King et al v. Taylor et al

Filing 86

OPINION & ORDER: Plas' 75 Motion in Limine to exclude the testimony of Kentucky State Police Lt. Bobby Day is hereby DENIED. Signed by Judge Karl S. Forester on May 8, 2013. (AWD) cc: COR Modified text on 5/8/2013. (AWD)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION at LEXINGTON

CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-96- KSF
ALLEN KING and BRUCE KING, as
Administrators of the Estate of Roger King

VS.

PLAINTIFFS

OPINION & ORDER

ERIC TAYLOR, in his individual capacity
as a Kentucky State Trooper

DEFENDANT

***********
This matter is before the Court upon the motion in limine of the Plaintiffs, Allen King and
Bruce King, as Administrators of the Estate of Roger King (“Plaintiffs”), to exclude the testimony
of Lt. Bobby Day of the Kentucky State Police (“KSP”) pursuant to Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharamaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 [DE #75]. This motion is fully briefed and is ripe for
review.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 25, 2009, in Boyle County, Kentucky, KSP Trooper Eric Taylor and officers

from the Boyle County Sheriff’s Office attempted to serve an emergency protective order and an
arrest warrant on Roger King (“King”). However, when the officers went to serve the EPO and
arrest warrant on King at his home, King did not answer the front door or a side door. The officers
moved to the rear of the house and saw a set of double-paned glass doors at the top of the porch that
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provided a line of sight to the interior of the house. Through the glass doors, one of the officers saw
King lying down on a couch with a blanket partially covering him. With Trooper Taylor providing
cover, one of the other officers approached the glass door, knocked loudly, announced that he was
with the Sheriff’s Department and called for King to come to the door, while also pressing his
shoulder against the door pane so that his reflective Boyle County Sheriff’s Office patch would be
visible through the glass, and illuminating the interior of the home with his hand-held flashlight.
Trooper Taylor alleges that, upon seeing the police officers at the rear of his house, King sat up on
his couch, looked at the officers angrily, retrieved a large, fully-loaded firearm (a Taurus Judge
revolver) from his left side and turned toward the officers, pointing his weapon at them. Trooper
Taylor alleges that he responsively fired his M-16 at King. King died of the gunshot wound.
Plaintiffs do not contest that King had a gun with him on the couch. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that
Taylor shot King from King’s back porch while King was lying on his couch. According to
Plaintiffs, King was not extending a gun in the officers’ direction and may have been sleeping when
he was shot.
Plaintiffs filed this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the following claims
against Trooper Taylor: (1) unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution (Count I); (2) assault and battery (Count II); and (3)
negligence (Count III) [DE #1]. Plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive damages from
Trooper Taylor [Id.].
Trooper Taylor has identified Lt. Bobby Day as an expert to testify in this matter. According
to his expert report, Lt. Day will testify that Trooper Taylor acted in accordance with his training and
accepted police practices during the execution of the warrant and EPO against King [DE #75-3].
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However, Plaintiffs argue that testimony that an officer violated, or complied with, a department’s
policies and procedures is irrelevant and inadmissible in an excessive force case. Plaintiffs argue
that the fundamental question for the jury in this case is whether Taylor exercised excessive force
and violated King’s constitutional and statutory rights. According to Plaintiffs, because Lt. Day
testified that he was not offering any opinions as to whether Trooper Taylor’s actions complied with
the Constitution, he cannot be permitted to testify.
II.

RULE 702 AND THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDINGS IN DAUBERT AND
KUMHO TIRE
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states the requirements for admissibility of expert

testimony:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on
sufficient facts or data; the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and (3) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
Fed.R.Evid. 702. Generally, this rule “should be broadly interpreted on the basis of whether the use
of expert testimony will assist the trier of fact.” Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 151
F.3d 505, 516 (6th Cir. 1998).
“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). As the Supreme Court stated in Daubert:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must
determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or
determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the
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reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts at issue.
Id. at 592-93. The proponent of expert testimony must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the testimony is reliable, not that it is scientifically correct. Id. at 593; Fed.R.Evid. 104(a).
In determining whether to admit or exclude proffered expert testimony, the court must act
as a “gatekeeper” to ensure that the expert is duly qualified to render an expert opinion, that his
testimony will assist the trier of fact, and that the proffered testimony is reliable. Id. In Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), the Supreme Court clarified that this “gatekeeper” function
applies to all expert testimony, not just scientific testimony. Id. at 147 (explaining that Rule 702
makes “no relevant distinction between ‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’
knowledge.

It makes clear that any such knowledge might become the subject of expert

testimony.”). However, the court’s gatekeeper role under Daubert “is not intended to supplant the
adversary system or the role of the jury.” Allison v. McGhan, 184 F.3d 1300, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999).
See also United States v. 14.3 Acres of Land Situated in LeFloure County, Mississippi, 80 F.3d 1074,
1078 (5th Cir. 1996)(The Court is mindful that its “role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a
replacement for the adversary system.”). Rather, “[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking [debatable] but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. In addition, the
Court should be mindful of the definition of relevance provided by FRE 401: “Evidence is relevant
if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence;
and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. “The Rules’ basic
standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.

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In 2000, Rule 702 was amended in response to Daubert and cases applying it, such as Kumho
Tire. It affirms the trial court’s role as gatekeeper and provides general standards for the trial court
to use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered expert testimony. Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 702. In fact, the advisory comments to the 2000 amendments to Rule 702 note that
“[a] review of the case law after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the
exception rather than the rule.” Advisory Committee Comments to the 2000 Amendments to Rule
702. Indeed, the trial court’s gatekeeping role does not permit it to reject admissible expert
testimony.
III.

ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs do not dispute Lt. Day’s qualifications to testify as an expert on police procedures

and training. Indeed, Lt. Day has significant experience and training in police procedures and
training, including ten years of experience as an active member of the KSP Special Response Team,
during which time his duties included high risk warrant service, warrant service planning and critical
incident management, as well as experience as an instructor at the Kentucky State Police Academy
and with OpTac (Operational Tactics) International [DE # 75-2, 75-4]. As of November 2010, Lt.
Day worked as an Operations Lieutenant at KSP Post 13 [Id.]. He has received many awards for his
service, include Post 9 Trooper of the Year in 1994 and Special Operations Trooper of the Year in
1997 and 2000, and the Ernie Bivens Outstanding Instructor Award in 2008, 2009 and 2010 [Id.].
Lt. Day has also had extensive training in SWAT and sniper tactics [Id.]. Thus, the Court finds that
Lt. Day is qualified to render an opinion in this case on police procedures and training. See Bush v.
Michelin Tire Corp., 963 F.Supp. 1436, 1443 (W.D.Ky. 1996)(“Experience is sufficient to establish

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expertise. The key issue in deciding expertise is whether the expert has sufficient experience
regarding the opinion to which he will testify.”)(citations omitted).
Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Lt. Day’s proposed testimony that Trooper Taylor acted in
accordance with his training and accepted police practices should be excluded because it is irrelevant
and, accordingly, does not assist the trier of fact. As noted by Plaintiffs, claims involving the alleged
use of excessive force by a police officer are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “objective
reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d
443 (1989). “Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under
the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”
Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (citations omitted). The proper application of this “reasonableness” test
“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the “reasonableness” of a particular use of force “must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight,” id., and “must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make
split-second judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving - about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-397 (citations omitted).
Because the inquiry is an objective one, “the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively
reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their
underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted). Thus, “[a]n officer’s evil intentions
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will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will
an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.” Id.
(citations omitted). With respect to the use of deadly force, the Supreme Court has held that
“[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical
harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by
using deadly force.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
Plaintiffs rely on Smith v. Freland, 954 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1992) and similar cases holding
that, in § 1983 cases, the relevant question is whether the officer violated the Constitution, not
whether that officer should be disciplined by the local police force. Id. at 347. In Smith, the Court
held that, as a matter of law, a police officer did not act unreasonably in using deadly force against
a motorist who was shot by the officer while fleeing in his car after a high-speed chase, thus
affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants. Id. at 344. The Court
noted that the fact that the officer’s actions may have violated the city’s policies regarding police use
of force does not require a different result. Id. at 347. As explained by the Court, “[a] city can
certainly choose to hold its officers to a higher standard than that required by the Constitution
without being subjected to increased liability under § 1983. To hold that cities with strict policies
commit more constitutional violations than those with lax policies would be an unwarranted
extension of the law, as well as a violation of common sense. [Plaintiff’s] position, if adopted, would
encourage all governments to adopt the least restrictive policies possible.” Id. at 347-348. Similarly,
in Woods, another case relied upon by Plaintiffs, the Court noted that “the receipt of a written
reprimand from the Jefferson County Police Department for a violation of its use of force policy is
not conclusive to whether or not [plaintiff’s] Fourth Amendment rights were violated,” nor does it
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necessarily create an issue of fact precluding summary judgment. Woods v. Jefferson County Fiscal
Court, 2003 WL 145213 at *4, FN1 (W.D.Ky., Jan. 8, 2003)(unpublished).
Indeed, these cases - which were notably all rendered in the summary judgment context support the proposition that, in an excessive force case, an officer’s compliance with, or violation
of, departmental policy is not conclusive as to whether or not the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights
were violated. Smith, 954 F.2d at 347; Walker v. Davis, 643 F.Supp.2d 921, 926 FN5 (W.D.Ky.
2009); Richardson v. Board of Educ. of Jefferson Co. KY, 2007 WL 2319785 (W.D.Ky. Aug. 10,
2007); at *2 Woods, 2003 WL 145213 at *4. Thus, an officer’s compliance with departmental policy
does not require finding that the officer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Similarly, the fact
that an officer has failed to comply with departmental policy does not always create an issue of fact
precluding summary judgment in such a case.
However, this proposition does not necessarily mean that evidence of police training and
procedures is never admissible for any purpose in a § 1983 excessive force case. Notably, “the Sixth
Circuit in Smith did not rule that [local law enforcement standards] could not be considered by a fact
finder, only that they cannot be understood to define the constitutional boundaries by which an
officer’s conduct is to be judged.” Alvarado v. Oakland Co., 809 F.Supp.2d 680, 690 at FN5
(E.D.Mich. 2011). In considering whether an officer’s actions are “objectively reasonable,” all of
the facts and circumstances confronting the officer may be considered, including standard police
procedures. Nelson v. County of Wright, 162 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Ludwig v. Anderson,
54 F.3d 465, 472 (8th Cir. 1995)(“Although these ‘police department guidelines do not create a

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constitutional right,’ Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1993), they are relevant to the
analysis of constitutionally excessive force.”)(citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 18-19)).1
Thus, in Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893 (6th Cir. 2004), a § 1983 case
alleging that police officers used excessive force in subduing an arrestee, the Sixth Circuit held that
the district court did not err in admitting the testimony of an expert witness about the use of
excessive force by police because that expert “had considerable experience in the field of
criminology and because he was testifying concerning a discrete area of police practices about which
he had specialized knowledge.” Id. at 908-909. The Court noted that “[c]ourts have permitted
experts to testify about discrete police-practice issues when those experts are properly credentialed
and their testimony assists the trier of fact.” Id. at 908 (citing Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d
1151, 1163-64 (6th Cir.1996), Kladis v. Brezek, 823 F.2d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir. 1987)). Similarly,
district courts directly considering the admissibility of expert testimony regarding police procedures
have found such testimony to be admissible, so long as the expert refrains from expressing legal
conclusions. Alvarado v. Oakland Co., 809 F.Supp.2d at 690-91 (expert may testify regarding
nationally recognized police standards governing the use of excessive force, as well as the specific
departmental excessive force guidelines to which the officer was subject, but could not opine as to
whether the officer’s conduct in arresting the arrestee was unreasonable under those guidelines or
practices); United States v. Eberle, 2008 WL 4858438 at *3 (E.D.Mich., Nov. 10,
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In Garner, the United States Supreme Court held that, although “[t]he use of deadly
force to prevent the escape of all suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally
unreasonable,” “[w]here the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat
of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable
to prevent escape by using deadly force.” Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. Notably, in evaluating the
reasonableness of a rule that deadly force may be used against any fleeing felon, the Court
examined the policies of individual police department nationwide. Id. at 18-19.
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2008)(unpublished)(expert witnesses would be precluded from expressing a legal conclusion as to
the ultimate issue of whether defendant’s conduct amounted to “excessive force,” but would be
permitted to offer testimony as to specific issues, including: 1) the continuum of force employed by
officers generally; 2) the specific training that officers receive; 3) whether defendant's conduct
violated specific police standards or practices; and 4) opinions as to whether specific actions taken
by defendant were warranted under the circumstances presented); Norman v. City of Lorain, Ohio,
2006 WL 5249725 at *3 (N.D.Ohio, Nov. 27, 2006)(unpublished)(expert may testify concerning
proper procedures to be followed in the situation facing the officer, but may not testify that the force
used by the officer was “unreasonable” or “unnecessary” or otherwise express any legal conclusions
while testifying). See also DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, 206 Fed.Appx. 418, 426 (6th Cir., Oct.
31, 2006)(unpublished)(expert’s conclusions that it was “objectively unreasonable” for the officer
to shoot the suspect; that “a reasonable officer on the scene would not have concluded at the time
that there existed probable cause that [the suspect] posed a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others”; and the use of deadly force by the officer was “improper and
unnecessary” were improper legal conclusions). Thus, the Court finds that Lt. Day’s testimony
regarding KSP’s policies and procedures is helpful to a jury considering whether Trooper Taylor’s
actions toward King were “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting him.
Plaintiffs also downplay the relevance of Lt. Day’s testimony to Plaintiffs’ negligence claim
against Trooper Taylor. Whether Trooper Taylor complied with KSP policies and procedures is
relevant to Plaintiffs’ allegations that Trooper Taylor’s conduct was negligent, reckless or wanton.
Plaintiffs argue that testimony regarding KSP policies and procedures is not relevant to their
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negligence claim because Trooper Taylor’s compliance with KSP policies and procedures does not
necessarily mean that he was not negligent. Although Plaintiffs are free to argue this point at trial,
this argument does not justify precluding evidence of Trooper Taylor’s compliance with KSP
policies and procedures altogether. Rather, Trooper Taylor’s compliance with KSP’s policies and
procedures is a factor that may be considered by the jury when evaluating whether Trooper Taylor
acted reasonably in the course of his interaction with King.
More importantly, Plaintiffs are seeking punitive damages from Trooper Taylor. Punitive
damages are available under Kentucky law if a plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that
a defendant acted with oppression, fraud or malice. KRS § 411.184(2). Punitive damages may also
be awarded where “gross negligence” is shown. Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 262-65 (Ky.
1998). In Kentucky, the “prevailing understanding defines gross negligence as a ‘wanton or reckless
disregard for the safety of other persons.’ It is not necessary that the jury find the defendant to have
acted with express malice; rather, it is possible that a certain course of conduct can be so outrageous
that malice can be implied from the facts of the situation.” Kinney v. Butcher, 131 S.W.3d 357, 359
(Ky. App. 2009)(citation omitted). Evidence regarding Trooper Taylor’s compliance with KSP’s
policies and procedures is certainly helpful to a jury determining whether Trooper Taylor’s actions
were outrageous or whether he acted with a “wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of other
persons.” For all of these reasons, the Court finds that Lt. Day’s testimony regarding KSP’s policies
and procedures, including his opinion on Trooper Taylor’s compliance therewith, is relevant and
helpful to the jury.
In the alternative, Plaintiffs argue that, even if Lt. Day’s testimony is relevant, it should be
excluded under FRE 403, as any probative value of the testimony would be outweighed by the
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potential for confusing the issues and misleading the jury. Specifically, Plaintiffs express concerns
that the jury will confuse compliance with KSP policies and procedures with compliance with the
requirements of the Constitution. It is true that an expert cannot provide testimony amounting to a
legal conclusion, such as offering an opinion that Trooper Taylor’s actions were constitutional, as
“[i]t is not for the witnesses to instruct the jury as to the applicable principles of law, but for the
judge.” United States v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)(quoting Marx & Co., Inc. v.
Diner’s Club, 550 F.2d 505, 509-510 (2d Cir.) cert. denied 434 U.S. 861 (1977)). For example,
testimony that certain behavior amounts to negligence under the law is inadmissible. Shahid v. City
of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543, 1547-1548 (6th Cir. 1989).2 However, Lt. Day does not purport to be
offering any opinion as to whether or not Trooper Taylor’s actions were constitutional. Rather, his
report clearly states only that, in his opinion, Trooper Taylor acted in “accordance with his training,
accepted police practices, and that no actions taken by Taylor violated any KSP policy and
procedure” [DE # 75-3]. In fact, Lt. Day appears to be acutely aware of the limitations of his
testimony. In his deposition, Lt. Day makes clear that he is not offering testimony about the
Constitution or the laws of the United States [DE #75-4]. Lt. Day also specifically agrees that he
is not being offered to testify that, because Trooper Taylor complied with KSP policies and
procedures, he is in compliance with the requirements of the Constitution or § 1983 [Id.]. Instead,
Lt. Day clarifies that his testimony is only “that Trooper Taylor acted in accordance with policy and

2

However, under Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “testimony in the form of an
opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.” Fed. R. Evid. 704. See also Woods v. Lecureux, 110
F.3d 1215, 1219 (6th Cir. 1997)(“Rule 704 removes the general proscription against opinions on
‘ultimate issues’ and shifts the focus to whether the testimony is ‘otherwise admissible.’”)
(citations omitted).
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procedure and accepted police practices as I have trained and taught people” [Id.]. In addition, the
jury will be instructed that their instructions on the applicable principles of the law come from the
Court, not the witnesses or lawyers. This instruction is sufficient to address the risk of confusion,
if any, resulting from the admission of Lt. Day’s testimony. Thus, the Court finds that the probative
value of Lt. Day’s testimony is not outweighed by the potential for confusing the issues or
misleading the jury.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ motion also refers to the inadequacy of the information upon which Lt.
Day’s opinions are based. However, to the extent that Plaintiffs dispute the basis of Lt. Day’s
opinions, or object to the sufficiency of the information provided to Lt. Day before he rendered his
opinions, such information goes to the credibility and weight of Lt. Day’s opinion and may be
addressed through cross examination.
IV.

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is no dispute that Lt. Day is qualified in the field of police practices and

procedures. His testimony will assist the trier of fact in evaluating whether Trooper Taylor’s actions
toward King were “objectively reasonable,” whether Trooper Taylor was negligent towards King,
and/or whether Trooper Taylor acted with malice or was grossly negligent in his interaction with
King. Thus, the Court finds that Lt. Day’s proposed testimony satisfies the requirements of Daubert
and Rule 702. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Kentucky State
Police Lt. Bobby Day [DE # 75] is hereby DENIED.
This May 8, 2013

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