Hacker v. Lincoln County Kentucky et al
Filing
78
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: (1) The 62 Joint Motion for Summary Judgment by Dfts Lincoln County Detention Center, Jailer William Gooch, Deputy Stephanie McAnich, Deputy Dennis Ray and Deputy Rodney is GRANTED IN PARTY AND DENIED IN PART AS MOOT, and all federal claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. (2) The Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over Pla's state law claims under 28 USC 1367(c)(3) and those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. (3) A separate judgment shall enter concurrently. Signed by Judge William O. Bertelsman on November 4, 2014. (AWD) cc: COR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2011-398 – WOB
DAVID HACKER
PLAINTIFF
VS.
LINCOLN COUNTY DETENTION
CENTER, ET AL.
DEFENDANTS
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
WILLIAM O. BERTELSMAN, District Judge.
This is a civil rights action brought by David Hacker, a former
Kentucky prisoner, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
of
the
Eighth
and
Fourteenth
Hacker alleges violations
Amendments
and
parallel
Kentucky
constitutional provisions arising from an assault by a fellow inmate
at the Lincoln County Regional Jail (“LCRJ”), which resulted in the
loss of one of Hacker’s eyes.
Hacker also alleges state law tort
claims.
This case is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment by
Defendants
Lincoln
County
Detention
Center,
Jailer
William
Gooch,
Deputy Dennis Ray, Deputy Rodney Price, and Deputy Stephanie McAnich
(individually and in their official capacities).1
(Doc. 62).
The
Court heard oral argument on September 9, 2014 and took this motion
1
The Complaint (Doc. 1) also names as defendants four inmates who shared a
cell with Hacker (William Plummer, Jason Napier, David Walls, and Brett
Whitaker) and other unknown prisoners.
These individuals were never served
and thus are not discussed.
under
advisement.
After
further
study,
the
Court
now
issues
the
following Memorandum Opinion and Order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2010, David Hacker was admitted to the LCRJ after
being found in contempt of court for violating a no contact order and
terms of his probation.
Doc. 62-1, Docket Sheet.
Previously, Hacker
had been convicted of several other offenses and had been incarcerated
at LCRJ multiple times.
catalyst
for
Hacker’s
Doc. 71, Hacker Depo., pp. 106, 109-19.
criminal
history
was
a
1998
motor
The
vehicle
accident, which caused Hacker to suffer a traumatic head injury that
significantly changed his personality.
Id. at 44; Doc. 65-1, Medical
Questionnaire, pp. 1-2.
Defendant McAnich was the booking officer on duty when Hacker was
admitted to LCRJ on November 15, 2010.
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., p. 95.
At the time of his booking, Hacker completed a Medical Questionnaire,
which stated that he had a serious medical condition of a “post closed
head injury,” took medication for emotional problems, and had been
separated from other inmates during previous incarcerations at LCRJ to
keep from being beaten up.
Doc. 65-1, Medical Questionnaire, pp. 1-2.
On that same form, Hacker answered “no” to the question, “Are you
aware of any reason you should be separated from other inmates while
you are here?”
Doc. 71, Hacker Depo., pp. 197-99; Doc. 65-1, Medical
Questionnaire, pp. 1-2.
However, Hacker claims he told McAnich at the
time of booking that he did not want to be placed in a cell with any
felons because he would be in danger due to his disabilities.
- 2 -
Doc.
71, Hacker Depo., p. 199.
Hacker claims McAnich responded by laughing
and saying no one wants to be housed with a felon and that everyone
would like to be in isolation.
Id.
McAnich booked Hacker in cell 119, a protective custody cell,
designated
as
such
“safest” cell.
pp. 201-02.
because
it
was
the
“quietest,”
“calmest,”
and
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., p. 42; Doc. 68, Gooch Depo.,
According to McAnich, cell 119 is for individuals with
mental health, physical, and social issues affecting how they interact
with other inmates.
does
not
recall
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., p. 41.
what
she
reviewed
during
Hacker’s
While McAnich
booking,
she
testified that typically she would review the inmate’s institutional
history, including housing history and medical history.
Id. at 41-46.
Hacker claims that problems began when defendants Jason Napier,
David Walls, Brett Whitaker, and Billy Plummer were placed in cell 119
in early December 2010.
Doc. 71, Hacker Depo., p. 163.
Hacker needed to use the restroom frequently due to continence
issues.
Id. at 155.
Hacker alleges that beginning around December 6,
2010, for about three days, Plummer would intentionally occupy the
bathroom when Hacker needed to use it.
Id. at 155-57, 162-63, 167-68.
Plummer’s blocking of Hacker’s access to the restroom caused Hacker to
wet his pants and instead urinate in other receptacles, including a
garbage can and, on or around December 7 or 8, an empty peanut butter
jar.
Id. at 169–70.
During the peanut butter jar incident, Napier
became upset because he believed Hacker had spilled urine from the jar
on the floor beside Napier’s bed.
Id. at 157-58, 172.
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As a result, on or around December 9 or 10, 2010, Napier told
Deputy Ray about the peanut butter jar incident and asked that Hacker
be removed from cell 119.
Id. at 157-58, 172-73; Doc. 69, Ray Depo.,
pp. 129-33.
Ray spoke to Hacker about the incident, and Hacker told Ray that
he had urinated in the peanut butter jar because Plummer and other
cellmates blocked his access to the restroom.
133-34.
Doc. 69, Ray Depo., pp.
Ray told Hacker that he would move him to a new cell if he
felt his safety was in jeopardy, but Hacker did not request a change
of cells and told Ray that he was “okay.”
p. 189.
Id.; Doc. 71, Hacker Depo.,
Then, Ray spoke to the men housed in cell 119 and told them
he was aware that some men were preventing people from using the
bathroom and asked that they not have any more problems with the
issue.
Doc. 69, Ray Depo., p. 134.
Hacker alleges that over the next few days he overheard Napier,
Walls, and Whitaker trying to persuade Plummer that he could commit a
crime in prison without being charged with a second crime -- what the
men called a “freebie.”
Doc. 71, Hacker Depo., pp. 176, 179.
Hacker
claims that on the afternoon of December 10, 2010, Plummer approached
him
and
commented
about
the
“freebie”
concept.
Id.
at
178-79.
Although Plummer did not threaten Hacker directly, Hacker testified
that he perceived the statements as threatening.
Id. at 180.
Hacker claims that at 11:00 p.m. on December 10, 2010, he asked
Deputy Price to move him from cell 119.
Id. at 150, 176.
Hacker
states that Price refused to move him and said: “We offered to move
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you out once.
you.”
You will just have to get what they want to give to
Id. at 150-51.
Price, however, testified that he never had a
conversation with Hacker in which Hacker asked to be moved out of cell
119.
Doc. 67, Price Depo., p. 70.
Price also testified that he was
not working the evening of December 10, 2010 –– a fact confirmed by
LCRJ time records.
Id. at 86-87; see also Doc. 62-3, Timesheet.
On December 11, 2010, at some point between 6:30 p.m. and 7:30
p.m., Plummer assaulted Hacker in his cell.
pp. 205-07.
Holding a domino between his fingers, Plummer punched
Hacker in the eye.
prescription
Doc. 71, Hacker Depo.,
eye
Id. at 205, 209.
glasses
to
the
The impact knocked Hacker’s
ground
and
caused
vision in his injured eye, as it filled with blood.
209.
Plummer hit Hacker two more times.
yelled for help during the attack.
Hacker
lose
Id. at 205-06,
Id. at 206, 209.
Id. at 206.
to
Hacker
Hacker estimates that
Plummer hit him three times in five minutes, with one to three minutes
elapsing between each hit.
Id. at 209.
Hacker believes that it took
seven minutes after the assault for the jail staff to enter the cell.
Id.
Hacker testified
Plummer,
he
looked
up
that in between
at
the
cell
the additional punches from
window
and
saw
three
deputies
watching the assault and failing to respond to his calls for help.
Id. at 206, 209.
Hacker is not certain which staff members he saw,
but claims he saw two male deputies he believed to be Glover and Lay,
and one female deputy, who he thought was McAnich or Mobley.
206-07.
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Id. at
Deputy McAnich was working as the control room operator during
the
time
the
assault
occurred.
Doc.
70,
McAnich
Depo.,
p.
81.
McAnich was on her way back to the control room after performing
checks on the female cells when she heard a commotion in cell 119.
Id. at 81.
Upon hearing the disturbance, McAnich called on her radio
to report the fight in cell 119.
Id.
Because she was working the
control room, McAnich did not have keys to the cell 119 door on her
person.
Id. at 81-82.
McAnich then immediately returned to the
control room, and passed Masterson, Godbey and Shackelford, who were
running into cell 119 to respond to the incident.
Id. at 81-82; 102.
Deputy Ray testified that he responded “within seconds” to the
commotion
in
cell
119.
Doc.
69,
Ray
Depo.,
pp.
159-60.
After
entering the cell, Deputies Shackelford and Godbey took Hacker to the
booking area to address his medical needs; Plummer was taken to a
different cell.
Id. at 164, 172-73.
Although Hacker recalls being
taken to Fort Logan hospital by ambulance, LCRJ records indicate that
Deputy Shackelford transported Hacker there by police cruiser to save
time due to the severity of the incident.
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., pp.
52-54.
Hacker arrived at Fort Logan Hospital by 7:35 p.m.
Hacker Depo., p. 225.
Doc. 71,
At approximately 8:30 p.m., EMS technicians
transported Hacker to the University of Kentucky Medical Center for
treatment, Doc. 62-5, EMS Run Report, arriving at approximately 9:30
p.m.
Doc. 62-6, UK Admission Note.
- 6 -
Hacker returned to the LCRJ on
December 13, 2010, after being discharged from the hospital.
Doc. 71,
Hacker Depo., p. 229.
Hacker was released from LCRJ on February 11, 2011.
230, 232.
Lincoln
On December 8, 2011,
County
Defendants
and
Walls and unknown inmates.
Id. at
Hacker filed this action against the
inmates
Plummer,
Doc. 1, Complaint.
Napier,
Whittaker,
In addition to his
federal claims, Hacker brought state law claims of failure to classify
under
Ky.
Admin.
respondeat
Regs.
superior,
3:110,
assault,
negligent
battery,
supervision,
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id.
civil
conspiracy,
negligence,
and
On April 30, 2014,
Defendants Lincoln County, McAnich, Ray, Price, and Gooch moved for
summary judgment.
Doc. 62.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
court
“must
consider
‘whether
the
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
evidence
presents
a
A
sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so onesided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Rouster v.
Cnty. of Sagniaw, 749 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2014)(quoting Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)).
whether
there
is
a
genuine
dispute
as
to
a
In determining
material
fact,
“we
interpret the facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in
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favor of the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
B. Federal Claims
“Being violently assaulted in prison is simply not ‘part of the
penalty
that
society.’”
criminal
Farmer
offenders
v.
Brennan,
pay
511
for
U.S.
their
825,
offenses
834
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
(1994)
against
(quoting
However, “not . . .
every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . .
translates
into
constitutional
liability
responsible for the victim’s safety.”
A
prison
requirements
official
are
met:
violates
(1)
the
for
prison
officials
Id. at 834.
the
Eighth
alleged
Amendment
deprivation
is
when
two
objectively
sufficiently serious, and (2) the prison official has a sufficiently
culpable state of mind, amounting to deliberate indifference.
Id.
The Supreme Court has held that:
a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of
confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,
and he must also draw the inference.
Id.
at
837.
A
prison
official
may
demonstrate
that
he
was
not
deliberately indifferent to a risk to an inmate’s safety by showing he
did not know of the underlying facts indicating substantial danger,
and
was
therefore
unaware
of
the
danger,
or
that
he
knew
the
underlying facts, but believed that the risk to which the facts gave
rise was insubstantial or nonexistent.
- 8 -
Id. at 844.
“‘Because . . .
prison officials who lacked knowledge of a risk cannot be said to have
inflicted punishment,’ the question of what [the officials] knew is
paramount.”
2012)
Cobbs v. Pramstaller, 475 F. App’x 575, 581 (6th Cir.
(quoting
Farmer,
511
U.S.
at
843).
The
individual defendant must be analyzed separately.
liability
of
each
Phillips v. Roane
Cnty., Tenn., 534 F.3d 531, 542 (6th Cir. 2008).2
It is undisputed that Billy Plummer’s December 11, 2010 assault
on Hacker is sufficient to create an issue of fact as to the objective
element of Hacker’s Eighth Amendment claim.
However, this claim fails
because Hacker is unable to demonstrate that any of the Defendants
acted with deliberate indifference, as required by the second prong of
the test.
Initially,
however,
Plaintiff’s
argument
that
all
of
the
Defendants should have realized Plummer posed a risk of harm to Hacker
due
to
Plummer’s
suicidal
history
and
mental
health
issues
fails
because there is no evidence any of the defendants were aware of such
a risk prior to the assault.
See Taylor v. Little, 58 F. App’x 66, 68
(6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the argument that an inmate’s propensity
for
violence
towards
one
prisoner
was
sufficient
to
put
prison
officials on notice that the inmate might attack another prisoner,
when the two have no apparent connection).
2
The evidence demonstrates
The Court sympathizes with Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants’ individual
knowledge, when taken collectively, may have revealed that Hacker was at
risk. But to establish § 1983 liability, the law requires proof that “each
individual defendant had a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Phillips,
534 F.3d at 542.
It is not enough for each defendant to hold a different
piece of the puzzle.
- 9 -
that
Plummer’s
propensity
for
violence
against himself, not others.
prior
to
the
assault
was
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., pp. 206-07.
Thus, Plummer’s prison record is insufficient to establish that he
posed a specific risk to Hacker.
See Davis v. Brian, No. 98-1810,
1999 WL 503522, at *5 (6th Cir. July 9, 1999).
cannot
show
deliberate
indifference
merely
Consequently, Hacker
by
arguing
that
the
individuals with whom he shared a cell had violent episodes in their
pasts.
1. Defendant McAnich
There is no evidence that Defendant McAnich was
deliberately
indifferent to a significant risk of harm to Hacker or his medical
needs.
Instead, the evidence demonstrates McAnich properly classified
Hacker on November 15, 2010 by placing him in the protective custody
cell.
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., pp. 41-43, 131.
The LCRJ’s inmate
classification policy requires that the detention officer review the
admission records and any existing facility records concerning the
inmate for background information, including history of violent or
disruptive
attack,
and
behavior,
evidence
Policy, p. 2.
evidence
of
of
mental
homosexuality
or
physical
or
vulnerability
handicap.
Doc.
to
65-2,
The evidence reflects that McAnich complied with this
policy in assigning Hacker to a protective custody cell in light of
his medical conditions.
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., p. 131.
Further,
McAnich could not have been aware Plummer posed a significant risk of
harm when she placed Hacker in cell 119 on November 15, as Plummer was
not moved to cell 119 until around December 6, 2010.
- 10 -
Doc. 71, Hacker
Depo., p. 163.
Likewise, there is no evidence that McAnich ever
became aware of any risk of harm to Hacker between his admission and
the December 11, 2010 assault.
Even if McAnich had not followed the classification policy, at
most this failure would amount to negligence, which does not rise to
deliberate indifference.
See Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio, 743 F.3d
126, 138 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting the dearth of authority holding that
violation
of
an
internal
policy
amounts
to
a
constitutional
violation); Johnson v. Bowlen, No. 99-6066, 2000 WL 1140739, at *2
(6th Cir. Aug. 8, 2000) (finding mere negligence
insufficient to
establish an Eighth Amendment claim).
There
indifferent
is
also
no
in
responding
evidence
to
the
that
McAnich
assault
on
was
December
deliberately
11,
2010.
McAnich testified that she responded as soon as she heard commotion
coming from cell 119, immediately requesting help because she did not
have keys to enter the cell.
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., pp. 81-82.
Although Hacker testified that he saw McAnich or another female guard
watching him from the window rather than intervening,
Doc. 71, Hacker
Depo.,
because
pp.
206-09,
this
testimony
is
irrelevant,
it
is
undisputed that McAnich could not personally intervene because she
lacked the required keys.
Doc. 70, McAnich Depo., pp. 81-82; 101-102.
Thus, the Court concludes that no reasonable jury could find
that Deputy McAnich was deliberately indifferent.
to Defendant McAnich is thus appropriate.
- 11 -
Summary judgment as
2. Defendant Ray
Hacker’s
allegation
that
Deputy
Ray
was
aware
prior
to
the
assault of conflict in cell 119 over use of the restroom does not
demonstrate deliberate indifference because there is no evidence that
Ray knew before the assault that Plummer presented a threat of serious
harm to Hacker.
inmates
is
A jail employee’s knowledge of a conflict between
not
equivalent
to
knowledge
significant risk of harm to another.
that
one
inmate
poses
a
See Varmado-El v. Martin, 52 F.
App’x 764, 766 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]hreats between inmates are common
and do not, under all circumstances, serve to impute actual knowledge
of a substantial risk of harm.” (quoting Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538,
541 (8th Cir. 1996))); Doe v. Bowles, 254 F.3d 617, 621 (6th Cir.
2001)
(finding
that
a
guard’s
knowledge
that
one
prisoner
had
“harassed” another did not constitute awareness of a substantial risk
of harm).
While the evidence establishes that Ray learned of a conflict
between Hacker and Napier related to Hacker’s urinating in a peanut
butter container, there is no evidence Ray had knowledge that Plummer
posed a significant risk of harm to Hacker.
And although Ray learned
through his conversation with Hacker following the jar incident that
Plummer
had
been
blocking
Hacker
from
using
the
restroom,
Hacker
denied being worried about the restroom situation, instead telling Ray
that he was “okay.”
evidence
Hacker
Doc. 69, Ray Depo., pp. 130-31, 134.
told
Ray
he
was
concerned
that
either
There is no
Plummer
or
Napier would attempt to assault him or that he felt at risk for
- 12 -
significant harm by Plummer.
In fact, Hacker’s deposition testimony
makes clear that it was not until December 10, 2010, that Hacker first
became concerned that Plummer planned to assault him.
Depo., p. 180.
Doc. 71, Hacker
Thus, Ray’s knowledge of minor inmate conflicts does
not establish that he was aware prior to the assault that Plummer
posed a risk to Hacker.
Hacker’s allegation that Ray failed to respond reasonably to the
assault also is not supported by the evidence.
Ray testified that he
responded “within seconds” to the noise he heard in cell 119, and
believes he was the first one at the door.
159.
Doc. 69, Ray Depo., p.
He was followed shortly thereafter by Shackelford, Glover, and
Godbey.
Id. at 160.
Jail staff proceeded to address the situation,
resulting in Hacker’s arrival at Fort Logan hospital within an hour of
the assault.
Doc. 71, Hacker Depo., p. 225; Doc. 70, McAnich Depo.
pp. 57-58; 238-39.
Thus, the Court concludes as a matter of law that
Ray was not deliberately indifferent either to the risk that Plummer
would assault Hacker or to Hacker’s medical needs after the assault.
3. Defendant Price
Hacker also fails to raise a material dispute of fact regarding
Deputy Price’s knowledge of Plummer’s perceived threat toward Hacker
the day before the assault.
Hacker alleges that he became fearful
that Plummer would hurt him after Plummer insinuated on the afternoon
of
December
10,
2010,
that
he
without facing criminal liability.
could
commit
an
assault
in
prison
Doc. 71, Hacker Depo., pp. 179-80.
Hacker claims that he told Deputy Price later that evening about the
- 13 -
exchange with Plummer and that he felt he was in “grave danger” and
should be moved to a safer environment.
Id. at 150, 176.
Hacker
claims Price callously rejected the request and suggested that Hacker
would just have to get what was coming to him.
Id. at 150.
But Hacker’s version of these events is contradicted by Price’s
timesheet,
which
reveals
that
Price
did
not
work
the
evening
of
December 10, 2010, and thus could not have had this conversation with
Hacker at that time.3
Doc. 62-3, Timesheet.
Cases in our Circuit are
clear that a party cannot create a triable issue of fact simply by
telling a story different than the one told by unambiguous evidence in
the record.
parties
tell
See, e.g., Shreve, 743 F.3d at 132 (“‘[W]hen opposing
two
different
stories,
one
of
which
is
blatantly
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe
it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of
ruling on a motion for summary judgment’” (quoting Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007))).
Because both Price’s testimony and his
timesheet show that he was not working at the time of Hacker’s alleged
report, summary judgment for Price is appropriate.
4. Defendant Gooch - Supervisor Liability
To hold a supervisor liable for a subordinate’s conduct under
§ 1983,
Hacker must prove “‘that the [supervising officer] did more
than play a passive role in the alleged violation or showed mere tacit
3
Deputy Price’s timesheet for the week of December 5, 2010 demonstrates he
did not work the night shift on December 10, 2010 or December 11, 2010.
Rather, the last shift Price worked before the assault on Hacker began on
December 9, 2010 and ended at 7:00 a.m. on December 10, 2010.
Doc 62-3,
Timesheet; Doc. 67, Price Depo., pp. 15, 87.
- 14 -
approval of the goings on.’”
Vaughn v. City of Lebanon, 18 F. App’x
252, 270 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041,
1048 (6th Cir. 1999)).
“Liability under this theory must be based on
more than a mere right to control employees and cannot be based upon
simple negligence.”
Hacker
Id. (citing Bass, 167 F.3d at 1048).
argues
Gooch
failed
to
review
Hacker’s
classification
status on a daily basis, which, if done, would have resulted in Hacker
being
moved
from
cell
119,
thereby
preventing
the
assault.
The
classification policy states that the jailer or his designee must
review all classification assignments daily.
Doc. 65-2, Policy, p. 2.
Gooch testified that he “pretty much” reviews the roster and housing
assignments every day, and that the shift commander and chief deputy
are supposed to review all the inmates who have come in.
Gooch Depo. at 146.
Doc. 68-1,
To the extent Hacker argues that other jail
officials failed to properly classify Hacker, the Sixth Circuit has
held that a supervisor cannot be held vicariously liable under § 1983
for his employees’ actions.
See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300
(6th Cir. 1999).
There is no other evidence with which to hold Gooch liable.
Gooch was not present the night of Hacker’s assault, so he was not
involved in the staff’s response to the assault.
Depo.,
p.
50.
Gooch
did
not
make
the
Doc. 68-1, Gooch
preliminary
classification
decision to place Hacker in cell 119, and he had no contact with
Hacker during Hacker’s incarceration.
Further, there is no evidence
that Gooch had any reason to suspect before the assault that Plummer
- 15 -
posed a threat to Hacker.
reason
for
Gooch
to
have
In fact, Hacker admitted that there was no
known
about
the
risk,
because
he
never
reported his concerns about Plummer to Gooch or submitted a grievance
on the issue.
Doc. 71, Hacker Depo., pp. 153, 188, 200-01.
Further,
none of Gooch’s employees ever told him that Hacker had asked to be
moved from cell 119 out of fear for his safety.
Doc. 68, Gooch Depo.,
pp. 75, 224-28.
For these reasons, summary judgment for Gooch is appropriate.
5. Municipal Liability
Although “the inadequacy of police training may serve as the
basis for § 1983 liability . . . where the failure to train amounts to
deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact,” there is no evidence to support this theory of
liability in this case.
388
(1989).
Gooch
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
testified
that
LCRJ
deputies
receive
at
least
sixteen hours of annual training approved by the Kentucky Department
of Corrections.
Doc. 68, Gooch Depo., p. 19; Doc. 69, Ray Depo. pp.
31-34; Doc. 67, Price Depo., p. 12.
that
LCRJ
ignored.
classification
policies
Likewise, there is no evidence
and
procedures
were
routinely
See Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 935, 947 (6th Cir.
2010) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the County where a jury
could not reasonably infer from five incidents that the County had a
widespread,
permanent,
and
well-settled
requests).
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custom
of
ignoring
inmate
Because
Hacker
has
failed
to
show
that
any
Lincoln
County
employee violated his constitutional rights, his § 1983 claim against
Lincoln County fails as a matter of law.
See City of L.A. v. Heller,
475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
Accordingly,
for
the
reasons
addressed
above,
Defendants
are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s federal claims.
C. State Law Claims
Pursuant
to
28
U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3),
the
Court
declines
to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state
law claims.
These claims will be dismissed without prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
Therefore,
having
heard
the
parties
and
the
Court
being
sufficiently advised,
IT IS ORDERED that:
(1)
The joint motion for summary judgment by defendants Lincoln
County Detention Center, Jailer William Gooch, Deputy
Stephanie McAnich, Deputy Dennis Ray, and Deputy Rodney (Doc.
62) be, and is hereby, GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART AS
MOOT, and all federal claims be, and are hereby, DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE;
(2)
The court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3), and those claims be, and are hereby DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and
(3)
A separate judgment shall enter concurrently herewith.
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This 4th day of November, 2014.
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