Rogers et al v. O'Donnell et al

Filing 73

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Madison County dfts' 64 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to state claims against the dfts in their official capacities & as to Madison County Sheriff's Department; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the moti on is DENIED as to federal claims & as to state claims against Madison County dfts in their individual capacities; IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Madison County dfts may submit, NLT 30 days, a supplemental motion for summary judgment that addresses the federal claims; pltfs shall have an opportunity to respond in accordance with local rules. Signed by Judge Jennifer B Coffman on 01/24/2012. (RJD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
LEXINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 10-373-JBC
JAMES J. ROGERS, ET AL.,
V.

PLAINTIFFS,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHERIFF NELSON O=DONNELL, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS.

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This matter is before the court upon the Madison County defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. R. 64. For the reasons explained below, the motion will be
granted in part and denied in part.
The plaintiffs accuse the Madison County defendants (Sheriff Nelson
O’Donnell, individually and in his official capacity as Madison County Sheriff; the
Madison County Sheriff’s Department; Scotty Anderson, individually and in his
official capacity as Sergeant with the Madison County Sheriff’s Department; and
Steve King, individually and in his official capacity as a detective with the Madison
County Sheriff’s Department) of various federal and state torts related to the
investigation and prosecution of alleged crimes stemming from a 2009 sexual
encounter involving the plaintiffs and April McQueen. The plaintiffs were acquitted
of all charges but in the aftermath of the proceedings plaintiff Rogers and Murphy
were terminated from the Richmond Police Department and plaintiff Hensley claims

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to have been forced to resign. The plaintiffs’ claims against the defendants include
malicious prosecution, abuse of criminal process, violation of privacy rights, public
disclosure of private facts, defamation, false light, conspiracy to violate civil rights,
failure to supervise, negligent hiring, and outrage.
Federal claims
The plaintiffs and the Madison County defendants both assert that the
defendants’ motion should be granted as to the federal claims. But their
conclusions appear to be substantially based on a misguided interpretation of the
court’s order granting the Smith defendants’ motion for summary judgment (R.50).
In that order the court held that the plaintiffs “have not alleged a constitutional
injury warranting §1983 relief.” Both the plaintiffs and the Madison County
defendants have concluded that this determination is “the law of the case” to be
applied universally to all defendants. But that conclusion is incorrect.
The court’s determination that the plaintiffs had alleged no constitutional
injury caused by the Smith defendants does not necessarily mean that the plaintiffs
have alleged no constitutional injury caused by any defendant. The court’s
consideration of the Smith defendants’ motion for summary judgment was based
on the facts of the case as they applied to the Smith defendants.
Because both sides appear to have been operating under mistaken
assumptions regarding the applicability of a previous order, the court will deny the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the federal claims but will provide

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an opportunity for the parties to re-brief the issue in a supplemental motion for
summary judgment and a response.
State claims
Summary judgment will be granted as to the defendants in their official
capacity and as to the Madison County Sheriff’s Department because each is
entitled to sovereign immunity, which “bars state-law actions against county
governments.” Doe v. Magoffin County Fiscal Court, 174 Fed. Appx. 962, 971 (6th
Cir. 2006), Citing Schwindel v. Meade County, 113 S.W.3d 159, 163 (Ky. 2003).
“Under Kentucky law, an officer sued in his official capacity receives the same kind
of immunity that protects the state or governmental agency for which he or she
works.” Id. (quoting Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510, 521-22 (Ky. 2002)).
As to the remaining state claims, the defendants assert that they meet the
requirements for qualified immunity. However, genuine disputes as to material fact
remain, and summary judgment will be denied as to the state claims against the
Madison County defendants in their individual capacities.
Qualified official immunity applies to the negligent performance by a public
officer or employee of discretionary acts or functions; in good faith; within the
scope of the employee's authority. Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d at 510. The
plaintiffs do not attempt to refute the defendants’ immunity claim by applying the
facts of the case to the test for qualified immunity. Instead, the plaintiffs contend
that “the question of qualified immunity for [the] Plaintiff[s]’ state law claims are

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too complex to be decided at this stage in the litigation.”
The closest that either side comes to an analysis of the subject is the
defendants’ contention that “because they have not committed a constitutional
violation they have acted in good faith pursuant to the state qualified immunity
analysis.” But this conclusion is misguided in two ways. First, as discussed above,
the question of whether the Madison County defendants have committed a
constitutional violation has not yet been answered. Second, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky has "held that qualified immunity would be defeated if an official 'knew
or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if he
took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury. . . .'" Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 523 (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815, (1982) (emphasis added). It is possible for a
defendant to fail to satisfy the good faith element of the test for qualified immunity
even in the absence of a deprivation of constitutional rights. If a defendant had a
malicious intention to cause injury, qualified immunity would not apply.
The questions of whether any defendant acted with malicious intent to injure
a plaintiff, whether the defendants’ actions were made in the scope of
employment, and whether they were discretionary have not been adequately
addressed by the parties. Because genuine disputes as to material fact concerning
the applicability of qualified immunity to the state tort claims against the

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defendants in their individual capacities exist, summary judgment is not appropriate
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 as to those claims. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Madison County defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (R.64) is GRANTED as to the state claims against the defendants in their
official capacities and as to the Madison County Sheriff’s Department.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion is DENIED as to the federal claims
and as to the state claims against the Madison County defendants in their individual
capacities.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Madison County defendants may submit,
not later than thirty days from the entry of this order, a supplemental motion for
summary judgment that addresses the federal claims. The plaintiffs shall have an
opportunity to respond in accordance with local rules.

Signed on January 24, 2012

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