]; (4) breathing and crying sounds heard by the
10
officers were coming from Mr. Easter’s daughter; (5) Mr. Easter was yelling and interfering with
the Defendants’ ability to speak with his daughter; (6) she had redness on the side of her face and
what appeared to be a “bruise” or “knot” on the back of her head; (7) there was some
disagreement and physical altercation between Mr. Easter and his daughter prior to the Officers’
arrival, though the details of that interaction are disputed; and (8) Mr. Easter’s daughter told
Officers Hendrix and Sasser that Mr. Easter hit her, that he had hit her before, and that she was
afraid of him. [See R. 1; R. 9; R. 37-2; R. 39.]
Taken together, and even viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Easter, it
is this Court’s conclusion that Officers Hendrix and Sasser had probable cause to arrest Mr.
Easter on a charge of Assault in the Fourth Degree, Child Abuse. Further, even if Officers
Hendrix and Sasser were mistaken as to the existence of probable cause to arrest, they are
entitled to qualified immunity. Confronted with the aforementioned facts, this Court believes it
would not “be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (citing Katz, 533 at 202). In
situations where law enforcement officers mistakenly but reasonably conclude that probable
cause for arrest exists, they should not be held personally liable; such is the purpose of the
qualified immunity doctrine. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 639, 641 (1987). Here, it is
not even clear that they were mistaken.
Therefore, the court GRANTS summary judgment on this claim to the Defendants.
2
Mr. Easter’s next claim is that Officers Hendrix and Sasser used unreasonable, excessive
force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment and § 10 of the Kentucky Constitution.
In his complaint, Mr. Easter alleges “Officer Hendrix or Officer Sasser grabbed the hood of the
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Plaintiff’s hoody and tightened it around his neck from behind . . . and executed a chokehold that
caused the Plaintiff to lose consciousness.” [R. 1.]
The legality of the arrest has nothing to do with the question of excessive force.
Determining whether force is excessive requires a balancing between “the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual” and “the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Slusher
v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 255 (6th Cir. 2008). But the Court does not need to reach the balancing
test in the case at hand. The Court is not bound to accept the unsworn allegations made in Mr.
Easter’s complaint as true for the purposes of summary judgment. See Whitehead v. Bowen, 301
Fed. Appx. 484, 489 (6th Cir. 2008). The Court does not wish to make light of or condone the
use of force that is alleged to have been used against Mr. Easter, if it occurred. But beyond the
allegation contained in his complaint, Mr. Easter makes no further citation to the record that
would allow the Court to find a genuine dispute of fact as to this issue. [See R. 1; R. 39.]
Rather, the record as cited by the Defendants seems to support that no genuine dispute exists.
[See R. 37.] Summary judgment is GRANTED for Defendants on Mr. Easter’s excessive force
claim.
3
a
Next, Mr. Easter makes a claim of false imprisonment in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights and his rights under § 10 of the Kentucky Constitution, as well as the state
law tort of False Imprisonment. These claims arise out of the cuffing that took place in his home
as well as his eventual arrest.
“A law enforcement officer is liable for false imprisonment unless he or she enjoys a
privilege or immunity to detain an individual.” Dunn v. Felty, 226 S.W.3d 68, 71 (Ky. 2007). A
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law enforcement officer has such a privilege when the arrest is pursuant to a warrant, or when
“the officer has probable cause, that is, reasonable objective grounds to believe that a crime was
committed and that the plaintiff committed it.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Similarly, to
recover for the tort of False Imprisonment in Kentucky, Mr. Easter must show “that [he] was
detained and that the detention was unlawful.” Wal-Mart Stores v. Mitchell, 877 S.W.2d 616,
617 (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
Probable cause exists where the facts are “sufficient to warrant a prudent person to
conclude that an individual either had committed or was committing an offense.” United States
v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 555 (6th Cir. 2008). Further, the use of handcuffs is not
necessarily dispositive of arrest. In some instances, circumstances warrant the use of handcuffs
in an investigative stop. See United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 2004). The
Kentucky Supreme Court has likewise found that handcuffing during an investigative Terry stop
does not always mean one is the official custody of law enforcement. See Taylor v.
Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d 521 (Ky. 2006).
In the case at hand. Officer Hendrix and Sasser were dispatched to Mr. Easter’s residence
in response to a phone call made by his mother, Libby Easter. [R. 1.] Upon arrival, Defendants
contend, and Mr. Easter has not effectively disputed, that they were invited into the residence.
[R. 37.] Upon entering, Officer Hendrix heard what sounded like a person in distress. [R. 37.]
Throughout their investigation into the source of the sound, Mr. Easter acted belligerently and
cussed at the Defendants to “get the F out of [his] house.” [See R. 1; R. 39.] Mr. Easter’s
daughter eventually told the Defendants that Mr. Easter had hit her, that he had hit her before,
and that she was afraid of him. At some point, the Defendants handcuffed Mr. Easter for his own
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safety and the safety of others in the home, and so they could continue their investigation and
interview with his daughter. [See R. 1; R. 37.]
These are the facts known by Officers Hendrix and Sasser when they initially handcuffed
Mr. Easter. Qualified immunity analysis requires they be taken into consideration in determining
whether the Defendants are liable for this conduct. Therefore, the dispositive question is whether
a reasonable officer would have believed that the use of handcuffs to detain a belligerent parent
in order to conduct an interview with a possible victim of child abuse was lawful. See Plumhoff
v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012, 2013 (2014); see also Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003, 2007
(2017). Although what occurred in Mr. Easter’s home was not a Terry investigative stop, it is
analogous. The Defendants detained Mr. Easter to prevent him from harming himself, the
Defendants, or his family members, just long enough conduct an investigation of the alleged
child abuse. Officers Hendrix and Sasser are entitled to qualified immunity, and summary
judgment is GRANTED for the defendants on this count.
The Court now turns to Mr. Easter’s eventual, explicit arrest. As explained in II.D.1,
supra, this Court finds that Officers Hendrix and Sasser had probable cause to arrest Mr. Easter
on a charge of Assault in the Fourth Degree, Child Abuse, and even if they were mistaken as to
the existence of probable cause, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Because it was
reasonable for Officers Hendrix and Sasser to find probable cause to arrest in light of the facts
before them, summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED for the defendants.
4
a
Additionally, Mr. Easter argues that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
malicious prosecution was violated. [R. 1.] To prevail on his malicious prosecution claim, Mr.
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Easter must show (1) that a criminal prosecution was initiated against him and that the
defendants made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute; (2) that there was a
lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) that, as a consequence of the legal
proceeding, Mr. Easter suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial seizure; and (4) that
the criminal proceeding was resolved in his favor. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09
(6th Cir. 2010). Where a malicious prosecution claim is alleged against an officer, “an officer
will not be deemed to have commenced a criminal proceeding against a person when the claim is
predicated on the mere fact that the officer turned over to the prosecution the officer’s truthful
materials.” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 315 (6th Cir. 2010).
Mr. Easter meets his burden with regard to prongs one and four; it is undisputed that a
criminal prosecution was initiated against Mr. Easter on the charge of Assault in the Fourth
Degree, Child Abuse, and that the proceeding was resolved in his favor when he was acquitted of
that charge in trial. However, Mr. Easter has presented no evidence that Officers Hendrix and
Sasser in any way “conspired with, influenced, or even participated in” the Kentucky state
court’s decision to prosecute. McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 444 (6th Cir. 2005).
The only evidence Mr. Easter presents of wrongdoing is an accusation that the Defendants are, in
general, “consistent liars.” [R. 39]. Officers Hendrix and Sasser “cannot be held liable for
malicious prosecution [when] they did not make the decision to prosecute,” and where the
conduct, as alleged, amounts to nothing more than “turn[ing] over to the prosecution the officer’s
truthful materials.” Id. (quoting Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 529 (6th Cir.
2002); Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 315 (6th Cir. 2010).
Furthermore, Mr. Easter’s claim also fails on prong two of the four-part test. As
discussed, supra, the facts that were known to Officers Hendrix and Sasser at the time of arrest
15
establish that the officer had probable cause to arrest Mr. Easter for Assault in the Fourth Degree,
Child abuse. Therefore, summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED in favor of the
defendants.
b
Mr. Easter also asserts a Kentucky law claim for malicious prosecution against the
Defendants. [R. 1.] Recently the Kentucky Supreme Court set forth a revised test for malicious
prosecution. See Martin v. O’Daniel, 507 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2016) (abrogating Raine v. Drasin, 621
S.W.2d 895 (1981)). Now, to prevail on his state law malicious prosecution claim, Mr. Easter
must show:
1) the defendant initiated, continued, or procured a criminal or civil judicial
proceeding, or an administrative disciplinary proceeding against the plaintiff;
2) the defendant acted without probable cause;
3) the defendant acted with malice which, in the criminal context, means seeking
to achieve a purpose other than bringing an offender to justice; and in the civil
context, means seeking to achieve a purpose other than the proper
adjudication of the claim upon which the underlying proceeding was based;
4) the proceeding, except in ex parte civil actions, terminated in favor of the
person against whom it was brought; and
5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the proceeding.
Martin, 507 S.W.3d at 11–12. As explained above, Mr. Easter has failed to establish that
the defendants acted both with malice, and without probable cause. Therefore, the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on the state law claim of malicious prosecution is GRANTED.
5
Mr. Easter claims that the force used during his arrest also amounts to assault and battery
under Kentucky State law. Assault and battery are two separate and distinct legal claims.
“Assault is a tort which merely requires the threat of unwanted touching of the victim, while
battery requires an actual unwanted touching.” Banks v. Fritsch, 39 S.W.3d 474, 480 (Ky. Ct.
16
App. 2001). A law enforcement officer who uses a reasonable amount of force in making an
arrest has not committed a battery. See City of Lexington v. Gray, 499 S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1973).
Presumably, Mr. Easter bases this claim on his allegation that either Officer Hendrix or
Officer Sasser “grabbed the hood of the [his] hoody and tightened it around his neck . . . and
executed a chokehold that caused the Plaintiff to lose consciousness.” [R. 1 at 7–8.] The
defendants deny this allegation and point to the record, arguing that neither the medical form
from booking nor the booking photograph taken at Shelby County Detention Center indicate Mr.
Easter sustained or required medical treatment for such an injury. See [R. 37.] Beyond the
allegation made in his complaint, Mr. Easter has cited to nothing that would tend to show this
incident actually occurred, and in fact other documents in the record seem to indicate otherwise.
[R. 1.] Indeed, he makes no further reference this alleged use of excessive force in his Response
to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 39.] Summary judgment is GRANTED in
favor of defendants on this count.
6
Mr. Easter’s final claim arises under the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, otherwise known in Kentucky as the tort of outrage. The Kentucky Supreme Court has
said “where an actor’s conduct amounts to the commission of one of the traditional torts such as
assault, battery, or negligence for which recovery for emotional distress is allowed, and the
conduct was not intended only to cause extreme emotional distress in the victim, the tort of
outrage will not lie.” Childers v. Geile, 367 S.W.3d 576, 582 (Ky. 2012) (citing Rigazio v.
Archdiocese of Louisville, 853 S.W.2d 295, 299 (Ky. App. 1993)).
In the instant case, Mr. Easter has not put forth facts that would show that Officers
Hendrix or Sasser were motivated by an intent to cause emotional distress in Mr. Easter.
17
Similarly, the conduct Mr. Easter alleges against the defendants falls more squarely into the
traditional torts of assault or battery. Therefore, Summary judgment is GRANTED to the
defendants on this claim.
7
As a final housekeeping matter, the Court would point out that Mr. Easter’s complaint
alleged violations of § 11 of the Kentucky Constitution. Section 11 is titled with “Rights of
Accused in Criminal Prosecution–Change of Venue.” Ky. Const. § 11. Mr. Easter has not
addressed any causes of action arising under this section of the Kentucky Constitution, and the
Court finds none. Therefore, summary judgment is GRANTED to Defendants on claims arising
under § 11 of Kentucky’s Constitution.
III
It is understandable that Mr. Easter might feel frustrated with the way he was treated by
law enforcement in light of the verdict in his jury trial. But a lawful arrest and prosecution does
not suddenly become unlawful just because the defendant is acquitted. Likewise, not every
unlawful arrest subjects the arresting officer to personal liability via a §1983 claim. Finally,
although the Court does not condone use of force against arrestees such that they lose
consciousness as alleged in Mr. Easter’s Complaint, there is simply not enough evidence aside
from this allegation present in the record to survive Defendants’ motion for Summary Judgment.
For the foregoing reasons and being otherwise sufficiently advised, the Court hereby
ORDERS as follows:
1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment shall be construed as a Response to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment;
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2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 37] is GRANTED as to all counts;
3. Judgment in favor of Defendants shall be entered contemporaneously herewith.
This the 23d day of October, 2018.
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