Smith et al v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government et al

Filing 85

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: IT IS ORDERED that Pla's 84 MOTION to Vacate, Alter, Amend And/Or To Set Aside Order granting summary judgment is DENIED. Signed by Judge Joseph M. Hood on 6/7/2011.(GLD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON
EUGENE SMITH, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY
GOVERNMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 5:08-183-JMH

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

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This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion to
Vacate, Alter, Amend and/or To Set Aside Order Granting Summary
Judgment to Defendants [DE 84], pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
The Court being adequately advised, this motion is ripe for
decision.
A motion to alter or amend a judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e) should be granted only where “there is a
clear error of law, newly discovered evidence, an intervening
change in controlling law, or to prevent manifest injustice.”
GenCorp, Inc. v. Am. Int'l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 804, 834 (6th
Cir. 1999) (internal citations omitted). The motion does not serve
as “an opportunity to re-argue a case.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998).
Accordingly, a party should not use this motion “to raise arguments

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which could, and should, have been made before judgment issued.”
Id. (quoting FDIC v. World Univ. Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.
1992)).
In their Motion, Plaintiffs do little more than announce their
disagreement

with

the

Court’s

earlier

decisions.

They

have

identified no clear error of law, newly discovered evidence,
intervening change in controlling law, or manifest injustice which
must be prevented.

Further, it is unclear from their Motion that

Plaintiffs appreciate – even if they ultimately disagree with it –
the Court’s reasoning in its decision to dismiss their claims.
First, Plaintiffs argue that the Court erred when it concluded
that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994), in part because Plaintiff LaToy Smith was never a
defendant in a criminal action. In fact, the Court recognized this
fact and stated that it did not reach the conclusion that Heck v.
Humphrey barred her claims because they failed for other reasons
articulated by the Court.

[See DE 81 at 11, n. 3.]

Next, Plaintiffs complain that the Court did not understand
Plaintiffs’ position that they were injured by the LexingtonFayette

Urban

County

Government’s

(“LFUCG”)

Asset

Forfeiture

Procedure when it considered their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
However, the Court concluded Plaintiffs had not identified how the
Asset Forfeiture Procedure violated their right to be free from
unlawful search and seizure [Id. at 14, n.4] and that “Plaintiffs

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. . . identified no LFUCG policy whatsoever which would promote .
. . injustice through the acts of its officers,” a statement which
clearly extends to the Asset Forfeiture Procedure.
Finally,

Plaintiffs

argue

that

it

was

error

to

deny

Plaintiffs’ Objection and Motion to Strike Argument in Defendant
LFUCG’s Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 56] as moot, without
issuing a reasoned ruling on it.1

In that Motion, Plaintiffs

requested that the Court strike LFUCG’s argument in its Motion for
Summary Judgment to the extent that it was based on Plaintiffs’
“settlement agreement and conciliation of pending matters,” i.e.,
the plea agreement and agreed order in Lexington Criminal Action
No. 08-cr-172 and Lexington Civil Action No. 08-265-JMH, as well as
any argument raised regarding waiver and judicial estoppel arising
out

of

that

agreement

and

order,

on

the

grounds

that

documents were inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 408.

those
In its

Memorandum Opinion and Order of May 9, 2011 [DE 81], the Court
neither

relied

upon

nor

resolved

LFUCG’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment on any ground related to the plea agreement, agreed order,
or any argument raised regarding waiver and judicial estoppel.

In

other words, the Court did not need to reach the issue of whether
those materials were admissible under Fed. R. Civ. P. 408 and
declined to do so.

It could not, therefore, be error for the Court

1

Defendant LFUCG filed a Response stating its opposition to
that motion [DE 57].
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to dismiss the motion as moot.
Having considered all of Plaintiffs’ arguments, the Court
concludes that they have set forth no reason that this Court should
vacate, alter, or amend its Orders or Judgment [DE 81, 82, 83] of
May 9, 2011.

In the absence of a clear error of law, newly

discovered evidence, intervening change in controlling law, or
manifest injustice which must be prevented, their request for
relief fails.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Vacate,
Alter, Amend and/or To Set Aside Order Granting Summary Judgment to
Defendants [DE 84] is DENIED.
This the 7th day of June, 2011.

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