Owen v. SSA
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: (1) Pla's 19 MOTION for Summary Judgment is DENIED; (2) Dft's 20 MOTION for Summary Judgment is GRANTED; (3) the administrative decision of Administrative Law Judge Don C. Paris will be AFFIRMED by separate judgment. Signed by Judge Danny C. Reeves on 10/12/2012.(DAK)cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
(at Lexington)
DAWN TRINETTE OWEN,
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Plaintiff,
V.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 5: 08-365-DCR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
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This matter is pending for consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment filed
by Plaintiff Dawn Trinette Owen (“Owen” or “the Claimant”) and Defendant Michael J. Astrue,
Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”). [Record Nos. 19, 20] Owen argues
that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) assigned to her case erred in his evaluation of the
medical source opinions regarding her psychological impairments. She seeks reversal of the
ALJ’s decision and an award of benefits. However, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will grant the Commissioner’s motion and deny the relief sought by
Owen.
I.
On October 18, 2005, Owen applied for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. [Tr., pp. 148-50] She alleged a disability
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beginning August 5, 2005. [Tr., p. 148] The applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration. Owen then filed a complaint in this Court. [Record No. 1] However, the
Commissioner moved to remand the case pursuant to Sentence Six of 42 U.S.C. 405(g) to
“remove non-relevant evidence from the administrative record,” evaluate additional evidence,
and “secure medical/vocational expert testimony as necessary, and address all medical opinions
of record.” [Record No. 8, p. 1] The Court granted the motion and remanded the action. [Record
No. 10]
On remand, the ALJ conducted additional hearings on June 21, 2010 and January 4, 2011.
[Tr., pp. 1090-1132] Owen and her attorney Rodney Davis appeared before ALJ Don C. Paris
at these hearings, along with vocational experts Martha Goss and Linda Taber. [Tr., pp. 1090,
1111] In a decision dated February 4, 2011, ALJ Paris found that Owen was not disabled under
sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act. [Tr., p. 871] The Appeals Council
declined review on September 28, 2011. [Tr., pp. 849-50]
Owen was forty-two years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision. [Tr., p. 148] She has
a bachelor’s degree and previously worked as a social worker. [Tr., pp. 804-06] Her alleged
disability stems from depression, anxiety, chronic pain syndrome, irritable bowel syndrome,
migraines, TMJ, cervical strain, chronic joint pain, fibromyalgia, and lumbar pain with
radiculopathy. [Record No. 19, p. 4] After reviewing the record and the testimony presented
at the hearings, the ALJ concluded that Owen suffered from a combination of severe
impairments, including: degenerative disc disease at C5-6 with pain and upper extremity
radiculopathy; fibromyalgia; major depressive disorder recurrent; panic disorder without
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agoraphobia; and trochanteric bursitis. [Tr., p. 862] Notwithstanding these impairments, ALJ
Paris found that Owen retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work.
[Tr., p. 867] Regarding the claimant’s mental impairments, the ALJ found that Owen had
the mental capacity to understand, remember and carry out simple work
instructions; sustain attention and concentration to perform such tasks in 2-hour
segments in an 8-hour workday; can adequately relate to co-workers and
supervisors in a low-stress object-focused work environment in which contact is
casual and infrequent in a non-public work setting and adapt to a routine work
environment without excessive productivity demands.
[Id.] As a result of the ALJ’s assessment, Owen was denied a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits. [Tr., p. 871]
II.
Under the Social Security Act, a “disability” is defined as “the inability to engage in
‘substantial gainful activity’ because of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment
of at least one year’s expected duration.” Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 539 (6th
Cir. 2007). A claimant’s Social Security disability determination is made by an ALJ in
accordance with “a five-step ‘sequential evaluation process.’” Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
459 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)). If the
claimant satisfies the first four steps of the process, the burden shifts to the Commissioner with
respect to the fifth step. See Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003).
First, the claimant must demonstrate that she is not engaged in substantial gainful
employment at the time of the disability application. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Second, the
claimant must show that she suffers from a severe impairment or combination of impairments.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Third, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful employment
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and has a severe impairment which is expected to last for at least twelve months and which meets
or equals a listed impairment, she will be considered disabled without regard to age, education,
and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). Fourth, if the Commissioner cannot make a
determination of disability based on medical evaluations and current work activity and the
claimant has a severe impairment, the Commissioner will then review the claimant’s RFC and
relevant past work to determine whether she can perform her past work. If she can, she is not
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
Under the fifth step of the analysis, if the claimant’s impairment prevents her from doing
past work, the Commissioner will consider her RFC, age, education, and past work experience
to determine whether she can perform other work. If she cannot perform other work, the
Commissioner will find the claimant disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). The Commissioner has
the burden of proof only on “the fifth step, proving that there is work available in the economy
that the claimant can perform.” White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 312 F. App’x 779, 785 (6th Cir.
2009) (quoting Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 203 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 1999)).
Judicial review of the denial of a claim for Social Security benefits is limited to
determining whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the
correct legal standards were applied. Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir.
2007). The substantial-evidence standard presupposes that there is a zone of choice within
which decision makers can go either way, without interference from the court. McClanahan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006). Substantial evidence is such relevant
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support the conclusion. Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed even
if the Court would decide the case differently and even if the claimant’s position is also
supported by substantial evidence. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876 (6th Cir.
2007); Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007); Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005); Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d
1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, the Commissioner’s findings are conclusive if they are
supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
III.
Owen argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the medical source opinions
regarding her psychological impairments. Specifically, she asserts that the opinion of her
primary therapist, Melissa Neal, LCSW, should have been given substantial weight by the ALJ.
[Record No. 19, p. 6] Owen maintains that ALJ Paris erred when he discounted Dr. Dennis B.
Sprague’s analysis of her mental functional capacity. Moreover, Owen contends that the ALJ
failed to set forth any basis for his rejection of the reports by Dr. Sandra Medley and Dr. Stuart
A. Cooke. [Id., p. 8] Finally, she argues that the RFC adopted by ALJ Paris was not supported
by the evidence in the record. [Id., p. 9]
A.
Weight of Medical Source Evidence
1.
Melissa Neal
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Owen asserts that the report submitted by her therapist, Ms. Neal, should have been
accorded substantial weight due to the length of their treatment relationship. Ms. Neal
completed a form entitled Ҥ 8:63 Medical Statement Concerning Depression for Social Security
Disability Claim,” on which she indicated that Owen experiences marked restrictions on the
“activities of daily living” and extreme difficulty “maintaining social functioning.” [Tr., p. 683]
Ms. Neal also noted marked impairment in other areas, including Owen’s “ability to work in
coordination with and proximity to others,” and “ability to respond appropriately to changes in
the work setting.” [Tr., pp. 684-85]
A treating source’s medical opinion will be given controlling weight if it is “wellsupported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the claimant’s record.
20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c)(2). However, as the Commissioner points out, Melissa Neal’s report is not
“evidence from [an] acceptable medical source[].” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). Neal is a licensed
clinical social worker and, as such, is not a source “who can provide evidence to establish an
impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a). Although her opinion may be used “to show the severity
of [the claimant’s] impairment(s) and how it affects [her] ability to work,” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1513(d), it is not entitled to controlling weight. Yoakem v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10cv-639, 2011 WL 5870827, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2011) (noting that a social worker’s
report is “not entitled to controlling weight, nor is it treated as a medical opinion”).
The ALJ evaluated Ms. Neal’s opinion regarding Owen’s impairments and assigned it
little weight. ALJ Paris indicated that he considered Neal’s report but found it “inconsistent with
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the weight of the evidence, particularly the reports from treating psychiatrist Dr. David Atcher.”
[Tr., p. 869] Indeed, Ms. Neal’s own treatment notes and medical statement are devoid of any
specific clinical findings that would support the marked limitations she imposed on Owen’s
functioning. [See Tr., pp. 413-25, 705-09, 783-89, 893-903, 908-10, 915-39, 1089] Based on
these considerations, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not err in discounting Neal’s opinion
regarding Owen’s ability to work.
2.
Dr. Sprague
Owen also objects to the ALJ’s treatment of the report filed by Dr. Sprague, a
consultative examiner. As the Commissioner points out, the RFC was “largely consistent with
the opinion” by Dr. Sprague. [Record No. 20, p. 4] However, ALJ Paris rejected several of Dr.
Sprague’s limitations on Owen’s capacity to work where they conflicted with the RFC.
Specifically, the ALJ discounted Dr. Sprague’s opinion that Owen exhibited moderate to marked
impairment in her “ability for sustained concentration and attention,” her “ability to handle the
stressors of everyday living,” her “ability to do complex task functions in the work arena,” and
her “capacity for reliability and consistency in work-related efforts.” [Tr., p. 1077]
The ALJ rejected Dr. Sprague’s findings of marked limitations because they were
inconsistent with the “psychiatric progress notes.”1 [Tr., p. 869] Owen asserts that Dr. Atcher’s
notes actually support the limitations findings by Dr. Sprague. Indeed, some of Dr. Atcher’s
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Although Owen expresses confusion about “which progress notes [the ALJ] was referring to and from
which medical source,” [Record No. 19, p. 7], the Court concludes that, taken in context, the ALJ was
comparing Dr. Sprague’s opinion to the progress notes made by Owen’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. David
Atcher. [See Tr., p. 868 (“Progress notes from [Owen’s] treating psychiatrist reflect that she is emotionally
stable and has responded well to psychotropic medication.”).]
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findings may arguably provide support for Dr. Sprague’s analysis. [See Tr., p. 1034 (noting “low
energy during the day”).] However, the fact that the progress notes show general improvement
over the course of Owen’s treatment, in addition to Dr. Atcher’s assessment of Owen’s thought
content and process as “Normal,” also provides substantial evidence for the ALJ’s rejection of
the marked limitations contained in Dr. Sprague’s report. [See Tr., pp. 1020-60.] And the
“findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the
record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762,
772 (6th Cir. 2001). Therefore, Owen’s argument that ALJ Paris failed to provide a “sufficiently
articulable reason to reject Dr. Sprague’s report” is unpersuasive. [Record No. 19, p. 7]
The Court also rejects Owen’s contention that ALJ Paris “should have sought to clarify”
the conflict between Dr. Sprague’s report and the progress notes by “consider[ing] a follow-up
with Dr. Sprague.” [Record No. 19, p. 8] The ALJ was not required to contact Dr. Sprague or
seek additional evidence. Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c), an ALJ may choose to recontact
a medical source if, after weighing all the evidence in the record, he “cannot reach a conclusion
about whether [the claimant is] disabled.” Id. Here, the evidence in the record was sufficient
to reach a conclusion regarding Owen’s alleged disability. Moreover, ALJ Paris was not
required to recontact Dr. Sprague even if the evidence had not been sufficient, and his decision
to “make a determination or decision based on the evidence” before him was a reasonable use
of his discretion under the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(d). ALJ Paris did not err in
refusing to obtain further evidence from Dr. Sprague.
3.
Dr. Cooke and Dr. Medley
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Owen asserts that ALJ Paris erred because he “never set forth any basis for rejecting Dr.
Cooke or Dr. Medley’s report[s].” [Record No. 19, p. 8] She also argues that he failed to
evaluate the restrictions contained in Dr. Cooke’s report, which — according to Owen — was
a “critical piece of evidence” that “would have rendered a finding of disability.” [Id.] Thus,
Owen maintains that the matter should be remanded for consideration of these medical sources.
ALJ Paris considered the reports submitted by Drs. Medley and Cooke in his March 20,
2008 opinion, and described the two consultative examiners’ findings in great detail. [See Tr.,
pp. 18-19] On remand, the ALJ wrote that “[t]he medical evidence was discussed at length in
the prior decision and will only be reiterated to the extent necessary herein and to address any
new material evidence of record.” [Tr., p. 862] ALJ Paris also indicated that he “considered
opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. [§] 404.1527.” [Tr., p. 867]
Although ALJ Paris did not specifically set forth his reasons for declining to rely on the
opinions of Drs. Medley and Cooke, it was not error because he was not required to do so.
Social Security regulations require an ALJ to give “good reasons” for the weight accorded to the
opinion of the claimant’s treating physician. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Wilson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004). However, here is no such requirement
for the opinions of examining medical sources. Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 482 F.3d 873, 876
(6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Social Security Administration “requires ALJs to give reasons
for only treating sources” (emphasis in original)). In other words, ALJ Paris “was under no
special obligation” to provide a detailed discussion of his reasoning behind the weight given to
the examining sources. Norris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 461 F. App’x 433, 440 (6th Cir. 2012).
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Thus, the ALJ did not err when he “consider[ed] all the evidence without directly addressing in
his written decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party.” Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, the Court concludes that there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
decision to discount the opinions of Drs. Medley and Cooke. Dr. Medley evaluated Owen on
November 30, 2005. [Tr., pp. 371-76] She opined that Owen’s anxiety and depression stemmed
from her chronic pain, and gave Owen a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score of
56.2 [Tr., p. 375] The ALJ’s RFC determination was, for the most part, consistent with Dr.
Medley’s evaluation. The only finding that the ALJ rejected was Dr. Medley’s assertion that
Owen’s “ability to adapt or respond to the pressures normally found in a day-to-day work setting
from a mental health perspective appeared poor to fair.” [Tr., p. 376] However, this opinion was
inconsistent with the rest of the report, which demonstrated Dr. Medley’s opinion that Owen had
a good ability to understand and remember simple instructions, sustain concentration, and to
interact appropriately socially. [Id.] Thus, the Court concludes that ALJ Paris’s decision not to
adopt Dr. Medley’s opinion regarding Owen’s ability to adapt to a work environment was
reasonable.
Dr. Cooke submitted a January 29, 2007 psychological evaluation, as well as a “Medical
Source Statement” form dated April 1, 2007. [Tr., pp. 687-95] Although the form indicated that
Owen’s ability to interact appropriately with others or respond appropriately to a work
environment were markedly impaired, Dr. Cooke made no notes under the question “[w]hat
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A GAF score of 51 to 60 indicates “moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning.” [Record No. 20-1, p. 2]
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supports this assessment?” [Tr., p. 695] Additionally, Dr. Cooke assigned a GAF score of 60
to Owen in January 2007, a finding that is at odds with the marked impairments noted on his
April 2007 form. [Compare Tr., p. 693, with Tr., p. 695; see also Record No. 20-1, p. 2.] Due
to the inconsistencies between the two opinions by Dr. Cooke, the ALJ did not err by declining
to adopt the limitations in Dr. Cooke’s RFC assessment. Moreover, because Dr. Cooke was
merely an examining source, ALJ Paris “was not obligated to agree with [Owen’s] belief that the
[Cooke] report was ‘the most critical’ of all the opinions in the record.” Kornecky, 167 F. App’x
at 508. In summary, the weight given to the opinions by Drs. Medley and Cooke was
appropriate and supported by substantial evidence.
B.
RFC
Owen contends that ALJ Paris “chose to disregard the opinion of each and every
examining source and adopt his own psychological assessment.” [Record No. 19, p. 6] She
asserts that the ALJ should have relied on the “assessment[s] of functional capacity . . . from Drs.
Cooke and Sprague and Melissa Neal.” [Record No. 19, p. 8] However, a claimant’s RFC —
what tasks she can or cannot perform — is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(d)(2); see also Edwards v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 97 F. App’x 567, 569 (6th Cir.
2004) (“[The RFC] determination is expressly reserved for the Commissioner.”). The ALJ need
not “give any special significance to the source of an opinion on issues reserved to the
Commissioner.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(3). Although it would be error for the ALJ to adopt
an RFC without evaluating all of the medical source evidence, see SSR 95-5p, 1996 WL 374183,
at *2 (July 2, 1996), ALJ Paris explicitly considered all of the evidence in the record of this case.
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[Tr., p. 867] Further, the Court has determined that the RFC was supported by substantial
evidence from the record, including the majority of Dr. Sprague’s and Dr. Medley’s opinions,
as well as the assessments of state agency consultants Dr. H. Thompson Prout and Dr. Jay Athy.
[See, e.g., Tr., pp. 379, 667, 1072-78] Therefore, Owen’s argument that ALJ Paris erred in
adopting the RFC in this case is without merit.
IV.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Owen is not disabled.
Further, the Claimant’s arguments that the ALJ failed to properly consider or give appropriate
weight to the evidence of record is without merit. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
(1)
Plaintiff Dawn Trinette Owen’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 19]
is DENIED.
(2)
Defendant Michael J. Astrue’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Record No. 20]
is GRANTED.
(3)
The administrative decision of Administrative Law Judge Don C. Paris will be
AFFIRMED by separate judgment entered this date.
This 12th day of October, 2012.
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