Hiler v. Extendicare Health Network, Inc. et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER: The Court GRANTS the 43 MOTION to Dismiss and DISMISSES Dfts Extendicare Reit, Extendicare, L.P., Extendicare Holdings, Inc., Extendicare Health Services, Inc., Extendicare Health Facility Holdings, Inc., and Extendicare Homes, Inc. from this action. Pla's Amended Complaint remains pending against Dfts Extendicare Health Network, Inc., Fir Lane Terrace Convalescent Center, Inc.. Signed by Magistrate Judge Robert E. Wier on 2/26/2013.(SCD)cc: COR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION
LEXINGTON
OMAR WAYNE HILER, as Executor of
the Estate of VIRGINIA E. HILER,
Plaintiff,
v.
EXTENDICARE HEALTH NETWORK,
INC., d/b/a Kenwood Nursing, Kenwood
Health Rehabilitation Center, Kenwood
House, and Richmond Health and
Rehabilitation Center; FIR LANE
TERRACE CONVALESCENT
CENTER, INC., d/b/a Richmond Health
& Rehabilitation Complex-Kenwood;
EXTENDICARE REIT;
EXTENDICARE, L.P.; EXTENDICARE
HOLDINGS, INC.; EXTENDICARE
HEALTH SERVICES, INC.;
EXTENDICARE HEALTH FACILITY
HOLDINGS, INC.; and
EXTENDICARE HOMES, INC.,

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No. 5:11-CV-192-REW

MEMORANDUM OPINION
& ORDER

Defendants.
*** *** *** ***
Defendants, Extendicare REIT, Extendicare, L.P., Extendicare Holdings, Inc.,
Extendicare Health Services, Inc., Extendicare Health Facility Holdings, Inc., and
Extendicare Homes, Inc. (collectively the “Corporate Defendants”), by counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the ground
that Plaintiff’s claims against them are barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and
therefore Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.1 See DE

1

In the original motion, Defendant Fir Lane Terrace Convalescent Center, Inc., d/b/a
Richmond Health & Rehabilitation Complex – Kenwwod, also sought dismissal. See DE
1

#43 (Motion); DE #46, Attach. 1 (Corrected Motion); DE #43, Attach. 1 (Memorandum
in Support of Motion). Plaintiff Omar Wayne Hiler, as Executor of the Estate of Virginia
E. Hiler (“Hiler”), filed a response in opposition to the motion (DE #51), and the
Corporate Defendants replied (DE #53). The matter is now ripe for review. For the
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the Corporate Defendants’ motion.
I.

Background
On May 13, 2011, Hiler filed a Complaint against Extendicare Health Network,

Inc., d/b/a Kenwood Nursing, Kenwood Health and Rehabilitation Center, Kenwood
House, and Richmond Health and Rehabilitation Center (“EHN”), and “unknown
defendants” in Madison Circuit Court. See DE #1, Attach. 1 at 4-8 (Complaint).2 The
Complaint raised a single claim of negligence against the defendants. See id. at ¶¶ 13-17.
Specifically, Hiler’s Complaint alleged that on May 5, 2009, Virginia E. Hiler was
admitted to a nursing home owned or managed by EHN for purposes of rehabilitating and
recovering from surgery. See id. at ¶¶ 6, 8. Hiler’s Complaint further alleged that as a
direct and proximate result of the defendants’ negligent actions or inactions, Virginia
Hiler suffered bodily injury, pain and suffering, emotional and mental distress, and loss
of life on May 14, 2009. See id. at ¶¶ 9-16.

#43. Counsel later filed a Notice of Errata and a second motion to dismiss, which clarify
that Fir Lane is not included in the motion to dismiss. See DE #46; id., Attach. 1. The
record reflects that both Fir Lane and Defendant Extendicare Health Network, Inc., d/b/a
Kenwood Nursing, Kenwood Health Rehabilitation Center, Kenwood House, and
Richmond Health and Rehabilitation Center, filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint. See DE ##47, 48.
2

Page numbers correspond to the numbers generated by the Court’s cm/ecf electronic
filing system.
2

EHN removed the case to federal court on June 15, 2011. See DE #1 (Notice of
Removal). The Scheduling Order set a deadline of February 29, 2012, for the parties to
file motions to join additional parties or amend pleadings (see DE #17), and Hiler filed a
motion for leave to amend its complaint on the deadline (see DE #24). Hiler’s tendered
amended complaint sought to add as defendants Lisa Johnson, the Administrator of the
nursing facility at the time Virginia Hiler resided there, as well as the Corporate
Defendants. See DE #24, Attach. 1. The defense objected to the motion, noting that
Johnson’s addition to the lawsuit would destroy the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. See
DE #26 at 2-4. Following a hearing on the motion, the Court denied Hiler leave to file
the tendered amended complaint as submitted. See DE #32. Specifically, the Court
denied Hiler’s motion to the extent it sought to add Johnson as a defendant, finding that
one of Hiler’s purposes in seeking to add the non-diverse nursing home administrator was
to divest the Court of jurisdiction. See id. The Court, however, granted Hiler leave to
file a new motion to amend, which would add only the Corporate Defendants, on or
before April 26, 2012. See id.
Hiler filed a second motion for leave to file an amended complaint in accordance
with the Court’s Order. See DE #33 (Motion). The defense again objected, this time
arguing that the applicable statute of limitations barred Hiler’s claims against the seven
newly named Corporate Defendants. See DE #34. Because Hiler had not had an
opportunity to address the argument, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a reply
memorandum. See DE #35. Ultimately, the Court granted Hiler’s second motion for
leave to amend, as it stated it would at the hearing on the first motion to amend, and
directed the Clerk to file Hiler’s Amended Complaint in the record. See DE #39. The

3

Court noted that the parties had not fully addressed the relation-back argument in their
pleadings. See id. The Court further noted that any Defendant could properly raise a
statute of limitations or other defense to the Amended Complaint, and the Court would
consider any fully-briefed motion. See id. Thereafter, the Corporate Defendants filed the
motion to dismiss currently before the Court.
II.

Analysis
In Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth

Circuit noted that “a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), which considers only the allegations in
the complaint, is generally an inappropriate vehicle for dismissing a claim based upon the
statute of limitations.” This is because “[t]he statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense, and a plaintiff generally need not plead the lack of affirmative defenses to state a
valid claim[.]” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)). Where, however, “the allegations in the
complaint affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred . . . , dismissing the claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Id.; see also Gibson v. American Bankers Ins. Co.,
91 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1040-41 (E.D. Ky. 2000). As with any Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
review requires the Court to “‘construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff.’” Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Kentucky law, specifically Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) § 413.140(1)(a),
sets a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Section 413.140(1)(a)’s
limitation period also applies to wrongful death claims. See Conner v. George W.
Whitesides Co., 834 S.W.2d 652, 653-54 (Ky. 1992). Pursuant to KRS § 413.180,

4

(1) If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to
413.160 dies before the expiration of the time limited for its
commencement and the cause of action survives, the action may be
brought by his personal representative after the expiration of that time, if
commenced within one (1) year after the qualification of the
representative.
(2) If a person dies before the time at which the right to bring any action
mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 would have accrued to him if he
had continued alive, and there is an interval of more than one (1) year
between his death and the qualification of his personal representative, that
representative, for purposes of this chapter, shall be deemed to have
qualified on the last day of the one-year period.
KRS § 413.180(1)-(2). The Kentucky Supreme Court has held that KRS § 413.180
applies to both personal injury and wrongful death actions. See Conner, 834 S.W.2d at
654. Thus, under § 413.180, so long as a personal representative is appointed within one
year of the date of death, he or she has one year from the date of appointment to file
personal injury and wrongful death claims on the decedent’s behalf. See Conner, 834
S.W.2d at 654. In no event may such claims be filed more than two years from the date
of death. See id.
Here, Hiler’s original and amended complaints allege that Virginia Hiler suffered
injury and death on May 14, 2009. See DE #1, Attach. 1 at 6-7; DE #40 at 9. The statute
of limitations thus began to run on that date. See Asher v. Unarco Material Handling,
Inc., 596 F.3d 313, 322 (6th Cir. 2010) (stating that under Kentucky law, the statute of
limitations on personal injury claims generally begins to run on the date of injury) (citing
Caudill v. Arnett, 481 S.W.2d 668, 669 (Ky. 1972)); Farmers Bank and Trust Co. of
Bardstown v. Rice, 674 S.W.2d 510, 512 (Ky. 1984) (statute of limitations on wrongful
death actions runs from the date of death). Hiler did not seek leave to amend his
complaint to add the Corporate Defendants until February 29, 2012, see DE #24 (first

5

motion for leave to file amended complaint), a date well beyond the statute of limitations,
regardless of when Hiler was appointed as Mrs. Hiler’s personal representative.
Accordingly, it is clear from the face of the Amended Complaint that Hiler’s claims
against the Corporate Defendants are timely only if they relate back to the date of the
original complaint.3
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15,
[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original
pleading when:
(A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations
allows relation back;
(B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to be set
out—in the original pleading; or
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party
against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied
and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving
summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be
prejudiced in defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have
been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the
proper party’s identity.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A)-(C). The proponent of relation back has the burden. See,
e.g., Smith v. Galia County Sheriff, 2011 WL 2970931, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 20, 2011)
(“Further, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the requirements of Rule
15(c) have been met.”) (citation omitted). Hiler does not contend that Rule 15(c)(1)(A)

3

Hiler filed his original complaint in state court on May 13, 2011. See DE #1, Attach. 1
at 4. The defense does not argue that Hiler’s original complaint was untimely.
6

applies,4 and because the amendment seeks to introduce new defendants, Rule
15(c)(1)(C) comes into play.
Of course, by its terms, one of the first requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C) is that
the amendment satisfy Rule 15(c)(1)(B). In other words, the amendment must arise out
of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original pleading. There is
no question the claims in Hiler’s Amended Complaint arise from the same core events as
those set forth in the original complaint. As noted previously, Hiler’s original complaint
raised a single claim of negligence against a nursing facility based on its treatment of
Virginia Hiler in May of 2009. Hiler’s Amended Complaint raises a similar claim of
negligence, as well as claims of negligence per se and corporate negligence, based on the
same factual transaction. Therefore, Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied.
Under Sixth Circuit precedent, however, Hiler’s Amended Complaint cannot meet
other requirements of the Rule. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit has held the Rule
inapplicable to amendments that name additional parties, rather than merely correcting a
misnomer or effecting a substitution of parties. See In re Kent Holland Die Casting &
Plating, Inc., 928 F.2d 1448, 1449 (6th Cir. 1991) (“[A]n amendment which adds a new
party creates a new cause of action and there is no relation back to the original filing for
purposes of limitations.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Cox v.
Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir. 1996) (“Sixth Circuit precedent clearly holds that
new parties may not be added after the statute of limitations has run[.]”). The Sixth
Circuit has reasoned that a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge regarding a defendant’s identity
4

A more lenient state rule in a diversity case could save a tardy pleading. Kentucky’s
relation back rules are consonant with the federal matrix, at least as relevant here. See
Bradford v. Bracken County, 767 F. Supp. 2d 740, 747 (E.D. Ky. 2011); see id. at 747 n.
4.
7

“does not constitute a ‘mistake concerning the party’s identity’ within the meaning of
Rule 15(c)[(1)(C)(ii)].” Moore v. Tennessee, 267 F. App’x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2008). The
Corporate Defendants are newly added parties, resulting not in substitution or a party
change but rather an enlargement of the defendant roster. Accordingly, relation back is
not permitted under current Sixth Circuit law.
The 2010 decision of the Supreme Court in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 130
S. Ct. 2485 (2010), however, has called into question the Sixth Circuit’s narrow reading
of the meaning of “mistake” under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). In Krupski, a passenger injured
aboard a cruise sued Costa Cruise Lines for damages related to her injuries. Id. at 2490.
Later, the plaintiff’s lawyer determined that Costa Crociere, S.p.A, was the proper
defendant. See id. at 2491. After the plaintiff amended her complaint to add Costa
Crociere as a party and agreed to the dismissal of Costa Cruise from the case, Costa
Crociere moved to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that the amended
complaint did not relate back under Rule 15(c). Id. The district court granted the motion,
finding, based on Eleventh Circuit precedent, that “the word ‘mistake’ should not be
construed to encompass a deliberate decision not to sue a party whose identity the
plaintiff knew before the statute of limitations had run.” Id. at 2492. The district court
concluded that, “[b]ecause Costa Cruise informed Krupski that Costa Crociere was the
proper defendant in its answer, corporate disclosure statement, and motion for summary
judgment, and yet Krupski delayed for months in moving to amend[,] . . . Krupski knew
of the proper defendant and made no mistake.” Id.
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. However, “[r]ather than relying
on the information contained in Costa Cruise’s filings, all of which were made after the

8

statute of limitations had expired, as evidence that Krupski did not make a mistake, the
Court of Appeals noted that the relevant information was located within Krupski’s
passenger ticket, which she had furnished to her counsel well before the end of the
limitations period.” Id. The Eleventh Circuit found that “[i]t was therefore appropriate to
treat Krupski as having chosen to sue one potential party over another.” Id.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts. The Court noted that, by focusing
on what the plaintiff knew or should have known as to the proper defendant’s identity,
the Eleventh Circuit “chose the wrong starting point.” Id. at 2493. Instead, the Court
clarified, the question under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is whether the prospective defendant
knew or should have known that it would have been named as a defendant, during the
Rule 4(m) period,5 but for an error. Id. According to the Court, “[i]nformation in the
plaintiff’s possession is relevant only if it bears on the defendant’s understanding of
whether the plaintiff made a mistake regarding the proper party’s identity.” Id. at 249394. The Court explained:
That a plaintiff knows of a party’s existence does not preclude her from
making a mistake with respect to that party’s identity. A plaintiff may
know that a prospective defendant—call him party A—exists, while
erroneously believing him to have the status of party B. Similarly, a
plaintiff may know generally what party A does while misunderstanding
the roles that party A and party B played in the “conduct, transaction, or
occurrence” giving rise to her claim. If the plaintiff sues party B instead
of party A under these circumstances, she has made a “mistake concerning
the proper party’s identity” notwithstanding her knowledge of the
existence of both parties. The only question under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii),
then, is whether party A knew or should have known that, absent some
mistake, the action would have been brought against him.

5

Rule 4(m) usually requires service of the complaint on a defendant within 120 days
after the complaint is filed. Thus, the Rule 4(m) period referenced in Rule 15(c) is 120
days.

9

Id. at 2494. The Court further found that “[t]he reasonableness of the mistake is not itself
at issue.” Id. On the specific facts before it, the Krupski Court held that Costa Crociere
should have known that the plaintiff’s “failure to name it as a defendant in her original
complaint was due to a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity,” especially in light
of the fact that Costa Cruise and Costa Crociere were related corporate entities with
similar names. Id. at 2498. Accordingly, the Court found that the plaintiff’s amended
complaint related back to the original complaint, and the statute of limitations thus posed
no bar to the suit.6 Id.
Krupski, then, may define “mistake” more broadly for purposes of Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) than prior Sixth Circuit case law, holding that lack of knowledge, and
particularly lack of knowledge regarding a party’s status, may qualify as a mistake. Since
Krupski, the Sixth Circuit has declined to examine its line of cases holding that Rule
15(c) does not permit relation back where the plaintiff seeks to add a new defendant. See
Beverly v. MEVA Formwork Systems, Inc., 2012 WL 4009711, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 12,
2012). District courts have reached different conclusions regarding Krupski’s effect on
prior Sixth Circuit law related to the addition of parties. See Erie Indemnity Company v.
Keurig, Inc., 2011 WL 2893013, at *2-3 (N.D. Ohio July 15, 2011); id. at 3 (citing
cases).
In Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012), the court did find
that Krupski had no effect on prior Sixth Circuit law holding that amendments that add
new parties in place of “unknown defendants” or “John Doe” defendants do not invoke or
6

The Krupski Court also found that a plaintiff’s delay in seeking leave to amend has no
impact on the Rule 15(c)(1)(C) relation back analysis. 130 S. Ct. at 2496. According to
the Court, “The Rule plainly sets forth an exclusive list of requirements for relation back,
and the amending party’s diligence is not among them.” Id.
10

fall within Rule 15(c)’s mistaken identity requirement. According to the court, plaintiffs
who name “John Doe” defendants do not make a mistake about which defendant to sue.
See id. Rather, they do not know whom to sue, and if they opt not to find out within the
limitation period, Rule 15(c) offers no relief. See id. Thus, to the extent Hiler seeks to
add the Corporate Defendants in place of the “unknown defendants” named in his
original complaint (see DE #1, Attach. 1 at 4), relation back is not permitted, and the
statute of limitations bars the claims, per Smith.
Additionally, Hiler’s amendment foundationally fails to meet the “mistake”
predicate of Rule 15(c). Even in responding to the defense motion, Hiler repeatedly
denies any mistake in naming the original defendant in the case. Thus, per Plaintiff, “It is
not disputed that the original corporate defendant was the correct defendant.” DE #51 at
2 (Response). Further, “As mentioned above, the Plaintiffs named the correct
Defendant.” Id. at 3. Rather than mistake, Hiler contends he gained more complete
knowledge about additional responsible “related corporate entities,” and thus added those
parties as defendants. See id. at 2. Rule 15(c), as relevant, hinges on a plaintiff’s
mistaken inclusion or naming of a party, and it applies when the amendment “changes the
party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted.” Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
There must have been an evident “mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” See
id. at (ii). Here, by Hiler’s own argument, Plaintiff does not contend that he sued “the
wrong one,” Krupski, 130 S. Ct. at 2494, but rather seeks to expand the list of defendant
targets by naming all entities within the original target’s ownership and structure. Hiler
did not, by amendment, replace the original defendant or re-name the original defendant.
Rule 15(c) does not permit relation back when a plaintiff learns more about a case and

11

seeks to broaden the liability sphere7 to encompass new parties in addition to one already
before the court. See Ham v. Marshall County, 2012 WL 5930148, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Nov.
27, 2012) (“[L]ongstanding Sixth Circuit precedent precludes Rule 15(c) from being used
. . . where . . . [plaintiff] did not seek merely to correct a misidentification . . . but instead
attempted to add . . . a defendant while maintaining his action against [the original
defendant].”); DeBois v. Pickoff, 2011 WL 1233665, at *12-13 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28,
2011) (discussing Krupski as not in conflict with the Sixth Circuit interpretation that “the
addition of new defendants is not consistent with Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s requirement of a
change in parties”) (emphasis in original); id. at *13 (“[A] number of district courts have,
while citing Krupski, reaffirmed the principle that adding parties is impermissible under
the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 15(c).”). To allow relation back here would, in
effect, convert Rule 15(c) into a discovery rule, for limitations purposes, something the
language of the rule simply does not support.
Further, even if Hiler’s Amended Complaint merely adds the Corporate
Defendants, rather than adding them in place of the previously named “unknown
defendants,” and even if the Sixth Circuit’s position on amendments that add new parties
is uncertain after Krupski, Hiler still cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 15(c)(1)(C).
As noted, Hiler’s original complaint asserted a claim of negligence against the entity that
owned, operated, and/or managed the nursing home that housed Virginia Hiler in May of
2009, as well as any “unknown defendants” responsible for her “assessment, treatment,
care, and protection[.]” DE #1, Attach. 1 at 5, ¶¶ 6-7. In its answer, EHN stated that it is
7

Plaintiff’s inclusion of wholly new theories of corporate liability and negligence per se
underscores that Hiler did not mistakenly name the original defendant but rather now
attempts to enhance the liability field by the addition of parties and distinct claims as to
those parties.
12

not the owner or operator of the skilled nursing facility where the events alleged in the
complaint took place. See DE #2 at 2. In its Rule 7.1 Corporate Disclosure Statement,
EHN further explained that Kenwood Health and Rehabilitation Center is an assumed
name of Fir Lane Terrace Convalescent Center, Inc., an EHN affiliate (see DE #4). Thus,
within the Rule 4(m) period, perhaps Fir Lane reasonably should have known that Hiler’s
lawsuit would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the identity of
the nursing home’s owner/operator.8 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii). Based on the
language of the original complaint, however, which only references those responsible for
Mrs. Hiler’s assessment, treatment, and care, and without a claim of corporate
negligence, the corporate owners of EHN and Fir Lane had no reason to think they were
intended defendants, but for a mistake concerning identity.9 Therefore, Rule 15(c) would
not permit Hiler’s Amended Complaint to relate back as to the Corporate Defendants, and
the statute of limitations bars any claims against them.
The Scheduling Order deadline of February 29, 2012, for the parties to join
additional parties or amend pleadings (see DE #17), a date agreed upon by the parties in
their Rule 26(f) planning meeting report (see DE #15), does not impact the Court’s
conclusion. A scheduling order deadline does not toll the running of the applicable
statute of limitations. See Bradford v. Bracken County, 767 F. Supp. 2d 740, 744 n. 1
(E.D. Ky. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Clark v. Hawkins, 41 F.3d 664 (table), 1994

8

Indeed, the facts are similar to those described in Krupski. Presumably, this is the
reason Fir Lane does not join in the instant motion to dismiss.

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Plaintiff’s list of lawsuits filed in Kentucky state and federal courts against the
Corporate Defendants (see DE #51 at 3; id., Attach. 1) does not persuade the Court that
the Corporate Defendants knew or should have known that they would have been named
in this action but for a mistake concerning identity.
13

WL 685037, at *3 n. 8 (5th Cir. Nov. 25, 1994) (per curiam) (stating that the court had
“found no authority to support the conclusion that compliance with a scheduling order
immunizes an amendment against a statute of limitations defense”).
III.

Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the motion to

dismiss (DE #43; DE #46, Attach. 1) and DISMISSES Defendants Extendicare REIT,
Extendicare, L.P., Extendicare Holdings, Inc., Extendicare Health Services, Inc.,
Extendicare Health Facility Holdings, Inc., and Extendicare Homes, Inc., from this
action. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint remains pending against Defendants,
Extendicare Health Network, Inc., d/b/a Kenwood Nursing, Kenwood Health
Rehabilitation Center, Kenwood House, and Richmond Health and Rehabilitation Center,
and Fir Lane Terrace Convalescent Center, Inc., d/b/a Richmond Health and
Rehabilitation Complex – Kenwood.
This the 26th day of February, 2013.

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