Arriola et al v. Commonwealth of Kentucky et al

Filing 296

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER : 1. Motions for Summary Judgment 278 , 279 and 280 are DENIED without prejudice; 2. Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages 277 is denied as MOOT; 3. This matter is REMANDED to the Franklin Circuit Court; and 4. This matter is STRICKEN from the Courts docket. Signed by Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove on 3/29/24.(CBD)cc: COR, Franklin Circuit Court Clerk

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
FRANKFORT
KEITH BRAMBLETT, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, et
al.,
Defendants.

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Crim. No. 3:17-cv-00100-GFVT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
&
ORDER

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This matter is before the Court upon multiple motions for summary judgment. [See R.
278-280.] This case—at one time like an imposing kudzu vine that swiftly grew in its number of
claims and its number of parties—has been steadily pruned to its current state. All that remains
are two pendent state law claims. Now, the Parties stand before this Court and ask it to resolve
those claims as a matter of law. But it has been brought to the Court’s attention that there is a
material dispute regarding the scope of the Plaintiffs’ class previously certified by the Franklin
Circuit Court. And although this Court could resolve the remaining state law claims, it is not
required to do so. Thus, for the reasons that follow, the Parties’ motions will be DENIED, and
this matter will be REMANDED to the Franklin Circuit Court.
I
In September 2012, a group of inmates incarcerated in Kentucky Department of
Corrections facilities alleged that they had been improperly denied educational good time credits
for having completed educational or behavior modification programs. [R. 222 at 2.] Twelve
years have now passed since the inception of this litigation, during which time Plaintiffs have

amended their Complaint eight times, attained class certification, removed named Plaintiffs,
added named Plaintiffs, and conducted massive discovery. Moreover, by Court order, the
Kentucky Department of Corrections’ records were subjected to an extensive audit which led to
the discovery of an “abysmally managed” system of state recordkeeping, uncovered the
existence of thousands of inmates who were either facing potential overincarceration or had
already been overincarcerated by the Commonwealth, and cost Kentucky taxpayers over twenty
million dollars. [R. 51; R. 225; see R. 195 at 87.] Because of this litigation, the Kentucky
Department of Corrections has issued an official course catalog, has granted credit to many class
members, and has overhauled portions of its inadequate processes. [See R. 157; R. 195 at 79; R.
230.] Additionally, since the inception of this litigation, various original plaintiffs have served
their sentences and been released from incarceration. [See R. 230 at 3 (noting the in-person
presence of Plaintiff Bramblett)].
Previously, the Parties reached the summary judgment stage and the Court found that the
Plaintiffs would not succeed on their Section 1983 claims. [R. 231.] Now, the Parties are back.
In their motions, the Defendants ask this Court to rule as a matter of law that they are not liable
under the Plaintiffs’ two remaining causes of action—one alleging negligence, the other alleging
false imprisonment. 1 [R. 278-79.] Conversely, the Plaintiffs maintain in their motion that partial
summary judgment on the issue of negligence is appropriate. [R. 280.] The Court turns now to
the pending motions.

At the time of briefing, numerous state law claims remained pending. On December 15, 2023, the Parties
submitted an Agreed Stipulation that dismissed all but two of the Plaintiffs’ state law claims. [R. 290-91.] Thus, the
only causes of action that remain are for negligence and false imprisonment. [See R. 290.]

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II
A
In their motions for summary judgment, the Defendants raise a plethora of arguments as
to why they are not liable for negligence or for false imprisonment. [R. 278-1; R. 279.] One
issue in particular, however, gives the Court great pause: class certification and standing. In
June 2015, before this litigation had been removed to federal court, the Franklin Circuit Court
certified the then-named Plaintiffs “as class representatives for a class of inmates incarcerated by
the [Department of Corrections] who have sought, or are seeking, the award of sentence credits
under KRS 197.045 through completion of educational or behavior modification programs
offered by DOC for the time period of five years preceding the filing of this action.” [R. 1-3 at
369.]
The Defendants assert that the Released Plaintiffs—the former inmates who are now
seeking damages for the denial of their good time credit—must establish that they themselves
suffered harm before their claims may proceed. [R. 278-1 at 8.] According to the Defendants,
all but one of the Released Plaintiffs lack standing as class representatives because they were
eventually credited with all of the educational, vocational, and behavioral good time credits to
which they were entitled. Id. at 8-9. The Defendants’ argument is based on the premise that
neither the Franklin Circuit Court nor this Court has certified a class for the purpose of damages.
[R. 286 at 2; R. 287 at 5] (emphasis added). They aver that the Franklin Circuit Court granted
class certification for the purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief only. [R. 286 at 2; R. 287
at 5-6.] Thus, because a class has not been certified to allow the representative Plaintiffs to seek
damages for others, those Plaintiffs are left with proving their individual claims for monetary

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damages. Because those remaining Plaintiffs have proffered no proof that they suffered any
individual injury, then the Defendants must prevail as a matter of law on the remaining state law
claims.
The Plaintiffs disagree with the Defendants’ interpretation of the Franklin Circuit Court’s
2015 Order granting class certification. It seems that according to the Plaintiffs, the certified
class was certified for damages, along with injunctive and declaratory relief. [R. 285 at 2-5.]
That being the case, argue the Plaintiffs, the Defendants have not supported their argument with
admissible evidence that the named Plaintiffs no longer have standing. Id. The Plaintiffs state
that a “conclusory affidavit” proffered by the defense is insufficient to support the Defendants’
conclusion that all but one of the named Plaintiffs have been correctly awarded their good time
credit. Id. at 3-5. And, even if the named Plaintiffs’ claims for damages were mooted by events
subsequent to the Franklin Circuit Court’s certification of the class, that does not deprive the
named Plaintiffs of standing to represent class members who still have damages claims arising
from their over-detention. Id. at 5-6.
Subsequent to the briefing period, this Court ordered a hearing on the pending summary
judgment motions so that the Parties could further elucidate their arguments on certain issues.
[R. 292.] After procuring a deeper understanding of the Parties’ arguments it now seems
apparent that whether or not a class was certified for damages will substantively affect how this
matter moves forward in its waning hours. The answer will determine whether the named
Plaintiffs have standing to represent a class of thousands of overincarcerated inmates, or whether
the Court will be inundated with a battalion of damages claims by individual plaintiffs.
Although after consider consideration the Court believes that it has the discretion to interpret the

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Franklin Circuit Court’s 2015 Order granting class certification, there exists a more equitable
arbiter to determine the scope of class certification—the Franklin Circuit Court itself.
B
Where a lawsuit consists of more than one claim, and the District Court has valid
jurisdiction over at least one of those claims, the District Court will have supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that form “part of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). But a court “may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” in one of
four situations:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district
court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
Id. § 1367(c). “Once a federal court no longer has federal claims to resolve, it ‘should not
ordinarily reach the plaintiff’s state-law claims.’” Southard v. Newcomb Oil Co., LLC, 7 F.4th
451, 455 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir.
2006)); see Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254-55 (6th Cir.
1996) (“When all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually
will point to dismissing the state law claims, or remanding them to state court if the action was
removed”). Supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right.”
United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

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When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any remaining state
law claims, the Court considers “the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and
comity.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). “The length of time the
parties have spent litigating the case before the court, the breadth of discovery compiled into the
record, and whether thoroughly briefed motions remain before the court are factors that impact
judicial economy.” Shehata v. Blackwell, No. 20-cv-012, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77049 at *6
(E.D. Ky. May 3, 2023). These interests should be balanced against “needlessly deciding state
law issues.” Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (1993).
The Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims, which were not added until the Sixth Amended
Complaint, prompted removal to the Eastern District. [See R. 1.] Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
this Court had original jurisdiction over those claims because of their federal nature. Because the
concurrent state law claims arose of a “common nucleus of operative fact,” exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 was
appropriate. See United Mine Workers of Am., 383 U.S. at 725. After disposing of the Plaintiffs’
federal claims [see R. 231], this Court, using its discretion, found it appropriate to continue
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims rather than remanding
those claims to the Franklin Circuit Court. At this juncture, however, the Court finds that the
best course of action may be allowing this case to end in the forum where it began.
First, all that remains are the two pendent state law claims—one for negligence and
another for false imprisonment. While this Court is more than capable of considering these tort
actions on their face, the Defendants have raised the affirmative defense of state qualified

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immunity. [See R. 278-1 at 16, 21-23; R. 279 at 23-24.] Under Kentucky law, “[q]ualified
official immunity applies to the negligent performance by a public officer or employee of
(1) discretionary acts or functions i.e., those involving the exercise of discretion and judgment, or
personal deliberation, decision, and judgment, (2) in good faith; and (3) within the scope of the
employee’s authority.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 522 (2001). Given the rather complex
nature of Kentucky’s qualified immunity analysis, and of this case, the Court finds that principles
of federalism and the value of comity lean towards allowing Kentucky’s own courts to make the
final call on qualified immunity should it be necessary. That is especially true where, as here,
there are multiple named defendants who served at various levels of state government. Thus,
rather than impose itself unnecessarily into an area of law rife with judicial peril, the Court finds
that the state forum is the preferred forum to make any determinations on state qualified
immunity. Moreover, this case: (a) is now based solely on Kentucky tort law; (b) involves
defendants employed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky; and (3) is brought by plaintiffs who
were incarcerated by Kentucky’s Department of Corrections. Kentucky’s courts, therefore, are
better equipped to jockey this matter across the finish line.
And second, as discussed above, the issue of class certification presents an exceptional
circumstance that favors this Court’s declination of exercising supplemental jurisdiction. This
Court is not the best arbiter to interpret what the Franklin Circuit Court ordered in 2015. But
who is? The Franklin Circuit Court. Too much is at stake for this Court to fasten its own
determination to Judge Shepherd’s words when it could more effectively permit Judge Shepherd 2
to articulate the meaning of his holding. Issues of comity demand no less. Thus, remand to the
Franklin Circuit Court is the most appropriate disposition.
2

The Honorable Phillip Shepherd, Franklin Circuit Court. [See R. 1-3 at 370.]

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III
The Court is conscious of the nearly seven years that this case has spent in the federal
forum. Judicial economy alone might support this Court seeing this case through to its end. But
for the reasons elucidated above, passing the ball back to the original point guard to take the final
shot before time expires is in every player’s best interest. Accordingly, and the Court being
otherwise sufficiently advised, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. The Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment [R. 278; R. 279; R. 280] are DENIED
without prejudice;
2. The pending Motion for Leave to File Excess Pages [R. 277] is denied as MOOT;
3. This matter is REMANDED to the Franklin Circuit Court; and
4. This matter is STRICKEN from the Court’s docket.
This the 29th day of March 2024.

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