Jones v. Tilley et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER:1. Dfts' Summary Judgment Motions 6 7 are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and 2. Case referred to Magistrate Judge Atkins to prepare sched order & monitor discovery of this litigation going forward. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 7/26/2018.(AKR)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
ALBERT JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
JOHN TILLEY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 3:17-cv-61-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
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This is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment. [R. 6; R. 7.]
Because these motions have come early in the litigation process, they will be DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE so that additional discovery can be conducted. Further, Defendants
are denied a qualified immunity defense at this point in the litigation.
I
A
Albert Jones brings this suit against various prison officials in their individual capacities.
He alleges that these officials refused to credit sentencing as a judge ordered and held him in jail
for seven (7) months longer than his sentence required. [See R. 1 at 2.]
Jones was sentenced to ten (10) years incarceration by the Honorable Brian C. Edwards
of Jefferson County Circuit Court, Division 11. [R. 1 at 4.] His sentence was to run
concurrently to his federal sentences that he was already serving. [See R. 1 at 4; R. 7-2 at 2.]
Jones alleges his time served began on January 28, 2008, “when the bench warrant for [his]
arrest was issued.” [R. 1 at 4.] Defendants allege Jones’ sentence began on September 30, 2009,
as calculated by the Bureau of Prisons. [See R. 7-1 at 2.]
Jones alleges that, upon realizing his time served was not being correctly calculated, he
“notified Defendants Tilley, Erwin, Potter-Blair, Hall, Bentley, and Belen by at least November
25, 2014.” [R. 1 at 5.] Defendants were ordered by Judge Edwards to recalculate Jones’ jail
time credit on April 16, 2015. [See id.] Defendants claim that they did recalculate his sentence
and determined that “Mr. Jones was not entitled to credit for any additional time.” [R. 7-1 at 2;
R. 7-4 at 2.] Jones alleges that he satisfied his sentence on July 26, 2016. [R. 1 at 6.] On
February 21, 2017, Judge Edwards ordered Defendants to give Jones credit “for all time spent in
custody beginning on January 28, 2008.” [R. 1 at 6.] Jones was released from custody on
February 27, 2017. [R. 1 at 6.]
Jones brings claims against each Defendant under the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, and a claim of False Imprisonment. Defendants assert they are shielded from
liability by qualified immunity.
B
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “A genuine dispute exists on a material fact,
and thus summary judgment is improper, if the evidence shows ‘that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Olinger v. Corporation of the President of the
Church, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577, 582 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). Stated otherwise, “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
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support of the Plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury
could reasonably find for the Plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
When applying the summary judgment standard, the Court must review the facts and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Logan v. Denny’s, Inc., 259
F.3d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255). The moving party has the
initial burden of demonstrating the basis for its motion and identifying those parts of the record
that establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc.,
285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002). The movant may satisfy its burden by showing “that there is
an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325.
Once the movant has satisfied this burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings
and come forward with specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Moreover,
“the nonmoving party must do more than show there is some metaphysical doubt as to the
material fact. It must present significant probative evidence in support of its opposition to the
motion for summary judgment.” Hall Holding, 285 F.3d at 424 (internal citations omitted).
II
Defendants bring two Motions for Summary Judgment. [R. 6; R. 7.] John Tilley moves
for Summary Judgment based on the fact that he was not commissioned into his office until
December 22, 2015. [See R. 6-1 at 1.] In addition to and in the alternative, each Defendant,
including Tilly, moves for summary judgment because they are shielded by qualified immunity.
[R. 7.]
When invoked, “the doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). In evaluating claims of qualified immunity, courts generally apply a
two-step analysis. First, “[t]aken in a light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the
facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Second, the court asks whether the right at issue was “clearly
established.” Id. Finally, once a defendant has raised the defense, “the burden shifts to the
plaintiff, who must demonstrate both that the official violated a constitutional or statutory right,
and that the right was so clearly established at the time of the alleged violation ‘that every
reasonable official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right .’”
Thomas v. Plummer, 489 F. App'x 116, 119 (6th Cir.2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct.
2074, 2083 (2011)).
Jones alleges various Constitutional violations according to § 1983. “To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege [1] the violation of [2] a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show [3] that the alleged violation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” Shorts v. Bartholomew, 255 F. App'x 46, 51 (6th Cir.
2007) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)). As a
preliminary matter, there is no dispute that Defendants were officials of the state when detaining
Jones. The second element is met as well, “when a prisoner's sentence has expired, he is entitled
to release.” Shorts, 255 F. App'x at 52 (collecting cases). Accordingly, only the first element
remains, whether or not Defendants committed a violation.
Jones alleges that all Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his release date. [R. 1 at
7.] Further, he alleges that he is not bringing suit against the supervisors named under
respondeat superior, which is not permissible in § 1983 cases, but rather claims they also were
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deliberately indifferent to his release date, which is a “stringent standard of fault,” requiring that
the supervisors knew their actions would lead to a constitutional right being violated. Shorts,
255 F. App'x at 53. In order to prove deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must:
[1] first demonstrate that a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and
thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted. [2]
Second, the plaintiff must show that the official either failed to act or took only
ineffectual action under circumstances indicating that his or her response to the problem
was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight. [3] Finally, the plaintiff
must demonstrate a causal connection between the official's response to the problem and
the infliction of the unjustified detention.
Id. at 54.
Applying all these elements to the case at hand, this Court finds that granting or denying
summary judgment at this point would be premature. The factual basis needed to prove or
disprove whether a violation occurred for qualified immunity purposes does not exist at this early
stage in litigation. Jones must prove that the prison officials were “deliberately indifferent” to
his plight. Without any discovery at all, this Court finds it difficult to understand how Jones is
supposed to disprove or prove anything related to his claims. Construing all facts in his favor,
Jones has made a prima facie case by stating that he was released past the date he was supposed
to have been released and has shown that the Defendants were at least under notice from Judge
Edwards that Jones was at risk of serving more time than he had been sentenced for. [See R. 1 at
6.] Though Defendants submit some mitigating evidence, Jones still has the opportunity to prove
the actions they took to calculate his sentence constituted only “ineffectual action.” Shorts v.
Bartholomew, 255 F. App'x 46, 54 (6th Cir. 2007). Whether or not they were deliberately
indifferent is a factual question that has not been resolved.
Finally, Mr. Tilley’s argument that he was not in office when Jones was incarcerated does
not mandate summary judgment. Jones does not dispute that Mr. Tilley was sworn in on
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December 22, 2015, but claims that he was deliberately indifferent when Mr. Tilley did not
immediately release him after being ordered by Judge Edwards to do so on February 21, 2017.
[R. 9 at 3.]
Finally, though “[d]iscovery is disfavored in this context, [] ‘limited discovery may
sometimes be necessary before the district court can resolve a motion for summary judgment
based on qualified immunity.’” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 623 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting
Crawford–El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574 at 593 n. 14 (1998)). In Crawford-El v. Britton, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the District Court has “broad discretion to tailor discovery
narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery” in order to “to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” 523 U.S. 574 at 598
(1998). With this in mind, this Court finds it prudent to refer this matter to the Magistrate Judge
to monitor the sequence of discovery and make decisions on the scope of discovery permitted in
accordance with Crawford-El.
III
Accordingly, and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motions [R. 6; R. 7] are DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; and
2.
This matter is referred to Magistrate Judge Atkins to prepare scheduling order and
monitor the discovery of this litigation going forward.
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This the 26th day of July, 2018.
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