St. Clair v. Bevin et al
Filing
8
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: 1. Defendant Erwin's Motion for Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [R. 4] is GRANTED; 2. Following a screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff St. Clair's Complaint [R. 1] is DISMISSED; and 3. Defendant Erwin's Motion for Extension of Time [R. 4] is DENIED AS MOOT. Signed by Judge Gregory F. VanTatenhove on 3/2/2018.(AKR)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
MICHAEL ST. CLAIR,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
MATT G. BEVIN, et al.
Defendant.
Civil No. 3:17-cv-00065-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER
*** *** *** ***
This matter is before the Court on Defendant James Erwin’s Motion for Screening and
Extension of Time, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. [R. 4.] Under § 1915A, a Court is required
to screen a complaint when a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer.
Defendant Michael St. Clair does not oppose the screening, but maintains that his claims are not
frivolous and should not be dismissed. [R. 5.] The Court has screened Mr. St. Clair’s Complaint
and finds he has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. For the following
reasons, Mr. St. Clair’s claims are dismissed.
I
Mr. St. Clair previously filed a similar action in this Court, but the former action was
dismissed as premature. St. Clair v. Thompson, No. 3:14-CV-00056-GFVT, 2015 WL 1526118
(E.D. KY. Apr. 3, 2015). He explains, in September 1991, in Oklahoma, he was convicted of
two counts of first-degree murder and one count of solicitation to first-degree murder, and on
these convictions, he received two sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole and one additional life sentence. [R. 1 at ¶6.] In January 1994, also in Oklahoma, he was
convicted of two additional counts of murder and received two additional life without parole
sentences. Id. at ¶7. In Oklahoma alone, he has received four different life without parole
sentences.
In October 1991, while in prison in Oklahoma awaiting sentencing for his 1991
conviction, Mr. St. Clair escaped from prison, fleeing to Hardin County, Kentucky. St. Clair v.
Thompson, at *1. Upon arrival, he and Dennis Gene Reese (“Reese”) kidnapped Frances Brady
(also known as Frank Brady) and stole his pickup truck. Id. They transported Mr. Brady to
Bullitt County, where they murdered him. Id. Subsequently, Mr. St. Clair and Mr. Reese parted
ways before they were arrested separately. Id. Due to the kidnapping of Mr. Brady in Hardin
County, Kentucky, and his subsequent murder in Bullitt County, Kentucky, criminal charges
were filed against Mr. St. Clair in Hardin Circuit Court relative to the kidnapping of Mr. Brady
and in Bullitt Circuit Court relative to Mr. Brady’s murder. Id.
A
On December 20, 1991, Mr. St. Clair was indicted in Hardin Circuit Court for two counts
of receiving stolen property, criminal attempt to commit murder, and second-degree arson. See
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Michael St. Clair, No. 91-CR-00207. Later, on January 17, 1992,
the Hardin County Grand Jury indicted him for the capital kidnapping of Brady. See
Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Michael St. Clair, No. 92-CR-00002. On June 19, 1998, the
Commonwealth filed its Notice of Intent to Seek Death Penalty. Mr. St. Clair was convicted in
February of 2001 of the capital kidnapping of Mr. Brady, and he was sentenced to death. He
appealed his conviction to the Kentucky Supreme Court. On October 20, 2005, the Kentucky
Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded for a new trial. St. Clair v. Commonwealth
of Kentucky, 174 S.W.3d 474 (Ky. 2005). On remand, the Hardin County kidnapping case went
2
to trial again in 2009, but it was prematurely terminated due to a mistrial. Before the case could
be tried again, Mr. St. Clair petitioned the Kentucky Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition
barring his retrial, arguing that retrial would violate both the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
and his federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial. St. Clair v. Coleman, No. 2007SC-000901, 2008 WL 2484715 (Ky. June 19, 2008) (unpublished opinion). However, the
Supreme Court denied St. Clair’s petition. Id.
The Hardin County case went to trial a third time in 2012. The jury in the third trial
found Mr. St. Clair guilty of all counts, except for the arson charge, for which he was convicted
of the lesser-included offense of criminal facilitation of second-degree arson. In the sentencing
phase, the jury recommended Mr. St. Clair be sentenced to death for the kidnapping, as well as
sentences of twenty years in prison for attempted murder of the Kentucky State Trooper, five
years for each count of receiving stolen property, and five years for facilitation of arson, all to be
served consecutively for a total of thirty-five (35) years. The trial court sentenced him in
accordance with the jury’s recommendation.
Mr. St. Clair appealed his conviction and sentence to the Kentucky Supreme Court. St.
Clair v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2012-SC-000130-MR. St. Clair raised thirty-five (35)
claims in this appeal. On February 19, 2015, the Supreme Court reversed his convictions,
addressing only those claims necessary to its decision, and remanded for a new trial. St. Clair v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, 455 S.W.3d 869 (Ky. 2015). On April 12, 2017, Mr. St. Clair
pleaded guilty to the Hardin County charges in exchange for a total sentence of thirty years in
prison. [R. 1 at 4.] The Hardin Circuit Court entered a judgement consistent with this deal on
June 15, 2017. Id.
3
B
Meanwhile, in February 1992, Mr. St. Clair and Mr. Reese were jointly indicted in Bullitt
Circuit Court, Bullitt County, Kentucky, for the murder of Mr. Brady. See Commonwealth of
Kentucky v. Michael St. Clair, No. 92-CR-010. Mr. Reese entered a guilty plea in Bullitt Circuit
Court and agreed to testify for the Commonwealth. Mr. St. Clair pleaded not guilty and
proceeded to trial. In 1998, Mr. St. Clair was convicted of Mr. Brady’s murder and received a
death sentence, in accordance with the jury’s recommendation. On direct appeal, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction but remanded for a new capital sentencing phase trial
because the jury was not instructed on life without the possibility of parole as a sentencing
alternative. St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 140 S.W.3d 510 (Ky. 2004) (hereinafter St. Clair I
Bullitt).
In September 2005, Mr. St. Clair was again sentenced to death. In April 2010, the
Kentucky Supreme Court again reversed that sentence and remanded for a new sentencing phase
because of inadequate jury instructions. See St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 319 S.W.3d 300, 306-08
(Ky. 2010) (hereinafter St. Clair II Bullitt). Subsequently, in July 2010, Mr. St. Clair moved for
a new trial, claiming comparative bullet lead analysis (CBLA) evidence, which had been used in
the guilt phase of his 1998 trial, had recently been determined unreliable and thus inadmissible.
The Bullitt Circuit Court denied the motion in January 2011. Initially, he sought interlocutory
relief at the Kentucky Court of Appeals, but voluntarily dismissed the action because it could be
consolidated with the appeal of the sentence.
In October 2011, the Bullitt Circuit Court sentenced Mr. St. Clair to death. He appealed
both the denial of his motion for a new trial and his death sentence to the Kentucky Supreme
Court, raising thirty-two (32) claims. St. Clair v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. 2011-SC-
4
000774-MR. On August 21, 2014, the Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed his conviction for
murder and his death sentence. St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.3d 597 (Ky. 2014) (rehr’g
denied, February 19, 2015) (Ky. 2014) (hereinafter St. Clair III Bullitt).
C
While these criminal charges in Kentucky were pending against Mr. St. Clair, he
remained incarcerated in Oklahoma, serving four life without parole sentences for his murder
convictions in Oklahoma. Pursuant to the terms of an Executive Agreement entered into in
February of 1995 between the Governor of Oklahoma and the Governor of Kentucky, Oklahoma
authorities released Mr. St. Clair to the custody of Kentucky authorities for transport to Kentucky
for purposes of trial on the criminal charges pending against him in Kentucky. Exhibit 1 to
Complaint, St. Clair v. Thompson, No. 3:14-CV-00056-GFVT, 2015 WL 1526118 (E.D. Ky.
Apr. 2, 2015). In this Executive Agreement, the two Governors also agreed if Mr. St. Clair were
acquitted of the charges in Kentucky, or if his prosecution in Kentucky were terminated in any
manner other than by reason of imposition of a judgment and sentence of death, Mr. St. Clair
was to be returned to Oklahoma for continued service of his prison sentences there. Id. On May
20, 1999, the Oklahoma State Penitentiary sent a request to the Kentucky State Penitentiary to
file a detainer for Mr. St. Clair on behalf of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. [R. 1 at
4.]
Because Mr. St. Clair’s death sentence resulting from his convictions in Kentucky was
affirmed in 2014, he now requests declaratory relief as well as attorney’s fees, costs, and
expenses incurred in prosecuting this action. He seeks an order declaring his convictions and
sentences in Oklahoma are satisfied and that Kentucky is prohibited from returning him to the
custody of Oklahoma. [R. 1 at 2.]
5
II
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a district court shall review a civil complaint in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. The Court must dismiss any claim that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F. 3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010). When testing the sufficiency of Mr. St. Clair’s complaint, the Court affords it a
forgiving construction, accepting as true all non-conclusory factual allegations and liberally
construing its legal claims in the plaintiff’s favor. Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433,
437-38 (6th Cir. 2012). Mr. St. Clair does not contest that § 1915A screening is proper.
However, he maintains that his claims are neither frivolous nor malicious and that his complaint
states a claim upon which relief can be granted. [R. 5 at 2.]
Mr. St. Clair has been incarcerated in Kentucky since May 11, 1995. [R. 1 at ¶15.] He is
currently serving a death sentence. Id. at ¶ 12. Mr. St. Clair simultaneously requests this Court
to issue declaratory relief affirming the agreement between Oklahoma and Kentucky while also
alleging the agreement violates state and federal law. Id. at ¶ 10. Most importantly, Mr. St. Clair
admits that Oklahoma has not requested his return and does not allege any possibility of his
return to Oklahoma. Id. at ¶ 14.
A federal court may issue a declaratory judgment in “a case of actual controversy within
its jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. An “actual controversy” requires that the parties have actual,
adverse legal interests, not merely hypothetical or abstract controversies. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of
Hartford v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937). Mr. St. Clair has admitted that Oklahoma
has not sought his return. Nor has he alleged that Kentucky’s actions have created a reasonable
apprehension that he will return to Oklahoma. See Sankyo Corp. v. Nakamura Trading Corp.,
6
139 F. App’x 648, 651 (6th Cir. 2005). Because of this, any dispute between the parties is
merely hypothetical, not presenting an actual controversy. N. Am. Nat. Res., Inc., v. Strand, 252
F.3d 808, 812 (6th Cir. 2001). Without an actual controversy, Mr. St. Clair’s case is not
justiciable within the meaning of Article III. Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 749 (1998).
Therefore, his complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
III
Accordingly, and the Court being sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.
Defendant Erwin’s Motion for Screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [R. 4] is
GRANTED;
2.
Following a screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff St. Clair’s
Complaint [R. 1] is DISMISSED; and
3.
Defendant Erwin’s Motion for Extension of Time [R. 4] is DENIED AS MOOT.
This the 2d day of March, 2018.
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?